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VOL. XII.



183933.

17.9.23.

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES,"
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON.

1917.



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CONTENTS OF VOL. XII.

	PAGE
CHAPTER CLXXXI.	
THE SALONIKA EXPEDITION: OCTOBER, 1915, TO NOVEMBER, 1916	1
CHAPTER CLXXXII.	
THE WORK OF THE FRENCH NAVY	41
CHAPTER CLXXXIII.	
THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA (II.)	77
CHAPTER CLXXXIV.	
THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (III.) THE LAST PHASE	117
CHAPTER CLXXXV.	
VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR (II.)	153
CHAPTER CLXXXVI.	
THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL ENGINEERING	193
CHAPTER CLXXXVII.	
PRISONERS OF WAR (II.)	229
CHAPTER CLXXXVIII.	
THE WAR GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH PEOPLES	269
CHAPTER CLXXXIX.	
THE WORK OF THE ITALIAN NAVY	305
CHAPTER CXC.	
THE "HINDENBURG" RETREAT IN THE WEST: JANUARY TO APRIL, 1917	345
CHAPTER CXCI.	
THE SIEGE AND FALL OF KUT: JANUARY TO APRIL, 1916	381
CHAPTER CXCII.	
THE BRITISH PEOPLE AT WAR	417
CHAPTER CXCIII.	
BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE: THE DEPORTATIONS	453

CHAPTER CLXXXI.

THE SALONIKA EXPEDITION: OCTOBER, 1915—NOVEMBER, 1916.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SALONIKA—ORIGIN OF THE EXPEDITION—ALLIED COMMAND—THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SERBIA—THE TENTH DIVISION—RETIREMENT INTO GREEK TERRITORY—THE GREEK CRISIS—SALONIKA AND ITS HISTORY—THE FRANCO-BRITISH DEFENSIVE LINES—GENERAL SARRAIL—THE WINTER OF 1915-16—LIFE AT SALONIKA—CAUSES OF DELAY—ITALIANS IN ALBANIA—GREEK SURRENDER OF FORT RUPEL—INTRIGUES IN GREECE AND ALLIED ACTION—OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER—BULGARIAN ADVANCE—SURRENDER OF GREEK ARMY CORPS TO GERMANY—ANALYSIS OF AUTUMN OPERATIONS—FALL OF MONASTIR—ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE.

OF the many campaigns into which the World War developed the Salonika expedition was one of the most hotly discussed. To many it seemed the key which would unlock Central Europe to the liberating armies of the Entente Powers. To others the undertaking appeared a wasteful and risky diversion of forces from other fronts where alone the enemy armies could be defeated in mass. Accusations, on the one side, of allowing politics to influence strategy, on the other of neglecting to strike the enemy at his most vulnerable and vital point, were freely bandied about. There was no subject on which expert opinion was so divided and so varied. The issues at stake both for the present and the future were so tremendous that feeling could not but run high, and difference of opinion as to strategical means was often connected with, and always attributed to, different views as to war aims.

Into this contentious field it is not here proposed to enter. We are concerned in this chapter with the Salonika campaign itself—a campaign unimportant or all-important, it may be, in the general war plan, but of a very distinct and interesting character from the mere point of view of operations.

It was inevitable that Salonika should in one way or another be involved in the World War. It was one of the four great ports of Europe, the status of which was closely bound up with international politics. Antwerp, Trieste, Salonika, Constantinople were outlets to the sea in which various nations justly or unjustly claimed to possess a vital interest. But more precisely, Salonika was a point on which Germanic, if not German, eyes had long been greedily fixed. While Germany looked to Constantinople and beyond it to Baghdad and to Cairo, her faithful satellite and accomplice, Austria-Hungary, had dreamed for years of at least controlling the side line down the Vardar valley to the Ægean. The signal overthrow of the Turk by the Christian kingdoms of the Balkans in 1912 and the subsequent defeat and punishment of Austria's secret ally, Bulgaria, left Salonika in the hands of Greece and the trade through the Macedonian hinterland in the hands of Greece's ally, Serbia. Serbia secured free access for commercial purposes to the Ægean and for the first time was able to plan an independent economic existence released from the jealous oppression of Vienna and Budapest. The outrageous attack on Serbia, by which the Austro-Hun-

garian Government provoked the European War, was no arbitrary act of anger or offended prestige, but a deliberate attempt to overthrow the Balkan settlement of 1913 and to reduce Serbia, the guardian of the way to the East, once more to vassalage. Once Serbia was involved in war, Salonika was doubly affected. It became an objective on which Austria-Hungary directed impatient, and Bulgaria more wary, glances. It became, too, an important port of transit through which stores and, later, guns could pass to distressed Serbia from her Allies. Lastly, from the beginning of the Dardanelles expedition it became an important commercial, and soon an important political, centre.

In an earlier chapter* the Austro-German invasion of Serbia, combined with Bulgaria's treacherous attack, has been described. Entente diplomacy had been lulled into a false

couraged from using her sole effective weapon—instant action. The Entente diplomatists, indeed, believed that if the worst came to the worst there was at least Greece to count on, for not only the Greek Premier, M. Venizelos, but even his political opponents had acknowledged implicitly, if not explicitly, that a Bulgarian attack on Serbia would involve a *casus foederis* for Greek intervention. True to this understanding, M. Venizelos at once asked his King for and proclaimed a general mobilization immediately following on the Bulgarian (announced September 23, 1915). Two days before, the Greek Premier had approached the French and British Ministers in Athens for an assurance that if Greece, in conformity with her obligations to Serbia, were drawn into war with Bulgaria these Powers would supply the 150,000 troops Serbia was bound by treaty to place on the Bulgarian frontier to cooperate with her



[Official photograph.]

GENERALS SARRAIL AND MAHON (the two central figures) EXAMINING A MACHINE GUN.

optimism till it was too late. Not only was there no adequate number of troops available in the Eastern Mediterranean to support Serbia and deter Bulgaria by threats when promises failed. Serbia herself was dis-

ally. Assured of this support, M. Venizelos proceeded to prepare Greece for her part in the inevitable struggle.

To the Entente Powers M. Venizelos's inquiry was practically tantamount—though technically it was not equivalent—to a formal invitation.

* Vol. VII., pp. 349-388.

On October 3 Anglo-French contingents began to disembark at Salonika, without waiting for Bulgaria's attack on Serbia, which would, to M. Venizelos have meant Greece's instant participation in the war. His country being still neutral. M. Venizelos found himself obliged by Article XCIX. of the Greek Constitution to utter a formal protest and thereby made his constitutional standpoint unexceptionable. At the same time, both to his mind and that of the overwhelming majority of the Greek people the British and French came as allies of Greece's allies and therefore as friends of Greece. The Greek General, Moskhopoulos, commanding the III. (Salonika) Army Corps was ordered to show, and did show, every courtesy to his country's guests, and there seemed no likelihood of any disagreement.

Unfortunately, King Constantine on October 5 discovered himself to be in disagreement with his Prime Minister as to the scope of the Greek mobilization. M. Venizelos accordingly was forced to resign. The new Premier, M. Zaïmis, hastened, indeed, to promise "the most entirely and sincerely benevolent neutrality" to the Entente Powers and no real objection was made to the Salonika landing, but circumstances had radically changed and the Anglo-French forces found themselves not a minute fraction, but the whole, of the relieving army that was to save Serbia.

Their numbers were very small. By October 9 there were some 15,000 French and 5,000 British troops landed. Two days later General Sarrail, who had been appointed "Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of the Orient," disembarked and took over the command. General Sarrail had played an active part at the beginning of the war in France, especially during the Battle of the Marne, and was looked on as an extremely energetic and resourceful leader.* In command of the small British force was General Sir Bryan Mahon, who had with him the 10th Division, which had taken part in the Suvla Bay fighting in Gallipoli. The Division was composed mainly of Irish regiments. It was, unfortunately, not up to its full strength, as the losses it had suffered had not yet been made good. It numbered some 13,000 men all told. French forces, however,

* During the retreat to the Marne, General Sarrail was in command of the Third French Army (round Verdun), and his able handling of it contributed to the success of General Joffre's strategy. Later on he successfully resisted the German Crown Prince's offensive on the Meuse.


arrived in greater numbers. Before the end of October three French divisions had reached Salonika. The total numbers of the Anglo-French armies for the opening stages of the campaign were between 30,000 and 40,000.



M. ZAÏMIS,
Greek Premier, October, 1915, June, 1916, and
May, 1917.

It was obvious that whatever was to be done must be done quickly. On October 11 Bulgarian troops under General Boyadzhiev crossed the frontier at various points, and the Serbians, who were putting up a fierce resistance to the Austro-German advance from the north, found themselves taken in flank by an overwhelmingly superior force. One of the first objects of the Bulgarian command was to cut Serbia's communications with Salonika. On October 17 Egri-Palanka and on October 21 Vranje were occupied. On the same day the Serbian Government and the Allied Legations left Nish for Kraljevo; Nish was already isolated.

The objective on both the Bulgarian and the Anglo-French sides was Skoplje (formerly better known under its old Turkish name of Uskub). Skoplje is not only the chief town of the Vardar valley, but is situated at the junction of the Nish-Salonika railway with the branch line to Mitrovitza, on which the Serbian Second Army was retiring. Only by reaching Skoplje could General Sarrail's army attain its object of linking up with the main Serbian forces. The Bulgarians succeeded, for their task was easier. On October 20 General Todoroff took Veles



GENERAL MAP OF THE BALKAN WAR AREA.



IN THE VARDAR VALLEY.
Between Egri-Palanka and Kumanovo.

(Kuprulu), and two days later his troops entered Skoplje. The outnumbered Serbian army on the lower Vardar sector was forced to fall back towards the Babuna Pass, which commanded the entrance to the Pelagonian Plain with its towns of Prilep and Monastir. The one hope was that the Serbians and Anglo-French, operating respectively down the Babuna and up the Vardar valleys, might effect a junction at Veles, the place where the Babuna River flows into the Vardar. Once Veles were won, Skoplje was threatened, for the flat country east of the Vardar in this part, known as the Ovche Polje, would have allowed advancing Allied forces to cut Bulgarian communications between Skoplje and Kumanovo. Sarrail, therefore, rushed his troops up in the direction of Veles.

The advanced sector Krivolak-Veles was assigned to the three French divisions under Sarrail's command, the rest of the Vardar valley from Krivolak to Salonika being guarded by Sir B. Mahon's small force. On October 27 two battalions of the Tenth Division were moved up from Salonika and took over the front Kosturino-Lake Doiran. On the same

day the French occupied Krivolak and began to push upstream to Gradsko. There was, however, little hope of reaching Veles. Failing that, there was no way of establishing contact with the Southern Serbian army save through the difficult country between Krivolak and Prilep. First of all, it was necessary to secure the position at Krivolak itself, which the Bulgarians continued to bombard from the east of the river. On October 30 two Bulgarian battalions attacked the bridgehead on the left bank, but were easily beaten off. The French occupied the heights of Kara Hojjali across the river and held them against repeated attacks of the enemy. Meanwhile, on November 3, French detachments seized the bridges over the Tchernia (or "Black") River, of which the most important was one at Vozarci close by the junction of the Rajec with the Tchernia. On November 10 they crossed the latter river and occupied the villages of Krushevac and Crkva, repulsing on the following four days "violent Bulgarian attacks," in which the enemy was calculated to have lost about 4,000 men. Thence they pushed forward along the left bank

and occupied the lower slopes of Mt. Arhangel. The Bulgarians hurriedly reinforced their troops there, sending from Veles, in addition to the 49th Reserve Regiment and the 3rd Macedonian Regiment, the 53rd Regiment. Meanwhile the Serbians had been able, with the help of some Anglo-French reinforcements, to repulse a Bulgarian attack on Izvor ("the Spring") at the entrance of the Babuna Pass. But this success could not long be maintained in face of heavy odds. On November 16 the Serbians fell back on Prilep and the Babuna Pass was in the hands of the enemy. The French on the Tcherma and Rajce were at once exposed to fresh attacks. For a fortnight, however, they maintained their positions and even continued a local offensive. But by November 25 the retreat of the Serbian armies rendered further operations on the Tcherma useless as well as dangerous. The French forces were withdrawn to the right bank and grouped round Kavadar. Thence they retired, in conformity with a similar movement on the part of the forces at Krivolak, through the Demir Kapu. This defile stretches for some twelve miles. The

greater part of it is fairly open and even in parts cultivated. But the northern entrance to it for some 500 yards or more presents a grim appearance which has earned for it its name ("Demir Kapu" is Turkish for "Iron Gate"). Here on December 5 there was some fighting, which was renewed on the following days. By December 9, however, the French had succeeded in retiring safely through the gorge and were in position on the river Boyernia, with the British Tenth Division on their right.

Whilst two battalions of this division had taken over the Kosturino-Lake Doiran front on October 27, the remainder of the division moved up from Salonika on November 12 and occupied the line east of Kosturino. Reinforcements were being sent from England and France and already beginning to disembark at Salonika, but there were many difficulties in the way of their immediate utilization. Communications with Doiran were dependent on roads which were little better than tracks, and transport of guns and stores proved a serious problem. General Sir Charles Monro, who since October 28 had been in command of the whole British Mediter-



GREEK TROOPS LANDING IN SALONIKA.

[Official photograph.]



[Official photograph.]

SERBIAN NATIVE WAGONS. CROSSING THE TCHERNA.

ranean Expeditionary Force, saw, however, the necessity for holding this line till the new divisions were disembarked at Salonika. He urged on General Sarrail the need for an immediate withdrawal of the French divisions from Serbia. Otherwise there was grave danger that the Germans and Bulgarians, who were concentrating in the Strumnitza valley, would overcome the resistance of the small British force and cut off the retreat of General Sarrail's army. On December 6 the Bulgarians attacked them in great strength, about four times their numbers. Fierce fighting continued for three days. The Tenth Division showed all the courage and toughness which was to be expected from the battalions composing it—Munster, Dublin and Inniskilling Fusiliers, and Connaught Rangers. There were "very heavy odds" against them, but they put up a gallant fight as they fell back on the positions on the right of the Boyenia line. Their casualties were about 1,500 and eight guns had to be left behind, but heavy losses were inflicted on the advancing enemy. In the opinion of General Sir Charles Monro the troops, who, it must be remembered, "had suffered considerably from the cold in the Highlands of Macedonia," "in the circumstances conducted themselves very creditably in being able to extricate themselves from a difficult position with no great losses."

Mr. John Redmond had every justification for pointing with pride to the gallant behaviour of this Irish division. In the words of the War Office *communiqué*, "it was largely due to the gallantry of the troops, and especially of the Munster Fusiliers, the Dublin Fusiliers, and the Connaught Rangers, that the withdrawal was successfully accomplished."

It was impossible, however, to rest on the Boyemia line. The small Franco-British forces would have been too far away from their base at Salonika, and the Bulgarians from Monastir, which they entered on December 2, might have taken them in the flank and rear. Already the question of retiring into Greek territory had been discussed. Having acquiesced in the Allies' disembarkation at Salonika the Greek Government could not easily object to their retiring on the town, but they were alarmed at the prospect of a Germano-Bulgarian invasion in pursuit of the retiring armies. The number of Greek troops concentrated round Salonika caused natural, if not altogether justified, misgivings to the British and French authorities. It was necessary to come to a clear understanding that no attempt would be made to disarm or hamper the retiring Franco-British and Serbian troops. On November 23 the French and British Governments presented

the Skouloudis Government* with a Note stating that "in view of the attitude adopted by the Hellenic Government towards certain questions affecting the security of the Allied troops and their freedom of action (two privileges to which they are entitled in the circumstances in which they landed in Greek territory), the Allied Powers have deemed it necessary to take certain measures, the effect of which is to suspend the economic and commercial facilities which Greece has hitherto enjoyed at their hands." This partial blockade aroused some resentment in Greece, for King Constantine and his Government disavowed any intention of attacking or interning the Anglo-French troops. Their attitude was,

audiences of the King, but only vague promises that Greece would never attack the Allied troops were forthcoming, and as the Allies persisted in their demands a continuation of the blockade was necessary. It was not till December 12 that the Greek Government accepted in full the demands of the Allied Powers, and agreed to withdraw from Salonika all Greek troops except one division. This acquiescence was not unconnected with the decision reached at the Paris Conference of the British and French Governments, at which it was determined that though the original object of the disembarkation, to save Serbia, had failed, Salonika should none the less be held as a base for future operations.




A BRITISH LOOK-OUT IN THE BALKANS.

however, less clear as regards our Serbian Allies, and they much disliked the idea of withdrawing Greek troops from the zone of the Allied armies or conceding to the latter full use of the railways and harbours. They expressed their willingness to secure for the Allied armies a secure "corridor" of retirement on Salonika with a view to their embarkation there, and pretended to fear that if Salonika were to be used as a base for offensive operations Greek territory would be involved in the war. M. Denys Cochin and Lord Kitchener were sent out to Greece by their respective Governments, and successively had

* The succession of Greek Premiers after the forced resignation of M. Venizelos was as follows: October 7, 1915, M. Zaimis; November 7, M. Skouloudis; June 22, 1916, M. Zaimis; September 16, M. Kalogeropoulos; October 9, M. Lambros; May 3, 1917, M. Zaimis.

By December 12 the whole Franco-British force had retired into Greek territory. Temporary lines were at once prepared in expectation of an immediate enemy attack. They ran from Karasulü ("Blackwater") on the Vardar railway to Kilindir on the Salonika-Dedeagatch line. A branch railway connected Karasulü and Kilindir. It was for the moment the best possible line for awaiting the enemy. But the attack never came. The failure of the Central Powers to seize their opportunity of disposing for ever of the Allied menace and occupying Salonika has been variously explained. The Skouloudis Government always claimed that it was its benevolent attitude to the Entente and firm tone towards the Bulgars that prevented the attack. Certain it is that even anti-Venizelist Greeks at that time viewed



M. SKOULOUDIS,

Greek Premier November, 1915, to June, 1916.

with indignation the prospect of the hereditary enemy treading the sacred soil of Hellas, and articles in this strain appeared in popular anti-Venizelist papers at Athens. Other papers of the same party spoke of allowing an Austro-German, though not a Bulgarian, invasion. But this was out of the question. The Anglo-French already disposed of eight divisions—the three French which had been in Serbia, and five British (the 10th, 22nd, 26th, 27th and 28th). There were not for the moment available adequate Austro-German forces to ensure a successful offensive. The use of Bulgarian troops was necessary. But would Greek public opinion endure it? Apparently the Germans argued that it was unwise. The Sofia correspondent of the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant* frankly admitted on January 4, 1916, that the Bulgarian General Staff—and particularly General Boyadzhieff—had been in favour of an immediate pursuit of the retreating Allied forces. This course was strongly advocated by the Bulgarian Government Press. On the other hand, the Bulgarian Opposition parties and Press opposed such an extension of hostilities. At this time the formerly Ententophil parties in Bulgaria still kept up the convenient fiction that Bulgaria was carrying on a purely national war for the "liberation" of Macedonia. More important than these objections was the veto of the German authorities. The German Government hoped that King Constantine's policy of neutrality had definitely solved all possibility of trouble from Greece. As for the Anglo-French expedition, it was believed and hoped in Berlin—and the hope found vent in an

enormous number of propagandist messages to the Germanophil Press of all countries—that the British and French Governments would not indefinitely maintain their contingents in Salonika, but would remove them elsewhere to meet a much-vaunted invasion of Egypt or the already rumoured offensive on the Western front which eventually took the form of the Battle of Verdun. Besides, the question as to whether the German or Bulgarian command should control the invading armies was not settled, and the ultimate destiny of Salonika



WINTER IN THE TRENCHES.

would lead to wrangling between the Allies, especially Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Whatever the reason, the retiring Anglo-French army was allowed to take up its new positions in Greek territory undisturbed.

The war in Macedonia thus entered on a new phase. The Serbian campaign had been converted into the Salonika expedition. The Entente Powers entered on a defensive which might or might not be indefinitely prolonged. The town of Salonika itself became the centre of interest.



SALONIKA.

Salonika lies at the bottom of a basin formed by mountains of various heights. On the S.W. the mighty massif of Olympus towers up over 10,000 feet, claiming for itself first place in the geography, as well as the legends, of the country. Forty miles west of Salonika the Vermion (or Neagush) ridge, running due north and south and culminating in the Kara Tash (or "Black Rock") of 6,234 feet, just fails to link the Olympus group with the almost continuous line of mountains which serves as Greece's actual frontier. This outer circle, with only small gaps, runs from the Vistritsa (Haliakmon) N.W. under the name of Nerechka (or Peristeri) into Serbia, then N.E. as the Nidje Planina (the highest point of which, Kaymakchalan, is 8,284 feet) to the Vardar, and thence passes east as the Belasitsa and Pirin ranges along the frontier whence it links up to the north with the now Bulgarian Rhodope and towards the Ægean throws off the lower branches of the Krusha and Beshik Dagh and the rocky three-pronged peninsula of Chalcidice. On the extreme east and west respectively lie the "Grey Mountains" (Boz Dagh), which traverse the Drama district, and the Pindus group, which stretches right down to Central Greece from Albania. Salonika is properly the centre of this geographical district. But to the south the chain is not com-

plete. Chalcidice and Olympus are not joined as they must have been thousands of years ago, for the sea has forced its way to the north and formed a nearly circular bay at the head of the Thermaic Gulf. The double circle of mountains which encompass the rich Bottiaian plain is broken by the Vistritsa (Haliakmon) to the S.W., the Bistritsa (Lydias) to the west, the Vardar (Axios) to the north, and on the east between the inner and outer circle of hills the Struma (Strymon) flows down to the sea through the rift in the Belasitsa-Pirin chain where the strong Fort Rupel was built. There are lakes in great numbers in the various valleys, but the only ones of importance are Lake Tachinos, on the east, through which the Struma flows to the sea, and Lakes Langhaza and Beshik (Gk. Volvi), which almost isolate the Chalcidice mountains from the east Macedonian system. Communication with the outer world is first and foremost by sea. Salonika is rather Mediterranean than Balkan, both in climate and character. To the north the Vardar Valley, with its single line of railway, offered Serbia her one link with the Ægean. The old Roman *Via Egnatia*, on its way west from Byzantium to Dyrrachium (Durazzo), passed through Philip of Macedon's capital, Pella (now Yanitsa), and the still older capital Aigai (Vodena), and then turned north to

Florina, Monastir, Okhrida, and Elbasan. This is still the only easy exit to the N.W. and the railway from Salonika, after making a detour south to Veria (the Berea of "The Acts of the Apostles") joins it near Vodena and runs close to it all the way to Monastir. With the east Salonika is linked by a circuitous railway which, in order to serve the more fertile parts of East Macedonia, goes due north to Doiran, then east to Demirhissar, and thence through Seres and Drama finds its way to Constantinople. With Greece the Porte had always shunned railway connexion, but the result of the Balkan wars was to offer Greece the opportunity of linking up her railway system with Salonika. The Venizelos Government had begun the task which was completed after his second resignation, and the new "union" line from the Thessalian frontier to Salonika was opened on May 21, 1916.

Salonika itself has had a famous past.* The old Greek city of Therme (probably so called from its "warm" springs) played a subordinate part in Athenian history before passing under Macedonian rule. In 315 B.C. the Macedonian pretender, Kassandros, refounded it and gave it the name of Thessalonike, after his wife, the daughter of Philip II. of Macedon. In Roman Imperial times it became an important town on the high road from the old to the new capital. It was the scene in 390 of the massacre, in penance for which St. Ambrose forced Theodosius the Great to "humble in the dust the pride of the diadem." It saw the perfection of Byzantine ecclesiastical architecture, to which some of its churches to-day still bear witness. Menaced by more than one Bulgarian Tsar, Salonika sent out the missionary saints, Cyril and Methodius, who won the Slav peoples for Christendom. Sacked by the Saracens in the ninth, and the Normans in the twelfth, century, Salonika became a tributary kingdom under the Latin Emperors of Constantinople. Recovered by the Greek Emperors, it was seized and lost in turn by three Ottoman Sultans and at last put itself under the protection of the Venetians. Finally, in 1430, Murad II. besieged, took, and sacked it. It was a fearful blow to the Greek Orthodox world. One of the most famous of mediæval Greek dirges complains:

They have taken the city, they have taken it, they have taken Saloniki;

* An admirable account of the kaleidoscopic fortunes of Salonika is to be found in "La Ville Convoitée," by P. Risal (Paris, 1917).

They have taken Ayia Sophia too, the great monastery.

When Our Lady heard it the ikons wept tears.
Hush, Sovereign Lady! weep not, dry thy tears;
Once more after long time, after long years thou shalt
regain thine own.

The Greeks had to wait 483 years before the Theotokos "regained her own." But the Salonika which their armies entered in 1913 was racially a very different city from the Salonika of 1430. The Turks had opened it to Jewish immigration, and the Sephardim, fleeing from the intolerance of the most Catholic kings of Spain, had succeeded in making it



GENERAL SIR C. C. MONRO, G.C.M.G.,
Commanded the British Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force, October, 1915.

in the course of four centuries into a half-Jewish city. Of its 150,000 inhabitants some 70,000 were Jews, and Spanish was the dominant language there. From Salonika trade and the Spanish language found their way to other towns of Macedonia and Thrace. Of recent years not only trade emanated thence. Salonika was the birthplace of the Young Turk Committee which overthrew the tyrant Abdul Hamid, only to re-establish an equally iniquitous rule in his place. The question of Salonika's lot was not resolved in the preliminary Græco-Bulgarian treaty of 1913. Accordingly Greek and Bulgarian armies raced for it. The victory was to the former. King George's armies entered as victors on November



SALONIKA JEWS TAKING THEIR SABBATH-DAY EXERCISE.

9, but allowed a small contingent of Bulgarian troops to garrison a part of the town till the outbreak of the second war. In the same city, on March 18, the King fell a victim to an assassin's revolver shot. His son's troops, fifteen weeks later, in alliance with Serbia, destroyed Bulgaria's hopes and expelled their rivals from the city.

Such was the varied history of the city which was receiving as its guests a more varied army than had ever yet entered it. The first care of the Allied Generals was to improvise defences against an immediate attack.

It was necessary to prepare the shortest line possible, for at this time the total forces hardly reached 200,000 men. But Salonika was a difficult place to defend in that it required almost a complete circle of defence round it to safeguard it. The problem was rendered somewhat easier by the fact that considerable Greek forces were guarding the frontier on the west at Florina and to the N.E. at Seres and the strongly fortified post of Rupel, which held the gateway of the Struma into East Macedonia. It was impossible with the small forces at their disposal for General Sarrail and Sir Bryan Mahon to hold either the outer or even the inner circle of mountains that surround Salonika. On the west the line of the Vardar was chosen. Towards its mouth the river is

marshy and easily defensible and, therefore, not many men were required. Leaving the Vardar near Topshin the line ran east for the Langhaza and Beshik Lakes, finally reaching the Gulf of Orfano at Stavros ("the Cross"). Altogether the distance was some 50 miles. Naturally and artificially the line offered good prospect of security, and General Castelnau, who visited Salonika on December 20, on a tour of inspection, expressed himself as quite confident about the Allies' power to hold it. Comparisons with Wellington's famous lines of Torres Vedras overlooked certain palpable differences between the relative accessibility and defensibility of the two positions. But at least there was no question of the Allies being caught in a "trap" in Salonika itself or "driven into the sea" as the enemy was fond of boasting. The Chalcidice peninsula offered adequate, if uncomfortable, ground for retirement if hard pushed, and an army which was in touch with the sea on both wings and could rely on powerful assistance from battleships, if necessary, need feel in no danger of being trapped. No precaution was neglected to make the position as strong as possible. Deep, carefully sandbagged trenches were dug in the most favourable positions for defence with machine-guns so as to command any advance and yet be very difficult for the enemy to locate. The official Press correspon-

lent described the whole system of defence, with pardonable pride, as worthy to "serve as a model for exhibition purposes."

Precautions of another sort were also necessary. Following on a raid of German airmen, who threw bombs on the field in which, curiously enough, Prince Andrew of Greece was reviewing some Greek troops, General Sarrail proceeded to arrest the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish Consuls and their families and to take possession of the Consulates.

Against both air raid and Sarrail's reprisal the Greek Government formulated an energetic protest. The Allies, however, were able to show good grounds for their action, for it was discovered that the Consulates had served as centres not only for enemy intrigues and propaganda, but actually as storehouses of arms. The offending Consuls, further, were treated with extreme leniency. They were only detained a short time and then transported to Toulon, whence they returned to their respective countries. The German offence against Greek neutrality was to prove the first of many. On January 7 a Taube dropped bombs on the

Allied camp without result. It was the harbinger of Zeppelin raids later.

With General Moskhopoulos, the Commander of the IIIrd (Salonika) Greek Army Corps, General Sarrail was on the best of terms. On New Year's Day they exchanged cordial greetings. On the Greek New Year's Day again (thirteen days later) the population made a public demonstration in favour of the Allies. But the situation was too critical to be allowed to depend merely on Greek good will. It was impossible to say how far the Greek forces in East Macedonia could be relied on—events proved they could not—to ward off an enemy invasion. A vital point was the great iron railway bridge at Demirhissar ("Iron Castle") where the line from Doiran to Seres crosses the Struma not far south of Fort Rupel, the key of the Struma entrance into Greece. On January 12, at the order of the Allied command, this bridge and a smaller one at Kilindir (near Doiran) were blown up and the probability of an attack from this side therefore lessened. The Greek Government uttered the usual protest, but there was little



THE RAILWAY VIADUCT OVER THE STRUMA AT DEMIRHISSAR,
Destroyed by the Allies in order to interrupt the communications between Bulgarian and
Turkish forces.

reason to suppose it wished to do more than save its face.

On January 16, 1916, General Sarrail was invested with the supreme command of the Allied armies in Macedonia. (Till then the British contingent, under General Sir Bryan Mahon, had been independent of General Sarrail and subject only to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force—*i.e.*, General Sir C. C. Monro, till January 9, when he was succeeded by Sir Archibald Murray). On January 28 French troops suddenly appeared before the fortress of Kara Burun, the "black headland" which from the S.E. commands the entrance to the inner Gulf of Salonika. Fortunately, the Greek officer in charge gave up the fort without any "incident" occurring. Greek feeling was, however, somewhat excited by the French General's summary methods, and the chief anti-Venizelist newspaper of Athens, *Embros*, accused the French troops of "taking Kara Burun at the point of the bayonet."

These two precautionary measures concluded the preparations for the defence of the Salonika lines. For some three months or more there was to be little or nothing of interest in the

way of military operations. On February 3 advanced French frontier posts had a slight skirmish with Bulgarians near Lake Doiran. On February 10 General Sarrail took the precaution of occupying the right bank of the Vardar to a depth of six miles to guard against the danger of a surprise attack from the Monastir direction. Along the frontier the Greek and Bulgarian Governments mapped out a neutral zone to obviate incidents such as had occurred in December at Koritsa. The zone was, however, violated by Bulgarian raiders on March 1 at Machukovo and on March 18 at Vetren, and French troops had to undertake the task, on March 21, of expelling the invaders. On March 27 the French frontier guards were joined by British cavalry. These had a considerable amount of patrolling work to do, in the course of which chance encounters with roving Uhlans provided excitement akin to that of the old contests of the English and Scottish Border. As spring came on these skirmishes became more frequent and were supplemented by artillery duels along the frontier line. On April 18 the enemy carried out a more ambitious raid, destroying ten bridges on the railway between Doiran and Akinjali. But until the end of



LAYING A RAILWAY THROUGH SALONIKA.

[Official photograph.]



BRITISH TRENCH ON A SHRUB-COVERED HILL.

[Official photograph.]

April there had been little serious fighting except in the air.

The first four months of 1916, therefore, were a time of preparation. Reinforcements—British, French, and French Colonials—kept arriving in a steady stream. By the end of the winter there were some 300,000 men on the Salonika front. Preparations were being made for the arrival of the heroic survivors of the Serbian armies who had been reorganized and re-equipped in Corfu, perhaps 100,000 men. Meanwhile there was little to be done but train, arm, and reinforce the Army of Salonika and await the possibilities of a spring offensive.

The lines stretched along the Vardar for some fifteen miles from its mouth. All this sector was held by French troops. Towards the mouth the country is marshy and not many men were needed to guard this part of the line. Further north the lines were held more strongly, and Sarrail also threw a covering force across the river and held an advanced front some six miles to the west of it. Some distance to the north of Topshin the line turned at right angles east and ran almost direct across the neck of the peninsula to the Gulf of Orfano, which was reached near Stavros. This part of

the line was assigned to the British. The position was naturally strong. A large part of it was defended by the Daud Baba and other hills which cover Salonika from the north. Farther east the two lakes of Langhaza and Beshik Göl protected over 20 miles of the British front. The defences of Salonika were a formidable problem to any attacking force. Farther north, too, the Allied outposts held the hilly country between Lakes Doiran and Butkovo, and as time went on, and from the defensive General Sarrail gradually passed to the menace of an offensive, the main position was shifted thither. But during the first four months of 1916 the most urgent problem was to take every precaution for the defence of Salonika and gain time for equipping, organizing and training the varied armies under the French General's command.

Training and road-making were the main occupations of the expeditionary force during these months. The roads, as almost everywhere where the Turk misgoverned, were few, and, in general, deplorably bad, although since 1909 a few improvements had been planned and begun. Under the superintendence of British and French engineers the country assumed a new aspect. Before the end of 1915



Official photograph.

ROAD-MAKING NEAR SALONIKA, ENLIVENED BY THE PLAYING OF A REGIMENTAL BAND

there were already 60 miles of new roads round Salonika. By the end of April the number was enormously greater. Light railways were laid down, and the question of transport assumed a less hopeless aspect.

For the soldiers it was a cheerless time. The country in which they were camped was swampy and sparsely inhabited. In the neighbourhood of the lakes and rivers it was malarial and later on fever was extremely prevalent.

Turkish name "Sari Göl"—"Yellow Lake"—describes) and fringes of reeds; the bare, rocky hills of the Krusha and Beshik ranges, almost treeless and waterless, broken only by stretches of arid plateau, on which Vlach and Turkish nomads seek in summer some scanty pasturage for their sheep and goats; the high mountains to west and north, snow-covered in winter and in spring the source of mountain torrents which feed the rivers before



BUILDING A SANDBAG VILLA ON THE HILLS.

[Official photograph.]

The climate, with its violent changes during daytime and night, was a treacherous one. Up in the Macedonian hills the winter was intensely cold with heavy snowfalls. Down in the plains the temperature ranged from an average of 81 deg. Fahr. in midsummer to a minimum of 14 deg. in winter. To the "Mistral" of Southern France correspond the "Vardar winds," which are particularly unpleasant during the winter months and piercingly cold. They sometimes last four or five days and make life round Salonika exceedingly unattractive. The extremes of temperature were found very trying by the British troops. Housed in brown canvas tents it was difficult for them to keep warm in this cheerless, damp cold. Yet, on the whole, the winter was a better time than summer, which brought the flies and mosquitoes and let loose malaria on the unacclimatised foreigner.

The British troops put up with these hardships with characteristic stoicism. There was at least much of interest to be found in the strange sights of this country. The scenery was very different from that of their native lands. The stony, dusty plains dotted with clumps of olives; the desolate, brackish lakes with their muddy waters (as the common

the May sun turns them into dry watercourses; all this was in strange contrast with fertile Yorkshire or Perthshire or Wicklow. Even the most insular of English countryfolk could not, as their letters showed, but be stimulated by the novelty of their surroundings. The sea bluer than it can ever be anywhere but in the Ægean; the blazing sun lighting up the monotonous white of the village houses; the clear atmosphere in which capes, mountains, and the cupolas of churches display the lines of their form with an insistence impossible in Northern Europe—all these were some compensation for absence from home, discomfort, and boredom.

Salonika itself was a miniature capital of east and west. Its 40,000 or so Turks, with white turbans and red fezzes, reminded the European that for nearly five centuries Salonika had been held by a Mahomedan Power in the face of the whole of Christendom. A nearly equal number of Greeks represented at once the oldest and newest stratum of inhabitants. In parts of the town (especially round the old Hippodrome) there were Greek families descended from those who had refused to abandon their city even after the fatal capture of 1430. On the other hand there were new Greek officials,



[Official photograph.]

A BRITISH CAMP IN RAINY WEATHER.

merchants, and, of course, soldiers who had come in with the liberating army in 1913. A smaller number of Slavs, "Macedonians" mainly or Bulgars, bore witness to Bulgaria's ambitious aims on "Solun," for centuries the goal of the Bulgarian armies. Like every Aegean town, Salonika contained a "European" colony—Italian, French, Spanish, or vaguely "Levantine." But, above all, there were the Jews—perhaps 70,000 of them—descendants of the Sephardim whom Castilian intolerance had driven from Spain. (Of these some 10,000 were Jewish renegades—"dunme," as the Turks call proselytes to Islam, distinct from both Turk and Jew. Born politicians, they had much to do with the Young Turk revolution, and Djavid Bey was one of their number.) Under the old lax Turkish régime the Jews had prospered exceedingly, and most of the trade of Salonika was in their hands. Their Spanish dialect was the current language of the town. The newspapers were largely owned by them. Distrustful of the Greeks, they welcomed the Anglo-French troops as profitable guests and customers.

Amusements were of a somewhat crude order. As everywhere there was the "cinema." The subjects of the film-dramas were of the lurid and erotic order, which, in the Levant, is dignified with the name "Parisian." But at least they provided some diversion from the monotony of existence. The proprietors of these picture-theatres made heroic efforts to cater for the linguistic peculiarities of their

new clients. Explanations were usually in Greek and Spanish (in Hebrew script). French could be added without much labour. English was a greater difficulty. The Official Press Correspondent, Mr. Ward Price, gives an example of the "English" title of one of these film-dramas. It ran:—

A ROYAL SINN.

Powerful sinny drama, in three long reels.

Far of Eyes Near of the Hearth
(i.e., Loin des yeux, près du cœur).

A whonderfull Drama, in 3 parts,
adapted from P. Mael's roman.

Truly the British Tommy was seeing "life." For the officers the chief attraction was "Floca's." This small café, indistinguishable from any other café in Greece or the Greek Levant, truly had "greatness thrust upon it." French and British, Serbian and Greek officers met there in the big square down by the sea day after day to "five o'clocker." It was the refuge for the bored and the rendezvous for the talkative. High strategy and high politics soon became the small talk of "Floca's." A daily paper—*The Balkan News*—kept the Expeditionary Force informed about current events and added another to the many languages (Greek, French, Spanish, Turkish, Bulgarian) in which Salonika journalism had found expression.


The self-education of the troops was not altogether neglected. Many an ex-Public Schoolboy tried to furbish up his moribund knowledge of Greek and attune it to its native pronunciation. Street-signs and newspaper

headlines awoke forgotten memories of Xenophon and Aristophanes. The more thorough characters indulged in grammars and dictionaries, and an occasional enthusiast held little classes in Greek, Bulgarian, or Turkish.

The historical remains of the town supplied unique material for study. Salonika is the eastern, as Ravenna the western, birthplace of true Byzantine art. The fine old basilica, which the Turk dechristened the "Old Mosque" (Eski Jani), dates from the first quarter of the fifth century A.D. The splendid nave of the Church of St. Demetrius is perhaps a generation younger. Above all remains the Cathedral of Ayia Sophia, the Holy Wisdom, which dates from the reign of the Emperor Anastasius (491-518). Signor Rivoira* finds in it the completion of the evolution of Byzantine art. Its namesake at Constantinople, built by Justinian's architect Anthemios forty years later, is but a grander and richer development of the same theme. St. Demetrius and Ayia Sophia are at once Salonika's gift to art and witness to its Imperial past.

Then, too, there was archæology. The

* In his great work *Le Origini dell' Architettura Lombarda*, from which these dates are taken.



A BRITISH PAPER PUBLISHED IN SALONIKA.

great "White Tower" which the Venetians built here—as in Crete, in Cyprus, in Corfu—to protect their distant outposts from the Greeks, Slavs, and, above all, the Turks, was partially occupied as an archæological museum. The director was a R.N.V.R. Lieutenant, better known as a distinguished London Professor. Under his skilled supervision "finds" were made and classified. Trench digging and road-making turned up more than one interesting relic of the past—"Geometric" pots, personal ornaments of Classical times, Greek and Roman coins.

Military operations on a grand scale had been held up first by lack of adequate troops, secondly by the season. But there was other sort of



(Official photograph.)

KOMITAJIS CAPTURED BY THE ALLIES.

food for the *communiqués*. The Allied Powers did not fail to remind both their enemies and friends that the full command of the seas was theirs. The pursuit of German submarines was carried on relentlessly, even when it meant—as it sometimes unavoidably did—a clash with the *amour propre* of the Greek authorities. The question of how the submarines obtained their supplies of petrol was always before the minds of our Naval autho



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE ITALIAN OPERATIONS IN ALBANIA.

ritics, and, though the Greek officials were in the main perhaps as innocent as they claimed to be, the Allies' vigilance was neither unwarranted nor excessive. Nor was the Bulgarian coast left immune from attack. On October 21, and again on November 16, 1915, Allied ships had already bombarded the port of Dedeagatch. A heavier bombardment of the place was carried out on January 19 by three British, one French, and one Italian warship for four hours. The Bulgarian *communiqué* declared that only "four horses were killed"! On the same day the more westerly harbour of Porto Lagos was bombarded by Allied warships—(according to the enemy, with no result). Such acts certainly had some effect on the ignorant Bulgarian peasant, and

reminded him of the fact of sea-power. All over the Ægean the Anglo-French naval forces were hard at work. On January 27 French marines occupied temporarily the Island of Kastellorizon, north-east of Rhodes. On April 10 the British and French Ministers informed the Greek Government of their intention to create naval bases at certain points in the Ionian Islands and the Ægean. Shortly afterwards the harbour of Arghostolion in Kephallinia was occupied. This action was the precursor of many similar ones.

But the most sensational acts of war were in the air. On January 23 a French squadron of 32 airplanes raided Monastir and Ghevveli. On the former some 204 bombs were dropped. Avoiding hospitals and Red Cross buildings, the position of which they had carefully noted—unlike their German rivals—they bombarded the Bulgarian Headquarters and military camps. Some 100 bombs were thrown on Ghevveli. In spite of a forty-mile cross wind the airmen returned safely from their journey, in the course of which they had to cross the high mountains of the Nidje Planina. The raid obviously made an impression on the enemy and for some time their airplanes steered clear of our lines. However, on February 1 the first German Zeppelin was seen over Salonika. Bombs were dropped in the usual promiscuous fashion, the casualties comprising not only one French and two British soldiers, but three Greek soldiers and four civilians (killed) and a score of Greek and Jewish civilians wounded.

Careless of the antagonistic feelings they were rousing in Greece, the Germans on March 16 again despatched a Zeppelin over Salonika. A few bombs were dropped without effect at Topshin, and the intruding monster was hunted away by French airmen. Eleven days later a German squadron of five aeroplanes raided Salonika. They had the satisfaction of killing nine Jewish, seven Greek, and two Turkish civilians, but had to pay for this exploit with the loss of at least three "Taubes." On April 16, 17 and 18 French airmen replied with raids on Strumitza, Ghevveli, and other military localities. On the night of April 20-21 a French airman accomplished a more ambitious flight. Starting from near Doiran he flew to Sofia, dropped two bombs with startling effect and returned after accomplishing the (till then) longest offensive flight of the war—some 350 miles. On April 24 German aeroplanes

retaliated on Salonika, again losing an "Albatross." Twelve days later another Zeppelin attempted to impress and damage Salonika. This one met with an ill-starred end. Dazzled by the searchlights and hit by the guns of the Allied warships, it was forced to descend in the marshes of the Vardar. Twelve of the crew were taken prisoners and admitted that it




INTERIOR OF THE BASILICA OF ST. DEMETRIUS, SALONIKA.

was the same ship that raided Salonika in February. She purported to come from Temesvar, in the Banat, and bore the number "LZ 85." Her wrecked framework lay in the marshes for some time, a warning to future transgressors and the delight of the excited people and newspapers of Salonika, for whose edification French army mechanics pieced it together and set it up round the "White Tower."

Farther west events had taken place which were afterwards to exercise some influence on the course of the Salonika expedition. The Italian Government had, in October, 1914, occupied the Island of Saseno, formerly considered one of the Ionian Islands belonging to Greece. In November of the same year they landed Red Cross detachments near Avlona (Gk. Avlon). M. Venizelos' Government had occupied Northern Epirus (or "Southern Albania"), the status of which had been a matter of lively discussion at the London Conference in 1913. The Italians declared their occupation of Avlona of the same provisional character as the Greek occupation of Northern Epirus. The fall of Mt. Lovtchen

on January 10, 1916, of Cettinje on January 13, and Shkodra (Skutari) on January 23, and the Austrian advance through Montenegro into Albania awoke the fears of the Italian Government for Avlona. An Italian expeditionary force had already been landed in Avlona, and early in December, 1915, it numbered between 20,000 and 30,000 men. It was none too soon, for the Austrian armies, accompanied by the Roman Catholic Mirdite tribes of Northern Albania whom they had enlisted on their side, were soon in occupation of the country as far as the Shkumbi. Meanwhile the Bulgarians had pushed west in pursuit of the retreating Serbians and occupied Elbasan. Eager to emphasize their claim to Northern Epirus—the population of which is largely Greek by speech, education, and religion—the Greek Government of M. Skouloudis recognised the province as part of Greece, and on February 17 admitted sixteen deputies from Argirokastron and Koritsa to the new Greek Chamber. For



THE WHITE TOWER AND SKELETON OF THE WRECKED ZEPPELIN.

the moment the Greek and Italian Governments did not revive the discussion as to the future status of Northern Epirus, but, it was realized on both sides that the question was unfortunately far from settled. But meanwhile Italy's preoccupations were mainly for the safety of her own expeditionary army. The advanced force which had held Durazzo and helped to secure the Serbian retreat and embarkation for Corfu fell back before the Austrian advance, and by the end of February had taken up a position on the line of the Voyusa (Viosa) river, grouped in semicircular fashion round Avlona. There was some agitation in Italy for a withdrawal even from Avlona, as it was feared that an immediate enemy advance

might cut off and destroy the expeditionary force. By the end of February, however, it was decided to continue to hold this "window opening on the Adriatic" (as the *Secolo* called it). On March 8 General Piacentini was appointed to succeed General Bertotti in the command of the expeditionary force and a large measure of executive independence was allowed



BRITISH NAVAL AIRMAN IN GREECE

Discussing the speed indicator of his machine with a French Airman.

him. Attempts were also made to conciliate Albanian feeling and win support from at least some of the Mahomedan tribes of Central Albania. The only prominent Albanian leader, however, who threw in his lot wholeheartedly with the Italians was Essad Pasha, who, in February, visited Rome, proceeding thence to Paris and London. Essad was subsequently to add to the many political and military

exploits of his career a participation in the Salonika expedition.

After the capture of Durazzo (February 27) the Austrians pushed slowly through Albania to the Italian lines, but made no serious attempt on Avlona. They were more concerned with political intrigues in Montenegro and Northern and Central Albania. Early in March they appear to have again proclaimed their old *protégé*, Prince William of Wied, "Mbret" (Imperator) in Durazzo. They were sure of the support of the Mirdite clans of the North, amongst whom for years Austrian ecclesiastics had carried on a successful propaganda. Elsewhere there were difficulties. The Mahomedans of Central Albania would have preferred a Turkish prince as their ruler. One of Prince Wied's former Ministers, Akif Pasha, actually set up a Provisional Government, though apparently with Austrian approval, in Elbasan. The Bulgarians shifted their centre of intrigue farther south to Berat. About this time they seem to have been coquetting with the idea of persuading certain of the Albanian leaders to elect Prince Cyril, second son of Tsar Ferdinand, Mbret of Albania. On the question of Albanian independence Radoslavoff was careful to make the reservation that, though Bulgaria "would not seek to put any obstacles in the way of the establishment of an independent Albanian Power," she "must interest herself in the future and in her political and strategical frontiers." The Bulgarian Government, however, soon abandoned these dreams. More definite advantages were to be expected elsewhere. An agreement was concluded early in April, 1916, between the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian Governments, and on April 19 the Bulgarians evacuated Elbasan and took over in return the districts of Prisrend and Prishtina in Serbia, which had hitherto been in Austro-Hungarian occupation, and proceeded at once ruthlessly to "Bulgarize" these districts.

During the months of inactivity at Salonika there was a revival of speculation as to the possibility of detaching Bulgaria from the Central Powers by the offer of liberal bribes of territory. Spasmodic outbursts of anti-German feeling in Bulgaria and discontent among the peasants at the indefinite continuance of what they had been told would be a few months' war were looked on in certain circles of the Entente as offering an opportunity for an "arrangement." Those who favoured

such a plan unfortunately failed to realize that the ruling circles in Sofia had far other aims than merely to liberate the oppressed "Bulgars" of Macedonia from the Serbian "yoke." What they aimed at was hegemony in the Balkans. As a Bulgarian "Socialist" paper wrote: "The Balkans must be controlled by a strong Power. Perhaps it is we who are destined to fill the rôle." The subsequent Bulgarization of occupied Serbia—apart from "Macedonia"—cast

an army of 100,000 men was ready to take the field again. The question of their transport to Salonika aroused considerable friction with the Greek Government. The Entente Powers proposed that they should be taken by sea to Itea or some other port on the Gulf of Corinth and then conveyed across country and by the Larissa railway up to the Salonika front. The Skouloudis Government, however, discovered all sorts of objections to this course. It would,



A SERBIAN OUTPOST IN THE MOUNTAINS.

a lurid light on Bulgarian "principles of nationality." In fact, the Central Powers promised Bulgaria the first place in the Balkans, side by side with a diminished Serbia, a cowed Rumania and a discredited Greece. What was the use in such circumstances of Entente diplomatists dallying with the idea of catching Bulgaria with the lesser bait of Serbian Macedonia or Greek Kavala?

It was, of course, impossible seriously to make any overtures to Bulgaria without the approval and knowledge of our Serbian Allies. Banished from their country by the perfidious attack of their neighbours, they looked for restitution to the sword. During the winter the Serbian armies had been reorganized and re-equipped in Corfu, and by the beginning of spring an

they said, dislocate normal traffic. The Serbs might be the cause of infectious diseases spreading in the country—possibly "Venizelitis" as well as typhus was feared. And, above all, it would involve a breach of neutrality and embroil Greece with the Central Powers. All these real or pretended objections were brilliantly answered by M. Venizelos in his new weekly paper, the *Kiris* (April 30). He showed that none of the dangers feared would, in fact, result. The Entente Ministers in Athens also pressed their point of view very strongly on the Skouloudis Government, but the latter maintained their opposition. While the matter dragged on the Serbian troops were already being transported by sea through the Corinth Canal. By May 11 some 70,000 were on the



THE FIRST SECTION OF SERBIA'S NEW ARMY ARRIVES FROM CORFU.

way and before the end of the month practically the whole Serbian army had been transferred to the Macedonian front.

Their arrival implied the initiation of a definite offensive at an early date. These Serbian soldiers had not merely come to defend Salonika, but to begin at once the heroic and difficult task of recovering their native land. Before long they were in position on the left flank of Sarrail's army—in the Florina sector. The Bulgars were threatened with a vigorous offensive.

In these circumstances the enemy decided to be the first to strike. The right bank of the Struma and the Greek frontier were guarded by French troops, but except for the destruction of the railway bridge at Demirhissar in January no steps had been taken to guard the approaches farther East. Lack of adequate numbers for holding so long a front may be the explanation. General Sarrail may have considered it improbable or immaterial that the Bulgarians would attack down the Struma valley. The valley was commanded by Fort Rupel, on the retention and strengthening of which M. Venizelos had always laid great store. General Sarrail may have trusted the Greek garrison to hold this safely. Behind the garrison itself there was the bulk of two Greek Army Corps in Macedonia—at Seres and Kavala. After the Greek Government's attitude to the question of a Bulgarian invasion in December it may have appeared probable that they would be equally opposed to such an invasion

in May. Subsequent revelations showed, however, that so long ago as March the Greek Minister of War (General Yannakitsas) had issued instructions to the officers commanding fortresses in Macedonia not to offer any resistance to the invader. Consequently when, on May 26, a Bulgarian force suddenly advanced on Rupel the Commandant surrendered this strongest of Greek fortresses after a merely nominal resistance. The key of the Struma valley was in Bulgaria's hands. Any idea of an offensive from East Macedonia was out of the question. It is, however, improbable that much could ever have been accomplished by an attempted invasion of Bulgaria up the Struma. Though the Greeks successfully achieved it in July, 1913, the Bulgarians had then already been defeated by the Serbians on the Bregalnitsa and were in danger of being outflanked. In the present case it was the invaders, not the invaded, whose flank would have been turned.

The capture of Fort Rupel was none the less a serious inconvenience to General Sarrail. It meant that should he begin an offensive elsewhere he would have to hold his Struma line far more strongly than if the Greek armies could be relied on to hold East Macedonia. The surrender of Rupel showed that no such reliance could be placed on the Greek Government. Politically it meant that relations between the Entente Powers and the Skouloudis Ministry had become impossible. The Powers almost at once instituted a blockade of

Greek ports. On June 21 this was followed by a Note demanding the replacement of the Skouloudis Government by a "service Government without political colour" pledged to guarantee the maintenance of the "benevolent neutrality" which Greece had promised to observe towards the Entente Powers. The complete demobilisation and reduction to a peace footing of the Greek Army, the dissolution of the Chamber and fresh elections, and the dismissal of certain objectionable police officials were also demanded. The Note was understood to be supported by a naval demonstration. M. Skouloudis at once resigned and M. Zaïmis formed a "service Ministry."

Meanwhile in Salonika General Sarrail had on June 3, 1916, declared a state of siege in the districts of Macedonia occupied by the Allied armies. He had now a considerable army—French, British, and Serbian—under his command and could afford to occupy a wider front and prepare for an offensive in the summer. It was arranged that Lieutenant-General G. F. Milne (who on May 9 succeeded Sir Bryan Mahon in the command of the British Salonika Army) should become responsible for that portion of the Allied front which covered Salonika from the east and north-east. On



MOUNT KOVIL,
Captured by the Serbians, July 24, 1916.

June 8 the British troops began to occupy advanced positions along the right bank of the Struma from Lake Butkovo to the north end of Lake Taclinos. By the end of July, on the demobilization of the Greek Army, this occupation had been extended to Chai Agiz ("The River Mouth"), where the Struma flows into the Gulf of Orfano. Later on—between July 20

and August 2—General Milne took over the line south and west of Lake Doiran in preparation for a general offensive.

During this time of preparation the French troops had also been active. They occupied the centre of the Allied position from near Lake Doiran to a point west of the Vardar, where they linked up with the newly reconstituted Serbian army. Their sector, if shorter than the British or Serbian, was probably the most important of all, for it contained the Vardar



Lafayette.

LIEUT.-GENERAL G. F. MILNE,
C.B., D.S.O.,

Appointed Commander of the British Army at
Salonika, May, 1916.

valley, the direct line by which Salonika might be attacked. Facing them was a composite army under General von Winckler. It was not clear how many Austrians and Germans had been left to him, since many had been withdrawn to reinforce the western and Galician fronts. The British and Serbians were faced by purely Bulgarian armies under the command of General Todoroff.

During June and July there was some spasmodic fighting on the frontier. On June 23 and 24 the Bulgarians attempted to take Poroj after a bombardment, but were driven off without difficulty. The enemy, however, claimed to have forced the French to withdraw their lines at Gorni Pordi (close to the frontier). There was a good deal of skirmishing round Ljumnica.

But, above all, French airmen were very busy. The Bulgars complained of "almost daily" raids over the frontier.

Further west the Serbians were not slow in beginning still more serious operations. The



GENERAL CORDONNIER,
In command of French Forces on the
Salonika Front.

Bulgarians had occupied the lower slopes of the Nidje Planina, six miles or so to the south-east of the Cræco-Serbian frontier. On July 24 a Serbian division attacked them and drove them back. Mt. Kovil (north-east of Bahovo and east of Kukuruz or "Maize" Hill) was seized, and the Bulgars retired after suffering heavy casualties. Some days after this success of his army the Prince Regent Alexander landed at Salonika and hastened to acquaint himself with the conditions under which his countrymen were beginning the reconquest of their fatherland. The Serbians were under the command of General Bojovich, but at this time an arrangement was made by which all the Allied armies were put under the general control of Sarrail, General Cordonnier (who had distinguished himself recently at Verdun) assuming command of the French contingent.

The time was approaching for the beginning of a general offensive. Politically even more than militarily it was urgently required. For months past Rumania had demanded an offensive from Salonika as an indispensable preliminary to her intervention. Till now Sarrail's small numbers had made this out of the question. But the arrival of the Serbian army and the reinforcements sent out to the French and British contingents had swelled his

expeditionary forces to a considerable size. On July 30 Russian troops arrived to join the army that was to liberate Serbia. Salonika saw the unprecedented sight of a Russian army which had voyaged round half Europe disembarking at its gates. The fine physique and soldierly bearing of these seasoned troops was not without its effect on the cosmopolitan city. Less startling, though not less important, was the appearance on August 11 of a considerable Italian force under the command of General Count Alfonso Petitti di Roreto.

The offensive which was to be the overture to Rumania's intervention opened on August 10. French artillery began a heavy bombardment of the town of Doiran. The Bulgars were forced to abandon Hill 227 to the south of the town and the French hastened to occupy it and the railway station of Doiran. The German *communiqués* of August 11 and 12 spoke scornfully of the "enemy's feeble feints" being "repulsed by our fire," but an appreciable gain had been made. The next few days were taken up with artillery duels, heavy howitzers playing their part on both sides. On August 15 the French made a further move. After bombardment they seized "Tortoise Hill," close to the village of Doldjeli, which lies a mile and a half south-west of Doiran. Then a sudden change came over the position.



[Official photograph.]
GENERAL PETITTI DI RORETO,
In command of Italian Forces on
the Salonika front.

The Bulgarians had grown uneasy about the persistence of the Salonika expedition. Their first opportunity of December, 1915, having been missed they had hoped that the

Allies would of their own accord relinquish their point of vantage. The arrival of the Serbians, and subsequently of the Italian and Russian contingents, dispelled this fond illusion. From a small force, the easy prey of the invader, Sarrail's command had been transformed into a considerable army. During June and July all the attention of the Central Powers had been occupied by the great Russian offensive in Eastern Galicia and by the Battle of the Somme. By August the situation—at least in

Meanwhile, on the eastern frontier, the Bulgarians crossed the Nestos (or Mesta Su) in the "Kaza" of Sari Shaban, and sent on patrols ahead to reconnoitre the road to Kavala. Further west, on the central sector of the Vardar valley, a simultaneous advance was made by General von Winekler. His troops failed, however, to take the village of Doldjeli, in spite of determined attacks. Both there and on the Struma British troops held up the Bulgarian advance. On August 19 General Milne



[Official photograph.]

ITALIANS ENTER SALONIKA.

the East—was somewhat better in hand, and the Salonika front offered an obvious opportunity for a cheap but impressive advance. Moreover, there was Rumania to be impressed and Sarrail's demonstration to be forestalled.

On August 17 the enemy armies invaded Greece in three main groups. On the eastern sector they advanced south from Demir-hissar, the Greek troops withdrawing before them. The Greek forts of Liso and Starshiste were surrendered on demand, no resistance being offered. On August 19 the enemy *communiqués* announced that the Vrundi Balkan (or Sharliya Planina) had been crossed. The Bulgarian armies were advancing on Seres.

sent out a mounted brigade with one battery which carried out "a strong reconnaissance." They found the enemy in some force on the Barakli-Prosenik line. After engaging him they withdrew to the right bank of the Struma. On August 21 the Anghista bridge on the Seres-Drama line was demolished by British yeomanry, engineers and cyclists in the face of the enemy's opposition, but after this operation no further obstacle was put in the way of the Bulgarian invasion of Eastern Macedonia. The British forces withdrew to the Struma-Lake Tachinos line, and left to the Greek armies garrisoning the country the task of dealing with the invader.



RUSSIAN ARRIVALS AT SALONIKA.

Kavala was the headquarters of the 4th Greek Army Corps. At Seres the 6th Division was at the time stationed under General Bairas, in whose temporary absence Colonel Khristodhoulou was in command. The advanced fort of Phea Petra was the first place to offer resistance to the Bulgarian armies on the road between Demirhissar and Krushevo. The commander, Major Kondhulis, refused to surrender the fort to his country's enemies, and lost his life in the fruitless attempt to defend it. The example was not lost on the garrison of Seres. Colonel Kristodhoulou and the men of the 6th Division put up a stout fight, in which they claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, themselves losing 2 officers and 100 men. The Athens Government's only recognition of this gallant action was to relieve the too patriotic colonel of his command, and issue strict injunctions against any further armed resistance to the invader. Kristodhoulou fortunately succeeded in evading the Bulgarian armies, and issued an appeal for volunteers to defend Macedonia. His *beau geste* made him the idol of the hour in Salonika and Venizelist Greece. A considerable number of volunteers enrolled themselves, and the Venizelist paper *Nea Ellas* called Kristodhoulou "a new Leonidas."

Not all Greek officers were equally heroic. The Bulgarian armies in their advance through Eastern Macedonia had at first been anxious to conciliate the feeling of the Greek population. A considerable number of Greeks (variously estimated at five and ten thousand), however, fled before the invader. They remembered

the atrocities committed by the Bulgarian troops when they retreated before the Greek armies in July, 1913. On that occasion they massacred a large part of the Greek population of Seres and wiped out the entire village of Dokzat, calling forth from King Constantine an appeal to the European Powers against "these fiends in human form." This time the Bulgars were wise. They refrained from occupying Drama and Kavala till their plans were ripe. On August 26, however, they seized the forts round Kavala, but found themselves under the heavy bombardment of the British fleet. For some time they did nothing further, and on September 6 Colonel Khristodhoulou made his way into the town with two of the regiments he had commanded at Seres. They did not find themselves in congenial company. The commander of the IVth Army Corps, Colonel Khatzopoulos, was one of those Greeks to whom even the Bulgar and the German were less distasteful than Venizelos. He bore in mind the instruction of the Athens Government that there was to be no fighting with the invading army. On September 12, therefore, he capitulated with the forces—some 8,000 men—under his command. The Bulgarian troops entered and occupied the coveted seaport which the arms of King Constantine's soldiers and the diplomacy of M. Venizelos had redeemed for Greece three and a half years before. Colonel Khristodhoulou, indeed, and some 1,500 soldiers, as well as many of the civilian inhabitants, succeeded in making their escape, through the help of British and French warships, to Thasos and

Salonika. The rest were disarmed and interned in "honourable" captivity at Seres, whence they were soon after removed to Germany to enjoy the hospitality of the Imperial Government in the Silesian town of Görlitz. According to German accounts, they were there entertained with every mark of respect, and encouraged to while away the hours of boredom and starvation diet with the editing of a local Greek newspaper (*The Görlitz News*) and the organization of concerts and theatrical performances.

To patriotic Greeks these ignominious actions of their politicians and soldiers had been more than could be endured. To assuage this feeling and conciliate the indignant Entente Powers the Chief of the General Staff, Dousmanis, was given 45 days' leave and replaced by General Moskhopoulos, hitherto in command of the IIIrd (Salonika) Army Corps. Dousmanis' assistant, Colonel Metaxas, was also relieved of his functions. Mass meetings to voice the indignation of the people were held in Salonika and in Athens, where M. Venizelos himself addressed the demonstrators. At a second demonstration on August 27 the great statesman made a powerful speech in which he adjured his King to put himself at the head of the nation and defend Greece's honour and territory. If King Constantine and M. Zaïmis

would even now stand forth as champions of the national cause, M. Venizelos promised his wholehearted support. But "if, contrary to all our hopes, our cry is disregarded, we shall then see what we can do in order to prevent the ruin into which we are being drawn. . . . We cannot look on fatalistically, while the catastrophe approaches, without counteracting it." Unfortunately the appeal was disregarded. The King refused to receive the demonstrators' memorial, and, backed by anti-Venizelist partisans and the "Reservists' Leagues" formed by the military clique on which he relied, he continued his "neutral" policy. The first armed protest came from Salonika. On August 30 Lieutenant Tsakonas, at the head of a body of Cretan gendarmerie, marched to the barracks where three regiments of the 11th Division were quartered and called on them to join the movement for the defence of Greek soil against the Bulgarians. The majority agreed, and Colonel P. Zimvrakakis put himself at the head of the revolution. In the famous Church of St. Demetrius the insurgents pledged themselves to save Greece from the hereditary foe. A Committee of National Defence was elected, with Colonel Zimvrakakis at its head, and an appeal was issued for volunteers. Confronted with overwhelming difficulties, the Greek Pre-



[Official photograph.]

COLONEL KHRISTODHOULOU, THE GREEK DEFENDER OF SERES,
At the head of his men leaving Salonika for the front.

micr, M. Zaïnis, resigned on September 12, and after some days was succeeded by a somewhat colourless anti-Venizelist, M. Kalogeropoulos. The new Ministry made some dubious essays to regain the confidence of the Entente Powers, but met with no success. The die was already cast. On September 24 revolution broke out at Candia, and in some days the whole of Crete had disowned the Athens Government and thrown in its lot with the National Movement under the ægis of its greatest son. On September 25 M. Venizelos himself, deciding that the moment for action had come, left Athens accompanied by Admiral Koundouriotis and other prominent public men. In Crete they proclaimed a Provisional Government, and from there passed to Chios, Mytilene, and other Ægean islands which hastened to espouse their cause. Finally they took up their headquarters at Salonika, and on October 18 a "Cabinet of National Defence" was formed by M. Repoulis, responsible to the Triumvirate—M. Venizelos, Admiral Koundouriotis, and General Danglis—which had taken on itself the task of cooperating with the Allies for the expulsion of the Bulgarians from Greek soil. Henceforth there were two Governments in Greece—that of Professor Lambros (who on October 8 succeeded M. Kalogeropoulos) at Athens, and that of the Triumvirate at Salonika. The former, main-

taining its rule over Central Greece, the Peloponnese and the Ionian Islands, remained in theory strictly neutral. The latter, recognized *de facto* in Macedonia, most of the Ægean islands and Crete by the Entente Powers, relied on real popular support. It frankly allied itself with the Entente and cooperated in military preparations against Bulgaria, on whom it declared war.

The chief interest of the autumn campaign centres round the operations in Western Macedonia, but before turning to them this account of the course of events on the eastern part of the Salonika front may be concluded. This sector had been handed over to the British forces. On September 10 the Struma, which had served as a line of defence, was crossed by General Milno's troops both south and north of Lake Tachinos. Between the Lake and the Gulf of Orfano they occupied the "New Village" (Neokhori or Yeni Kiöi). To the north they crossed at various points between Lake Butkovo and Lake Tachinos. Some small villages were occupied, and the Northumberland Fusiliers drove the Bulgarians out of Nevoljen, inflicting severe losses on the enemy. The British troops subsequently withdrew as pre-arranged. Five days later the offensive was renewed. British forces seized the villages of Kato (or Lower) Ghoudheli, Jami Mah, Ago



GENERAL ZIMVRAKAKIS AND LORD GRANARD DISCUSSING THE BRITISH GUNS.

Official photograph.



HIGHLANDERS ON THE MARCH NEAR DOIRAN.

Mah and Komarian, and burnt them to the ground. On September 23, in spite of a sudden rise of three feet in the river, which hampered bridging operations, a crossing was again effected and the villages and trenches occupied by the enemy were raided. Valuable reconnaissance work was effected.

As the big Allied advance on Monastir proceeded it was found necessary to increase our activities on the Struma front. Taking full advantage of the superiority in artillery fire which the high ground on the right bank allowed, General Milne on the night of September 29-30 threw considerable forces across the river, over which the Royal Engineers had succeeded in constructing bridges. At dawn the Gloucesters and Cameron Highlanders advanced, and by 8 a.m. had won the village of Karaja Kiöi Bala. On their left the other two battalions of the brigade—Royal Scots and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—pushed on in spite of "heavy and accurate" enemy artillery fire, and by 5.30 had occupied Karaja Kiöi Zir. The Bulgarians' repeated attempts to regain these two villages on the nights of September 30 and October 1 failed, and by October 2 the position had been consolidated. Next day an infantry brigade composed of the Munsters and Dublins attacked and seized Yeni Kiöi on the main road to Seres. Here they were exposed to fierce bombardments and counter-attacks, in which six or seven enemy battalions participated. In spite of their efforts, however, the Bulgarians failed to recover Yeni Kiöi and fresh reinforcements secured the village for the British. On November 5 Nevoljen (to the west) was again occupied, and by November 8 the British forces were in

possession of the line Ago Mah-Omondhos-Elishan-Ormanli, the cavalry holding an advanced line Kispiki-Kalendhra. Not only had the enemy been pushed back, but he had lost at least 1,500 men killed, 375 prisoners and 3 machine-guns. In the opinion of General Milne the success of these operations "was due to the skill and decision with which they were conducted by Lieutenant-General C. J. Briggs, C.B., and to the excellent cooperation of all arms." Not less credit was due to the work of the Royal Flying Corps, the Royal Engineers and the Army Ordnance Corps, in whose hands lay the problems of transport. On this as on other fronts both motor ambulance drivers and stretcher-bearers rendered splendid service in rescuing and conveying the wounded to the dressing stations and hospitals—many of the latter voluntarily organized units of the British Red Cross and Order of St. John. The Royal Army Medical Corps, under Surgeon-General H. R. Whitehead, C.B., deserved not less praise for the way in which they had grappled with malaria, dysentery and other diseases from which the troops had to suffer much in the marshy and unhealthy Struma valley.

Operations on the Doiran-Vardar River sector were also begun with a view to holding up the enemy. His forces here amounted to some 30,000 men—practically the whole of the Bulgarian 9th Division and at least two-thirds of the German 101st Division. Between September 11 and 13 General Milne began a heavy bombardment of the German salient north of Machukovo, known as "The Machine Guns' Knob." On the night of September 13-14 the King's Liverpool Regiment and Lancashire Fusiliers stormed and occupied



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF MONASTIR.

the enemy's position here, killed over 200 Germans and captured 71. The work was, however, exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, and in face of his attacks in superior force it was found necessary to retire after a successful demonstration. The rest of the fighting on this sector consisted chiefly of raids on the enemy's trenches, but throughout the next two months these operations had great value in detaining considerable forces of the enemy which might otherwise have been available for the defence of Monastir.

It was on the left of the Allies' line that events of decisive importance took place. Here in their spectacular invasion of August 17 and 18 the Bulgarians had occupied Florina and forced the Serbians to fall back on Ostrovo. The Bulgarians pushed on along the main road and by-paths converging on Kozani. As usual they massacred and plundered the unfortunate

inhabitants of villages like Negovani and Aitos, in the latter of which the mayor and another official were murdered. After penetrating the Kirli Derbend ("Dirty Pass") the enemy occupied Sorovichevo and Sotir, but was there attacked by the Serbians and had to retire to Ekshisu. It was expected that he would again attempt a spectacular advance on Kozani or attack Vodena and threaten Veria in the hope of cutting Sarrail's land connexions with Greece and impressing King Constantine's subjects. The Serbians, however, backed by French and Russian contingents, were not long in retaliating. The invader was gradually driven back. By September 15 the Allied armies were closing on Florina, having taken many prisoners and guns. The Serbians alone captured 32 of the latter, including several heavy pieces as well as stores and munitions, and claimed to have inflicted, with few

casualties of their own, severe losses on the enemy.

A general advance was in progress. On the left the French and Russian contingents crossed the Mala Reka ("Little River") Ridge, approaching Florina from the south. From the east the Serbians advanced from Ostrovo, driving the enemy before them. By September 16 they had taken the village of Gornichevo (on the Banitsa-Ostrovo road) and carried the greater part of the Malka Nidje ridge at the point of the bayonet. Their cavalry had driven the Bulgarians headlong from Ekshisu and cleared the whole country round Lake Petrsko. On September 17 there was a fierce battle between the advancing French and Russians and the retreating Bulgarians on the Florina-Rosna line. The struggle lasted all day, but in spite of a desperate resistance the Bulgars were beaten and had to fall back. On September 18, at 10 a.m., the French entered Florina. The great Bulgarian invasion of Greece had come to grief after a month.

But from Florina alone it was impossible to advance on Monastir, which now became the objective of the Allied armies. Monastir


lies in the extreme south of the Pelagonian plain. From Florina, indeed, the way is open. But Monastir is in turn commanded by the outlying mountains of the Albanian tangle on the west and on the east it is protected by the loop of the Tchernia ("Black") River, within the bend of which stands the high Selechka Ridge. To the east of the Tchernia is the formidable mountain barrier of the Starkov Grob and Nidje Planina, culminating in the mountain of Kaymakchalan, with which all aspirants to Monastir must first grapple.

The fighting to the west of Lake Ostrovo in the last week of August had resulted in the failure of the Bulgarians in spite of tremendous efforts, led by the 1st Brigade of the 8th Division under Colonel Scrafimoff, to envelop and crush the Serbian left wing. General Bojovich's troops had stood firm. On September 1 they had won the Malka Nidje ridge and thence they, with the French and Russians on the left, had advanced and recovered Florina. On the Serbian right the last week of August also saw the initiation of a vigorous offensive. The order to advance all along the line appealed to the home-sick Serbian troops. Through the Moglenitsa valley they advanced



[Official photograph.]

OFFICERS' MESS AT A NEW CAMPING-PLACE.



MOUNT KAYMAKCHALAN.

The eastern slopes stormed by the Serbians.

on the mountain barrier, held by the enemy, which separated them from their native land. The Bulgarians held strong positions along the crest of the Starkov Grob and Nidje Planina and occupied the hills commanding the Moglenitsa valley from the north.

The Serbians' first attack was on Mount Kovil. Clambering up its steep sides they attacked their enemies with bombs and bayonet. It was a fierce struggle in which little counted except the individual soldier's strength and courage. For three days the issue was in doubt, but finally the victory fell to the Serbians, who won the hills of Kovil and Kukuruz ("Maize Hill") and thereby secured all the positions dominating the Moglenitsa valley. It was the first real test of the worth of the re-formed Serbian army, and the result was a splendid one.

Everything now depended on the possession

of Mount Kaymakchalan, the highest point (8,284 feet) of the whole range. The Bulgarians—as documents captured from them proved—had orders to defend this height to the last man. For the Serbians it was a unique opportunity of once more entering their native land. After fierce fighting the troops of the Drina Division won the summit of the peak on September 18—the day the French entered Florina—and planted the national flag once more on Serbian soil. The victory cost them heavily, for the Bulgarians again and again returned to the attack. They held on obstinately to their positions on the northern slopes of the mountain and reinforced their troops from other fronts. On September 26 they attempted a desperate counter-attack with men drawn from four divisions. They gained a local success, but were unable to maintain it, and on September 30 the Serbians occupied the whole mountain block and the Bulgarians hastily withdrew, abandoning four field guns, four mountain guns and much material of other kinds. There is documentary proof that the Bulgarian losses were frightfully heavy. Their 11th Regiment, for instance, had 73 officers and 3,000 men out of action. The victors, too, had heavy losses, but they could console themselves with the results of their success. On October 3 the Bulgarians evacuated the whole Starkov Grob and withdrew their whole line. Serbia was once more open and the Serbian flag was hoisted in the seven villages which the victors entered.

The first Serbian village recovered by the Serbian armies was Jivonya (near the River Brod). Thus the moment was described by a Serbian officer:

At the entrance we met the first Serbian citizen, a citizen of the Kingdom of Serbia, and this first one, though poor, robbed and stripped of everything by the enemy, would not come to meet his brothers empty-handed, and since he possessed nothing else, he set before us two pitchers of water. All were there to greet us, to welcome us and offer us water.

I was not thirsty. I did not drink, but I did not wish to refuse the offer of the first Serbian citizen. I set eyes on and who greeted me and wished me luck. For luck, then, and at the auspicious time, and with a kind of faith I swallowed a mouthful of water. I took that mouthful of water full of faith as if it had been the Holy Communion. I communicated in this holy water which springs from our soil, which to us is holy.

The results of the capture of the Kaymakchalan were far-reaching. On October 3 the Bulgarians abandoned the whole ridge of the

Starkov Grob—their whole first line from Krushograd to the Nidje Planina. The victorious Serbians pushed forward to Petalino (on the extreme western slopes of the Kaymakchalan) and reached the loop of the Tcherná River. To the west the Allied forces advanced from Petorak and Vrbeni (which they had occupied on October 2) almost up to the frontier to Negochani and beyond the frontier to Kenali, their extreme left resting at Pisoderi at the head of the Jelova valley. Thence they pushed west the following day to Popli (on Lake Prespa) and N.W. to Buv, on the slopes of the Stara Nerechka. A rapid advance from these two places brought the French forces by October 8 to Yermano and Kishovo respectively. For the moment this concluded the advance of the Allies' extreme left wing. It was necessary to await the arrival of the Italian forces moving eastward through Northern Epirus before the mountains to the west of Monastir could be attempted.

In their invasion of August 18 the Bulgarians had pushed west as far as Koritsa (S.W. of Lake Prespa), whence they ejected the Greek

garrison. It was rumoured that their intentions in this direction were to join the Austrian forces in Albania in a combined attack on the Italian army occupying Avlona. Anxiety was felt in Italy for the safety of this expeditionary force. Reinforcements were sent and the Greek Government's actions—or inaction—having shown that their friendship was no longer to be relied on, the Italian command proceeded to occupy strategic positions. A month later (October 2) the important harbours of Ayii Saranda (or Santi Quaranta) and Khimara were occupied by the Italian forces. The troops in occupation of Tepeleni marched south, took possession of Ergeri (Argirokastron) and joined up with the newcomers. During the next three weeks the Italian Expeditionary Force made its way through the broken country of Northern Epirus, and on October 25 it was announced that it was in touch with the Allies' left wing, where, about the same time, the French occupied Koritsa. This growing threat to the Bulgarians from the west was an important and essential preliminary to the abandonment of Monastir.



Official photograph.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE AT SALONIKA: BRITISH, FRENCH, SERB, RUSSIAN,
AND ITALIAN.

But the chief struggle for the coveted city necessarily took place to the east. The Serbians, after their victory of Kaymakchalan, were faced by the triple barrier of the Tchernia River, the rough Morihovo plateau and the Selechka Mountains in their westward advance on Monastir. The Serbians had reached the Tchernia through Petalino on October 4. On October 6 they forced their way past the Dobro Polje ("good field") heights, part of which they occupied, and descended to Budimirea and Grunishite. On October 9 they crossed the Tchernia at the important point known as Skochivir, where, as its name shows, the placid river breaks into "rapids" in the narrow defile into which the approaching Selechka and Starkov Grob mountains squeeze it. Further west the Serbians also crossed the Tchernia between Dobroveni and Brod. The Bulgarians an-

nounced on October 8 that, "after his sanguinary defeat," the enemy had "abandoned his attempts to advance," but "the enemy" did not do anything of the sort. On October 9 Sofia admitted that "some enemy battalions" had "crossed the Tchernia." Prisoners in considerable numbers were coming in; between September 20 and October 10 it was calculated that some 3,000 of the enemy had been captured on the various Macedonian fronts; of these the Serbians took 800 on October 8 and 9. On October 11 the Serbians "gained a footing" in the village of Brod, on the north bank of the Tchernia. For a day or two further advance was held up, but on October 14, after artillery preparation, the Allied forces began a powerful offensive under the eyes of General Sarrail and the Prince Regent of Serbia. There was fierce fighting for some days, the enemy making a determined, and at first successful, resistance. On October 17, however, the Serbian Army under General Mishich's command carried the villages of Velyeselo and Brod and their cavalry pursued the enemy to the north. Gardilovo also fell into their hands, and its capture threatened to cut off the Bulgarian forces who were holding the French and Russians on the Kenali River-Sakulevo line. They began to fall back across the Tchernia by the Bukri Bridge and so leave the way to Monastir open. The Serbians on their part pushed north from Gardilovo towards Baldenci, and on October 19 and 20 took a large number of guns and about 1,000 prisoners, among the latter a German officer and 43 men, part of a reinforcement which the Germans had hastily sent from East Prussia to their hard-pressed ally. Among these were some Alsations, who showed little desire to fight the allies of the French. On the following day further progress was made towards Baldenci and north of Skochivir, but then for a time operations were interrupted by a break in the weather. General Mishich and the Second Serbian Army were thus held up just at a moment when speed was essential and time was given to the enemy to reinforce his beaten army. Encouraged by the arrival of German contingents, the Bulgarians on October 22 attempted to recover the ground lost three days before, but their attacks were repulsed with heavy losses, and a Serbian counter-attack advanced the line 700 yards further north. On October 24 the enemy was expelled from the slopes of the Starkov Grob



[Official photograph.]

SERBIAN BAGPIPES.



BULGARIAN TRENCHES NEAR MONASTIR.

and the Serbians seized a fortified height at the confluence of the Tcherná and the Stroschnitsa. North of Brod fighting continued fiercely during the next few days. Gardilovo, which had been lost, was recovered by the French on October 28. In spite of the bad weather and mud the Serbians made steady, if slow, progress. Their objective was the Novak Bridge, which is the eastern entrance to Monastir. The wooden bridge over the Tcherná at Bukri was destroyed by Serbian artillery fire on October 29. Attempted enemy thrusts at the Serbian right wing south of Polog and Budimirea were successfully parried on November 4 and 5. Similar attempts met with similar results on November 7 and 9.

On November 10 came the Serbian reply. The enemy's strong positions on the rocky heights of Chuks (some 1,400 feet above the valley), at the extreme south of the Selechka range, were stormed. His losses were very heavy, and he left in the hands of the Serbians 600 prisoners and considerable material in guns and stores. All his counter-attacks failed, the only result being that the Serbians captured 1,000 fresh prisoners and pushed their line farther forward. The southern half of the village of Polog was

already captured. On November 12 Iven, a village farther north, was also taken, and now the whole Serbian army had effected the crossing of the Tcherná. Sixteen field guns and a great quantity of other war material fell into the victors' hands. The Bulgarians were forced to fall back 3,000 yards to the north. On November 13 there were "bloody engagements" with the enemy. The Serbians secured their positions near Tepavei and made 1,000 fresh prisoners, the majority of them Germans. On November 15 enemy *communiqués* admitted the "withdrawal of their defence." The Serbians took the village of Chegel and pushed on against Hill 1212. The following day they advanced from Tepavei on Jarashok. They were already dangerously near to the Novak bridge and the enemy could no longer risk maintaining his right wing on the Kenali-Bukri line. On November 14 he withdrew his whole line some five miles and took up a new and last position at Bistrica, his left here protected by the Bistrica stream, which flows through marshy country to the Tcherná. The pursuing Franco-Russian forces occupied Jabyani, Porodin, and Velushina and reached the river Viro. The Serbians at the same time captured Nego-



SERBIAN PEASANTS RETURNING TO THEIR HOMES.

chari and the monastery of Jarashok. The enemy took up position on Hill 1378. It was, however, impossible for him any longer to protect himself in Monastir. The Serbians, advancing from the east, stormed Hill 1212, in spite of the desperate resistance of the Bulgarian 49th Regiment. On the left the French and Russians were pressing against the Bistrica lines. Monastir was untenable. It was hastily evacuated, and on November 19, at 8 a.m., French troops entered the much-coveted city.

It was exactly four years since the Serbian armies under the Crown Prince Alexander, pressing from the north, had overthrown Zekki Pasha's troops after a four days' battle and won the capital of Macedonia. It was not the Serbians who were destined in 1916 to set first foot in their most southern city. But it was indisputably they who had most contributed to its recovery. All the Allied contingents, indeed, shared in the honour of the success. To the east, on the Struma and Doiran fronts, General Milne's army had during October and November allowed the Bulgarians and their Allies little rest and compelled them to concentrate there many of the heavy guns which might have helped to guard the Tchernia line. On the Serbo-Greek frontier Italian contingents had maintained an invaluable pressure on the enemy's centre. It was, too, the Italian advance

through Albania which had threatened Monastir from the west and so completed the encircling of the town. The large French and smaller Russian forces had played a foremost part in the advance from Florina direct on Kenali and Monastir and well deserved to recover Monastir for the ally they had so brilliantly assisted. But by common consent it was the Serbians themselves to whom chief honours belonged. It was they who had stormed the peaks of Kaymakchalan (one of the most brilliant feats of the campaign), forced the passage of the Tchernia, fought their way through the rocky ridges of the Chuke and Morihovo. "It is thanks to the Serbians that we have won the town," said a French Colonel who was one of the first to enter it. Their losses had been very heavy. Their honour was the greater. To few armies can any town have been a dearer goal than Monastir to the Serbian army.

The capture was still more important from the political than from the military point of view. Strategically, it was indeed a considerable success. The Allies' line now ran continuously across the Balkan peninsula from the Struma to the Adriatic. Its right was protected by the Struma itself; its centre ran fairly exactly along the mountainous Serbo-Greek frontier; its left, after passing somewhat circuitously through

Monastir, round Lake Prespa, and thence through the tangled mountain system of Southern Albania, rested securely on the Adriatic ports of Avlona, Khimara and Ayii Saranda. It is true that Monastir itself was not a perfectly safe residence for the victors; regardless of the fact that he claimed it as a "Bulgarian" town, the enemy continued to shell it ruthlessly throughout the winter from the mountainous heights to west and north still in his possession. But its occupation gave an opening for a farther advance, when the opportune moment should arrive later on, along the Pelagonian plain to Prilep, whence, through the Babuna Pass, ran the route to Veles and the Vardar valley. At least the menace of an enemy thrust on the Allies' left was destroyed for good. The capture of Monastir marked, if not the end, at least the turning-point, of the Salonika expedition.

Politically it meant far more. Not only did it mean the return of the Serbs to an important district of their country. Its capture was the symbol of the eventual failure of pan-Bulgarian dreams. Monastir—to the Bulgarians "Bitolya"—was indeed an entirely cosmopolitan city in which Greeks, Turks, Jews, Rumans, Albanians, Bulgars, Serbs and "Macedonians" lived and quarrelled together. But it repre-

sented the old Bulgarian Empire. It was Okhrida and the Monastir district that had formed the centre of Tsar Samuel's dominions at the end of the tenth century. From 1870 on the Bulgarian Exarchist propaganda had been vigorously engaged in the proselytization of the district. It was, in certain contingencies, to have fallen to Bulgaria under the Serbo-Bulgarian secret treaty of March 13, 1912. Bulgaria's treacherous attack on her Allies on June 30, 1913, resulted in the forfeit of this reward. But to every Bulgarian, and especially to Dr. Vladoff's Macedonian party, the recovery of Monastir was one of the chief (though not the only) attractions of intervention. While in November, 1915, the Germans were still cajoling King Constantine with the promise that if Monastir were occupied at all it would be occupied jointly by Austrian, German and Bulgarian troops—this was actually done for a short time—and might eventually be ceded to Greece in return for a guarantee of her continued neutrality, by December 9, 1915, even German and Austrian papers found themselves forced to quote with approval the unanimous demand of the Bulgarian press that Monastir should become and remain purely Bulgarian. Its fall was, therefore, a severe blow to Bulgarian dreams. The dissatisfaction



MONASTIR.



[Official photograph.]

SERBIAN STAFF OFFICERS EXPLAINING THE POSITION TO BRITISH OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENTS

of the public was ill concealed by the evasive consolations of the leading articles in the press. The dissatisfaction might probably have found louder utterance had not the capture of Bukarst, on December 6, and Radoslavoff's

announcement of the peace proposal of the Central Powers, on December 12, for a time diverted public attention. But the fall of Monastir remained a political, as well as military, fact of far-reaching importance.



CHAPTER CLXXXII.

THE WORK OF THE FRENCH NAVY.

THE FRENCH NAVY AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR—FRENCH NAVAL STRATEGY AND BRITISH INTERVENTION—FIRST MOVEMENTS IN THE CHANNEL—THE MEDITERRANEAN—THE ADRIATIC BLOCKADE—THE PART OF THE FRENCH NAVY AT THE DARDANELLES—ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS—THE LOSS OF FRENCH SHIPS—FRENCH SUBMARINES—THE SALONIKA EXPEDITION—GREECE—NAVAL WORK IN THE FAR EAST—CONQUEST OF GERMAN COLONIES—THE CHANNEL AND NORTH SEA—THE FRENCH NAVAL BRIGADE IN BELGIUM AND ITS SERVICES TO THE ALLIES.

THE part played by the French Navy in the war was not fully explained as the war progressed, and was not, therefore, generally well understood. The French Fleet exerted a very important influence throughout the whole of the operations, but, like the British Fleet, it worked in silence, and the official *communiqués* did not give a picture of its activities. It provided for the reinforcement of the French armies on the Marne, the Somme, and on all the long length of the line to the Vosges; the brigade it landed in 1914 fought gloriously at Dixmude and elsewhere on the Yser; it took a leading share in paralysing the initiative of the Austrian Fleet at Pola; it patrolled a large part of the Mediterranean; it left imperishable memories at the Dardanelles; in alliance with a British squadron it was behind the land forces at Salonika and in Egypt; its flotillas were active in the Channel and even in the North Sea; and in many distant regions of the world it assisted in putting an end to enemy commerce and in the subjection of the possessions of Germany in Africa and in the Pacific. There were many glorious deeds to be inscribed in its records, enterprise, heroism, fortitude in the most terrible trials of war, coolness in danger and the long patience of the sea; and the losses it suffered in ships, officers, and men neither shook its confidence nor diminished its resolution.

It was fortunate for the Allies that the Anglo-French Entente had indicated to France a clear

Vol. XII.—Part 145.

and definite line of naval policy on the outbreak of war. The main force of the Fleet had been concentrated in the Mediterranean, and only a few of the older cruisers remained, with strong flotillas, at Brest. There is weakness in naval coalitions, but the best results would be attained by clearly defining zones or regions of activity. England must be charged with the control of the North Sea and the Channel; and France of the Mediterranean. In France there had been strong opposition to this arrangement, chiefly among those who regarded the Anglo-French Entente as platonic, and questioned its real permanence and value, but the redistribution was carried through, and the situation indicated existed in practice at the outbreak of war.

The French Navy suffered under some disadvantages. A political storm had in March, 1914, driven from office M. Monis, Minister of Marine, who, after a conference with Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had undertaken a further reconstitution of the French war organization. The reforms remained incomplete, and the German assault found M. Monis's successor, M. Gauthier, a doctor of medicine, in course of initiation in the duties of his office. M. Gauthier promptly resigned, and was succeeded by M. Augagneur, who held office until October 1915, when M. Briand became Prime Minister, and Admiral Lacaze became Minister of Marine.

It is also to be noted that the French Navy



THE ARMOURD CRUISER "MARSEILLAISE."

was completely imbued with the doctrine and inspired with the training for the *grande bataille en haute mer*—the achieving of glorious victories in fleet engagements—but found itself instead employed in the sedentary work of patrol and blockade, which was not congenial to the ardent spirit of officers and men. Yet a French admiral remarked that it was really a fortunate thing for the French Navy that the enemy was not within its reach, and, in fact, declined to be brought to action.

At 8 p.m. on August 2, 1914, Rear-Admiral Rouyer received orders to proceed up the Channel to the Straits of Dover and forbid the passage to the enemy. His force consisted merely of six old armoured cruisers, the *Marseillais* (flag), *Admiral Aube*, *Jeanne d'Arc*, *Gloire* (broad pennant of the second-in-command, Captain Lo Cannelier), *Gueydon*, and *Dupotit-Thouars*, with a dozen torpedo-boats. What could the Rear-Admiral have done if the whole German Fleet had come down upon him? But that was not to be. On the morning of August 3 British destroyers communicated to the French flotilla the happy intelligence that the Grand Fleet was ready to intervene if the German Fleet moved against France. On August 2 the British Cabinet had given France the assurance that, "if the German Fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power."

The situation was immediately cleared by this news, and interest was transferred to the Mediterranean. Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, and it was necessary to be very cautious and watchful, but the early declaration of Italian neutrality speedily removed what might conceivably have been the greatest preoccupation of the French Naval Command. There still remained the danger that the German cruisers then in the Mediterranean might attempt to interfere with the transport of troops and supplies from Algeria and Tunis, which the military authorities regarded as a matter of the most urgent importance. The fact that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* issued from Brindisi, and rushed westward to bombard Bona and Philippeville, on the morning of August 4, confirmed the impression that they intended to surprise and sink some of the transports leaving the Algerian ports. The two cruisers would, of course, have been no match for a powerful fleet, but their high speed made them formidable for a raid of this kind. In the event, however, such were the combinations effected by the British and French Naval forces that the German cruisers were obliged to abandon their object, and to fly at their utmost speed to the Dardanelles, with their pursuers close at their heels.

The French Fleet had left Toulon at 4 a.m. on the morning of August 3, and had extended fan-like in three groups directed severally towards the ports of Philippeville, Algiers, and Oran.

The first group was under command of Vice-Admiral Chocheprat, in the *Diderot*, the second of Vice-Admiral Le Bris (*Patrie*), and the third of Rear-Admiral Guépratte (*Suffren*). Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, commander-in-chief, had his flag in the *Courbet*, and was with the second group directed towards Algiers. When abreast of the Balearic Isles, wireless brought intelligence of the presence of the German cruisers, and at the same time the latter learned of the menace that endangered them. It was quite uncertain whether they would attempt to escape through the Straits of Gibraltar, but the French squadrons definitely turned them to the east, and the danger disappeared.

In this way the French troops from Algeria and Tunis were secured from imminent attack. This had been the first object of the French Commander-in-Chief, and the troops came in accordance with a plan long pre-arranged, and first fought at the Battle of the Marne. The 19th Army Corps in Algeria belonged to the "Metropolitan Army," and the total number of troops in Algeria and Tunis was about 83,000. Including soldiers of special categories, the transport involved the carrying across the Mediterranean of upwards of 100,000 men, with horses, mules, heavy and field guns, warlike and general stores, aeroplanes, hospital requisites, clothing, food, forage, camp equipment, and even



THE ARMOURD CRUISER "GLOIRE."

building materials, coal and petrol. Marseilles, Toulon and other southern ports were filled with transports bringing these troops, while an immense transport of troops from Indo-China began, which traversed the whole length of the Mediterranean from Port Said. The old Cochinchina transports, Vinh-Long, Bien-Hoa and Duguay-Trouin, came into new youth, and found a great sphere of activity. Across and through the Mediterranean there



[French official photograph.]

ADMIRAL LACAZE,
French Minister of Marine.

was thenceforward a continuous transport operation, for troops were always arriving and departing in great numbers, with all the vast requirements of fighting armies. Salonika and the Dardanelles increased the demands, and the wounded had to be transported and repatriated. The steamers *France IV.*, *Bretagne*, *Ceylan*, *Canada*, *Carthage*, *Divona*, *Telhad*, *Sphinx*, and others were requisitioned. The activity of enemy submarines complicated the matter, but the organization was complete, and the French Navy had charge of the whole of the convoy and patrol, the shield of the British naval forces operating, of course, as a guard. Details of the organization were not disclosed, but it will be realized that a work of enormous difficulty was undertaken and achieved with

complete success. The losses and mishaps were very few.

The great transport of troops was not the only care of the French Navy. The Austro-Hungarian squadron at Pola became its principal objective. Its flotillas were a constant menace, but as the squadron itself practised the reticent strategy of the German High Sea



THE ARMoured CRUISER "AMIRAL CHARNER."

Fleet, and refused to be drawn into action, it was necessary to establish a blockade, which was accomplished effectively, and conducted for over nine months, until Italy declared war on May 23, 1915, and partially relieved the French Fleet of this duty. Such were the geographical conditions of the Adriatic, with the great fringe of islands along the Dalmatian coast, admirable base for enemy flotillas, implying the need of blocking both Pola and Cattaro, that it was decided to establish the blockade at the Straits of Otranto, with Malta

as the base, at a distance of 400 miles. Lissa was seized as an advanced base. There was always the possibility of the bigger Austrian ships issuing from Pola, using Sebenico, Spalato or Zara as a base, and establishing a strong and menacing position at the Bocche di Cattaro. Sweeps of the Adriatic were to be made from time to time, and the provisioning and supplying with munitions of Montenegro and Serbia were in charge of the French Fleet.

It was a difficult and dangerous business, as events proved. There were large numbers of patrolling vessels, but the big ships had to remain at sea, returning periodically to Malta, and were subjected to great hazard. French battleships had never before cruised for such long periods between their visits to port. Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière was in supreme command, after the departure of Admiral Sir A. Berkeley Milne in August, 1914, and a British light cruiser squadron was with him. The bombardment of Cattaro began in that month and was continued intermittently. A demonstration was made on August 16, when the Austrian light cruiser Zenta was destroyed off Antivari, but this raid and others did not tempt the Austro-Hungarian Fleet to come out. Its flotillas, issuing through the channels behind the islands, became very menacing to the blockading forces. They were supported by swift cruisers, and accompanied by aeroplanes, and at intervals the battleship Diderot and the armoured cruisers Léon Gambetta, Victor Hugo, and Jules Ferry were attacked. The Gambetta was a second time menaced by a submarine on September 2, but compelled her assailant to submerge. In October the French light cruisers had escorted a transport laden with supplies and munitions to Antivari, and



POLA.



CATTARO.

the armoured cruiser *Waldeck-Rousseau*, which had accompanied them, narrowly escaped a torpedo discharged by an enemy submarine, while aeroplanes were dropping bombs.

Episodes of this kind were frequent when the French attempted to carry necessary supplies to the Allied ports. The new Dreadnought *Jean Bart* arrived, and was flying the flag of the *Admiralissimo* when she was struck by a torpedo on December 21, but fortunately with damage which was easily repaired. An effort to strike at the Austrian Fleet at Pola was made by the French submarine *Curie*, but she was entangled and captured off the port on December 24. From all this it will be seen how very anxious and hazardous was the work of the French Navy at the entrance to the Adriatic. It was in an enterprise to carry help to Montenegro that the destroyer *Dague* was sunk by a mine off *Antivari* on February 24, 1915. The blockade was of great value to the Allies because, though submarines occasionally passed through the guard, any important activity on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet was rendered impossible.

The most tragic event of the blockade was the sinking of the *Léon Gambetta*. The cruiser had been rendering great service from the beginning. Her company were looking forward to a return to Toulon, where important work was required to fit the ship for further work at sea. An old French sea song has the refrain: "C'est là qu'y en aura du vin dans les bidons!" But no officer or man thought of escape from his duties. The *Léon Gambetta* was torpedoed on April 27, 1915, by the Austrian submarine *U5*, Lieutenant von Trapp, and in the resulting disaster 684 gallant officers and men were lost, out of a total complement of

821. Not a single officer was among the survivors. There had always been the possibility of the Austro-Hungarian squadron attempting to escape and join the *Goeben* and *Breslau* at the Golden Horn, with the object of depriving the Russians of their command of the Black Sea. At the particular date of the disaster the watch had been redoubled in vigilance because the transport of troops for Gallipoli was then in progress. The blockading line had been brought as far south as possible, because of the submarine menace, and between Cape Santa Maria di Leuca, the heel of the Italian boot, and Cape Ducata, on an island off the coast of Albania, it had been divided into four sectors, each patrolled by light forces, with an armoured cruiser as leader.

The *Gambetta*, with her division, was posted nearest to the Italian shore, and she flew the flag of Rear-Admiral Séné, in command. The heavy winter weather was over, in which the seamen had given proof of great hardihood and endurance in a most arduous and exacting task, and flat calms and spring mists had followed. The moon was almost at the full, and the *Gambetta*, which had been steaming at 10 knots during the day, had reduced to 6 knots in order to economize coal. Except for the whalers, the boats had been swung inboard in order to widen the field of fire of the anti-torpedo guns, at which the men slept. No one was surprised by what followed. The warnings had been many, and officers and men had learned to look death calmly in the face. The danger was expected from the attack of destroyers, submarines not having as yet attempted to operate by night. At 20 minutes after midnight, however, a torpedo, discharged by an enemy submarine, struck the *Gambetta* on the port side, entering the dynamo compartment, which

produced current for the electric light and the wireless service, and the cruiser was immediately plunged into darkness and cut off from communication with the outside world. A few seconds later a second torpedo penetrated one of the boiler rooms, and the engines stopped; but the cruiser kept her way slowly until she sank some twenty minutes later. Captain André, on the bridge, where he slept, gave orders to fill the starboard compartments, in the hope of keeping the vessel upon an even keel. "He awaited death at his post of command, having given all necessary orders for

men to reach the deck and endeavour to escape. One officer, possessing great fortitude, stood up to his knees in water—for the cruiser was heeling 30 degrees to port—calmly lighting a cigar to inspire the men with calmness like his own. Boats were launched, some were broken against the hull, killing some men, injuring others, casting many into the water; floating material was set adrift, and, with splendid order, the ship's company were bidden to save themselves if they could. "Courage! Nous mourrons ensemble!" cried the officers to those for whom there was no hope. The Admiral, Captain and



THE ARMOURD CRUISER "LÉON GAMBETTA."

the safety of his company." Admiral Sénès, when he learned that the wireless could not make the S.O.S. signal, encouraged the men to endure and persevere to the last. "To the boats!" was the order. "Be steady, my children! The boats are for you; we officers will remain!" "Nous autres, nous restons!"—words, says Commandant Vedel, who has preserved them in his admirable little book *Nos Marins à la Guerre*, which should be graven in letters of gold on the bridges of all French ships of war, with the name of him who uttered them.

There was no panic. Discipline was preserved. "Light! light!" was the only cry. The officers were everywhere encouraging and helping the men. The sick and wounded were brought up from the sick-bay. In the lower flats officers with pocket-torches were enabling

some officers were still clinging to the bridge, whence came the cry, "Vive la France!" which was taken up by the men still on board, and by those in the sea. Then the great cruiser turned, and went down by the head. Of the 137 survivors many were brought to land by the Italian destroyers *Impavido* and *Indomito*. The conduct of every man of the sunken cruiser had been noble, and that of the officers magnificent. Not an officer lived to tell the tale. The story of the sea has few more lustrous episodes than that of the sinking of the *Léon Gambetta*, and happily the survivors made their record of it.

The Italian declaration of war, May 23, 1915, brought the Italian Fleet into the war, and the French were relieved of the heavy blockade work which they had conducted so gallantly and well. For ten months the blockade had

been continued with many classes of vessels, with really remarkable endurance. At the time of the intervention of Italy, Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière issued an Order of the Day to the Fleet, commending his officers for their tireless zeal, energy and self-sacrifice displayed in supporting him in "the most arduous and thankless tasks which naval forces ever had to accomplish." The Vice-Admiral resigned on grounds of ill-health in October, and was succeeded by Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, who had been in command off the Syrian coast.

he picked his way to the mine field and cut the cables of about 100 mines, which he destroyed. French submarines were, indeed, brilliantly enterprising, and rendered most valuable service in many hazardous duties. The Fresnel was sunk by an enemy flotilla off San Giovanni di Medua, December 5, 1915, and the Monge near Durazzo on the 20th of the same month. Subsequently, French flotillas and naval aeroplanes were frequently reported as engaged in active work in the Adriatic. The submarine Foucault was concerned in sinking an Austrian light cruiser in January,



ADMIRAL DARTIGE DU FOURNET AND HIS STAFF.

French forces continued to cooperate with the Italian Fleet, sharing in the delicate task of transporting an army to Albania, and in that wonderfully successful work, the withdrawal of the Serbian Army. Splendid things were achieved by flying men and submarine commanders. Sub-Lieutenant Rouillet, a French airman, dropped bombs on the Austrian submarine U11 on July 1, 1915, one of them bursting near her conning tower, killing four men and wounding others, besides damaging the submarine herself. The destroyer Bisson sank, by gun-fire, on August 15, 1915, the Austrian submarine U3, and the submarine Papin torpedoed some enemy destroyers. The commanding officer of the latter boat, Lieutenant Cochin, carried out an enterprise of astounding hardihood which had perhaps had no parallel in the war.⁶ In clearing an area of mines,

1916, and was herself sunk, apparently by aeroplane bombs, in the following September. The destroyer Renaudin was torpedoed and sunk by an Austrian submarine, February 18, 1916. On May 4, 1916, an Austrian destroyer was sunk by the French submarine Bernouilli.

The events at the Dardanelles and in the Gallipoli Peninsula have been dealt with at length in several previous chapters. It will suffice, therefore, to give here merely such a brief sketch of the course of operations as will make clear the share of the French Fleet in them. The relations of the Allied Fleets at the Dardanelles were intimate and satisfactory from the very beginning, and British and French officers worked together with the utmost confidence, cordiality and understanding. Vice-Admiral Sir Saekville Carden was in command,



THE BATTLESHIP "SUFFREN."

and that gallant and energetic officer, Rear-Admiral Guépratte, with his flag in the Suffren, commanded the French forces under his orders. As the *Tenedos Times* said:

Armies on land, the Fleets at sea,
What better alliance could there be?
We'll lead the German dogs a dance,
England for ever! Vive la France!

After the German cruisers had taken refuge in the Dardanelles, British ships remained to establish a watching blockade, and on September 26, 1914, they were joined by the French battleships Suffren and Verité. On the very night of the arrival of the French ships the Allied squadron navigated in company without lights, and on the next day the ships engaged in steam evolutions, manoeuvring in line and abreast, altering course together, and in other movements showing that the brotherhood of arms was already giving the desirable cohesion to the combined forces. On November 3, Turkey having thrown in her lot with the Central Powers, orders had arrived to make a demonstration against the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. The Indefatigable and Indomitable, followed by the Suffren and Verité, approached at 15 knots to within a range of about 13,000 yards, and shelled the defences, inflicting a good deal of damage, especially at Kum Kale, which was the target of the Suffren. The object was understood to be to discover, by means of a practical test, the effective range of the Turkish forts.

This warning to the Turks, however, set them at work, with the active advice and assistance of their German masters, in making good the damage done, preparing to mount new guns, providing mobile batteries, accumulating ammunition, digging trenches, and obtaining large quantities of mines in order to be ready to

sow the waters with these engines. The winter came on, and in that region, visited frequently by violent gales and heavy seas, the task of the blockaders was of the most difficult. Damage was sometimes suffered, making necessary the return of ships to their bases to undergo repair. The principal naval base was established at Mudros. It was the practice for the ships to lie at single anchor at Tenedos during daylight, with banked fires, and to patrol at night upon appointed sectors of the sea outside the entrance to the Dardanelles. No lights were carried by the ships, and the need of very cautious navigation made it an anxious time for their captains and navigators. In the French ships it was the practice to post an observer, provided with a good night glass, on each bow and each quarter of the vessel. Each of these observers was responsible for watching the sea in the sector comprised between two lines extended from the ship as a centre to the two extremities of a quadrant of the circle. In this way the whole sea was under observation, and the watchers were instructed to report anything that might betoken the existence of any vessel or floating buoy or other object, and especially anything that might appear in the way of a periscope or air bubbles, indicating the presence of a submarine. Men lay by the searchlights and guns ready for any emergency or alarm.

The weary work of watching during the winter, in a period of intermittent roaring gales and flat calms, was marked by no mishaps. Commandant Vedel has preserved an extract from a letter or journal of Sub-Lieutenant Coindreau, who was in the French flagship, throwing light upon the winter work. "Our sole diversion was to visit Sigri in the island of

Mitylene, the Lesbos of the Ancients, for coal. While a collier transferred to us as quickly as possible supplies for our bunkers, we eagerly scanned the little houses of a village on the coast through a cloud of impalpable dust which invaded everywhere on board and raised a veil between us and the land. With the aid of a glass we could see children playing before the doors, which was a sort of consolation to us who never left the ship, showing us that not all the joy of life was banished from the world. And when a local vessel, entering the port or leaving it, slid easily through the oily sea, the quiet of her movements contrasted with the fever of our own reminded us that the evil dream of war would yet have its end."

The causes which led to one of the most disastrous series of events in our naval and military history have no place here. The decisions were taken in London, and the French agreed to and loyally acquiesced in them, and were eager to participate in all the operations necessary for the execution of them. The scheme was first propounded in November, 1914, and the War Council decided on January 13, 1915, that the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in the following month

"to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective." M. Augagneur, Minister of Marine, described the plans as "prudent et prévoyant." The results were the bombardment of the outer forts on February 19 to 25, followed by the great naval attack on March 18. Several successive operations were intended, leading up to the decisive operation against Constantinople. The forts on the sea-front were first to be destroyed. Mine-sweepers were then to clear the entrance channel. Next the inner forts were to be silenced, and then the Kilid Bahr and Chanak Forts at the Narrows were to be pulverized. Then the Allied Fleet would proceed into the Sea of Marmora. How far this programme was carried out, and where it was arrested, has been told in previous chapters. The British fleet had been increased to a strength of eighteen ships of the line, including the Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson, and Agamemnon. The French squadron now consisted of the Suffren (flag), Bouvet, Gaulois, and Charlemagne, all mounting 12-in. guns as their heaviest armament. The deep water port of Trebouki, in the north of the island of Skyros, was at times the anchorage.



[French official photograph.]

ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN ON BOARD THE "WALDECK-ROUSSEAU."

In the bombardment of February 19 the *Suffren*, at a range of about 10,000 yards, knocked out three of the four big guns at Kum Kale, the effect of her fire being observed and reported by the *Bouvet*, which took up a position some 9,000 yards east of Cape Helles. The *Suffren* then supported the *Vengeance* by pouring a most destructive fire on Fort Ertogroul, one of the defences on Cape Helles. On the next day Admiral De Robeck, on board the *Inflexible*, cordially thanked Captain de Margerye for his gallant and effective inter-




ADMIRALS GUÉPRATTE AND FOURNIER.

vention. Bad weather interfered with the operations, which were not resumed until February 25. When Admiral Carden had explained his plan to Admiral Guépratte, the latter had asked to have the honour of leading the attack, but Admiral De Robeck was senior, and claimed the privilege for himself. The French *Gaulois* was in the first attack on that date, supporting the action of the *Agamemnon* in bombarding Kum Kale and the forts at Cape Helles, and in the second advance the *Suffren* and *Charlemagne* and the *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis* advanced in pairs to attack the entrance forts. The French flagship approached to within about 1,000 yards of the line of anchored mines before turning. By this tremendous bombardment the outer gate of the Dardanelles was broken down.

The French had a full share in the second phase of the operations—the perilous work of mine-sweeping. Intimate as was their co-operation with the British naval forces, it was

a point of honour with them to provide everything that was necessary for their own share in the operations. Their destroyers and submarines were with the fleet. They were assembling a great number of trawlers, coasting vessels, yachts, tugs, tankers, repair ships, hospital ships, fishing vessels from Arcaehon, Monaco, and other ports, boats of every kind, seaplanes for discovering mines, etc.—*Charrue*, *Goliath*, *Henriette*, *Marseillais*, *Poupée*, *Provence*, *Rateau*, *Pioche*, *Herse*, *Chambon*, *Camargue*, and very many others. The old salts of the French fisheries were as splendid fellows as the men in the British mine-sweepers. They carried their lives in their hands in their dangerous work, which they conducted with the utmost coolness, often under fire, and menaced by German aeroplanes, which frequently dropped bombs about them. The work became so perilous that ultimately it could only be conducted at night. The mine-sweepers then usually entered the Straits at about 11 o'clock escorted by destroyers, being able to keep a speed of only about three knots against the current. The Turkish searchlights were always endeavouring to discover them, and sometimes did, but the damage inflicted was inconsiderable, and the mine-sweeping work was successful. During the day the battleships kept the whole space which had been swept by the trawlers under the fire of their guns, and every suspected craft venturing from the shore was immediately surrounded by the splashing of shells. But the task of the mine-sweepers was, nevertheless, like that of Sisyphus, for the Turks and Germans were still able to plant new engines in their mine-fields, and they constantly set adrift floating mines of the most formidable character on the current, which is always flowing down through the Dardanelles to the Aegean. The work of the mine-sweepers, therefore, was continuous, whenever practicable at night, throughout the whole of these operations, and light cruisers and other vessels were always supporting them, while aeroplanes flying low endeavoured to discover their quarry for them by day. The French mine-sweepers, though often the targets for the shore guns, and on one or more occasions attacked by torpedoes from the fixed stations at Suan Deré and elsewhere, were, on the whole, more fortunate than our own. The *Camargue* and *Chambon* were both hit, and men were wounded on board, but they returned safely to their base.



French official photographs.



INTERIOR OF A FRENCH SUBMARINE.
The Commander is at the periscope, the men are at their posts.

In the smaller picture the air-tube is seen overhead, and in the centre the breech of a torpedo-tube.

French submarines also engaged in the work among the enemy's minefields and found many opportunities for distinction. They went in to look out for possible mine-layers, and also to observe and report on the position of the shore guns. For the latter purpose, having penetrated the danger zone, they were accustomed to navigate submerged, attracting fire by the visible wash caused by their periscopes, and thus they were able to observe the positions of the batteries. One of them, the *Coulomb*, had a remarkable adventure, and narrowly escaped destruction, and a sister boat, the *Joule*, was sunk. Both belonged to a class of submarine built at Cherbourg, Rochefort,

and Toulon in 1909-12, and named after eminent men of science. They had a displacement of 398 tons, a speed of $12\frac{1}{2}$ knots on the surface and $7\frac{3}{4}$ knots submerged, and were armed with seven tubes, and carried 30 officers and men. Three others, the *Saphir* and *Turquoise*, of an earlier class, and the *Mariotte*, one of the most recent submarines, were also lost in the Dardanelles operations.

The gallant action of the *Coulomb*, under command of Lieutenant Delègue, occurred on March 15, three days before the great attack in which the battleship *Bouvet* was sunk. It was a case of a mine being towed, caught out of a tangled minefield, and it anticipated a like episode in the adventurous and successful cruise of the British *E11*, Lieut. Commander M. E. Nasmith, when that submarine entered Constantinople harbour in the following June and returned carrying an enemy mine for a distance of eleven miles.

The *Coulomb* on the occasion referred to reached the entrance at daybreak, as the mine-sweepers were coming out after their night's work. She navigated on the surface until abreast of Eski Hissarlik point on the European side, where she submerged. Thence her course took her past the White Cliffs and almost into Kephez Bay on the opposite shore. No sus-

picious vessel was sighted, and the *Coulomb* then returned for a certain distance on her course. She had been under a hail of fire, the Turkish gunners having observed the wash of her periscope, and rifle bullets had been hammering frequently on her conning tower and sides. She had withdrawn her periscope, and when she turned again to go up the Straits she used it only at intervals. Once more she approached *Kephez*, and then, having attained her purpose of locating the position of the

a strange and terrible situation, but the commanding officer was cool and collected. In the hope of disembarassing himself he came to the surface, but no sooner had he done so than an enemy aeroplane, which had come from *Suan Dere*, made a nose dive towards him and began to drop bombs. He had no choice but to submerge, and in that position went slowly on. Then he came to the surface again, only to find himself in the near neighbourhood of a Turkish destroyer, which, having seen what had



[French official photograph.]

A FRENCH SUBMARINE.

shore guns, altered course to return to her base at *Rabbit Island*, but, as she did so, those on board felt a sudden shock and the submarine began to swing round. Then blows were heard against the hull, and the lever actuating the submerging planes became very difficult to work. Lieut. *Delègue* tried in vain to go at speed ahead, and progress was very slow. The striking of some object at the hull of the submarine continued, and then, as the chronicler has recorded, all those in the submarine realized that *Death* himself was knocking at the wall. The cable of a mine had hooked in one of the forward hydroplanes, and the mine itself was bumping against the shell of the boat. The question was whether the infernal machine would explode at this blow or the next. It was

happened, had come out in the hope of giving the *coup de grâce* to the submarine. Lieut. *Delègue* was too quick for him, and plunged once more, after which he progressed slowly towards the mouth of the Strait, using his periscope only when it was absolutely necessary, until at last he got out of the danger zone.

It was an extraordinary and providential thing that the bumping mine, with the strange eccentricity which sometimes characterizes such destructive engines, did not explode, and when the submarine finally emerged, those on board had the joy of seeing the infernal mechanism, at last disengaged, float away. They distinctly saw the mine with its cable and anchor gear, which they had carried along with them from the Straits. A patrolling vessel also

observed the mine, and exploded it by gun-fire. The submarine had had a remarkably narrow escape.

The four submarines lost by the French at the Dardanelles and in the Sea of Marmora were the *Joule*, *Mariotte*, *Saphir*, and *Turquoise*. Three of them met with misfortune in later months, after the great naval attack in March, but it will be convenient to record and describe the incidents here, before leaving the subject of the gallant

company, of whom not an officer nor a man survived.

The *Joule* was commanded by Lieut. Aubert Dupetit-Thouars de Saint-Georges, a member of a very distinguished French naval family. He was the cousin of a brilliant officer of the same name in the French Navy, who was second in command of the flagship *Suffren* at the Dardanelles; his uncle was the Admiral Dupetit-Thouars who left a name famous in the Pacific; to his grand-uncle France owed the



[French official photograph.]

MARINES DRAWN UP ON THE AFTER-DECK OF THE "WALDECK-ROUSSEAU,"
Beneath the 7.6 inch Guns.

deeds of the French submarines. Like the British *E11*, *E14*, *E15*, and other submarines, they were endeavouring to interfere with the Turkish transports carrying troops to the Gallipoli Peninsula. On May 1 the *Joule*, which had left Mudros in the early morning, was engaged in this duty at the Narrows. She had been seen to submerge, but was not seen again. The Australian submarine *AE2* was sunk at the same time. An intercepted Turkish wireless message stated that an unknown submarine had fouled a mine, and been blown up off Chanak. Afterwards the *Agamemnon* picked up the air-chamber of a torpedo which had belonged to the *Joule*, and there could no longer be any doubt as to her fate or that of her gallant

possession of Tahiti; his great grand-uncle was the famous captain of the *Tonnant* at the Nile, the brave Dupetit-Thouars who had his foot shot off and his leg broken, and is stated to have had himself placed on a barrel that he might die at the post of honour, in the spirit of our own redoubtable Benbow, and of Widdrington, too, who "when his legs were smitten off, he fought upon his stumps." The brilliant young officer who perished in the *Joule* was worthy of all the officers of his great name.

The submarine *Mariotte*, a vessel of 615 tons submerged, which had been very capably handled, was sunk by Turkish fire, July 26, 1915, in the Dardanelles. The *Turquoise*, which, like several British submarines, pene-

trated to the Sea of Marinnora, had the misfortune to go ashore near Gallipoli, where she was overpowered and captured on November 3 by the Turks, who renamed her *Almed*. The incident took place too far up the Straits to make it possible for enterprising men to save her from this fate, as was done in the case of the British submarine *E15*, when she stranded near Kephez Point. The *Saphir* was lost at an earlier date, in January.

The great attack on the forts at the Narrows on March 18 has been described in a previous chapter, and here it is necessary only to relate the operations of the French squadron, formed of the *Suffren* (Captain de Marguerye), *Gaulois*



CAPT. BIARD OF THE "GAULOIS."

(Captain Biard), *Charlemagne* (Captain Lagrè-sille), and *Bouvet* (Captain Rageot de La Touche), which was most gallantly led into action by Admiral Guépratte, whom British officers began to call the "Fire-Eater." When the British ships had poured their destructive fire on the forts, causing a terrific explosion in Fort Hamidieh on the Asiatic side, and setting the village of Chanak in flames, it was thought that such damage had been inflicted on the forts that the older ships could engage. Accordingly the French squadron was ordered to take up a

position about 4,000 yards in advance of the British ships, and to attack the forts on both sides of the Narrows. The *Suffren* and *Bouvet* came within about 4,000 yards of Fort Dardanus on the Asiatic side, and within about 2,000 yards of the White Cliffs, where many howitzers were in position. All the forts and batteries



THE BATTLESHIP "GAULOIS."

on this side were firing. The *Gaulois* and *Suffren* kept at about the same distance from the shore on the European side, where they were under the fire of the batteries at Swan Dere.

Admiral Guépratte reported that all the Turkish guns were well served, and that the mobile batteries were numerous and concealed in the folds of the ground, and often changed their positions. The French ships were almost at point blank range from these guns, but had little time to attend to them, being engaged in shelling heavily the forts at the Narrows. The four ships suffered a good deal from the intense fire of the enemy. "Eh bien!" said the Admiral, "j'ai ressenti une vive et légitime satisfaction à constater qu'en dépit de vicissitudes variées, aucun de nos batiments ne songeait à reculer d'une semelle." They were compelled to remain almost stopped in order to fire effectively at the forts, moving little more than under the influence of the current.

Serious injuries were suffered by the *Gaulois*, *Bouvet*, and *Suffren*, but they maintained their fire with the utmost intensity. In the *Bouvet*, when fire was first opened, the pneumatic apparatus for driving out the deleterious gases of the shells in the forward 12-inch turret failed to act, and all the men in the turret were asphyxiated. But the fire of all the ships was

continued until, after about an hour and a half's shelling of the Turkish positions, the French squadron was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw. Gallant Captain Ragoot de La Touche in the Bouvet could not willingly resign himself to leave the scene of action, where he was posted nearest to the Chanak forts, and Admiral Guépratte had to signal to him a second time to retire. He seems, like Nelson to have wished to turn a blind eye to the signal when it was first hoisted in the French flagship. Then he turned to follow in the wake of the Suffren, and, as he did so, a drifting mine struck his ship and tore a hole in her starboard side. In less than a minute the doomed vessel listed heavily to starboard, one of her 6·4 inch gun turrets breaking away and rolling into the sea. In an incredibly short space of time she disappeared, carrying with her a gallant and devoted company of 29 officers and 680 men. Of these only 71 were saved, including five young officers. The sinking of the Bouvet was a swift and terrible tragedy, but discipline prevailed to the last. The gallant captain and

was when some survivors of the Bouvet were brought to him on board the Suffren. Among them was one man who was so overjoyed at finding himself alive that he exclaimed: "Ma foi, Amiral, j'aurais cru qu'une mine c'était plus terrible que ça!"

The flagship Suffren was hit ten times by shell fire within fourteen minutes, and, as she turned to change positions with the Bouvet, a 9·4 inch projectile passed clean through one of her 6·4 inch turrets, and exploded in a casemate, killing a dozen men and setting fire to that part of the ship. The fire was extinguished, but the magazine would have blown up but for the presence of mind of one of the warrant officers who flooded it. The Gaulois, on the European side of the Straits, was most seriously injured below water by the fire of one of the forts, and water entered in such quantities that the pumps could hardly cope with the danger. Captain Biard, who handled his ship with consummate skill, saw his danger, but declined help, and disdained to seek safety by running the vessel on the Gallipoli shore, where he would have dishonoured himself



THE END OF THE "BOUVET."

On the left of the picture is the "Suffren," and on the extreme right the "Lord Nelson," both approaching the sinking ship.

all the senior officers perished, and the few survivors were rescued by the boats of the squadron, many of them by the British battleship Prince George. It is stated that the Turks concentrated fire on the rescuing boats. Admiral Guépratte, in describing the disaster, said that in the most tremendous events there are sometimes words which will bring a smile to the lips, and so it

and his flag. Instead, accepting the risk, he held boldly on in the hope of reaching Drepano, for to run to Tenedos would have been impossible. The ship was going down by the bows, and her progress could not but be slow, yet everything was disciplined and in order. When Admiral Guépratte went on board, the hawse-holes were already under water, but the bugles rang out



THE "GAULOIS" AT THE DARDANELLES.



THE BATTLESHIP "BOUVET."

Sunk in the Dardanelles March 18, 1915.

and the guard was mounted with naval precision to receive him. By skilful handling, and by the happy fortune which attended the good seaman who was her captain, the ship was safely beached on Rabbit Island, where she was temporarily repaired. Of the four French ships which shared in this gallant action, the *Charlemagne* (Captain Lagrésille), though she had fought as brilliantly as the others, was the only one that received little injury from the enemy's fire.

How the British ships suffered which went in to relieve the French is well known. The *Ocean* and *Irresistible* were both sunk by mines, and the *Inflexible* was seriously injured both by shell fire and by mine. The naval attack was not resumed, but to both the allied squadrons ships were added to replace those which were lost or required repair. The *Suffren* and *Gaulois* proceeded to Toulon, and the *Charlemagne*, with six destroyers, and the submarines *Faraday* and *Le Verrier* alone remained. The old battleship *Jauréguiberry* very soon arrived, becoming the flagship of Admiral Guépratte, accompanied by the coast-defence ship *Henri Quatre*. Then in April came the destroyer *Trident*, five torpedo boats, and two submarines, followed by the armoured cruisers *Jeanne d'Arc* and *Jatouche-Tréville*. The battleship *Saint Louis*, and the *Suffren*, repaired and refitted, arrived in May. The great harbour of Mudros became filled with shipping of every class and variety. The first French battalions began to

arrive from Alexandria about April 17, and by the 25th the French had assembled 15,000 men, with 92 guns. But to recount the gallant story of the disembarkation and the tremendous fighting, in which these troops took a great share, is not intended here, nor to relate the story of the withdrawal.

The part played by the French warships must not, however, be omitted in this record. The British landing force left Mudros on the afternoon of April 25. The French were to make a diversion by disembarking at Kum Kale, with the purpose of deceiving the Turks into the belief that an advance in strength might be made upon the Chanak position. But the operation was not intended to be pushed far, and only 2,800 men were put on shore, with a battery of 75's. The transport work rested with the Navy. The troops left Mudros at about 10 p.m. on the 25th in five ships, accompanied by a hospital ship, and were escorted by the *Jauréguiberry*, flagship, the Russian cruiser *Askold*, the old "coast defence" ship *Henri Quatre*, the armoured cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc* and some destroyers, while the auxiliaries *Provence* and *Lorraine* made a feint in Besika Bay. The batteries on shore were heavily shelled by the ships, and the troops were successfully landed, except that one boat full of men was sunk and the men killed or drowned by one of the batteries ere they could strike a blow. The disembarkation was completed by the afternoon, and the

men entrenched themselves, after hot fighting, in which the warships supported them by well-directed fire. At daybreak on the next morning the ships again shelled all the Turkish positions, those on both sides of the Menderes River and on the headland, but the batteries were not silenced, and the *Jeanne d'Arc* suffered some injury. On shore the troops were menaced by increasing forces, the situation was not encouraging, and the object of the expedition having been achieved as far as was possible they were re-embarked before the dawn.

to Ney from Tordesillas: "Si vous entendiez le feu demain matin, il faudrait marcher droit sur le feu." Just in that spirit did Captain Dumesnil of the *Latouche-Tréville* steam into the Dardanelles, and Admiral Guépratte applauded his having acted without orders in coming to the aid of the troops.

The little cruiser—she displaced only 4,700 tons, dated from 1892, and had been "scrapped" by some compilers of lists of "effective" ships—was destined to do very useful work and to gain great renown at the Dardanelles. The main



GUNNERS OF THE "JAURÉGUIBERRY."

On the night of this landing the cruiser *Latouche-Tréville* joined the Fleet. She had left Alexandria, and as she approached Lemnos in the afternoon had heard the guns at the Dardanelles at a distance of over 60 miles. Arriving at Mudros she found the great harbour empty of its vast array of transports and auxiliaries, and without a moment's hesitation her commander decided to steam to the sound of the guns. "Marchez au canon!" had been an old instruction of the French army. Napoleon described it as a first principle of war to go to the assistance of troops attacked if there were any doubt of their success. He enforced the duty of marching to the sound of the guns upon Generals Nansouty, d'Hautpoul and Klein in October, 1806, and in December, 1808, he wrote

body of the French expeditionary force had assembled at Tenedos, being there joined by the troops returned from Kum Kale, and the disembarkation on the Gallipoli coast, within the Straits, was effected on April 27 and subsequent days. The operation included the putting on shore of a considerable army, with guns, ammunition, horses, mules, camping material, drinking water and an immense volume of stores, and it was accomplished by the boats and means furnished by the French Navy. The work was exceedingly arduous, for the beaches were often swept by enemy fire, and the army, having been landed, had to be reinforced, supplied with munitions, and fed and watered. The skill and endurance of the French seamen were taxed to a high degree.



[French official photograph.]

THE OLD ARMOURD CRUISER "LATOUCHE-TRÉVILLE" AT THE PIRÆUS.

The Turks made fierce assaults on the positions the troops had occupied, which extended from Sedd-el-Bahr, round Morto Bay, and to the Kereves Dere ravine on the north side of Eski Hissarlik. So sustained and threatening became the attacks that General d'Amade applied to Admiral Guépratte for the landing of a naval brigade to support the troops, who had then been fighting for six days and six nights, and were almost exhausted. The division of General Bailloud was daily expected to arrive, and meanwhile the need of help was pressing. Large parties of officers and men who would be required to form the naval landing party were at the time engaged as working parties ashore, but they were recalled, equipped and landed, accompanied by some small guns. It was necessary also to keep under intense fire the slope of Kereves Dere, where the Turks were attempting to drive the French out of their lines.

The situation became very menacing, and the *Latouche-Tréville*, which carried two 7.6 in., six 5.5 in. and some smaller guns, was chosen to execute this duty, which involved considerable risk. The guns of Aehi-Baba soon made her a target, and it was only by skilful seamanship in keeping under way that she could hope to confuse the aim of the gunners on that commanding position. At night the plucky little cruiser anchored for a time about 2,000 yards from the shore, kept the whole ravine illuminated with her searchlights, so that the greatly fatigued French troops could not be taken by surprise, and systematically shelled the Turkish positions. By skilful handling she suffered little damage.

It was a critical time, and General d'Amade warmly thanked the French Admiral for the precious help of the brigade landed in the emergency, and for the very effective and courageous service of the *Latouche-Tréville*, which had prevented the Turks from attacking with the vigour they had previously displayed. Upon her support, he said, he continued to depend, as guard of the French right flank, and indeed of the flank of the Allied armies.

This service was of the utmost importance, but the *Latouche-Tréville* required fresh supplies of ammunition and some slight repairs. Admiral Guépratte decided, therefore, to enter the Straits in his own flagship, the *Jauréguiberry*. She soon came under the fire of the Aehi-Baba batteries, while her own smaller guns continued to shell the Turkish positions in the ravine. One large shell struck the after part of the flagship, passed through the Admiral's cabin, broke up much of the furniture and gilt work, shattered a portrait of Admiral Jauréguiberry which hung there, scattered Admiral Guépratte's papers in great confusion, and exploded on the lower deck. The Admiral himself had a narrow escape. Commandant Vedel has preserved the story. Lieutenant Delègue, the same cool and capable officer who had had the extraordinary experience in the submarine *Concomb*, which is related above, was now serving in the *Jauréguiberry*, and said of Admiral Guépratte: "Pas un mot, pas un geste chez cet homme qui ne sait ce que c'est que la peur, ni même que l'appréhension." British officers did not forget, when they heard of the French Admiral's gallantry, that when the Atlantic Fleet visited Brest in



ON BOARD A FRENCH MINE-SWEEPER: PREPARING TO RAISE A DERELICT TORPEDO.



ON BOARD A FRENCH MINE SWEEPER: GETTING THE "FIND" ABOARD.

1905 to cement the Anglo-French Entente, a ball was given on July 11 in honour of the visitors on board the historic and now famous old battleship *Jauréguiberry*.

Until the close of the Dardanelles operations one or other of the French battleships or cruisers was always supporting, with effective fire, the operations of the troops on shore. One broadside usually enfiladed the enemy's positions at Kereves Dere, while the other shelled the batteries on the Asiatic side. It was a most dangerous duty, and the British Navy came to the assistance of the French. While engaged in this work, just inside the straits, the battleship *Goliath* was torpedoed and sunk by the Turkish destroyer, *Muavenet-i-Millet*, commanded by a German officer, on May 12. The chief trial of the French ships was to withstand the destructive howitzer fire of the enemy, and some naval guns were landed and placed in a concrete-protected battery on the beach, in the hope that a better-directed fire might be brought to bear upon the Turkish batteries in the opposite region of Erenkeui and In Tepe than was possible from the moving ships.

After the disaster to the *Goliath* the ships were not allowed to remain within the Straits at night. The French vessels then anchored under Kum Kale, but it was found that drifting mines came in that direction, and they afterwards went to Mudros or Kephalos. Neither of these anchorages was without disadvantages, which affected both the French and ourselves. *Kephalos* had no protection from the north, and was swept by a high sea in northerly gales, while at Mudros the transshipments and disembarcations, due to want of pier and wharfage accommodation, were often seriously impeded by winds from the north or south. Leaving one or other of these anchorages very early in the morning, the French ships arrived off the Dardanelles at dawn to take up their positions. When it became known that one or more big German submarines had passed Gibraltar, the situation of the ships became more critical. While supporting the Anzac position on May 25 the *Triumph* was torpedoed and sunk, and the *Majestic* suffered the same fate off Cape Helles two days later.

The French ships were more fortunate. When under way they kept on irregular and zig-zag courses, thus countering the effects of the submarines. The auxiliary *Carthage* was, how-

ever, sunk off Cape Helles on July 4. Great caution was exercised, but when the troops were attacking the enemy's commanding positions, and naval help was required, it was provided. Once again the gallant *Latouche-Tréville* was employed in the work under hostile fire, and threatened by the enemy's submarines. A destroyer circled round her, while a flotilla of destroyers and armed vessels, under a hail of fire, continued to engage the enemy closely.

Thus did the French Navy assist and support the army in those times of the epic story of the Dardanelles in the disembarcation, the heroic struggle against the outnumbering foe, and the wonderful work of the withdrawal, which was directed by Rear-Admiral Le Bon. Vice-Admiral Nicol arrived to reinforce the squadron, and to assume the chief command.

"To the very end," said Admiral Guépratte, when he said farewell to his old squadron, "brave officers and men expended themselves without counting their sacrifices, in circumstances nearly always difficult and often under the fire of the enemy." It was a splendid story, though it ended in a cruel failure to achieve that which, if all the efforts had been co-ordinated for a sharp and rapid operation, might have proved a crowning success.

We will now turn again to the Mediterranean situation, as it affected the French Navy and to the events in which it took part. That sea was a theatre of hostilities of paramount importance to the French. Its waters were traversed by French transports and supply ships from end to end and from side to side from the very beginning. It was vital to the Allies to exercise command of the sea there. The fighting strength of the enemy was not confined to his warships. The big steamship lines of Germany were capable of furnishing numerous vessels, which would have been a constant danger to the Allies.

Many of them were in neutral ports in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war, and the Germans claimed the right to transform them into fighting ships on the high seas. Patrols were, therefore, immediately established, and kept a close watch on them in case they should leave neutral waters. This precaution was the more necessary because, in addition to the ships recognized as convertible into cruisers, events showed that among the apparently purely commercial ships then in the Mediterra-



OFF CEPHALONIA.

[French official photograph.]

mean many were concealing military stores of all kinds destined for German cruisers and those of the German allies. The watch was completely effective, and of these auxiliary ships not one was able to fulfil its mission. At the same time some hundred of other ships found themselves blockaded in neutral ports where they had taken refuge. Thus, from the very first, enemy ships of war, auxiliary ships, and merchant ships were all condemned to inaction.

The blockade in the Mediterranean was even more difficult than in the North Sea. The neutral flag was employed to cover enemy goods, and the possibility of transmitting commodities through Spain to Cartagena or other ports increased the difficulties of the work for the French Navy. The many peninsulas and islands of the Mediterranean enabled non-continuous voyages to be made and circuitous routes to be taken. The difficulties were increased by the number of countries remaining neutral, and neutral shippers showed great astuteness in their dealings, whereby a very difficult and delicate task was imposed upon the French Navy. The resources of the French mercantile marine were not inexhaustible, and it was not without great difficulty that the necessary armed patrols were organized. Fortunately, the difficulties had been largely overcome by the time the great strain of the transport of the troops for the Dardanelles and Salonika began, but during the whole sub-

sequent period the transport of troops and army stores was in progress.

There is hardly space to recount here the many operations and activities of the French Navy in the Mediterranean. When, in February, 1915, the Turkish Army from Syria made its attempt upon the Suez Canal, the old French light cruiser D'Entrecasteaux brought her 9·4 in. guns into action, and the ancient ironclad Requin, which dated from 1885, and had been used as a gunnery training ship, smashed up some of the Turks' heavy artillery. Some French torpedo boats were employed in patrolling the Suez Canal, and the armoured cruiser Montcalm, fresh from the Far East, was at Suez and with British vessels patrolling the Red Sea. In April the battleship Saint Louis and in May the cruiser D'Estrées bombarded the Turkish positions at El Arish, and the Jeanne d'Arc and D'Estrées destroyed petrol depôts near the coast. A French seaplane carrier was employed in these Egyptian operations, and several squadrons of naval aeroplanes were flying over the canal region. The Allied navies worked in the closest collaboration, and often French airmen to up British officers as observers.*

The French maintained a detached squadron in the Levant and off the Syrian coast, ready

* A complete account of the First "Invasion of Egypt," with further details of the operations of the French warships, will be found in Vol. IV., Chapter LXXIII.

to check the enemy's communications along the littoral, to control suspicious shipping, hunt out submarine bases, and bombard enemy positions. The Allied navies co-operated in many operations off the coast of Asia Minor and in the Aegean. The French mine-layer *Casabianca* was sunk at the entrance to the Aegean, June 3, 1915. A blockade extending from the Egyptian frontier to the island of Samos was declared. The Greek island of Castellorizo, off Cape Khelidonia, on the southern coast of Asia Minor, was occupied on December 29, 1915, as a base for the French operations.

The French also occupied Corfu, not in a military sense, but to organize the place for the reception of the Serbian army, which was withdrawn from Albania. The landing was conducted in a masterly manner. The squadron of four cruisers arrived at Corfu on January 11, 1916, at 2 a.m., and the disembarcation began immediately, the whole being completed by 11 a.m. No transports were used, every man, gun, horse and mule and all the ammunition, stores and forage being conveyed in the four cruisers, which came, unexpectedly to the authorities of Corfu, without lights and escorted by destroyers. No horse slings were used, the animals being lowered in ordinary ships' boats with the thwarts removed, and with straw and cherecoal laid in the bottoms to prevent slipping.

The naval commander-in-chief in the Medi-

terranean was Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, who had left the Levant command in October, 1915, and directed many operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the landing and charge of the Salonika expedition, the action taken by the Allies against Greece, and the blockade of that country, until Vice-Admiral Gauchet was appointed to succeed him in December, 1916.

The history of the Salonika expedition does not belong to this chapter. The British 10th Division, under command of Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon, which arrived early in October, 1915, had been preceded by the disembarcation of two French Divisions, commanded by General Sarrail, whose force was soon strengthened by the coming of a third Division. This great force, with all its guns, ammunition, horses, mules, camp equipment, and every requirement for active service, was under the charge of the naval forces commanded by Admiral du Fournet, and, as at the Dardanelles, the operation of setting the army on the shore taxed the power of organization and the skill and resource of the French naval officers to the highest possible degree. The task was accomplished with magnificent success, and the army, once landed, had to be kept supplied with ammunition and every requirement for its service over a long period. This continued to impose an enormous strain on the resources of the French mercantile marine and on the Navy, which was



VICTUALLING A FRENCH WAR-SHIP OFF SALAMIS.

responsible for the maintenance of its communications.

The increasing menace of the submarine added to the anxieties of the Admiral and cast a duty of sleepless vigilance on his officers and on the men of the patrol service. There were some disasters, as will subsequently be shown. The attitude assumed by the Greek Government, threatening the security of the allied armies, soon imposed new duties on the sister navies under their French Commander-in-Chief.

The forts at the entrance to Salonika harbour

It was at this time that M. Venizelos, with Admirals Condouriotis and Miaulis, left the Piræus for Crete, where the Provisional Government was proclaimed on the 28th. The developments were rapid, and on October 11 Admiral du Fournet presented an ultimatum to the Greek Government, demanding, as a precautionary measure, in view of the security of the Allied fleet and army, the surrender to his control of the entire Greek fleet, with the exception of the armoured cruiser *Georgios Averoff* and the two old battleships, *Kilkis*



FRENCH TROOPS LEAVING CORFU FOR SALONIKA.

were occupied by British and French troops and allied naval detachments at the end of December, 1915, in order to control the operations of the enemy submarines, which had made Salonika their base. On April 9, 1916, the Allies announced their intention of occupying the harbour of Argostoli and establishing bases in some of the Ionian islands

Admiral du Fournet also made his dispositions, in accordance with diplomatic instructions, to exercise the necessary compulsion upon the Greek Government, and on September 1, 1916, he arrived off the Piræus with a large Allied fleet and took possession of the wireless telegraphic service of the Greek warships. An embargo was also placed on Greek shipping,

and Lemnos, which had been bought for the United States. He also demanded the control of the Piræus-Larissa railway. The ultimatum was complied with under protest, and the fleet, consisting mainly of a dozen effective destroyers, was handed over at Keratsini, and French seamen were drafted into them, the French flag being hoisted. On the 16th the Admiral landed Allied detachments to proceed to Athens, and the arsenal, the submarine defences, and the munition depôts on the islands of Leros and Cyra were taken under control. Then followed the demand for the surrender of Greek guns and the landing of detachments from the Allied fleets, which were treacherously attacked with some loss in very serious fighting.

A blockade of the Greek ports was afterwards proclaimed.

The presence of numerous enemy submarines in the Mediterranean, especially from September, 1915, onwards, created a danger which increased to very serious proportions. Admiral du Fournet had a task before him of stupendous difficulty in organizing and protecting the sea services of the armies on very long lines of communication. The transport *Calvados* was sunk, and among other vessels the *Sidi-Ferruch*, at Algiers, and the *Yser*, ex-

when about 1,000 lives were lost out of 1,800 on board. The vessel sank within 15 minutes of being struck by the torpedo. A sharp lookout had been kept, but nothing was seen to indicate the presence of the submarine, of which the identity was disclosed afterwards. The menace began to assume larger proportions. The British Navy lost the battleship *Russell*, claimed by the Germans to have been sunk by a submarine, and other smaller war vessels. On October 4 the British transport *Franconia* and the French transport *Gallia* were both



EMBARKING ARTILLERY FOR SALONIKA.

Dacia, of the Hamburg-Amerika line, off Philippeville. French and British naval forces made a systematic search for submarine bases throughout the Aegean and the Levant, and parties landed at Corfu, Santi Quaranta, Zante, Phaleron, Corinth, and elsewhere. Admiral Lacaze was now Minister of Marine, and he wisely over-ruled the objection of his predecessors to the arming of merchantmen. The light cruiser *Amiral Charner* was torpedoed off the Syrian coast in February, 1916. On the 26th of the same month the French auxiliary cruiser *Provence II.*, which was engaged in transporting troops and military stores to Salonika, was torpedoed in mid-Mediterranean by the German submarine U35,

sunk by enemy submarines. In the British vessel only 12 of the crew were missing, but the *Gallia* was full of French and Serbian troops to the number of 2,000, and about 600 were lost. One of the magazines blew up and the wireless installation was destroyed, making it impossible to call for help. At about the same time the Germans claimed that one of their submarines had sunk a small French cruiser or submarine destroyer, named the *Rigel*, in the Mediterranean. This statement was subsequently denied inferentially by the French, when the Germans, in January, 1917, falsely claimed to have seriously damaged by submarine the French battleship *Vérité*. The most serious loss of all was that of the early



THE BATTLESHIP "DANTON."

dreadnought *Danton*, which was struck by two torpedoes discharged by a submarine, and sank within half an hour. The disaster occurred on March 19, 1917, in the Mediterranean. The finest discipline prevailed on board, and 806 men were saved by the destroyer *Massue* and some patrol vessels, the number lost being 296. The submarine was discovered and attacked with bombs by the *Massue*, whereupon she disappeared and was not seen again. The battleship *Suffren*, which had taken so great a part at the Dardanelles, was lost in the previous November. She left Gibraltar for Lorient, and was never seen again. Whether she struck a mine or was sunk by a submarine was not reported.

The guarding of the sea route in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Ionian Sea afterwards fell mainly to the British Fleet, while the western basin from Malta to Gibraltar fell chiefly to the French. What special steps were taken by the French naval authorities was not disclosed, but it became known that an extensive patrol service was at work, that the methods employed in the Channel and the North Sea were applied in the Mediterranean, as far as they could be used, and that nothing that provision could enable the naval officers to do or provide was neglected.

The French Navy, allied with our own and with that of the Japanese, began early in the war to exert its influence throughout the world. The Seven Seas were made subject in part to

French naval sway. The Naval Division of the Far East and the Pacific, which Rear-Admiral Huguet had commanded, was not, indeed, an organization of great fighting force. The *Montcalm*, which was the flagship, was nearly twenty-five years old, and on her displacement of 9,367 tons she carried two 7·6 in., eight 6·4 in., and smaller guns. The only other vessel of any force was the *Dupleix*, which belonged to the same period, had a displacement of 7,578 tons, and, as her heaviest armament, mounted eight 6·4 in. guns. The station of these vessels was the China Seas, and the Division had attached to it a destroyer, a gunboat and four river gunboats. An old unprotected cruiser, the *Kersaint*, and the gunboat *Zelée* were usually in Australian waters, but they were out of commission, and their *personnel* and guns had been used to put New Caledonia and Tahiti in a better position of defence. A dispatch vessel and two torpedo boats were at Madagascar, and an old armoured gunboat, three destroyers, and about a dozen torpedo boats and several small vedette boats at Saigon.

The conquest of the scattered colonies of Germany was an object of the Allies at the beginning of the war. Tsing-tau fell to the prowess of the Japanese. The German possessions in the Pacific gave their opportunity to the young Navy of Australia, to whose help came the *Montcalm*. The squadron of Count Spee was at large, its whereabouts were unknown, and the capture of the *Ladrones* and the *Marshall Islands*, the *Bismarck Archipelago*,

German New Guinea and Samoa was attended with uncertainty. The Australian squadron was directed to proceed to New Zealand to convoy an expeditionary force, which was to capture Samoa, and the French cruiser joined the flag for that purpose, her presence adding to the confidence with which the operation was undertaken. The achievement involved a sea voyage of over 2,000 miles, and was accomplished without mishap or interference. The Germans made no resistance at Samoa, and when von Spee arrived off Apia, on September 14, 1914, he was surprised to find the British flag flying there.

From Samoa the German squadron steamed to Tahiti, and in the little port of Papeete found the disarmed gunboat *Zelée*, which was destroyed by gunfire, as well as some of the buildings there. But the Commander of the vessel, Lieut. Destremeau, had placed the guns he had dismounted in an excellent position, and the German Admiral thought it prudent not to linger more, especially as the coal depôt at Fare Use had been set on fire by the defenders and no coal was obtainable. Any serious resistance of the Germans in their Pacific possessions was impossible, and they were speedily reduced one after another.

When the adventurous cruise of the *Einden* brought her disguised to Penang on October 28, she entered the harbour there, and by torpedo and gunfire sank the Russian cruiser *Jemtchug*,

which was surprised at anchor. A French destroyer, the *Mousquet*, Commander Thiérouine, attacked her as she went out with the utmost dash and gallantry, but the fight was unequal, and the destroyer was sunk, her commanding officer, who had been wounded, going down with her. The survivors, to the number of 36, were sent by Captain von Müller in a captured British vessel into a port in Sumatra.

The *Montcalm*, after her service against the German Pacific possessions, went north and was employed in patrolling in the Indian Ocean, thus aiding in securing the safety of the numerous transports which were then bringing troops, guns and stores from India and other Eastern countries. Afterwards the cruiser continued this valuable service in the Red Sea, where the cruiser *Desaix* was also employed. The latter vessel at Hodiedah compelled the Turks to surrender the French Consul, who had been taken into the interior, but was brought in safety to Suez.

In previous chapters the story of the reduction of the German colonies of Togo and Cameroon has been told.* The French Navy took its due share in the operations in the Gulf of Guinea, as French troops did on land. The most important unit in the Naval Division was the old armoured cruiser *Bruix*, flying the broad pennant of the officer in command, who had

* Vol. VIII., Chapter CXXXI.



EMBARKING AT TOULON FOR SALONIKA.

[French official photograph.]



THE ARMoured CRUISER "CONDÉ."

with him the gunboat *Surprise* and a number of smaller shallow-draught vessels. Other cruisers afterwards joined him. The *Bruix* and *Surprise* shelled the coast positions of *Compo* and *Kribili*, on October 11-14, 1914, and on August 24, 1914, the *Surprise* supported the disembarkation of the French column and attacked the German station of *Cocoa Beach* at the mouth of the *Muni River*. The Germans were driven into the interior after a sharp engagement and the *Surprise* sank the steamers *Rhios* and *Italo*. The Allies captured a fleet of German vessels in the *Cameroon River*, belonging mainly to the *Woermann Line*—*Clive*, *Irna*, *Henrietta*, *Jeanette*, *Paul Woermann*, and others. All the important points on the coast were bombarded, and the *Bruix*, *Pothuan*

and *Friant* took part in the blockade of the coast.

In the Atlantic the French Navy had a share in the rounding up of the German cruisers and the guarding of the trade routes. On this service the armoured cruiser *Condé* and the light cruiser *Descartes* were employed in the Caribbean, and when the German raiding cruisers had disappeared the watch was for a time continued in view of the large number of German liners and merchant vessels which had taken refuge in American ports and might have attempted to escape.

We have gone with the French Navy, in its work in the war, round the world, from the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, to the Pacific



LAUNCH OF A FRENCH SUBMARINE AT HAVRE.

and the Atlantic, and now we "fetch up," as they say in the Navy, in the North Sea and the English Channel. The courage and endurance of French seamen in the operations in the North Sea cannot, however, be described here. M. Bertin, the eminent naval architect, and formerly chief constructor of the French Navy, said that in the North of Scotland French bluejackets participated in the maintenance of the blockade. "It is a rough and dangerous service. Naval literature which has celebrated the vigilance of our cruising in the Adriatic, the bearing under fire of our ships at the Darda-

the enemy. During the transportation of the British Expeditionary Force to France, when British destroyers and submarines took positions from which they could have attacked the German High Sea Fleet, the French Second Light Squadron cooperated in the protection of the passage and disembarkation of the troops. During the critical days of the fighting on the Yser, when the French Fusiliers Marins were rendering on land magnificent service, which neither England nor France should ever forget, Vice-Admiral C. E. Favereau, Commanding-in-Chief the French forces in the Channel,



TORPEDO TUBES AND LONG-RANGE GUN IN A FRENCH CRUISER.

nelles, and the exploits of our battalions of fusiliers at Dixmude, has not yet made known the endurance of those who labour without resting in an inclement sea and in the mists of the North. These last, without doubt, will have their history later." *

At the first moment of French naval activity in the Channel, when Rear-Admiral Rouyer, commanding the light squadron at Brest, set forth to execute his orders—"Appareillez immédiatement et empêchez par les armes le passage du Pas de Calais"—which have been alluded to above, the torpedo boats and submarines all proceeded to their appointed stations to watch for the anticipated coming of

placed under the orders of the late Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, then in command of the Dover Patrol, five French destroyers, and the British Admiral, flying his flag in the *Intrépide*, led the French flotilla into action off Lombartzyde. These boats were the *Francis Garnier*, *Capitaine Mehl*, *Dunois*, *Aventurier*, and the flag vessel, and were of modern and powerful character. The fire of the *Francis Garnier*, with her 4-inch guns, silenced the enemy batteries at Lombartzyde and Westende, and enabled the Belgians to resume the offensive. During all these operations French and British squadrons, cruising off Nieuport, continued to support the extreme left of the allied armies by shelling the German

* *La Nature*, February 10, 1917.

batteries, and at the same time they assisted in guarding the unceasing passage of transports and the floating commerce of the Allies in the Channel and in all the approaches to the French ports, where German submarines were at work, as the torpedoing of the refugee ship *Amiral Ganteaume*, the *Ville de Lille* and many other incidents testified. French cruisers and coast defence flotillas were constantly engaged in patrolling and in chasing German submarines. On March 4, 1915, one of the cruisers made three hits on a submarine, which disappeared and left no trace. The light squadrons cruised

November, 1915. Lieutenant de Siuçay, accompanied by the British Sub-Lieutenant Viney, destroyed a German submarine by bombs on the Belgian coast. A great raid took place in March, 1916, when 19 French naval aeroplanes, in cooperation with about 30 British and Belgian machines, bombarded the German seaplane station at Zeebrugge and the aerodrome at Houttave in the vicinity. In the following June it was officially announced that during a reconnaissance in Belgium three French armed aeroplanes discharged 65 shells on German boats near the coast.



FRENCH MONITOR AT DUNKIRK.

(French official photograph.)

with British naval forces which cooperated with the land armies until the tide of battle rolled back from the stricken region of the coast.

When Zeebrugge developed into a German submarine base, defended by heavy guns, the French Navy continued to cooperate with our own in persistent endeavour to root out this wasps' nest, and to eliminate the pests which had their home there. A French aviation station was established at Dunkirk in January, 1915, and early in the next month French naval airmen from that place bombed the military establishments and barracks at Zeebrugge and Bruges and the railway station at Ostend. In this raid 48 allied machines participated. In

These were indications of the activity displayed by the French Navy in the Channel and its approaches. Many other incidents showed the enterprise displayed by French seamen and naval airmen, and complete command was obtained by the French Navy, in cooperation with our own, in the waters of the Channel and its approaches from the ocean.

If the greatest service rendered by the French Navy to the Allies had been in assisting to maintain command of the seas, in transporting troops to several theatres of war, which that command enabled it to do, and in securing the safety of their communications and their

supplies, it has written no more brilliant page in the *Livre d'Or* than that which tells the tale of the glorious and ever memorable deeds of the Naval Brigade which fought at Dixmude and on the Yser. A full account of the German counter-offensive and of the Battle of the Yser has already been given, and the course of the operations will not therefore be related here.*



MACHINE-GUN MANNED BY FRENCH MARINES ON THE SAND-DUNES.

The significance of that battle was enormous for the issue of the war and the future of British Sea Power. It definitely beat back the Germans from Calais, and put an end to their dream of bombarding Dover and, with gun and submarine, of cutting our communications between the North Sea and the English Channel. Well might Joffre describe this as "the greatest battle of the world." A French song written and sung in the French trenches in Belgium, to the air of "Auprès de ma blonde," sets the splendid achievement of the French Fusiliers Marins in the clearest manner in its first verse :

Sur les bords de l'Yser
Les marins ont tenu
Les Allemands en arrière,
Si bien qu'ils n'ont pu
Traverser la rivière
Comme ils l'avaient convenu.†

We cannot feel too deeply the gratitude we owe to the French Naval Brigade, and to the gallant Belgians, supported by the French, for the services rendered in that critical and vital period of the war.

At this point it is interesting to summarize

* See Chapters LIV. and LXV.

† This song is preserved by Commandant Vedel, "Nos Marins à la Guerre."

the facts contained in an official *communiqué* issued by the Ministry of Marine on October 31, 1914, setting forth the nature of the help which the Navy had rendered to the French land forces. Not only had it cooperated with the Allied Fleets in the blockade of the enemy ports and coasts, in the protection of convoys, the guarding of the trade routes, and the pursuit of the German cruisers : it had lent to the army every material and personal assistance that it had at its disposal. Its arsenals and establishments worked with the greatest activity for the War Department. The Navy had taken charge of a great part of the coast defences, thus liberating a considerable number of men to the heavy artillery. Moreover, with the remainder of the men it could spare from its own needs it had constituted forces which fought in the first rank in the front with the armies. These formations, at the date given, comprised a brigade of 6,000 fusiliers marins, a machine-gun company, a regiment of 2,000 seamen-gunners, groups of motor machine-guns, and a group of motor searchlights, as well as a river flotilla for the Scheldt.

The brigade of the Naval Fusiliers and the



[French official photograph.]
FRENCH DUG-OUT IN THE SAND-DUNES OF FLANDERS.

machine-gun company distinguished themselves greatly by their heroic attitude at Dixmude on the right wing of the Belgian Army. They had already served with the Army before Paris. The regiment of seamen-gunners, with their own guns, had contributed to the successful defence of the fortified region on the east. The motor-guns had been distributed with the

army, and had given proof of great activity and efficiency. These various formations were supplied from a *depôt* which was established at Paris. In addition the Navy sent to the regimental *depôts* several thousands of seamen, and it subsequently placed at the disposal of the



[French official photograph.]

FRENCH MARINES

Who took part in the defence of Dixmude.

army all the men of the *Inscription Maritime* who were not required for the Fleet, and were not indispensable to the mercantile marine. All this great service was completed by the placing at the disposal of the Minister of War of a part of the *personnel* of the naval aviation service, as well as many engineers and officers of various corps, and large numbers of artificers. Quite early in the war a total number of 30,000 naval reservists and men of the *Inscription Maritime* were given up to the War Department, and embodied in the Colonial Infantry, where they rendered notable services with all the dash of the seaman. There was one bluejacket whose deed was recorded by the *Moniteur de la Flotte*. He had remained with his motor machine-gun and an assistant in a town which the Germans had occupied, and there, with the greatest coolness, he fought several little battles at the crossings of streets, and escaped from the place in safety with his gun and the man who accompanied him. Some of the machine-guns were used in the defence of Paris, and especially in the anti-aircraft service, while many of the seamen-guns were sent to serve

the guns in the forts of the entrenched camp of Paris, while others were dispatched to the defences of the Meuse.

Parisians were accustomed to meet seamen who were employed as messengers or otherwise at the Ministry of Marine in the Rue Royale, but they were astonished, in the very early days of the war, to see numbers of men of the Fleet doing duty in the streets of the capital. Some were old salts, reservists, stokers, and artificers, who donned their old uniforms, and others were young bluejackets from the ports, just embodied in the new contingents. All these classes of men soon took on, under training, something of the ordered smartness of the soldier without ever losing their naval character. Those who remembered 1870 bethought themselves of Le Bourget, where the Fusiliers Marins encountered and threw back the Prussian Guard, and of other incidents in which the Navy in those times came to the help of the land forces. The Fusiliers Marins of the great war began to arrive from the ports, and their *depôt* and headquarters were located in the Grand Palais in the Champs Elysées. By the end of August, 1914, the Brigade, consisting of two regiments, was brought up to its strength of 6,000 men, afterwards augmented, and Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h was placed in command. The great advance of von Kluck threatened Paris, and the Fusiliers were sent out, not to the front line, for they still required training, but to dig trenches, which they manned. One company did encounter the enemy in the vicinity of Creil—a party of raiding Uhlans, who were driven off. When the armies of von Kluck were diverted to the eastward, to encounter defeat on the Marne, the Naval Brigade came into its quarters, and the work of organization and training began. The men were badly and variously equipped. Some of them had never fired a rifle. There were not many good drivers among them, and their transport was composed of old vehicles gathered from many quarters. But Admiral Ronarc'h was a man of extraordinary energy and organizing power, and had with him as company commanders a number of energetic and capable naval lieutenants. Commandant Vedel has given a picture of him, written by one of his lieutenants: "Of middle height, well set-up; an energetic head set on a sturdy, muscular trunk; active and resolute; a Breton in the accepted sense of the description, including the legendary dogged obstinacy; exacting from others that which he was ready to give himself, but thinking more

of their hardships than of his own; recalling the saying, eternally true, that the fighting man has his value in his character."

The Rear-Admiral's marines were sent to Dunkirk, where a force intended for the defence of Antwerp was being concentrated, but the German offensive had developed with great rapidity, the enemy's big howitzers had destroyed the Belgian fortresses and the Belgian Army was in retreat. It was a critical and even decisive moment of the war, for Calais was at stake. The seamen were therefore hastened forward to Ghent, where they encountered the German onslaught (October 9). Lieutenant Le Douget was one of the first of their number to be killed. The immediate object of enabling the hard-pressed Belgians to retire with their guns was attained, and the whole force fell back. The Belgians retreated to Bruges, and from Bruges to the Yser. British troops which had been landed had come into line, and they marched by Roulers to Ypres, while the French seamen retired through Thourout, where they came under the direct command of the King of the Belgians (October 13), and by way of Werken and Eessen to Dixmude, which place was the centre and key of the position. There the brave fellows were to stand fast, *coûte que coûte*, for four days

at least, after which reinforcements were expected to arrive. The position had not been prepared, the naval brigade of 6,000 men, with its machine-gun companies, covered a front of $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the Belgian guns which were attached to it were altogether powerless against the big German guns, and there were no aeroplanes or balloons to bring intelligence to Admiral Ronarc'h. Not for four days only, but for twenty-six days did the tremendous struggle continue, and the long fight in the inferno of Dixmude, in which the heroic seamen rivalled the achievements of the legendary Paladins, losing terribly, but still undaunted, gave imperishable renown to the *personnel* of the French Navy.

On November 16 a territorial division came to the relief of Admiral Ronarc'h, and his splendid brigade retired, but only to reorganize and prepare itself for further service against the enemy, still in the stricken land of Belgium, where it had the intense satisfaction of meeting and defeating a force of German marines.

The glorious valour of the seamen had merited well of the country, and M. Augagneur, then Minister of Marine, decided that thenceforth the sailors ashore should carry colours, as did the army, bearing the inscription "Régiment de la Marine."



French official photograph.

THE FRENCH ARMY HONOURS THE FRENCH NAVY.
General Lyautey decorating Marines from Dixmude.

ments de Marins." The Minister would appoint one unit of the Naval Brigade to keep the colours during war, which in time of peace would be confided to the care of the school of the Fusiliers Marins at Lorient. The colours were presented to the Naval Brigade at Dunkirk on January 11, 1915, by the President of the French Republic. M. Poincaré told them that the flag which was given to them they had themselves won on the field of battle. They had shown themselves worthy to receive it, and capable of defending it. For long weeks, closely associated with their comrades of the army, they had sustained victoriously the most bitter and sanguinary struggle. Nothing had chilled their ardour, neither the difficulties of the terrain, nor the ravages which, at first, were made in their ranks by the enemy's fire. Nothing had checked their *élan*, not ice, nor rain, nor floods. Their officers had given them an example of courage and sacrifice, and everywhere, under their orders, they had achieved prodigies of heroism and abnegation.


The flag which I confide to you shall represent henceforth in your eyes immortal France: France—that is to say, your homes, the places where you were born, the

parents who brought you up, your wives, your children, your families and your friends, all your memories, all your interests, all your affections; France—that is to say, a whole past of common efforts and collective glory, a whole future of national unity, of greatness and of liberty. My friends, they are the most distant destinies of our country and of humanity which are being inscribed, at this moment, in the Book of Gold of the French Army. Our race, our civilization, our ideals are the sacred issue of the battles you wage. Yet a few months of patience, of moral strength and of energy will determine the course of future centuries. In carrying this banner to victory, you will not only avenge the dead; you will merit the admiration of the world and the gratitude of posterity.

In the semi-official *Moniteur de la Flotte*, M. Charles Le Goffic, writing on August 5, 1915, spoke in noble words of the deeds of the French seamen. For more than twelve centuries, he said, the horn of Roland had been silent, but they still showed near Hagueta the "brèche de Roland," the cleft made in the mountains by his virgin sword Durandal. Roland, he said, lives always in French hearts—Roland, a Breton, like most of the seamen of France. "Is it too much to think that Dixmude will last as long as Roncesvalles? Of this I am sure, that Roland would recognize his own among the fighting men of the Yser. You



INSPECTION OF FRENCH MARINES ON BOARD THE "PROVENCE," BEFORE LANDING AT ATHENS.



TORPEDO-ROOM OF A FRENCH BATTLESHIP.

belong to the same cycle: you are of the same epic family—a race of heroes who do not know how to surrender, and who are found in all history—at Roncesvalles with Roland, in the last square at Waterloo with Cambronne, under the smoking ruins of Dixmude with Admiral Ronarc'h."

The original strength of the Naval Brigade, including 250 men with the machine-guns, was 6,250, and by March 1, 1915, 3,470 men had joined them to reinforce their depleted ranks. Of the latter number, about 500 were wounded men who returned to the front, from which it appears that the total number of the Fusiliers Marins sent to the Belgian front actually approximated to 9,200 men. The casualties amounted to something like one-half of this figure, and the General Commanding the group of armies of the North said that no élite troops in any age had done what the Marines had achieved in bravery and long endurance.

When the greater part of the Naval Brigade left the zone of the armies, in November, 1915, General Joffre expressed his gratitude for the noble service rendered in the plains of the Yser, at Nieuport and at Dixmude, which, he said, would remain to the armies as an example of warlike ardour, of the spirit of sacrifice, and of devotion to the country. "Les Fusiliers Marins et leurs Chefs peuvent être fiers des nouvelles

pages qu'ils ont écrites au Livre de leur corps." Admiral Lacaze, then Minister of Marine, on December 12, 1915, brought General Joffre's order to the knowledge of those for whom it was intended, and added an expression of gratitude of the whole Navy to those at the front who had come to be known as "La Garde." These

ADMIRAL RONARC'H,
General of the Fusiliers Marins.

two orders were authorized to be posted in the batteries of French warships, and in the departments in the dockyards under the naval device: "Honneur et Patrie"—there to remain per-



THE DIXMUDE MARINES ESCORTING GENERALS LYAUTEY AND BALFOURIER AFTER THE PRESENTATION. (See illustration on page 73.)

manently, said the Minister, "pour que les équipages de demain sachent ce qu'ils auront à faire pour se montrer dignes des Marins de Dixmude et de l'Yser."

Not a word that was said by the eminent Frenchmen exceeded the merits of the brave, indefatigable and undaunted Naval Brigade. Not often does it fall to the men of the sea to be so acclaimed. The silent work of the French Navy, its long watches in all seasons and all weathers, its courage, fortitude and self-sacrifice whenever it encountered the perils of the sea or the assaults of the enemy, were every whit as meritorious as the services of the seamen on shore, but the personal bravery of men

is more easily observed on land than are the supreme characteristics and qualities and the heroic actions and long endurance of the men who go down in ships to the sea. The seaman has not always received his just reward nor been esteemed at his true value. When the battleship *Languedoc* was launched at Bordeaux, on April 29, 1915, M. Augagneur, then Minister of Marine, rightly expressed the gratitude of France to the French Navy, but said truly that its work, because it was silent, was not always judged at its real worth. "Il a fallu le canon des Dardanelles pour satisfaire l'opinion publique, disposée à croire à l'inaction quand l'action ne lui apparaît pas sous l'aspect des batailles."



CHAPTER CLXXXIII.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA (II.).

EVENTS IN EAST AFRICA, MARCH-OCTOBER, 1916—INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE GERMAN PROTECTORATE—SUPPLIES PLENTIFUL—VON LETTOW-VORBECK'S WAR MEASURES—BRITISH RESIDENTS' HARSH TREATMENT—NATIVES REDUCED TO SLAVERY—BLOCKADE RUNNERS LAND MUNITIONS—KILIMANJARO CAMPAIGN—GENERAL TIGHE'S PLANS ADOPTED BY GENERAL SMUTS—VAN DEVENTER SEIZES TAVETA—LATEMA NEK ACTION—GENERAL STEWART'S FLANKING MOVEMENT FAILS—FIGHT AT KAHE—CONQUEST OF KILIMANJARO AND MERU COMPLETED—GENERAL SMUTS'S FUTURE PLANS—A HETEROGENEOUS ARMY—VAN DEVENTER'S MARCH SOUTH—KONDOA IRANGI SEIZED—VON LETTOW-VORBECK'S ATTACK ON VAN DEVENTER FAILS—RAINY SEASON STOPS OPERATIONS—TRANSPORT TROUBLES—PARE AND USAMBARA OCCUPIED—SMUTS'S MARCH TO HANDENI—TANGA AND BAGAMOYO CAPTURED—THE NAVY'S HELP—VAN DEVENTER REACHES THE CENTRAL RAILWAY—NGURU OPERATIONS—THE FIGHT AT DAKAWA—ESCAPE OF THE ENEMY—COMBINED MOVEMENT BY SMUTS AND VAN DEVENTER—MROGORO OCCUPIED—VON LETTOW-VORBECK AGAIN ESCAPES—GERMANS DRIVEN INTO RUFJI AREA—BELGIAN OCCUPATION OF UJJI AND TABORA—ALL NORTHERN GERMAN EAST AFRICA CONQUERED.

AT the beginning of March, 1916, when General Smuts opened his campaign in East Africa, the Germans, after nineteen months of warfare, still held, with one or two trifling exceptions, the whole of their protectorate as well as the Taveta district on the British side of the frontier in the Kilimanjaro region. By the end of the September following the enemy had lost all the northern half of the protectorate, as well as the southern seaboard and the western and south-western borderlands (adjoining the Great Lakes). Every town of any importance in German East Africa, as well as both the railway systems, had passed into the possession of the British or Belgians. The Germans had also suffered very heavy losses in men and munitions. But Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck, the commander-in-chief, had avoided a decisive engagement, and still had a considerable, well-disciplined force. In October, 1916, he was established in and north of the valley of the

Rufiji river—south of Dar-es-Salaam—while German detachments held the Mahenge plateau in the south central part of the country.

Three distinct bodies of troops were engaged against the Germans: (1) the East African Force under Gen. Smuts, which attacked the main German army from the north, (2) the Belgian Expeditionary Force, under Gen. Tombeur, which invaded German territory on the north-west, between Lake Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza; and (3) the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Force, under Brig.-Gen. Northey, which advanced into German territory from the south-west, between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. In addition, Portuguese troops were engaged along the southern border of German East Africa, while Gen. Smuts received very effective help from the Royal Navy.

Neither the Belgians nor Gen. Northey invaded German East Africa until after the close of the first phase of Gen. Smuts's campaign, and not until 1916 was more than half

over did their advance directly affect the course of the main operations. This will be readily appreciated when the vast size of and the difficulties of transport in the German protectorate are remembered. The places whence Generals Smuts and Northey respectively invaded German East Africa were 550 miles apart in a direct line, while the Belgian base was some 800 miles from either of the British bases. It was a real achievement in



TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES: A RIVER IN FLOOD.

General Smuts in Foreground.

organization which enabled the various expeditionary forces to co-operate. This they did as the operations went on, but at the outset Gen. Smuts, as has been indicated, was working independently. His first undertaking was the conquest of the Kilimanjaro and Meru region. This was a task limited in scope and complete in itself, and did not necessarily commit Gen. Smuts to one particular plan in his further operations.

The situation at the opening of 1917 was set forth in Chapter CLV. (Vol. X.), where also the events of 1914-16 are recorded. The position as it affected the offensive undertaken by Gen. Smuts may be briefly recalled. Major-Gen. Sir Michael Tighe,* who then commanded the forces in British East Africa, had already been reinforced by the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, which he kept as a separate unit. He had formed his original command into two divisions—the 1st E. A. Division under Major-Gen. J. M. Stewart, and

the 2nd E. A. Division under Brig-Gen. Malleon. These divisions included the 2nd Batt. Loyal North Lancashire Regt., the 25th Batt. Royal Fusiliers (Legion of Frontiersmen), the 2nd Rhodesia Regt., the East Africa Mounted Rifles and other volunteer bodies raised from the European settlers in, and the natives of, British East Africa; battalions of the King's African Rifles (almost all natives of East Africa, but including Sudanese), and various battalions of the Indian Army and Indian Imperial Service troops. Gen. Tighe had, moreover, drawn up a plan for the conquest of Kilimanjaro, a plan to which, with slight modifications, Gen. Smuts adhered.

Before describing the conquest of Kilimanjaro an indication of internal conditions in the German protectorate will prove helpful. As the narrative given in Chapter CLV. has shown, Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck was a very capable soldier. He was a man of great determination, he exercised immense influence over his officers and he was the inspiring spirit of the defence. It was rumoured that he had served on the Boer side in the South African War; he had commanded in Cameroon and had personal knowledge of bush-fighting. He had organized and drilled a large native force, and he had impressed nearly all the Germans of military age in the country.* He had, to a large extent, effaced the bad effect of the anti-Moslem movement initiated by the Governor, Dr. Sehnee, before the outbreak of the war and he had rallied to his standard many of the Arabs. This support was obtained partly by statements which the Arabs interpreted as a promise to restore the slave trade should the Germans prove successful. The belief in the restoration of the slave trade accounted for the sympathy with Germany shown by some of the Zanzibar Arabs, who found means of conveying valuable information to Dar-es-Salaam, especially before the establishment of the blockade of the coast on February 28, 1915. (After the conquest of Kilimanjaro many Arabs, disillusioned, gave up the German cause. Others had never embraced it and several leading Arab merchants suffered from German rapacity.) At first there was a party among the Germans in

* General Tighe was made a K.C.M.G. in recognition of his services in East Africa.

* Ships' crews, shop assistants, professional men, all and sundry, were called to the colours. Of three Germans captured in a skirmish one was an estate manager, one a lawyer, and the third a railway guard.



[Elliott & Fry.]

LIEUT.-GENERAL J. C. SMUTS,
Commander-in-Chief, East African Expeditionary Force.

East Africa averse from a fight to a finish with the British. This party is credited with having had the sympathy if not the support of the Governor, whose wife was a New Zealand lady. Its members included many of the planters, and its idea was to make terms with the British on the lines afterwards accepted by the Germans in South-West Africa—

namely, that all farmers, planters, traders, merchants and missionaries should be allowed to carry on their avocations undisturbed. Whatever chance this party might have had of obtaining a hearing vanished with the total defeat of the attempt of the British to seize Tanga in November, 1914. Thereafter von Lettow-Vorbeck was master of the situation.

Besides his military measures he adopted all the usual German methods of procedure to mislead his public. Thus belief that Britain had lost India was so widespread that the governor of Mafia Island, on his surrender, was astounded when told that he would be deported to India. He appeared to be convinced that "the Pathans" had by then (January, 1915) conquered that country. Again, when Italy joined in the war, it was announced at some of the Government stations that she had joined Germany; the Italian flag was hoisted

scattered over German East Africa, were not interned, but all their goods which the Government desired were forcibly requisitioned, and payment made in valueless paper money. Their trade with the natives was also largely cut off and many of them were ruined. Swahili and Arab merchants likewise suffered from German extortions.

Towards the natives the attitude of the German authorities was "utilitarian." It was governed by what Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck considered military necessities. The adherents



NEW MOSHI IN THE HANDS OF THE GERMANS.

Native troops on parade.

side by side with the German and Moslem flags and some Italian residents were even induced to join the German ranks. Hatred of the British was not general among the German civilians in East Africa, but was exhibited by the officials, especially in their treatment of the missionaries—women as well as men. Nearly all European enemy aliens, travellers, traders, missionaries and planters, with their wives and children, were placed in concentration camps, where the accommodation and food were alike bad. Special indignities were inflicted upon the members of the Church Missionary Society, both by the Germans and their native soldiers, with the avowed object of lowering the prestige of the English in the eyes of the natives. The British Indians, of whom several thousands, mostly shopkeepers, were

of the British missions were, without any proof, regarded as hostile, and their leaders, clergy, teachers and others, were deported to a native internment camp, where their treatment was extremely brutal. Natives living near the frontier were removed to the centre of the country and treated as prisoners of war on the supposition (well founded) that they would welcome and aid the British invaders. In this manner large areas were depopulated and tribal life completely broken. But the chief value of the natives in German eyes was as soldiers or carriers. The number of natives forcibly enrolled in the Army is put as high as 50,000; the manner in which their enrolment and the requisitioning of natives for transport work—women as well as men—was carried out practically reduced the country to a state of

slavery. After enrolment, the *askari* (as the native soldiers are called*) were well treated. Care was taken to draw them from the most warlike tribes. The carriers, regarded simply as beasts of burden, though they were sometimes used as a screen for the troops, received no consideration from their masters. "When on the march if a porter could not be forced any longer to carry his load on account of weakness, through sickness or from hunger or thirst, and was therefore no longer of any use to them, he was shot or bayoneted, and his body left by the roadside—a striking reversion to old Arab slavery methods."† Evidence of the appalling cruelty with which these carriers were treated was obtained by the British during the campaign. The Moslems among the natives, a very small community—the East African "Arab," though three-quarters negro, is never reckoned a native—received consideration, nor was there any special ill-treatment of the people apart from that inflicted by "military exigencies." There was among them much discontent, but the success of German arms up to March, 1916, and the high state of discipline to which the *askari* had been brought prevented any rising, though in the north-western part of the protectorate, where the tribes had never been completely subdued, several chiefs and their followers joined the Belgians as soon as they entered the country.

In several respects the arrangements made either by Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck or by the Governor were admirable. The civil administration was carried on by Dr. Schnee from Mrogoro,‡ but every consideration was subordinated to military necessities. Though cut off by the British blockade from outside supplies, the Germans for a long while lacked little—a shortage of clothing was first apparent. Supplies of European foods of all kinds and in large quantities had just been imported when war broke out. This had been done, such was the official explanation, for the benefit of the thousands of visitors who were expected to attend the exhibition at Dar-es-Salaam, which

* From the Arabic *askar*—army; cf. Persian *lashkar*—army, whence the word *lascar*, applied first by Europeans to men in military service.

† From an article in the African Society's *Journal* for April, 1917, by the Rev. J. H. Briggs, of the C.M.S. Mr. Briggs was one of the missionaries interned in German East Africa, and his account of conditions in that country has been drawn upon in this chapter.

‡ Here a daily newspaper was published. It dwindled down by Sept., 1916, to a single sheet, filled mainly with official and obituary notices and tobacconists' advertisements.

was to have been opened on August 12, 1914. Apparently also arms and munitions were imported for the same purposes, and two aeroplanes were brought over specially to impress the natives. It happened, too, that in 1914 in most districts the natives had supplies of corn in hand, and the cattle disease had been stamped out. Both corn and cattle were "requisitioned" for the needs of the *askari*.



GENERAL SMUTS AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL COLLYER.

Food depôts were established by Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck all over the protectorate, and the native chief of each district was compelled to deliver corn to the depôts. The carriers he had to obtain were under military discipline and were often chained together to prevent their escape. For the benefit of the white population all European food supplies in the stores of the traders were likewise requisitioned, and the country itself furnished plenty of milk, butter and eggs. The lack of sugar was largely compensated for by the abundance of wild honey—bees are exceedingly numerous in East Africa. Articles they could not import the Germans endeavoured to manufacture, and with considerable success. Spirits (benzine, whisky and brandy), soap, biscuits,



A GERMAN CHAIN-GANG AT KILOSSA.

chocolate, tea, quinine, cigars and cigarettes, all were manufactured, and enough calico was made from the cotton grown in the plantations to clothe the *askari*. Serviceable boots were made from locally tanned hides.

It will be seen that Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck had little to fear with respect to maintaining his armies in the field. Probably his chief anxiety was as to his supply of munitions. The, for him, fortunate destruction of the *Königsberg* in the estuary of the Rufiji had supplied him with ten 4.1-inch and other naval guns as well as ammunition for them, and had put at his service some 600 trained seamen. But in a prolonged contest he must have feared the exhaustion of his munitions. He was again favoured, for two ships carrying arms, ammunition and hospital supplies* evaded the British blockade and successfully landed their stores. One of these blockade runners got through about the middle of 1915, the other early in 1916—at the time when the Kilimanjaro operations were in progress. Reference was made in Chapter CLV. (page 144) to the smuggling in of arms and ammunition in 1915; the failure of the Navy to prevent the second vessel discharging its cargo resulted in the addition of a large stock of ammunition, besides some howitzers and trench guns, to the Germans' store, at a time, too, when supplies were beginning to get low. Strange stories were told about the second blockade runner. It was said that she went ashore off the coast, that it was four days before she floated off, and that altogether she took three weeks to unload her cargo. Besides munitions she brought, as had the 1915 ship, drugs, wine, mosquito nets and clothing. Not all the Germans in East Africa were pleased that an unwonted lack of vigilance on the part of the British Navy had allowed them to replenish their munitions. Had they not come in an honourable surrender might have been inevitable after the fall of Mrogoro and Tabora, and the hopeless struggle shortened.

For military purposes Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck had divided the country into three areas: the northern, where his main force was concentrated under Major Kraut; the

south-west or Nyasa force under Count Falkenstein, and the western or Tabora force. Command of the troops at Tabora was entrusted to Major-Gen. von Wahle, a retired Prussian officer, who had opportunely arrived in German East Africa a few days before war broke out to attend the opening of the Dar-es-Salaam Exhibition. To each of these forces some of the ten 4.1-inch guns from the *Königsberg* were distributed.

This slight sketch of the conditions in German East Africa shows that its conquest was no easy undertaking, while to the determined opposition of a well-armed, well-disciplined and well-led force were added tremendous difficulties of climate and transport. As regards the effect of climate, on the British side as many as two-thirds of the troops, during the 1916 operations, were whites new to the country; on the German side only some 10 per cent. of the troops were whites, and most of them had been residents for some period. As regards transport the Germans at the outset had interior and vastly shorter lines, and as they retired their lines became shorter and those of the British longer. Over and over again in his dispatches Gen. Smuts recurs to the deadly effects of the climate and to the almost intolerable strain of ever-lengthening lines of communication. Unless these factors are constantly in mind no proper appreciation is possible of the achievements of the forces engaged. Happily in the Kilimanjaro campaign they did not play so great a part as in the subsequent operations.

In January, 1916, the German Northern Army was strongly entrenched in British territory south-east of Mount Kilimanjaro. It held Taveta (which was 25 miles distant from New Moshi, the terminus of their railway from Tanga), and its advanced position was at Salaita Hill seven miles east of Taveta on the road to Voi, a station on the Uganda railway. Gen. Tighe's advanced post, at the beginning of January, was at Maktau, roughly half-way between Voi and Taveta, and to that point he had built a branch railway. On January 22 the 2nd Division, under Brig.-Gen. Malleson, advanced from Maktau to Mbuyuni (which became the British advanced base), and the railway from Voi was brought up to Njoro drift, only three miles east of the German position at Salaita. This indicated one of Gen. Tighe's proposed lines of advance. Meantime, on January 15, the 1st Division, under

* The medical arrangements of the Germans in East Africa were good. They had ample hospital accommodation and the medical and surgical staffs were expert and adequate. The *askari*, too, were specially trained in the removal of wounded from the battlefield. The number of wounded prisoners captured by the British was comparatively small.



TYPICAL BUSH COUNTRY AND A GERMAN TRENCH ON THE HILL-SIDE.

Major-Gen. J. M. Stewart, had been ordered to occupy Longido, the isolated mountain north-west of Kilimanjaro which had been the scene of stiff fighting earlier in the war, and to develop the lines of communications with the Magadi branch of the Uganda Railway, which would enable him to draw supplies from Nairobi. Thereafter Gen. Stewart, who had with him the 1st South African Mounted Brigade under Brig.-Gen. J. L. Van Deventer, was to sweep round the west side of Kilimanjaro while Gen. Malleon's brigade advanced by Taveta through the gap between Mount Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mountains. The objective of both brigades was Kahe, a station on the Tanga Railway, lying just west of the gap. Early in February the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade reached Mombasa and was at once brought to the front. On February 12 Gen. Tighe directed Gen. Malleon to make a reconnaissance in force of Salaita Hill, and, if possible, eject the enemy. Gen. Malleon selected for this operation three battalions of the 1st East African Brigade and three battalions from the South African Brigade. They were supported by eighteen guns and howitzers. Salaita was attacked.

An isolated hill, covered with dense jungle, it was a naturally strong position, it had been carefully entrenched, and it was held in force. The British attack failed, the Germans counter-attacked, and Gen. Malleon was compelled to withdraw. The British casualties were 172, of which number 139 were among the South Africans. Valuable information had been gained, and, as Gen. Smuts somewhat drily remarked, "the South African Infantry had learned some invaluable lessons in bush fighting, and also had opportunity to estimate the fighting qualities of their enemy." Accustomed to the veld with its great open spaces the South Africans had, indeed, almost everything to learn concerning bush fighting, and that the Salaita action ended as it did was not altogether without its compensations for the attackers.

Such was the position when Gen. Smuts, on February 19, reached Mombasa. Accompanied by Gen. Tighe, he immediately visited the front, and, having concluded that the proposed operations were feasible, on arrival at Nairobi (General Headquarters) on February 23 he telegraphed to Lord Kitchener that he was prepared to carry out the occupa-

tion of the Kilimanjaro area at once. The matter was urgent, for unless operations were undertaken without delay the rainy season would be reached, and nothing would be able to be done for months. Two days later Lord Kitchener's sanction to his proposal reached Gen. Smuts, and on the ninth day following (March 5) the offensive was opened. They had been days of great activity, but the preliminary organization by Gen. Tighe had been so thorough that they sufficed to make the final preparations. As Gen. Smuts generously acknowledged, not only did he adopt Gen. Tighe's plan of campaign, but the success of the operations was in a large measure due to his foresight and energy. In addition, Gen. Tighe, who on Gen. Smuts's appointment had been designated for employment elsewhere, remained in East Africa till the Kilimanjaro operations were completed, taking command of the 2nd East African Division. The principal alterations in Gen. Tighe's plans made by Gen. Smuts was to remove from Gen. Stewart's command the 1st South African Mounted Brigade and to use it, with other troops,

as an independent unit on the Taveta front. At Mbuyuni Gen. Van Deventer's command was enlarged by the addition of the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade, which had reached East Africa two or three days previously. In his final arrangements Gen. Smuts disposed his forces as follows:—

1st East African Division (Major-Gen. Stewart) at Longido.

2nd East African Division and Army Artillery (Gen. Tighe) at Mbuyuni and Serengeti.

1st South African Mounted Brigade and 3rd S.A. Inf. Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Van Deventer) at Mbuyuni and Serengeti.

Reserve—2nd S.A. Inf. Brigade at Mbuyuni. The 2nd E.A. Division was to advance against Salaita; Van Deventer's force was to strike north-west, seize the high ground round Lake Chala and develop a turning movement against Taveta from the west. Van Deventer and Malleson were thus both operating against the main body of the German Northern Army which held in force the gap between Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mts. Major Kraut, it was estimated, disposed of 6,000 rifles, and had 16



A BIVOUAC IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

naval and field guns and 37 machine guns. The task of the 1st E.A. Division remained as planned by Gen. Tigho. From Longido it was to strike south between Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru and thereafter to cut the enemy's line of retreat at Kahe on the Tanga railway. As Gen. Stewart had a longer distance to cover he was given two days' start before the advance on Taveta began. He struck camp at Longido on March 5, and by the afternoon of March 6 his advanced troops had crossed 35 miles of waterless bush and established themselves on a small hill east of the Engaro (river) Nanjuki. By 2 p.m. on March 7 the whole of Gen. Stewart's division was concentrated at this point. On the evening of the same day the offensive on the Mbuyuni front was opened by Van Deventer's column—mounted men and infantry—crossing the Sorongeti Plains towards Chala.

The scene of the campaign was altogether remarkable. The snow and glacier-clad summit of Kilimanjaro towers above Serengeti, which is not an open plain, but is mostly covered with thick bush. Eastward the plain joins the high ground around the foothills of Kilimanjaro, the line of junction being marked by an intricate river and lake system. From Mawenzi (17,564 feet), the lesser of the twin peaks of Kilimanjaro, many torrents flow east and south. In the foothills is a small lake, Chala. From it issues a stream which is joined by one of the mountain torrents, and is called the Lumi. This river flows south and enters another lake, Jipe. North-east of Chala is a swamp, Ziواني, whence issues a stream tributary to the Tsavo. Between Chala and Jipe, and on either bank of the Lumi, is the straggling settlement of Taveta (2,493 feet). The high



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE KILIMANJARO CAMPAIGN.



KILIMANJARO.

road to Moshi passes through Taveta, and here the Lumi was crossed by a substantial bridge.

The German front, wholly in British territory, extended from the southern end of Ziwani swamp, through Taveta—with an outpost at Salaita Hill—to the swamps around Lake Jipe and the Ruwu River, a distance of over 30 miles. The enemy left flank was protected by the dangerous, broken foothills of Kilimanjaro, their right flank by the Jipe and Ruwu swamps and the northern end of the Pare Mountains, while in front, between them and the Lumi River, stretched seven miles of dense bush. Their main strength was concentrated between Taveta and Lake Jipe.

From Taveta the Germans had the advantages of two roads connected with the Tanga railway. That to Moshi was in excellent condition, and the many torrents which came down the southern slopes of Kilimanjaro and crossed it were all bridged. The second road was inferior, but quite passable, and had been improved to meet military needs. It led south-west to Kahe, through a region of forest, swamps and rivers. Near Taveta this route passed between two hills, Latema and Reata, and it was on those hills that the Germans had their strongest positions.

Gen. Van Deventer's advance was highly successful. The mounted men reached the Lumi near the south end of Ziwani swamp; the infantry, simultaneously, reached the river east of Chala. The crossings were seized early in the morning of March 8, and the enemy forced to withdraw from the Chala position. An enemy detachment of 300 to 500, cut off by Van Deventer's advance, crept through the thick bush lining the river and attacked the infantry outposts, but was driven back and retired northward. On March 9 Van Deventer's mounted men got astride the Moshi road behind Taveta. This disconcerted the enemy, who during the day evacuated Taveta, falling back by the Kahe road. Meantime the 2nd Division, under Gen. Tighe, had bombarded Salaita Hill—over which floated the green standard of the Prophet as well as the German flag—on March 8, and the infantry of his first brigade had advanced and dug themselves in, preparatory to an assault on the 9th. On that day the bombardment of Salaita was continued till 2 p.m. The infantry then advanced, only to find that the bombardment, coupled with Van Deventer's turning movement, had caused the garrison to retreat. Though mounted



A BLOCKHOUSE ON THE VOI-KAHE LINE.

men were sent in pursuit the garrison got clear away.

The Germans quickly reported of having abandoned Taveta, and early on March 10 sent a strong body to reoccupy it. But still earlier in the morning Van Deventer had sent a regiment of South African Horse from Chala to the same spot, and it had "made good" Taveta before the Germans* appeared. A sharp encounter ended in the retreat of the enemy, who were hotly pursued by the South African Horse and Field Artillery, to their Latema-Reata position.

Gen. Smuts did not know whether the main enemy force had retired along the Moshi or the Kahe road, but in any case it was necessary to occupy the Latema-Reata position, and operations against it were ordered for March 11. There ensued one of the stiffest fights in the whole campaign in East Africa. The Germans know the great strength of their positions, they had hitherto had the advantage in the struggle since the war began and they believed that the reverse at Taveta might be retrieved. There was too, then, a general belief among the German residents that the British troops in East Africa were urgently needed for the defence of Egypt, and it was thought that if the British were defeated at Kilimanjaro the German protectorate would be saved from invasion.

Brig.-Gen. Malloson, with the 1st Brigade of the 2nd E.A. Division, was selected "to clear up the situation and, if possible, make good the neck." The force at his disposal, which was altogether inadequate to the task assigned it, was thus composed:—

Belfield's Scouts (a volunteer force raised in British

* For convenience all the troops employed are styled generally German or British. Only where necessary is the exact composition of the force indicated.

East Africa); Mounted Infantry Co.; Nos. 6 and 8 Field Batteries; No. 134 Howitzer Battery; 2nd Rhodesian Regt.; 130th Baluchis; 3rd King's African Rifles; Machine Gun Battery, Loyal North Lancs. Regt.; and a Volunteer Machine Gun Co.

A spur of Latema Hill, which commands the pass from the north, was chosen as the objective, and at a quarter to twelve the troops advanced to the attack. The 130th Baluchis on the right and the 3rd K.A.R. on the left formed the firing line. The attack was supported by artillery at a range of about 3,500 yards, and the mounted troops watched on the flanks. As they approached the bush-clad slopes of Latema the Baluchis and K.A.R. came under very heavy fire. The Germans had field guns and pom-poms in action besides numerous machine guns, while their rifle fire was steady and accurate. Despite much gallantry the assaulting troops made little headway and at 4 p.m. the Germans were still in full possession of the ridge. At this hour, wrote Gen. Smuts in his dispatch covering the Kilimanjaro operations, "Gen. Malleson, who was seriously indisposed, asked to be relieved of his command, and I directed General Tighe to assume command of the operations personally." At the same time the Force Reserve, which had just reached Taveta, reinforced the 2nd Division with the 5th S.A. Battalion. The course of the fight from this point is vividly described by Gen. Smuts.

On the arrival of the 5th South African Infantry General Tighe (wrote General Smuts in his dispatch) ordered the Rhodesians to advance, and to carry the King's African Rifles forward with them in an assault on the Latema ridge, the 130th Baluchis co-operating vigorously on the right. All ground gained was to be at once made good. The 9th Field Battery and 5th South African Field Battery, as they arrived in Taveta, were brought into action in support of the attack. This assault was gallantly pressed home, especially by the Rhodesians, but failed to make good the ridge. The 3rd K.A.R., who had been hotly engaged since the outset, had the misfortune to lose their gallant leader, Lieut.-

Colonel B. R. Graham, and several other officers. General Tighe found it necessary to support the Baluchis with half the 5th South African Infantry, and I further reinforced the 2nd Division with the 7th South African Infantry.

This latter battalion reached General Tighe about 8 p.m., and shortly afterwards he decided that the best chance of quickly dislodging the enemy from their position on the nek was to send in the two South African Battalions with the bayonet by night.

Night operations in dense bush were fraught with considerable risk, but Gen. Tighe did not hesitate to take the risk, and the ultimate result justified his action. Moreover, the moon was in the first quarter and aided movement up to midnight.

The night advance of the two South African Battalions was ably organized and gallantly led by Lieut.-Colonel Byron, Commanding 5th South African Infantry. The 7th South African Infantry formed the first line, with the 5th in support. They advanced with great dash through the bush, which proved to be much thicker than was anticipated, driving the enemy before them till the latter was on the crest, where he checked our advance. A certain amount of disintegration was inevitable in a night advance through the dense thorn bush in the face of stubborn opposition. Groups of men and individuals who got separated from their leaders had no course but to fall back to the position where the 1st East African Brigade was formed up in general reserve, about 1,500 yards east of the nek.

Colonel Byron had issued instructions that, on reaching the crest, Lieut.-Colonel Freeth, commanding the 7th South African Infantry, and Major Thompson, of the same battalion, should wheel outwards and make good the heights north and south of the nek respectively, while Colonel Byron himself secured the actual nek. These two gallant officers most ably carried out their task. Colonel Freeth fought his way up the steep spurs of Latema till he found that the party with him had dwindled to 18 men. He was joined by a few of the Rhodesians and King's African Rifles, who had elung on to the crest of the ridge after the assault in the evening, and the small party held on till daylight. Major Thompson wheeled towards Reata with 170 men and dug himself in in an advantageous position. About midnight Colonel Byron reached the nek within 30 yards of the enemy's main position. The opposition here was very stubborn. At one point Major Mainprise, R.E., Brigade Major, and 22 men were killed by the concentrated fire of three machine guns, and Colonel Byron who was himself slightly wounded, reached the nek with only 20 men. The enemy was still in a position which commanded the ground he had won, and, finding it impossible either to advance or to hold his ground, he was reluctantly compelled to withdraw.

Meanwhile General Tighe found it extremely difficult to keep touch with the progress of the fight, of which he could only judge by the firing and the reports of officers and others sent back from the ridge, who naturally were only cognizant of events in their own immediate vicinity. About 1 a.m. several requests for reinforcements reached him, and he ordered forward the 130th Baluchis. These advanced at 1.20 a.m., and shortly met Col. Byron, who reported that he had ordered his small party to retire. General Tighe accordingly re-formed his force and dug in astride the road to await daylight. Attempts to gain touch with Colonel Freeth and Major Thompson failed.

It appeared as if the fight were but half won, but the Germans had suffered more heavily than their opponents realised. Gen. Smuts had

at 4.30 a.m. on March 12 actually ordered Gen. Tighe to withdraw his whole force farther back, and the withdrawal was in progress when patrols brought in the news that the enemy was in full retreat towards Kahe. The artillery was brought up to shell the Germans in their retirement, but effective pursuit through the dense forest could not be attempted. The Germans carried away nearly all their guns, all their wounded and most of their dead, but between 40 and 50 bodies were found in the abandoned position, besides a 6 cm. gun and three machine guns. The British casualties, killed and wounded, were about 270. In this engagement the South Africans showed that they were apt



[From "The Conquest of German East."]

MAJOR-GENERAL VAN DEVENTER, C.B.,
Divisional Commander under Gen. Smuts.


scholars in the art of bush fighting, while nothing could exceed the gallantry shown by the 130th Baluchis and the 3rd K.A.R., some of whom were in action over 16 hours.*

Gen. Van Deventer in his advance from Taveta encountered comparatively slight resistance, and on March 13 he occupied Moshi unopposed. But on their retirement the enemy had destroyed all the numerous bridges along

* The fight of March 11 was at first called the Kitovo action, after the general name of the hills of which Latema and Reata form part.



O.X-DRAWN ARTILLERY



HORSE-DRAWN AMBULANCE.

the road, and thus early in the campaign difficulties of rationing the force made themselves felt.

From Latema and from Moshi the Germans had withdrawn towards Kahe. That place, it will be remembered, was the objective of the 1st Division, which under Gen. Stewart had left Longido on March 5 to outflank the enemy by marching westward of Kilimanjaro. The good progress it achieved in the first few days—already chronicled—was not maintained. On March 8 it was at a place called Geraragua, where was a large enemy camp. The German commander retired and Gen. Stewart burnt the camp. But, though he met with only slight opposition from the enemy, the country Gen. Stewart had to traverse was covered with heavy bush and he had many troubles with his transport, which was partly ox-drawn, partly motor. On March 9 Gen. Stewart halted to reconnoitre and to let his supplies come up. He halted again on the 10th in consequence of the exhausted state of the ox-transport, and because all the bridges on the direct road had been blown up by the enemy, who also blocked the road with masses of thorn bush. A difficult track farther west was found, and at midday on the 10th the advance was resumed through country where lions, elephants, and "rhinos" disputed man's right of way. Rain also hindered the movements of the infantry, and it was not until March 13 that the 1st Division reached Boma Jangombe, on the western flank of Kilimanjaro. Here Gen. Stewart was informed by telegram that the enemy had already avoided encirclement, and the 1st Division was ordered to make direct to New Moshi, instead of continuing its march to Kahe. It reached New Moshi on the 14th, where it joined up with Van Deventer's force. On March 19 Gen. Stewart left for India.

The turning movement had failed, and the six companies (about 1,200 men) who had been opposing Gen. Stewart had passed through New Moshi en route to Kahe on the night of March 12.* It is, however, somewhat doubtful whether the 1st E.A. Division, had it reached Kahe in time, was strong enough to hold it against the force the Germans could have concentrated there.

* The German commander was severely censured by Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck for not opposing General Stewart's advance, and, it is stated, committed suicide. It is known that through fear of Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck's displeasure at least two German officers committed suicide.

At Kahe the enemy occupied positions offering great advantages to the defence. They stretched, south of the Taveta-Moshi road, along the gap between Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mountains, a gap which has been already described as a region of forest, swamps and rivers. The rivers were some of the head streams of the Pangani. Of these the Himo, Mwe, and Rau flow south from Kilimanjaro, each in turn joining the Ruwu (or Rufu), which has an east to west direction, curving round the northern end of the Pare Mountains. As these heights turn south, near Kahe, so does the Ruwu, which from this point is usually known as the Pangani. The road from Tanga and Usanbara keeps close to the western scarp of the Pare Mountains and goes on past the western end of "the gap" to Moshi. Parallel to and west of the road is the railway, and both road and railway cross the Ruwu (Pangani) near Kahe. The German forces were posted along the Mwe and Himo, between which streams is the high road to Kahe; along the Ruwu, and at Kahe railway station and the adjacent Kahe Hill.

To turn them out of these positions was Gen. Smuts's next undertaking. The principal operations were entrusted to Brig.-Gen. S. H. Sheppard, who had commanded one of the brigades of the 1st E.A. Division. The attack began on March 18 on a front extending from Latema Nek to the Mwe, Sheppard advancing along the Mwe-Kahe road. There was sharp fighting on the 18th, 19th and 20th. Sheppard's force advanced on the 18th along the road to Kahe as far as Masai Kraal, and on the 19th pushed the enemy back to Store, four miles further south. There, on the 20th, his camp was heavily but unsuccessfully attacked from 9.30 p.m. till midnight. The enemy advanced with bugles blowing and with much shouting, to be mown down by machine-gun fire. Again and again, with great bravery, the attack was repeated, but the British lines were never reached, though a few bodies were found within five yards of the trenches.

On the afternoon of the same day (March 20) Gen. Van Deventer had been sent westward from Moshi with the 1st S.A. Mounted Brigade, the 4th S.A. Horse and two field batteries to get in rear of the enemy's position at Kahe station. They had to traverse a thorn-bush country, which made the going slow, but by daylight on March 21 they were nearing the Pangani at a point south-west of Kahe Hill. Notwithstanding some difficulty in crossing the

river, by midday Van Deventer with part of his force had occupied Kahe Hill, another height known as Baumann Hill and Kahe station. In retiring the Germans blew up the railway bridge across the Pangani. Some of Van Deventer's men were still on the far side of the river. Those who had crossed had to resist several determined attempts to retake Kahe Hill. Too late the Germans had realized that it was the key of their position. They failed, however, to drive out the South Africans. For his part Van Deventer found that he could not do much more until the whole of his force had crossed the Pangani. A detachment which he sent forward to cut off the retreat of the enemy by the high road found the Germans in force, and had to retire. The defence was much aided by two of the Königsberg's guns, which were in action all day. One was in a concealed fixed position, the other was mounted on a railway truck.

While Gen. Van Deventer was waiting to develop his turning movement Gen. Sheppard fought a very stiff action. He was ordered to attack as soon as Gen. Smuts learned that Van Deventer was nearing Kahe. Gen. Sheppard's force then consisted of the 2nd E.A. Brigade (25th Royal Fusiliers, 29th Punjabis, and 129th Baluchis), the 2nd S.A. Brigade (the 5th, 6th and 8th S.A. Infantry Battalions), the East African Mounted Rifles, 1st King's African Rifles, one squadron 17th Cavalry, 1st and 3rd S.A. Field Artillery Battery, the

27th Mountain Battery (Indian Army), No. 12 Howitzer Battery and two naval armoured cars (these cars much affrighted the natives, who called them rhinoceros). The 3rd S.A. Brigade, which had moved down the Himo river and had occupied a hill called Euphorbien, was to co-operate on Gen. Sheppard's left (east) flank. The advance of this brigade, wrote Gen. Smuts, "was so impeded by the dense bush that it was unable to exercise any influence on the fight." Without their aid Gen. Sheppard found himself too weak to complete the task assigned to him.

The advance began half an hour before midday, and by half-past twelve the Germans had been forced back to their main position. This position was cleverly chosen. It stood on the southern side of a clearing in the bush with tributaries of the Ruwu, the Soko Nassai and the Defu, protecting its flanks. This clearing, which varied in width from 600 to 1,200 yards, part of Sheppard's infantry tried to cross. They advanced with the utmost gallantry, but the enemy's dispositions were so skilfully made that every attempt was met and repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire, both from front and flank. The troops, too, were attacking an unseen foe, and for the artillery definite targets were very hard to obtain. Sheppard's guns were well handled, the 27th Mountain Battery being in action in the actual firing line.* The forward guns of this battery

* This battery had come from India in August, 1914,



KAHE BRIDGE, PANGANI RIVER, BLOWN UP BY THE GERMANS.

were firing at ranges of from 1,400 to 700 yards for hours without seeing a single enemy or being sure where his guns were placed. The fight continued while daylight lasted, and it was only as evening fell that the flames from the German machine guns were visible, enabling the British gunners to locate them. During the fight some 150,000 rounds were fired by the British artillery alone. To help his frontal attack Sheppard detached two double companies of the 129th Baluchis to turn the enemy's right. They crossed the Soki Nassai shoulder deep, and came almost up to the German lines, when a very hot engagement ensued, a German and a British machine gun having a duel at a distance of only 45 paces. The Baluchis, counter-attacked and held their ground, but could make no farther advance, and it was too late in the evening to send reinforcements.

With nightfall the contest ended. Gen. Sheppard did not know that Van Deventer was already at Kahe Station, some miles in advance of his right flank, and no contact could be established through the intervening dense bush. Sheppard therefore gave orders to his troops to dig themselves in, preparatory to a renewal of the attack at dawn. "The whole force," said Gen. Smuts, "was ably handled by Gen. Sheppard, and the men fought like heroes." The casualties on the British side in this engagement were 288, those of the enemy were not known.

On the 21st the Germans had been engaged on a double front—on their right (east) against Gen. Sheppard and the 3rd S.A. Brigade, on their left (west) against Van Deventer's mounted force. They had shown a certain amount of weakness against Van Deventer, but had fought with skill and tenacity on the Ruwu front, and they had been reinforced during the day by troops brought up by rail. Their obstinate resistance on that front was, it appeared, undertaken to enable them to withdraw before Van Deventer could develop his movement against their left flank. Under cover of darkness the enemy evacuated the whole of the Kahe-Ruwu line, retiring south by the Tanga railway. Patrols sent out by Gen. Sheppard early on March 22 found the enemy gone. He had crossed the Ruwu and passed down the main road to the nearest point of the railway. The retirement was orderly, and practically all his guns and equipment were removed, with the

and with the 29th Punjabis constituted the first reinforcement to reach East Africa. Both the 29th Punjabis and the 27th M.B. had already rendered excellent service.

important exception of the stationary 4.1-inch Königsberg gun, which, being unable to take away, he had blown up.

While these operations around Kahe were in progress mounted scouts had ridden westward from Moshi, 50 miles to Arusha, a German settlement on the southern slopes of Mount



[Elliott & Fry.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL S. H. SHEPPARD,
D.S.O.,

Commanded First East African Brigade.

Meru, driving (March 20) an enemy company southward. Thus when the Germans retired from Kahe the conquest of the Kilimanjaro-Meru region was completed. This little campaign had lasted just 18 days. During that period the enemy had been finally driven from British territory, and had lost one of the most healthy and the most fertile districts of German East Africa. The German missionaries at Moshi after a few days' detention were set at liberty, as were other German civilians, and the policy of leaving German non-combatants undisturbed was followed in the later operations. The enemy acted otherwise. Thus the Germans had deported the Boer families settled around Kilimanjaro and Meru.*

* These Boers, over 90 all told, were found at Lol Kisaale, and rescued when that place was captured. (See p. 99.)

Kilimanjaro had been conquered with such speed that the campaign was over before the advent of the rainy season, which in that part of the country began in mid-April. Gen. Smuts, who had moved his headquarters to Moshi, while he had to decide the strategy to be followed in the coming campaign, had other pressing matters to consider. Chief among them were the need to reorganise his army and



INDIAN TRANSPORT ATTACHED TO EAST AFRICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

the ever troublesome transport question. As to reorganisation, one of the difficulties, little comprehended in England, arose from the extraordinarily heterogeneous composition of Gen. Smuts's army. Drawn from almost every continent, the troops spoke a perfect babel of languages. They included many diverse races from India; Arabs, Boers, and representatives of almost every tribe and tongue in East Africa, besides British South Africans, East African settlers (including a number of Canadians, Australians and Americans) and battalions of the Regular Army. Again, of the East African native troops, the King's African Rifles were regulars, and others were local levies who knew scarcely a dozen words of English. (For these Swahili-speaking officers were needed, Swahili being understood by most East African natives.) Even the Union foreos were not all European, as they included a battalion of "Cape Boys"—*i.e.*, coloured men from Cape Province.* Up to this period the troops had been thrown together as immediate necessity demanded, and it is no wonder that Gen. Smuts, among the reasons for reorganising his force, stated the need to secure smooth and harmonious working. The arrangement adopted, which came into force by the end of March, was to create three divisions, two (the 2nd and 3rd)

*A Native Labour Corps and an Indian Bearer Co. were also raised in the Union of South Africa.

formed by the contingents from South Africa and the other (the 1st) to include the Indian and other British forces. The divisional and brigade commanders were:—

FIRST DIVISION.—Commander, Major-General A. R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O. First E. A. Brigade, Brigadier-General S. H. Sheppard, D.S.O. Second E. A. Brigade, Brigadier-General J. A. Hannington, C.M.G., D.S.O.

SECOND DIVISION.—Commander, Major-General J. L. Van Deventer. First S.A. Mounted Brigade, Brigadier-General Mamie Botha. Third S.A. Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General C. A. L. Berrangé, C.M.G.—With this division was also the 28th Mountain Battery of the Indian Army.

THIRD DIVISION.—Commander, Major-General Coen Brits. Second S.A. Mounted Brigade, Brigadier-General B. Enslin. Second S.A. Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General P. S. Beves.

Of these officers Gen. Hoskins (North Staff. Regt.) was Inspector-General of the King's African Rifles. He had seen active service in the Sudan, in South Africa and in East Africa, and on his appointment to the 1st Division it was understood that in case of need he would succeed Gen. Smuts, as he eventually did. The Chief of the General Staff was Brig.-Gen. J. J. Collyer, C.M.G.; the chief of the Administrative Staff Brig.-Gen. R. H. Ewart, C.B., and Brig.-Gen. W. F. S. Edwards, D.S.O., was Inspector-General of Communications. These three men,



GRASS HUT BUILT BY BRITISH AFRICAN TROOPS IN CAMP.

whose names rarely figured in the accounts of the campaign, rendered most valuable service.

With respect to transport the British base was Mombasa, 220 miles from headquarters at Moshi. Mbuyuni, on the Voi branch of the Uganda Railway, was the advanced base, and the most urgent need for speedy transport was to press forward the building of the branch line till it linked up with the Tanga-Moshi railway. Col. Sir W. Johns, who had charge of railway construction, and his helpers accomplished marvels. While the Kilimanjaro operations were in progress the railway was carried forward from the Njoro drift, past Salaita to Taveta



• GENERAL SMUTS EXAMINING AN ENEMY POSITION FROM AN ARMOURD CAR.

and the Latema nek at an average rate of a mile a day, including surveying, heavy bush cutting and the bridging of the Lumi river. After the abandonment of the Ruwu positions by the Germans the building of the line went on apace. It was taken from the Latema Nek through the gap between Kilimanjaro and the Pare Moun-



[Elliott & Fry.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. J. COLLYER,
C.M.G.,

Chief of the General Staff under General Smuts.

tains, and linked up with the German line at Kahe. This was a very difficult piece of work, the track having to be cut through virgin forest (necessitating the felling of enormous trees), which was at the same time a swamp. When the first wagons were placed on them the rails sank beneath the sodden soil. All difficulties were overcome, and on April 25 the railway was completed. Though completed, the railway, in the rainy season, was for long distances practically under water, and thousands of labourers had to be constantly employed to prevent the track disappearing in the mud. This was the western limit of the British railway service, and until he was able to secure a new base at a port in German East Africa for every step in his farther advance Gen. Smuts had to depend on other means of transport, chiefly motor lorries, which were of a kind that proved too heavy and cumbersome. As it was, the resources of the Uganda Railway were severely taxed, and additional rolling stock had to be obtained from India.*

* The report for 1915-16 of the Railway Administration, British East Africa showed that the Uganda Railway had transported, in the period covered, for army purposes 55,000 head of horses, mules, donkeys, and cattle and over 140,000 sheep, and this with only one mishap. The railway also carried, free of charge, 770 tons weight of gifts for the troops.

By the completion of the railway line to Kahe, Gen. Smuts was able to make freer use of Mbuyuni, which was built on a wooded ridge with ample space for a large camp, whereas Moshi was perched on a steep slope of Kilimanjaro. Mbuyuni was headquarters for certain brigades and was also the principal aeroplane base, and at that time (March-May, 1916) aeroplanes in large numbers were being tested there. Aeroplanes had been used to locate the enemy positions on the Ruwu, but observation in dense bush and forest country did not prove very satisfactory. Later, aeroplane attacks proved an effective method of dispersing troops and carriers on the march.*

The problem confronting Gen. Smuts after the conquest of Kilimanjaro was difficult. The British troops occupied but a very small fraction of enemy territory—

which (said Gen. Smuts) stretched out before us in enormous extent, with no known vital point anywhere, containing no important cities or centres, with practically no roads, the only dominant economical features of the whole being the two railway systems.

This description, if not quite accurate from the colonial standpoint—there were, for in-



[Elliott & Fry.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL C. A. L.
BERRANGÉ, C.M.G.

Commanded the Third South African Infantry Brigade.

stance, some 3,000 miles of good roads (in a country twice the size of Germany) and four or five considerable towns—was true in the military sense, for as the event proved it was only

* The natives—especially those in German territory—believed the aeroplanes to be birds, and called them *ndegi* (Swahili for bird). Many could hardly be convinced that there were men in them, and when bombs were dropped from them they said that the birds were mating.

by the actual occupation of the whole protectorate that resistance could be ended. Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck expected an attack in the Pare and Usambara mountains, and had massed there the greater part of his force, while according to the information which reached Gen. Smuts, he intended, after making as long a stand as possible in Pare and Usambara, to retire to the Tabora area, in the west-central part of the protectorate. There were excellent reasons for not striking at the enemy in the region where he was best prepared for defence, and where the *terrain* offered him every advantage. But putting aside an advance on Usambara, Gen. Smuts had still three alterna-

such an alternative and many factors favoured an advance by way of Dar-es-Salaam. The port lay at the mercy of the Navy and its capture would, as Gen. Smuts himself pointed out, have had great political and military importance. Moreover, its occupation would much facilitate transport and supply arrangements. Whether in the light of subsequent knowledge it would have been best to adopt this plan of campaign is a point that cannot be definitely decided. Gen. Smuts decided against it—

partly because the prevalence of the S.E. monsoon at that period made a landing of a large force on that coast an operation of great difficulty, and even danger, partly because a prolonged campaign on the coast immediately



MOTOR LORRIES BRINGING UP TROOPS.

tives. Of these, one, an advance via Victoria Nyanza on Tabora was ruled out for an excellent reason—the British force already in the lake region should be able in conjunction with the Belgians and some little assistance from Gen. Smuts to seize Tabora. Between the two remaining alternatives the choice was not easy. They were (1) an advance south from Arusha, and (2) an advance west from Dar-es-Salaam along the line of the Central Railway. In German South-West Africa the plan of striking inland from the coast along the railway lines had been adopted with signal success, but it had also been adopted because there was no real alternative. In East Africa there was

after the rainy season would mean the disappearance of a very large percentage of my army from malaria and other tropical ailments.


The course adopted, that of striking straight into the interior from Arusha, with the Central Railway as objective, did also in fact entail the disappearance of a very considerable proportion of the army from malaria and other tropical ailments. This was in part the result of misconceptions concerning the extent and severity of the approaching rainy season. Gen. Smuts was assured that the violence of the rains would be mostly confined to the Kilimanjaro-Arusha area, and that farther west and south the rains would not markedly

interfero with military operations. Predictions about the rains in East Africa proved to be as dangerous as weather predictions in England ; when the rainy season came it came with equal violence throughout the proposed area of operations. "The numerous rivers came down in flood and swept away almost all our laboriously built bridges, the roads became impassable mud tracks, and all transport became a physical impossibility. The rains fell steadily day after day, sometimes as much as four inches in one day, and the low-lying parts of the country assumed the appearance of lakes."

But before the rains began, rather before they had lasted many days, a very shrewd blow had been struck at the enemy. Within a week of the Kahe fight Gen. Smuts had made his decision as to the main lines of his strategy, and action followed immediately. The whole of the 2nd Division was pushed south from Arusha, the 1st and 3rd Divisions being kept for the time in rain quarters facing the enemy in the Pare district. Gen. Smuts expected, and so it befell, that to stem the tide of invasion in the interior the enemy would with-

draw largo forces from Pare, and that thus, even if called upon to send additional troops to the 2nd Division, he would still have a sufficient force in hand to make a comparatively easy conquest of the Pare and Usambara districts.

By the end of March the whole of the First S.A. Mounted Brigade was at Arusha, and on April 1 Gen. Van Deventer, with Brig.-Gen. A. H. M. Nussey, his chief of staff, established headquarters there. The road into the interior "stood wide open and unguarded" ; the region ahead, the Masai Steppe, was practicable for mounted troops, who were now being employed on a largo scale in East Africa for the first time. Scouts sent out by Van Deventer reported, however, the presence of an enemy detachment near an isolated rocky hill, Lol Kissale, 35 miles south-west of Arusha. This detachment was posted so as to deny to the British use of the springs on the hill, the only water (in the dry season) to be found for many miles around. Still farther off, along the western and southern searp of the Masai Steppe, were weak German garrisons at Ufiome, Umbulu, and Kondoa Irangi. Of these



THE ADVANCE TO THE CENTRAL RAILWAY.



A LOOK-OUT POST.

three places Kondoa Irangi was the most important. About 85 miles north of the nearest point of the Central Railway it had a wireless station, and was one of von Lettow-Vorbeck's food depôts.

On learning of the importance of Lol Kissale as a water supply, Gen. Smuts issued instructions that the advance south of the Second Division should be directed first to that place. Accordingly on the morning of April 3, three regiments of S.A. Horse moved out of Arusha, and during the ensuing night surrounded Lol Kissale. The Germans, attacked in the morning, fought with determination all through April 4 and 5, but at daybreak on the 6th the whole force surrendered. All this time, since noon on April 3, the horses of the South Africans had been without water. The enemy force which surrendered was found to consist of the 28th Field Co. and Kämpfe's Detachment. It numbered 17 Europeans and 404 *askari*, with two machine-guns. The Boers removed from Kilimanjaro were found here; the Germans had not had time to send them, as they intended, farther south. A large quantity of stores, ammunition, and pack-animals fell into Van Deventer's hands. Equally valuable was the information gained that the garrisons of Kondoa Irangi and of Ufiome had been instructed by Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck to hold out as long as possible, and that reinforcements were being sent to them.

Van Deventer was thereupon instructed to press forward with his mounted troops and

occupy Kondoa Irangi, Umbulu,* and Ufiome before the garrisons could be reinforced. This task he accomplished "with his usual dash and resourcefulness." On April 10 the First Mounted Brigade located the position at Ufiome, which the enemy garrison of some 20 Europeans and about 200 *askari* evacuated on the 13th, leaving 30 prisoners, besides some wounded and a quantity of stores, in the hands of the South Africans. The enemy were pursued for 20 miles and thrown into disorder, but managed to escape into the mountains. A halt of four days having been made to rest both men and horses, the advance was resumed on April 17 and contact established with the enemy the same day at a spot four miles north of Kondoa Irangi. Fighting continued till noon on the 19th, when Van Deventer occupied Kondoa Irangi. "The British success," said Reuter's correspondent, "was due to the employment of typical Boer tactics. The centre was firmly held, while the flanks of the enemy were slowly and cautiously enveloped with the aid of rifle and field-gun fire. Not a burgher was exposed, as the net was drawn closer and closer until after two days of fighting the enemy burnt his stores and bolted before the enveloping movement could be completed." During this engagement the losses of the South Africans were *nil*, while the Germans had 20 killed and wounded, besides four whites and

* Umbulu was captured on May 11 by a separate force sent from Arusha and consisting of the 4th S.A. Horse, supported by the 10th S.A. Infantry and the 28th Mountain Battery.



GENERAL VAN DEVENTER (in centre) WITH CAPTAIN PRINCE AND CAPTAIN PRETORIUS.

20 *askari* captured. The Germans had destroyed the wireless station and part of their supplies, but the "booty" left behind included 800 head of cattle—a welcome addition to van Deventer's commissariat.

For the time Van Deventer had reached the limit of his tether. He had lost hundreds of animals through horse sickness during his advance of some 200 miles from Moshi, and his troops were worn out with ceaseless marching and fighting. In any case he could not move until remounts arrived, and meantime the rains had begun, and were increasing in violence. The Second Division was, in fact, cut off from Gen. Smuts's main body for several weeks by over 200 miles of quagmire. It had to depend on what supplies could be got locally, or at most painfully brought by carriers (none but human transport was possible) from Lol Kissale, which is 120 miles distant from Kondoa Irangi.

Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck quickly realized that Van Deventer's thrust into the heart of the country threatened danger to his rear, and he acted as Gen. Smuts had anticipated he would act; he transferred a strong force from Pare and Usambara to Kondoa Irangi. He was much less hampered than Van Deventer had been by the rains. In the first place his troops were sent by the Tanga Railway to Mombo, thence by a light line to Handeni. From that place they had to march 130 miles to the Central Railway, along which they were taken to

Dodoma. From that place they marched again towards Kondoa Irangi. The German troops, too, 90 per cent of them *askari*, were more accustomed to the rains than the South Africans, and were fleet-footed. Nevertheless, it was a considerable achievement on the part of Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck to transfer the force as quickly as he did. By May 7 he had concentrated over 4,000 men six miles south of Van Deventer's position. At that time the Second Division was so weakened by privations and sickness, and unavoidable detachments, that it could barely muster 3,000 rifles at Kondoa Irangi. Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck, perceiving his opponent's situation, took the offensive, Van Deventer retiring to entrenched positions which had a perimeter of about five miles. The Germans, at 7.30 p.m. on May 9, made a general attack on Van Deventer's front, and pressed their attack until 3.15 a.m. on the 10th, when, having been unable to gain any advantage, they withdrew. Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck was in personal command, and had at his disposal some 25 companies, organised as three battalions and one smaller detachment. The strength of the companies varied. The majority were about 150 strong, some were weaker and some numbered 200. The total force von Lettow-Vorbeck brought against the Second Division could not have been much below 4,000, and may have been greater. The attack was pressed with great spirit. Four

separate onslaughts were made, the enemy in some places repeatedly charging right up to the British positions. The brunt of the defence fell upon the 11th S.A. Infantry, supported by the 12th S.A. Infantry. When the enemy withdrew to his own positions he left three Europeans and 58 *askari* dead on the ground, and five wounded men. The other wounded had been removed. One battalion commander, von Kornatzky, was killed, another, von Bock, wounded. On the British side the total casualties were five killed and 18 wounded.

In one sense this fight at Kondoa Irangi was decisive. It was the first and last time that the Germans took the offensive against any large part of Gen. Smuts's army. The failure of this attack, made in circumstances more favourable to the Germans than were likely to recur, convinced Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck that the only strategy open to him was to act purely upon the defensive, to avoid big engagements, and thus prolong resistance to the last possible moment. For the time being he stayed where he was, occasionally bombarding the British camp at long range. Van Deventer remained, of necessity, inactive. It was not until nearly the end of June that he was able to resume the offensive.

While Van Deventer's division was marching and fighting the 1st and 3rd Divisions were waiting for the rains to cease. The 3rd Division was indeed incomplete. The 2nd S.A. Mounted Brigade, under Gen. Enslin, only

reached East Africa in May and was not ready to take the field until the latter half of June. So that when on May 18, the rains having abated, Gen. Smuts began another advance he had only a division and a half at his disposal. Rather less, for the 7th and 8th S.A. Infantry Regiments, with artillery and machine guns, all from Gen. Beves's brigade of the 3rd Division, had been sent to reinforce Van Deventer. Thus most of the troops engaged in the operations now undertaken belonged to Gen. Hoskins's Division—a division which included some of the best and the most experienced and acclimatized troops in the field. The following list gives the names of the principal troops of the division:—

BRITISH.—2nd Batt. Loyal North Lancashire Regt.; 25th Batt. Royal Fusiliers (Legion of Frontiersmen); 2nd Rhodesian Rifles; Royal Artillery and Engineer detachments; Royal Flying Corps and R.N.A.S. units; R.N. Armoured Car Section; Armoured Motor Battery (A.S.C.); East African Mounted Rifles (white settlers in B.E.A.); Bowker's Horse (Boer settlers in B.E.A.).

INDIAN.—27th Mountain Battery, 29th Punjabis, 13th Rajputs, 61st Pioneers, 101st Grenadiers, 129th and 130th Baluchis, 40th Pathans, 5th and 17th Light Infantry, and a squadron of the 17th Bengal Lancers. Two European Volunteer Maxim Gun Sections and Imperial Service Troops from Gwalior, Jhind, Kashmir, Rampur, etc.

AFRICAN.—3rd and 4th Batts. King's African Rifles. (To the 3rd Batt. was added a mounted infantry detachment composed of Somalis, Abyssinians, Arabs, and Nandi—about 100 strong). East African Scouts (Somalis, Masai, etc., under Capt. Barclay Cole), 1st Arab Rifles (the force raised by Major Wavell).

In the operations begun on May 18 the



GERMAN TRAIN DERAILED BY THE BRITISH.

immediate object of Gen. Smuts was the dislodgment of the enemy from the Pare and Usambara regions. That accomplished, it was his intention to turn south on a line east of and parallel to that followed by Gen. Van Deventer, his first objective in this southern march being Handeni. The great strength, for defensive purposes, of the enemy positions in Pare and Usambara has already been indicated. Pare and Usambara are large blocks of highlands rising abruptly from the level of the surrounding plateau, the eastern end of Usambara overlooking the coast plain and Tanga. The

of the British for a period long enough for reinforcements to be sent them. In this calculation they had omitted two possibilities. The first was that an advance might be made along the banks of the Pangani—this probably was discounted as an impossible task for a large force considering the denseness of the bush and the absence of roads. The other point they had omitted to provide against bespoke an absence of imagination or a disregard of geographical factors. The Pare Mountains are not continuous, but are divided into three blocks, separated by easily travers-



MACHINE-GUN EMPLACEMENT IN A HOLLOWED-OUT ANT-HILL.

western* sides of both the Usambara and Pare mountains are precipitous, and immediately at the foot of the hills on this side run the high road and railway to Moshi. Farther west, separated by 15 to 20 miles of dense bush, the Pangani, in most places and seasons an impassable river, flows roughly parallel to the railway and mountains. The Germans expected Gen. Smuts to follow the line of the railway, which they had fortified at all convenient points for 100 miles, and they had good reason to suppose that the force Col. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had left along the railway—which though not more than 2,000 strong had naval and field guns—would bar the progress

* Gen. Smuts wrote "south," not "west," in his dispatch. From Kahe the general trend of the mountains is S.E. and towards the railway they face westwards for three-fourths of their length.

able passes, and a still wider "gap" intervenes between the Pare and Usambara mountains. These gaps were left practically undefended and it was open to Gen. Smuts to send forces through them.

The plan adopted by Gen. Smuts was to send the main column (Sheppard's and Beves's brigades), with most of the artillery and transport, down the inner (left) bank of the Pangani. A smaller column under Gen. Hannington followed the railway, and a third column under Lieut-Col. T. O. Fitzgerald, 3rd K.A.R., starting from Mbuyuni, entered the Pare Mountains on the north-east through the Ngulu Gap. The main column kept somewhat ahead of Hannington. With his flanks thus thrown well forward in the mountains and along the Pangani, Gen. Smuts sought to

convince the enemy that resistance in the centre would be hopeless. And he trusted to push the operation through before von Lettow-Vorbeek could send up reinforcements. As he had designed, so it happened, and Gen. Smuts carried out his programme "according to plan" and to the last letter. Outflanked again and again, one strong German position after another was abandoned. Only at one point, Mikotsheni, where the Pangani river sweeping in comes close to the railway and the mountains, was a stand attempted. On that occasion while the Rhodesians made a frontal attack the rest of Gen. Sheppard's Brigade made an arduous but successful turning movement, and during the night, taking with him a 4.1 in. naval and field guns, the enemy retired. This was on May 30, and the next day the main body of the enemy left the Tanga railway at Mombo and went south along the route of the trolley line towards Handeni. Usambara, a rich, flourishing and healthy district, the district in which were most of the German settlements and plantations, was almost denuded of defenders. Gen. Smuts decided, therefore, to follow the enemy south.

Col. Fitzgerald's column from Mbuyuni had done its special work well, and on May 26 had joined Gen. Hannington. Thereafter the combined force had crossed the south Pare hills, and on June 1 was coming down the Gonja Gap between Pare and Usambara. Gen. Smuts, having removed his main column, entrusted to Gen. Hannington the clearing out of the remaining enemy units from Usambara. These units retired to Mombo, where there was a brisk fight, ending in the defeat and retreat of the Germans. During the action a company of *askari* in a trench on a hill, protected in front by a thick belt of sisal, was holding up a party of the 40th Pathans. An officer of the 27th Mountain Battery, climbing a tree, located the position of the machine gun, and a few rounds from two of the battery's guns at 1800 yards emptied the enemy trench of its occupants, the machine gun passing into possession of the British. The German *askari* had a special dislike of these mountain guns, declaring that they got to places guns ought not to be able to reach, and came so close that they could not miss their targets.

Gen. Hannington continued to press and to outflank the enemy, and another hill position, which had been strongly entrenched and could only have been taken with considerable loss,

was abandoned without a fight. On June 12 Hannington occupied Wilhelmstal, the capital of Usambara, without opposition, and on June 15 he reached Korogwe, from which town the railway to Tanga descends to the coast plain. The Germans had been very industrious in pulling up the railway, destroying bridges and "bushing" roads as they retreated, but Hannington's advance was, nevertheless, so rapid that the important road bridge over the



[Elliott & Fry.]

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. A.
HANNINGTON, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanded Second East African Brigade.

Pangani near Korogwe was saved. At this point Gen. Smuts instructed Hannington to abandon his operations in Usambara and rejoin the main column, considering it more important to pursue the enemy southward than to deal with the small enemy forces remaining on his left flank. These forces afterwards caused a good deal of trouble.

When the main column of Gen. Smuts left the line of the Tanga railway at Mikotsheni a few days were occupied in completing a bridge over the Pangani left unfinished by the Germans and in cutting roads, but pursuit of the enemy was soon resumed. At Mkalamo the two main columns were again in touch, and



PIONEERS BRIDGE-BUILDING.

on June 9 the 1st East African Brigade was in action all day. As usual, the Germans retired during the night. Followed up across a dry belt of 32 miles, they were found to be occupying a strongly entrenched position near Handeni. While Sheppard's brigade demonstrated against the enemy in front, Beves's brigade was sent westerly to threaten the enemy in the rear. Becoming aware of this movement, the Germans evacuated Handeni and turned south towards Pongwe. On June 18 Beves's men, attacking the retreating enemy, fought engagements at two places, at Pongwe and four miles north thereof. The Germans suffered heavy loss, but they succeeded in escaping. On June 19 the 5th South African Infantry (Col. J. J. Byron) were sent to occupy Kangata, eight miles south of Pongwe. They "bumped" against an entrenched enemy position concealed in dense bush and suffered heavy losses. They held on staunchly, however, and night witnessed the usual sequel—the Germans vanished.

Hannington, with the greater part of his brigade, arrived at Handeni from Korogwe on June 20 in time to take part in a movement which Gen. Smuts hoped would compel the enemy to stand. The Germans had retreated to a position on the Lukigura river, where the track to Mrogoro approaches the Nguru hills. Gen. Hoskins, with two battalions of South African Infantry, a composite battalion of Kashmir Imperial Service Infantry, 25th

Royal Fusiliers and a small body of mounted scouts, left camp on the night of June 23 and the next morning crossed the Lukigura above the place where the Germans were entrenched and got astride the road behind the enemy position. The same morning (June 24) the remainder of the 1st Division, under Gen. Sheppard, advanced direct to the Lukigura. At midday the enemy were engaged by both columns, being attacked simultaneously on three sides. The Germans after a stout resistance managed to get away by the one line open to them into the Nguru hills. In Gen. Smuts's opinion only the denseness of the bush, which hid their movements, enabled the enemy to escape from complete capture. Special distinction was earned in this day's fighting by the Kashmiri, and it was a source of gratification that Indian Imperial Service troops had proved their worth, though not all the contingents did as well as the Kashmir Rifles.* The 25th Fusiliers (Lt.-Col. D. P. Driscoll, D.S.O.) were coupled with the Kashmiri for conspicuous bravery on this occasion. In this battalion Mr. F. C. Selous, the African explorer, held the rank of captain, and he set a magnificent example to all ranks.† The

* The Jhind Infantry and the Faridkot Sappers and Miners, among other Imperial Service Troops, earned special mention.

† In September, 1916, Capt. Selous was given the D.S.O. "for conspicuous gallantry, resource and endurance [he was 64 years old]. The value of his services with his battalion cannot be over-estimated."



BRIDGE OVER THE PANGANI AT MIKOTSHENI.

Begun by the Germans and finished by the British.

German losses at Lukigura were seven whites killed and wounded and 14 taken prisoners, 30 *askari* killed and many wounded and captured. Two machine guns, a pom-pom and much ammunition fell into the hands of the British.

In the Nguru hills the enemy was reinforced from the south by Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck. The German positions were very strong, and as Gen. Smuts was in no ease immediately to continue the pursuit, he formed a large standing camp on the Msiha river, some eight miles beyond the Lukigura.

Our transport (wrote Gen. Smuts) had reached the utmost radius of its capacity and the troops had been on half rations for some time. They also required rest and reorganization. Several units were reduced to 30 per cent. of their original effectives*, owing to the ravages of malaria, and the difficulties of evacuating the sick were as great as those of forwarding supplies and reinforcements.

Since May 22 the troops had marched considerably over 200 miles in difficult country, often having to cut their way through almost impenetrable bush, and constantly engaging the enemy in his prepared rearguard positions. The march was rendered more arduous by most serious transport and supply difficulties, and, for the last 80 miles, since leaving the Pangani, frequent shortage of water for both men and animals. Besides, I deemed it necessary, in view of the ever-growing supply difficulties, to repair and restore the Mombo-Ndereina [Handeni] trolley line before moving farther.


Additional reasons for the pause at the Msiha river were (1) the desirability that Van Deventer's division should be farther

advanced before a combined movement on the German forces guarding the Central Railway began, and (2) the urgent necessity to clear out the enemy posted on the left flank of Gen. Smuts's force. Meantime General Headquarters were established at Handeni. Though in the middle of the tropics and only 1,900 feet high, Handeni was extraordinarily cool. This was agreeable enough for the Europeans, but was very trying to the Indian troops. The native troops, King's African Rifles, made themselves at home. As usual, whenever they were halted long enough, they built themselves a village of grass huts, with well-laid-out streets, pallisades and main gates. In the district were many *shambas* (plantations), chiefly of rubber.*

Clearing the left flank of Gen. Smuts meant the reduction of Eastern Usambara and the coast region from the Anglo-German frontier to Bagamoyo. In these operations the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral E. F. Charlton, C.B., rendered valuable help, while the Government of Zanzibar placed their steamers at the disposal of Gen. Smuts. The greater part of

* The largest of these *shambas* was owned by Mr. W. N. McMillan, an American big-game hunter and explorer who had become a settler in British East Africa. Mr. McMillan served in the British forces, attaining the rank of major. For the benefit of the troops he maintained, entirely at his own expense, two splendidly staffed and equipped convalescent homes. Another prominent settler in British East Africa who joined the forces was Lord Cranworth; he served in the Royal Artillery as a lieutenant.

* One unit which should have been 1,000 strong was reduced to 40 effectives.



CAPTAIN SELOUS AND HIS COMPANY OF THE ROYAL FUSILIERS.

the coast plain is covered with dense jungle, the heat is intense, the climate most unhealthy, and in this district as few European troops as possible were employed. The coast operations, subject to the orders of Gen. Edwards, I.G.C., were under the command of Col. C. W. Price, C.M.G., and were ably carried out. The first step taken was to send the 5th Indian Infantry across the British border towards Tanga; a small enemy detachment retreated before them. Then a force under Col. Price landed at Kwale Bay, eight miles north of Tanga. It arrived before that place on July 7, simultaneously with the appearance of British warships in the harbour. Tanga was occupied practically without opposition, very interesting information being obtained from German sources as to the effect of the bombardment of the place in November, 1914. The enemy force, about 200 strong, ejected from Tanga lurked in the neighbouring jungle, and, in conjunction with the force of about the same strength which had fled from Hannington at Korogwe, began to raid the British lines of communication, and even, on July 13, made a determined but unsuccessful attempt to blow up the road bridge at Korogwe. The 5th Indian Infantry from Tanga and the 57th Rifles from Korogwe completed the occupation of Usambara. At Amani, the important botanical station in Eastern Usambara, 25 Europeans surrendered. A detachment of Railway Sappers and Miners, Jhind Imperial Service Infantry and other details, under Lieut.-Col. C. W. Wilkinson, R.E., on July 15 defeated the Korogwe raiders on the lower Pangani, capturing a Hotchkiss gun in good order. The port of Pangani was occupied by the Navy on July 23. Gen. Hannington was now sent back from the Lukigura to help in rounding-up the enemy parties. He followed in part the old and practically disused slave route from Handeni to Pangani. Elusive as ever, most of the Germans succeeded in escaping south. They were pursued by Lieut.-Col. W. J. Mitchell with a detachment of 40th Pathans, a detachment of the Cape Corps (the "Cape Boys") co-operating. The enemy were beaten and driven south to Mandera, on the lower Wami. The small port of Sadani, at the mouth of the northern branch of the Wami, was occupied by the Navy on August 1, and here a detachment of the West India Regiment was landed. Gen. Smuts had already reached the conclusion that for a campaign which

threatened to be long drawn increasing use would have to be made of African troops, and the West India Regiment was but the first addition of negro soldiers made to the Expeditionary Force. The West Indians, the Cape Corps and the 40th Pathans between them cleared the enemy out of the lower Wami and then advanced to Bagamoyo. That once famous roadstead opposite Zanzibar, the start-



BRIGADIER-GENERAL P. S. BEVES,
Commanded the Second S.A. Infantry Brigade.

ing point of the greatest explorers of Africa, had been eclipsed by the rise of Dar-es-Salaam, but was still of some importance. It was captured, after a brilliant little operation, by ships of Admiral Charlton's squadron on August 15, among the booty being one of the Königsberg's 4.1 in guns uninjured. With the occupation of Bagamoyo, the whole of the area between Gen. Smuts's main column and the sea had been cleared of the enemy. An additional advantage was reaped in that it now became possible to shorten the lines of communication. The British base, with the help of the Navy, was removed from Mombasa to Tanga, a saving of 75 miles in the voyage from the Cape and from 200 to 300 miles in rail transport being thus effected.

Before the close of these coast operations Gen. Smuts had, on August 5, resumed his offensive. In the interval Gen. Botha, whose son, Capt. L. Botha, was serving under Gen. Smuts, paid a visit to East Africa. He stayed a few days at headquarters at Handeni and inspected the camp on the Msihi river, having the experience of coming once again within range of the German guns. While the 1st and 3rd Divisions had been compulsorily inactive, the

2nd Division had kept the enemy in play, and when Gen. Smuts once more advanced Van Deventer was already in possession of the middle section of the Central Railway.

His division having rested and been strengthened, and the dry season having come, Van Deventer on June 24 attacked and carried, with small loss, the German position near Kondoia Irangi. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had already sent part of the Kondoia troops to the Nguru mountains to oppose Gen. Smuts, and he now fell back eastwards towards Mrogoro.

under heavy machine-gun fire. Going straight for the enemy position Kirkpatrick's men took it with a loss of eight killed and nine wounded, and on July 31 seized Saranda station on the Central Railway, as well as Killinantinde, seven miles farther south. Before Van Deventer's main column could move supplies and transports had to be collected—his line of communication was still the long trail by Arusha and Moshi. But by mid-July Van Deventer was well on his way. He divided his column into two forces, one, chiefly mounted troops, under Brig.-Gen. Mamie Botha, the other, chiefly



BRITISH SHIPS OFF TANGA HARBOUR, NOVEMBER, 1914.
(From a German photograph found on the capture of the town in July, 1916).

The rapid progress the Belgians were then making in the north-west part of the protectorate rendered it too hazardous for von Lettow-Vorbeck to go west to Tabora; the German force there had to be left to its fate. Gen. Smuts therefore ordered Van Deventer to press on to the railway at Dodoma and thence turn eastward to co-operate with the 1st and 3rd Divisions. Gen. Van Deventer carried out this work with great vigour and complete success. Small columns under Lieut.-Cols. A. J. Taylor and H. J. Kirkpatrick operated on the right flank. Col. Kirkpatrick's column had one sharp action. While going through very dense bush, where scouting was almost impossible, it came suddenly

infantry, under Brig.-Gen. Berrangé. On July 25 Berrangé's men had a stiff fight, the Armoured Motor Battery (which was commanded by Major Sir John Willoughby) distinguishing itself by engaging the enemy at close range. Four days later Berrangé seized the section of the railway at Dodoma. Mamie Botha occupied the water-holes at Tissa Kwa Meda on July 22, after a sharp encounter. "From here," wrote Gen. Smuts, "Brig.-Gen. Mamie Botha, who had rendered great service at the head of this [the 1st South African Mounted] Brigade, returned to the Union of South Africa on private business." His place was taken by Brig.-Gen.



KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES IN CAMP.

Nussey, who had been Van Deventer's Chief of Staff. The brigade reached and occupied the railway at Kikombo on July 30.

Thus by the end of July Van Deventer was in possession of 100 miles of the Central Railway, from Kilimantinde on the west to Kikombo on the east. Practically every bridge and culvert was found to have been blown up, but the enemy had not had time for the further destruction of the track. By August 9 Van Deventer had concentrated his division at Njagalalo, east of Dodoma.

While Van Deventer was coming east Gen. Smuts had begun to press the enemy from the north. From his camp at Msiha the road south—the line of his advance—passes for about 45 miles close beneath the main western mass of the Nguru Mountains, with foothills and the lofty Kanga Mountain on the east. The Germans had a force of some 3,000 rifles, with much heavy and light artillery, in the mountains and athwart the road, which was entrenched along the foothills which it crosses. Gen. Smuts decided to clear the mountains by



GENERAL BOTHA WITH GENERAL SMUTS AND STAFF.



CAMELRY IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA.

wide turning movements. The footpaths and tracks which had to be taken were very difficult and progress was much hampered by the numerous streams which scored the sides of the massif and unite to form the Wami. Of these streams the Mdjonga (or Mhonda) flows through the broadest valley or gap of the mountains, and in this gap was the mission station of Mhonda. Gen. Enslin, who, with the 2nd South African Mounted Brigade, entered the mountain on August 6, occupied Mhonda on August 8. He reported that the route he had followed was impracticable for wheeled traffic of any kind,

but did not succeed in holding them. A small party of the enemy, aided by a naval 4.1 in. gun, engaged Enslin's troops, and eventually the whole force, taking with them the 4.1 in. gun, got away. Sheppard, having worked his way through the dense bush round the enemy positions on the slopes of Kanga, reached the Russonga river on April 12. He found the enemy had evacuated the Ruhungu position. Although the "drive" had failed, the Germans had been forced to abandon, without firing a shot, a position which it would have been very costly to capture. The following is a description



CONVEYING TROOPS BY BOAT.

and the transport, which had started to follow Enslin, had to be sent back. Of the other forces, Hannington's Brigade went down the Mdjonga valley and Sheppard's Brigade traversed the bush on the left (east) flank to get behind the main enemy position, which was near the main road at Ruhungu. Gen. Brits took Beves's Brigade to reinforce Hannington, who on August 9 had reached Matamondo, where one of Enslin's mounted regiments, which had lost its way in the mountains, eventually arrived.

There was very stiff fighting at Matamondo on August 10 and 11, the British casualties amounting to about 60 killed and wounded. The enemy suffered much more heavily and on the night of the 11th retreated. Enslin had occupied positions on the line of their retreat,

of the Ruhungu position as seen by Gen. Sheppard's force on August 12 :—

Ruhungu, which covered the German right flank, was well nigh impregnable, owing to the inability to use artillery against it because of the dense forest all around. The position was very heavily entrenched and so constructed as to obtain an all-round fire. In front of the trenches was a line of sharpened stakes covered with grass, a horrible surprise to anyone charging up the place. The stakes were a foot and a half high. All around was one mass of dug-outs, to allow the detachments to get cover from the aeroplane bombs, which had given them a hot time. There was a deep feeling of thankfulness that the turning movement of Brits and Hannington had caused the Germans to evacuate it [on August 10].

On evacuating Ruhungu the bulk of the enemy force, falling back towards Mrogoro, crossed the Wami at Dakawa and occupied an entrenched position on its farther (right) bank, breaking down the bridge after they had passed



ARMOURD MOTOR-LORRY CROSSING A DAMAGED RAILWAY BRIDGE.

The S.A. Pioneers narrowed the gauge of the heavy lorries so that they could run on the railway line.

over. They were followed by Enslin's Mounted Brigade, while a small force under Sheppard crossed the river higher up. Both Enslin and Sheppard approached Dakawa on August 16, a third force, composed of the 6th South African Horse, two double companies of Baluchis, a South African Infantry Battalion, and part of the 27th Mountain Battery, acting with Enslin. This third force made for the Dakawa crossing. A belt of thick bush covered their approach, but as the Wami was neared the bush gave place to open forest, with fairly big trees and much tall grass. The German position was well sited near the river with several machine guns covering the crossing. The enemy was in sufficient strength to prevent the crossing being seized and at the same time to keep off Sheppard's force (not more than 500 rifles), which had taken up a position about two miles from their right flank.

The action began (wrote a correspondent) with the advance in the afternoon of the Baluchis and 6th South African Horse, who, under a hot rifle fire, got to within 150 yards of the river, where they entrenched. The Indian mountain artillery, whose observation officer was posted in the Baluchi firing line, then opened fire, searching the enemy trenches at a range of 1,600 yards. The 2nd Mounted Brigade came into action on the right, but did not attempt to cross the Wami. At 7 o'clock the next morning, on Baluchi scouts approaching the river bank, they were heavily fired upon. The enemy seemed to have been reinforced. A little later an enemy machine gun was smashed by shells from the 27th Mountain Battery. Fighting at the crossing continued into the afternoon. Four armoured cars which, soon after midday, boldly advanced almost to the river's edge were obliged to retire. A German sniper wounded the squadron commander. While the detachment at the bridge was holding the enemy the Mounted Brigade managed to cross the river higher up, but it was late in the afternoon before they got near the enemy. All this time Sheppard's column, though unable to advance, hampered the foe, who in the

night slipped away. The heat was most trying and, although the action was fought by a river, there was a lack of water. The South Africans especially suffered badly from thirst. Our casualties were about 120 all told. The enemy losses were certainly double ours. But they carried off their field guns.

Skilful handling of his forces had again extricated the enemy from a difficult position, but he was still in a tight corner, with Van Deventer pressing fast along the line of the railway to which he was retreating. On the same day that he had concentrated his division at Njangalo (August 9) Van Deventer started east. On August 12 he occupied Mpapua; on August 15 and 16 he fought the enemy at Kidete station, losing 6 killed and 39 wounded. The enemy, outflanked by mounted troops, retired, and on August 22 Van Deventer entered Kilossa, the garrison of which had already got away to Mrogoro. Gen. Van Deventer's report to Gen. Smuts gives some idea of the difficulties overcome in this rapid advance, in which the South African troops were seen at their best:—

The railway from Kidete to Kilossa for a distance of 25 miles follows a narrow defile cut through the Usugara mountains by the Mkondokwa river: every yard of advance was stubbornly resisted by the enemy. . . . The fighting consisted of the enemy receiving our advance guard with one of several ambushes, then falling back on a well-prepared position, and retiring from that on to further well-selected ambush places and positions. All the time our less advanced troops were subjected to vigorous shelling by means of long-range naval guns.

Since leaving Kondoa Irangi the troops who have reached Kilossa by the shortest route have done at least 220 miles. Owing to bad roads, shortage of transport and the rapidity of advance, the adequate rationing of the troops was not possible. The underfeeding and overworking are sadly reflected in their state of health. Regarding the animals of my Division, the advance from Mpapua to Kilossa was through one continual fly belt where practically all the animals were infected.

Gen. Smuts now tried, in his own phrase, "to bottle the enemy up in Mrogoro." To this end Enslin was sent south. He crossed the Central Railway west of Mrogoro on August 23 and the next day occupied Mlali, on the western flanks of the Uluguru hills, some 15 miles south-west of Mrogoro. The 1st Mounted Brigade, under Gen. Nussey, was now detached from Van Deventer's division to co-operate with Enslin. The rest of Van Deventer's division, notwithstanding the exhausted condition of the infantry, responded gallantly to an appeal by Gen. Smuts that they should block the enemy line of retreat still farther to the south-west. Crossing a series of mountain ridges, all entrenched, and at each of which the enemy fought retarding actions, they reached Kidodi, on the Ruaha river, on September 10—a remarkably fine performance. Gen. Smuts was specially concerned to bar this route as he had learned that, if driven from Mrogoro, it was Col. von Lettow-Vorbeck's intention to retire by it to Mahenge, a Government station on a healthy plateau which lies midway between Mrogoro and Lake Nyasa.

Having made dispositions to guard against

von Lettow-Vorbeck's escape, the troops on the Wami began the march to Mrogoro on August 23. Gen. Smuts first moved back along the Wami for nine miles, striking thence across a waterless belt of some 25 miles to the Ngerengere. The dense bush, the heat and the absence of water made this march, which lasted two days, one of the most trying of the whole campaign. It served its purpose, for, misled by Enslin's movement farther west, the enemy had massed his troops on the direct road between Mrogoro and Dakawa. The German commander-in-chief had been, at Mrogoro for some weeks. There also was the Governor, Dr. Schuce, and the administrative headquarters. By August 24 von Lettow-Vorbeck realized that not only was it impossible to hold the place any longer but that unless he retreated immediately the decisive engagement it was his object to avoid would have to be fought. Calling back his forces from the Dakawa road, he hurriedly evacuated Mrogoro (taking Dr. Schnee with him), leaving the town by a track which went due south through the Uluguru mountains. Gen. Smuts did not know that this track existed until on August 26



ACTION AT DAKAWA, WAMI RIVER.

A sketch made on the spot. A mountain battery gun less than 200 yards from the enemy's trenches.

the brigades of Gens. Sheppard and Beves entered Mrogoro. Then it was seen that the elaborate arrangements made to guard the flanks of the mountains—Hammyngton was now moving east of Uluguru—had proved vain. The enemy had once more got away.

Although his troops and animals were "worn out" and his transport had reached "its extreme radius of action," Gen. Smuts decided upon immediate pursuit of the enemy. After six weeks of most arduous fighting the Germans were driven from the Uluguru mountains. They evacuated Kissaki, their last and chief stronghold in those mountains, on September 15, having previously abandoned two naval guns

conducted the coast operations farther north, had about 2,000 troops at Bagamoyo—Indians, Cape Boys and West Indians. He divided them into two columns. While one column marched along the coast, the other took a more inland route so as to approach Dar-es-Salaam from the east. Neither column met with serious opposition. The Germans had determined not to defend Dar-es-Salaam, where they had gathered a large number of European non-combatants. Simultaneously with the appearance of Col. Price before Dar-es-Salaam British warships entered the harbour and the town was ceremoniously occupied on September 4. The garrison had retired south some days previously, taking



GERMAN FORT AT KISSAKI, ULUGURU MOUNTAINS.

and very large quantities of heavy-gun ammunition. Part of the German force escaped to Mahenge, but the main body, with von Lettow-Vorbeck and Dr. Schnee, took up defensive positions towards the coast and stretching from the Mgeta river to south of the Rufiji. It was now mid-September, and Gen. Smuts's Army was so exhausted and worn out—for weeks it had been on half rations or less—that a thorough rest was imperatively necessary, on medical as well as military grounds. For the time being offensive operations ceased.

Concurrently with the advance of the British main forces in August, operations were undertaken to clear the coast plain between Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam. Col. Price, who had

with them their artillery, except one 6-in. gun, which was blown up. The harbour works and the railway station had also been effectively destroyed. Many of the German locomotives were run into the sea.


In seven months, March-September, 1916, Gen. Smuts had reduced the strength of the enemy opposed to him by two-thirds and had occupied the whole of the north-eastern part of German East Africa, including the chief areas of European settlement—Kilimanjaro-Meru, Usambara, Handeni and Mrogoro. Concurrently Belgian forces under Maj.-Gen. Tombeur had conquered the north-west part of the German protectorate. The two main Belgian columns, which were commanded respectively



CROSSING A RIVER.



BUILDING A BLOCKHOUSE.



BRIDGE BUILT BY INDIAN SAPPERS TO REPLACE ONE DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS.

by Cols. Olsen and Molitor, invaded German territory north and south of Lake Kivu in April. Col. Molitor, who struck south-east, was aided by a Lake Column sent by Gen. Smuts to the Victoria Nyanza and commanded by Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Crewe. Col. Olsen's column, marching down the north-east shores of Tanganyika, occupied Ujiji and Kigoma, the lake terminus of the Central Railway, early in August, Belgian gunboats and seaplanes assisting. Thereafter the Olsen, Molitor and Crewe columns advanced on Tabora, the chief town in the western part of German East Africa. It was occupied by the Belgians in September after stubborn fighting. The one section of the railway left in German hands, that between Tabora and Kilimantinde, was seized by Sir

Charles Crewe's column. By the end of September the Central Railway and the whole of the German protectorate north of the line had passed into the possession of the Allies.

Gen. Northey's Nyasaland and Rhodesia columns had also achieved noteworthy successes. Between May and September they conquered the south-western part of German East Africa, and after the capture of Tabora and Mrogoro they played an increasingly important part in the operations. The story of the campaign in the western part of German East Africa, of the fighting in the Mahenge and Rufiji districts and of the Portuguese operations in the south is reserved for treatment in a subsequent chapter.



CHAPTER CLXXXIV.

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (III.) THE LAST PHASE.

SITUATION AFTER THE FALL OF BUKAREST—THE INVADING FORCES AND THEIR PLANS—RUMANIAN AND RUSSIAN RETREATS—ABANDONMENT OF THE DOBRUDJA—THE DELTA OF THE DANUBE—FALL OF MACIN AND BRAILA—THE SERETH LINE—THE END OF THE ENEMY ADVANCE—A BITTER WINTER—RUMANIAN ARMY REORGANIZATION—GERMAN HOPES OF BREAD AND OIL—THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT—DESTRUCTION OF THE OIL FIELDS—RUMANIAN POLITICS—FORMATION OF A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT—PROSPECTS OF REFORM—RUMANIA AND THE ALLIES.

WITH the fall of Bukarest on December 6, 1916, opens the last stage of the enemy advance in Rumania.

The Rumanian theatre of war remained as yet divided into three distinct parts, which may be described as the Moldavian, the Wallachian, and the Dobrudja fronts.

Along the Moldavian border the opposing forces were still facing each other in approximately the same positions as had been reached by the Rumanian Fourth Army under Gen. Presan about the middle of October, 1916, but by the end of November hardly any Rumanian units were left in that sector, their place having been taken by two Russian armies under Generals Kaledin and Lechitsky, the conquerors of Lutsk and Czernowitz—the main craftsmen of the Russian victory in the summer of 1916. The enemy forces in this area were comprised in two Austro-Hungarian armies, the Seventh under Gen. Kövess von Kövesshaza in the north, and the First under Gen. Arz von Straussenberg in the south; these two commanders, both natives of Transylvania, were among the few Austro-Hungarian generals whose reputation was not lost in the disasters which the Hapsburg Monarchy had suffered on

Vol. XII.—Part 147.

the Russian front during the preceding summer. Besides Austro-Hungarian troops their armies contained a fair number of German units, among others a group of divisions under Gen. von Gerok. The supreme enemy command was nominally in the hands of Archduke Joseph, a blue-blooded nonentity. When on November 22 Archduke Charles Francis Joseph had succeeded his great-uncle as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, Archduke Joseph, a member of the so-called Hungarian branch of the Hapsburgs, was appointed to the command on the Transylvanian front.

In the centre, in the Wallachian plain, the enemy armies were predominantly German, and remained entirely under German command. Here Field-Marshal von Mackensen personally supervised the operations; it was he with whom rested in reality the supreme enemy command in the entire Rumanian theatre of war, from Dorna Vatra to the Black Sea. By December 6 the entire Wallachian front had been reduced to about 75 miles. Within this sector operated two armies: the Ninth German Army under Gen. von Falkenhayn, which in November had been scattered along the entire northern border of Wallachia from the Vulcan

Mountains to the Buzeu Pass, on a front of about 150 miles, and the so-called army of the Danube under Gen. von Koseh. The Ninth Army presented the strongest concentration of forces within the entire Rumanian theatre of war; it included the army groups of Generals von Kühne, Krafft von Delmensingen and von Morgen and the Cavalry Corps of Count Schmettow. The army of the Danube consisted



GENERAL ARZ VON STRAUSSENBERG
Commanded the First Austro-Hungarian Army
on the Moldavian Border.

of German, Bulgarian and Turkish divisions, and was to be further reinforced in its advance along the Danube; it gathered in the forces which had been detailed to guard the river-line, whilst the northern bank had still been in the possession of the Russian and Rumanian forces. On the side of our Allies, following on the battle of the Argesh, most of the worn-out Rumanian units were withdrawn behind the front, to be reorganised under the leadership of Generals Avereseu and Presan. They were replaced by fresh Russian troops, and thus the Rumanian theatre of war gradually changed into a fourth division of the Russian front (the other three were—the northern sector on the Dvina under Gen. Ruzsky, the centre in Lithuania under Gen. Evert, and the original southern front in Volhynia and Galicia under Gen. Brusiloff). In January, 1917, Gen. Gurko,

who had greatly distinguished himself during the autumn fighting in Volhynia, was put in supreme command of all the Allied forces in the Rumanian theatre of war.

In the Dobrudja the Allied forces under the Russian General Sakharoff were still facing the Third Bulgarian Army under Gen. Nerizoff on a line extending 10 to 15 miles north of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway. These positions had been reached by the Russian counter-offensive about the middle of November; then the fatal breakdown in the Jiu Valley made Wallachia the centre of events.

Wallachia remained the centre also after the fall of Bukarest. The initiative was entirely with the enemy, and all the efforts and skill of the Russian generals and all the tenacity of the Russian peasant-soldier could not counterbalance the omissions of the thoroughly disorganised and incompetent—sometimes even criminally incompetent—Government system of Russia's *ancien régime*. Half of the reinforcements which Russia sent to Rumania in December, 1916, if afforded two months earlier—when the weakness and failings of the Rumanian army organisation and the



GENERAL VON KÖVESS
Commanded the Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army
on the Moldavian Border.

overpowering strength of the enemy had already become patent to the whole world—might have saved the situation. Now the invasion could not be arrested, not even after the eastern base of the Wallachian salient had been reached.

After the battle of the Argesh the enemy advance in the centre had brought the Wallachian front into line with the western border

of Moldavia; they joined into a practically straight line extending from Dorna Vatra, at the farthest north-western-end of Moldavia, to Oltenitza on the Danube, and at right angles to that river. From Oltenitza to a short distance north of Cernavoda the Danube intervened between the opposing forces, on a line running to the east with a slight but increasing curve to the north. In the Dobrudja the front extended due east and west.

The further enemy advance in Wallachia had to be a wheel pivoting on south-eastern Transylvania, and sweeping across the lowlands in the big bend of the Danube between Oltenitza and Braila. The ultimate objective set in that wheel to the two German armies in the centre was the narrow sector between Focshani and Braila, in front of the Sereth line. The right enemy wing in the Dobrudja was meantime to complete the conquest of that province, support the operations on the left bank of the Danube, and finally to turn the line of the Sereth by crossing the Danube below Galatz and invading Bessarabia. The Austro-Hungarian armies on the left wing were to force, through the valleys of the Bistritsa, the Trotus and other minor mountain streams, a descent into the valley of the Sereth and against the Dorohoi-Bacau-Focshani railway. In the centre the two German armies, a new phalanx directed against a sector which towards the close of the campaign measured only about

50 miles, were to continue to make the pace in the offensive; the line on which their advance was finally arrested marked only the minimum of the German strategic aims.

But for the Russian command the line along the northern Moldavian border, bending back past Ocna and Maraseshti to the lower Sereth, and along the Danube from Galatz to the Black Sea, meant the maximum withdrawal compatible with the safety of their Galician front. Had the line of the lower Sereth been turned or broken through, or had the railway line in the upper and middle Sereth Valley been anywhere reached by the enemy, our Allies would have had to evacuate Moldavia and retire on to the line of the Pruth. This movement, by uncovering the Bukovinian flank, would have necessitated also a retreat from the Carpathian front between the Jablonitza and Dorna Vatra, in south-eastern Galicia and in the Bukovina. The Russians would have had to abandon the wide belt of land south of the Dniester which the brilliant victories of General Lechitsky had gained for them in June and July, 1916. Not merely strategically but even in territory they would have lost most of the fruits of the preceding summer campaign. The enemy would have regained the important railway line at the northern foot of the Carpathians, the object of so many offensives and counter-offensives during the two years 1914-1916. The Rumanian campaign would have



AUSTRIAN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS LAYING AND TESTING A FIELD TELEPHONE.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE CAMPAIGN IN MOLDAVIA.

resulted in a marked enemy recovery in the entire southern half of the Eastern front. It was therefore with the utmost tenacity that the Russians continued to hold the line from Dorna Vatra to the Odobeshti Mountains, and here, on a front of about 150 miles, during a campaign of three months, which was marked by very considerable advances in every other part of the Rumanian theatre of war, the enemy never succeeded in breaking anywhere through the Allied defences or in gaining anything but small local advantages usually fully counter-

the fighting fell. Two river lines intervene between the Argesh and the Rinnie Sarat-Braila front, the Jalomitsa and the Calmatuiul, whilst the Buzeu, running in its lower course in a north-easterly direction, covers the western flank of the positions round Braila. In their lower courses these rivers form serious obstacles to military operations, but each of them was forced in its upper course by the German advance along the Ploeshti-Foeshani railway. The distance from Ploeshti to the Buzeu River amounts to only 40 miles, and on December 14,



RUMANIAN CONVOY IN BUKAREST SHORTLY BEFORE ITS CAPTURE.

balanced by similar successes attained by the Russians.

During the wheel which carried the enemy forces from the Ploeshti-Bukarest to the Rinnie Sarat-Braila front, the main body of the Ninth Army followed the railway which runs from Ploeshti, past Buzeu and Rinnie Sarat to Foeshani, whilst the army of the Danube advanced parallel to it, along the outer circle, against the corner between the Sereth and the Danube. The distance covered by the troops of Gen. von Koseh was on the average about twice that traversed by the Ninth Army, but it was on the latter that the main brunt of

eight days after the fall of Bukarest, the enemy crossed it east of the town of Buzeu. The road was now practically open for an advance of the Army of the Danube against Braila. In this advance the troops of General von Koseh were still further helped by strong Bulgarian detachments crossing, on December 8, the Danube at Calarashi (opposite Silistria), and at Feteshti (at the Wallachian end of the Cernavoda bridge). The Army of the Danube could sweep on against the Jalomitsa, leaving to the Bulgarians the task of clearing the Baragan steppe.

On November 28 the whole of the Campolung-Piteshti railway line, which runs about 30 to 40



BUZEU.

miles west of the Predeal-Ploeshti railway, was as yet in the hands of our Allies. A week later, whilst the Rumanian forces in the Prahova valley were still offering stubborn resistance to the enemy pressure from the north in the district round Sinsia, the forces of Gen. von Falkenhayn were already approaching the outskirts of Ploeshti. The line of retreat through the Prahova valley was cut. "The pursuit of the Rumanians across the Bukarest-Ploeshti line," announced the Austrian official report of December 8, "is proceeding rapidly. The enemy retreating from the Predeal and Alt-Sehantz passes has already found his retreat barred by Austro-Hungarian and German troops. The majority of them were captured yesterday by the Ninth Army, and numbered about 10,000 men."

The same story, only worded differently, was told by the German *communiqué* of the same day, except that the round and impressive figure of 10,000 prisoners covered in it *all* the captures effected by the Ninth Army on December 7, and not merely those in the Prahova and the Dostaia valleys. As a matter of fact neither version was true. The bulk of the Rumanian troops which had held the passes north of Ploeshti succeeded in effecting their retreat to the east, across the mountains, whilst Rumanian and Russian forces were holding up the main forces of Gen. von Falkenhayn east of Ploeshti. "The

German reports giving the impression that they had captured the Predeal Army at the end of November" (O.S., *i.e.*, the beginning of December), wrote the correspondent of *The Times* with the Rumanian Army under date of January 8, "reached here only yesterday. I witnessed personally the retreat of the whole Army under the command of Gen. Avereseu, now commanding the Rumanian Armies. As soon as the hope of saving Bukarest was abandoned a retreat from the Carpathians was ordered, and the troops withdrew slowly, keeping contact all the time with the enemy. The artillery maintained the position, firing at the enemy until the infantry had succeeded in getting away, but the guns, after being destroyed, were lost. The rearguards, which fought very bravely, had also to be sacrificed.

"The Predeal Army then joined the remainder of the Bukarest divisions, and with them offered the first organized resistance to the enemy south of Buzeu. Divisions of these much-tried troops are still fighting at the front."

Some 10 miles west of Ploeshti the Rumanian rearguards supported by the Russians succeeded in arresting for a while the enemy advance on the line of the Cricovul River. It was not until after the Germans had turned these positions from the north by an advance across the mountains against Cislau, in the Buzou Valley, that our Allies withdrew on December 9 in the direction of Mizil. After


another three days of fighting, Mizil also was abandoned. On the same day the right wing of the Ninth German Army crossed the River Jalomitsa at Receau; the Army of the Danube crossed at Urziceni; the cavalry from Gen. von Kosch's army had crossed at Copiza on December 10. On December 14 the enemy captured the town of Buzeu, the important junction of the railways from Ploeshti, Cernavoda, Braila, Focshani, and of the line which runs up the Buzeu river towards the Buzeu Pass. On December 15 and 16 severe fighting deve-

loped for the crossings of the Buzeu both north and south-east of the town, and in the Calmatuiul lowlands, south of the Buzeu. On the next day the Buzeu was crossed by the Ninth Army on a broad front, whilst the Army of the Danube forced a passage over the Lower Calmatuiul, south of Filipeshti. The forces of our Allies were now retiring in two directions, the Rumanians mainly on Rinnic Sarat, where Russian reinforcements were awaiting them, the Russians towards Braila.

The retreat across the Lower Jalomitsa



THE VALLEY OF THE BUZEU RIVER.



THE DELTA OF THE DANUBE.

resulted naturally in a corresponding withdrawal in the Dobrudja. On December 14 General Sakharoff's troops evacuated the positions which they had held since about the middle of November, and reached on the next day the Hirshova-Cartal-Cogelac line, some 10 miles north of their previous front. It was decided to abandon practically the whole of the Dobrudja; the movement was carried out with comparatively small losses, and much of the time even out of touch with the enemy. On December 17 the Russians crossed the Babadag-Pecineaga line, some 30-35 miles

north of their original front. The next day Bulgarian cavalry entered the town of Babadag. On a line extending from Turcoia on the Danube to Hangearca, and then along the River Taita to Lake Babadag (north-east of the town), the Russian rearguard, consisting largely of Cossack cavalry, for the first time during the retreat offered serious resistance. On December 19 fighting "attaining more than average intensity" was reported from the district of Cernia, on the Russian right wing, and on the next day some serious encounters took place in the centre round Balabancia and Bachkioi between the Third Cossack and the Fourth Bulgarian Infantry Divisions. Soon the battle extended across the whole of the Dobrudja front. "The enemy, with superior forces, attacked our detachments along the whole front," says the Russian official *communiqué* of December 22. "After a stubborn resistance our detachments commenced to withdraw northwards. By a daring attack of one of our regiments, the Bulgarians, who advanced east of Lake Babadag from the village of Enisala, were thrown into Lake Ibolota. The greater part of them were drowned. . . ." On December 23 the left Russian wing was withdrawn over the Lower Danube across pontoon-bridges which had



CHRISTMAS CUSTOMS IN RUMANIA.

On Christmas Eve the children go singing from house to house, carrying a paper star lighted from behind by a candle.



TULCEA.

been constructed there in September, 1916, at Tulcea and Isaceea. The Russian forces remaining in the Dobrudja were concentrated on the line Rachel-Greei, in front of Macin.

On Christmas Eve the enemy entered in force the town of Tulcea, one of the most important commercial centres in the Dobrudja. Inhabited by Rumanians, Russians, Jews, Tartars, Armenians and Greeks, it lies opposite the Bessarabian town of Ismail, the first important settlement on the Danube, on the western fringe of its Delta, which from now onwards was to separate on a wide front the opposing armies.

In the district of Tulcea the Danube divides into three main branches: the Kilia arm which, in the north, forms the frontier between the Russian province of Bessarabia and the Rumanian Dobrudja; the Sulina canal, opened some time since to navigation, by dredging and the removal of the sand bars; and the St. George's canal, which, down to Dunabet, forms the southern border of the Delta. At certain periods, especially between April and the middle of July, the wide country enclosed by these rivers and measuring about 1,500 square miles changes into an enormous lake—only few islands stand above the flood; at other times, in the dry season, wide fields and meadows emerge, covered with magnificently rich growth, though big lakes and numerous rivers still remind one of the waters which claim this land in their own season. For ages the

Delta of the Danube remained practically unexplored; current theories described it as a swamp and enterprising capitalists planned its drainage. At present the best authorities consider it an inland lake, traversed by ridges and causeways which divide it into many separate basins; most of its bottom sinks below the surface of the Black Sea—hence all ideas of draining it have to be dismissed as impracticable.

The extraordinary life of the Delta, where plants as well as animals have had to develop a new type adjusted to the regular interchange of floods and dry seasons, has found its recorder in the distinguished Director of the Museum of Natural History in Bukarest, Dr. G. Antipa. His descriptions read like bits of a new "Jungle Book"; here is the paradise of animals, where man alone can find no permanent footing. The amount of dry land in the Delta is very small at all seasons, but the more or less solid surface is very much enlarged by a peculiar growth of water plants called "plaur" which form wide, strong mats, sometimes more than three feet thick—whole islands—inhabitable by animals and even by enterprising men. Fishermen build on them their huts of reeds, and animals find safe refuge from the rising waters. Most of them, even the wolves, the foxes, the wild oxen and pigs in the Delta, know how to swim, and they all better than men recognise the time when they have to make for safety. When the mice and rats gather on



AN ISLAND IN THE DANUBE DELTA.

higher ground it is a sure sign that the waters will soon be rising. Only the hares have not learned the art of swimming, but when the floods come run for their life. The crowns of the magnificent willow-trees which cover wide stretches of land in the Delta are a peculiar place of refuge. Even wolves and foxes can sometimes be found seeking safety in the willow-trees (the usual haunt of the wild cat) gnawing the young shoots; if the flood lasts long they die of starvation. This is the land where the story of Noah's Ark is repeated every year in tens of thousands of places; where, indeed, animals, mammalia, as well as birds, have their permanent arks against men. It is their own land, their exclusive land. Fish also abound, and when man makes occasional preying inroads into this region it pays him well to do so. Especially during high floods fish gather in the Delta to live on its rank plants. It is recorded that in 1907-8, when at Braila the river had risen almost 20 feet above the usual level, 13 million pounds of fish were caught in the Delta.

In exceptionally cold winters the Delta freezes, and again its life enters on a new phase. But when in spring the ice breaks it sometimes tears off and carries away with it the banks of reeds, the "plours," which change into swimming islands, and by their removal

it transforms the face of the landscape. Only during the most severe frost does the Delta admit free movements of men across its lands, but no such frost came in the winter of 1916-7, until after the winter campaign had practically closed. The Delta was saved from invasion.

By December 17 the two German armies which operated between the Carpathians and the Danube reached a line extending from Slobodia, on the Calnau, a left-hand tributary of the Buzeu, past Pirlitzi to Vishani, some 25 miles east of the town of Buzeu; then south of the Buzeu River, past Filipeshti and Viziru to the Danube. The positions on this line ran about 15 to 30 miles in front of Rinnie Sarat and Braila, covering these last two Wallachian towns still in the possession of our Allies. The sector before Braila was the best protected and fortified part of the line, and the enemy, therefore, did not attempt a frontal attack against it, but began his advance by movements on both its flanks; in the Dobrudja by closing in against Macin, in the west by an offensive against Rinnie Sarat. The first attempts in the latter direction having met with determined resistance, the enemy paused for a few days, only to resume the attack with bigger forces on December 22. A battle then

followed which lasted five days and was fought on a front extending over some 30 miles. The main attack against Rinnie Sarat was carried out from two directions. On the left wing of the Ninth German Army, the group of Gen. Krafft von Delmensingen, comprising the German Alpine Corps, advanced from west to east against the Calnau line in front of Racovitseni, whilst, on the right wing, the attack proceeded from south to north, from Pirlitz and Balaceanu

against Zoita. On December 23 the enemy captured the villages of Ardrecesti and Pintencani, Heights 60 and 69 and the village of Balaceanu. The next day violent artillery fire was reported from this part of the front, and also from the Calnau. The German superiority in artillery was again telling against our Allies. "The enemy fire was particularly fierce to the north of the Buzeu-Rinnie road," reports the official Russian



A RUSSIAN TRANSPORT WELCOMED AT BRAILA.

communiqué of December 25, "where he launched attacks and captured a height south of Racovitsei. Our troops counter-attacked and dislodged the enemy from this height, but our detachments soon abandoned it again, as the enemy was sweeping it with shells." On the next day the front was extended still farther to the north, to the sources of the river Rinnic, north-west of the town. The Alpine Corps had established contact with the Army Group of Gen. von Gerok on the extreme right wing of the First Austro-Hungarian Army. On December 26 fighting round Rinnic Sarat reached its culminating point. The German forces succeeded in breaking through the tenaciously defended positions of the Russians on a front of 10 miles and in capturing the villages of Pardosi, Costieni and Zoita, the last only about seven miles south of the town of Rinnic. During the night of December 26-27 our Allies took up new positions on the heights north-west of Zoita, and the next day was marked by a swaying battle, which finished, however, in a further Russian withdrawal. "After a stubborn resistance," says the official Russian *communiqué* of December 28, "our detachments were pressed back by superior hostile forces on the sector near the railway in the region of Rinnic Sarat and were obliged to withdraw as far as the River Rinnic."

After severe street fighting the town itself was evacuated. The enemy claimed to have captured during the five days of fighting in front of Rinnic Sarat 10,220 prisoners.

It was not until after the Ninth Army had gained a considerable stretch of ground beyond the Buzeu that the Army of the Danube resumed, on Christmas Day, its advance against the Vishani-Viziru front. German divisions reinforced by the Austro-Hungarian group of Colonel Szivo formed the main attacking force; the Turks and Bulgarians held the eastern part of the line, near the Danube. "Throughout the day the enemy was attacking with considerable forces on the Filipeshti-Lisconteanca front," reports the Russian *communiqué* of December 26, "but was repulsed with heavy losses. The fighting was especially fierce in the village of Filipeshti, which, having been set on fire by enemy artillery, was evacuated by us." Also Height 55 was abandoned, but the railway station of Filipeshti remained in the hands of our Allies. During the next two days no further operations on a large scale were undertaken by the troops of General von Koseh. They were awaiting the results of the battle round Rinnic Sarat. With the withdrawal beyond the River Rinnic, the positions in the lake district on the eastern bank of the Buzeu, round Satneu, Slobodia,



BULGARIANS IN MACIN.



BRITISH ARMOURD CARS WHICH FOUGHT IN THE VIZIRU DISTRICT.
Photographed on their way to Rumania.

and Balta Alba ("White Lake") had also to be abandoned. The right flank and rear of the Russian troops on the Filipeshti-Viziru line was thereby uncovered and a retreat in that sector could no longer be avoided. It began on December 28 and was carried out in perfect order. During the next two days the threatened right wing of the forces fighting in front of Braila, between the Buzeu and the Danube, was withdrawn from Filipeshti to the Sueshti-Janca-Perichora line, the centre and left wing standing firm at Bordeia Verde and Viziru. In the battles fought in that district a detachment of British armoured motor-cars greatly distinguished themselves. "Its gallant commander," reported the Russian *communiqué* of December 28, "was wounded during the battle of December 26, when repulsing the enemy attacks. Nevertheless, on the 27th, he again directed the operations of his detachment, and put the enemy to flight."

It was by threatening a flank attack from the Dobrudja that Mackensen forced the Russians to abandon their positions south of Braila. By December 29 the Russian forces in the Dobrudja had withdrawn on to a narrow front round Macin and taken up positions on the range of wooded hills which surround the town from the south-east; their line extended from Height 90 near the village of Greci, across Heights 161, 364, and 197 to the village of Lunceavitsa. On December 30 the Fourth Bulgarian Division opened its attack against the centre of the Russian positions; the next day Bulgarian

units captured Height 161, a German regiment Height 90. On New Year's Day, 1917, Hill 197 and Lunceavitsa were lost, and the Russians retired on to their last defensive line extending from Macin, past Jijila, to Hill 108, in front of Vacareni.

The strategic importance of Macin and Vacareni is due to the narrowing up of the bed of the Danube in that region. North of Hirshova the Danube divides into two main branches. The belt of land between them, which is, on the average, about 10 miles wide, is traversed by numerous minor branches of the river and covered with lakes and swamps. Not a single road or track crosses this marshy waste, which forms a perfect barrier to any military operations. Some 40 miles below Hirshova the right arm of the Danube turns at a straight angle to the west and rejoins the other arm opposite the town of Braila. At the point where the right arm turns to the west, and at a distance of six miles from Braila, lies Macin. A good high-road accompanies the river-arm to its junction opposite Braila and then follows the right bank of the Danube as far as Pistră, opposite Reni. It is joined in the corner, facing Galatz, by another high-road which runs along a natural causeway from Vacareni. It is most misleading to describe either Macin or Vacareni as bridge-heads, as the enemy Press used to do for purposes of propaganda. There were no bridges across the Danube, which at Braila and Galatz is some 800 yards wide: merely owing to the



RIMNIC SARAT.

configuration of the country access could be gained to the river bank. Here, as nowhere else, below Hirshova was it possible to threaten from the Dobrudja the Danube flank of the Russian armies.

Yet, however important the Macin positions were for the defence of Braila, it would have been extremely risky to detail any considerable forces for their defences where the lines of retreat were so few and so narrow. The complete evacuation of the Dobrudja, and therefore also the evacuation of Braila, were now merely a question of days. On January 2 Height 108 was abandoned, and the next day Jijila was lost after severe bayonet fighting in its streets. On January 4 German, Bulgarian and Turkish troops entered the town of Macin. Part of the Russian troops had withdrawn across the Danube to Braila, the rest towards Vacareni. On January 5 at dawn two Bulgarian regiments launched fierce attacks against the last Russian rearguards holding Vacareni. "Our detachments fought a stubborn battle throughout the day with superior forces, inflicting great losses on the enemy. Towards the evening we were compelled to commence a withdrawal to the other bank of the Danube." The last Allied troops had left the Dobrudja. From Mount Orliga, which rises on the bank of the Danube between Macin and Jijila, about 350 feet above the river, German artillery opened fire against Braila.

The army of General Sakharoff in the Dobrudja must have consisted, about the middle of December, 1916, of some four army corps and a few cavalry divisions. Its retreat was carried out across rugged, wooded hills, traversed only by a few roads of inferior quality, and finally across one of the biggest rivers in Europe. The Sofia official report of January 6 claims that during this retreat 37 officers, 6,000 men, 16 guns and 36 machine guns had been taken from the Russians. Even if it were to be assumed that for once the Bulgarians failed to round off their figures, the losses are extraordinarily small and bear witness to the character of the retreat and the skill of its leadership.

After the fall of Macin the positions in front of Braila had to be evacuated. On January 3-4 a battle was fought between the Russian rearguards and German and Austro-Hungarian regiments in the district of Gurgueti and Romanul; on the night of January 4 the Russians withdrew across the Sereth, and the next day the Germans and Bulgarians entered Braila both from the west and the east, *i.e.*, from Macin. Braila, with a population of 66,000, is the fourth town in Rumania. It is a purely commercial town, being the headquarters of the grain trade and the chief port of entry into Wallachia. Its prosperity dates from about half a century ago, when the navigation of the Danube was enormously improved by the measures taken by the European Commission

set up for that purpose under the Treaty of Paris. As a result British steamers of 4,000 tons before the war went up to Braila and unloaded at its wharves. British shipping, indeed, is of more importance to Braila than that of any other country. The town has large grain elevators, docks, and warehouses. But of its stores, of its factories and workshops, hardly anything was left when the enemy entered Braila. In the course of the three weeks which had elapsed since the Germans crossed the Buzeu River the town had been completely evacuated. Even the shops were emptied of all their goods. Enemy officers and war correspondents had to record with undisguised annoyance in their letters and dispatches how on entering the finest shops they were told that there was nothing to be obtained, because everything had been bought up by the Russian Army before it left the town.

On January 5 the left wing of the Army of the Danube reached the Sereth between the mouth of the Buzeu and Cota Lung; on the 6th the right wing approached the river north of Braila. They were now standing before the line on which the Russian Command had decided to arrest at all cost the enemy offensive. The advance of the Army of the Danube had reached its end, but the Ninth Army was now


wheeling from a front facing north to one facing north-east; the Lower Sereth was its pivot.

After the fall of Rimnic Sarat it had continued its movement along the Plocшти-Focshani railway. The group of Gen. Krafft von Dellmensingen advanced on the left wing, across the spurs and foot-hills of the Carpathian range; in the centre that of Gen. von Morgen was pressing forward against Plaineshti; east of the railway the army group of Gen. von Kühne advanced towards the Lower Rimnic; on the extreme right wing the cavalry corps of Gen. Count Schmettow pushed forward from the lake district across the open plain on the left bank of the Buzeu, keeping contact with the Army of the Danube on the other side of the river. On January 5-6, the days on which Gen. von Kosch reached the Lower Sereth, a pitched battle was fought by the right wing of the Ninth Army, which was closing in against the fortified area of Fundeni and Nomoloasa. The army group of Gen. von Kühne and the Cavalry Corps of Count Schmettow, supported by a considerable artillery force, were advancing against the Lower Sereth between the River Rimnic and the Buzeu.

Two of the best German divisions, the North Prussian 42nd Division under Gen. Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, and that of Gen. von Oettingen,



BRAILA.



BULGARIAN TRANSPORT COLUMN IN THE NORTHERN DOBRUDJA.

captured after a whole day's fighting the Russian positions on the road from Tartarani to Rimniceni, whilst Count Schmettow's forces captured the villages of Olanceasca, Guleanca, and Maxineni. Bit by bit, from south-east to north-west, the Germans were gaining the southern bank of the Sereth. The Russians were giving ground, though amid heavy fighting; once Braila had been abandoned, it would have been to no purpose had they tried to maintain themselves south of the Lower Sereth. It was only the line of the Sereth itself which formed for them the limit beyond which a further retreat was inadmissible.

The actual battle front now extended, as the crow flies, over some 130 miles, roughly from the Gyimes Pass to the junction of the Sereth and the Danube. It fell into three marked divisions. From the Gyimes Pass to near Focshani for some 70 miles the scene of the fighting was the Carpathian Mountains, difficult ground even in summer, but in the depth of winter, outside the valleys, a pathless wilderness. Between the mountain ridge of Odobeshti and the bridgehead of Nomoloasa the district in front of the Middle Sereth formed on a stretch of about 30 miles what may be described as the centre of the line—its weakest part. The Sereth, in itself as yet no serious obstacle to military operations, cuts its path between fairly high banks through an open plain. Its valley is on the whole free of marshes; the swampy depression east of Focshani is separated from the valley of the Sereth by a low, broad ridge. It is only south of Nomoloasa that its character changes, and in these last 30 miles of the front the river formed a real barrier to an enemy advance. Its valley, 6 to 10 miles wide, is covered with ponds and swamps, and is cut by minor confluents merging into the belt of marshes rather than into the river. Though roads run on both sides of the Sereth parallel to it, and the Jassy-Berladu-Galatz railway accompanies its northern bank, not a single road crosses the river below Nomoloasa. Beyond Galatz the Danube formed an almost impenetrable barrier.

Here, then, the enemy offensive had reached the first strong continuous line across Rumania, since the gate into Wallachia had been forced in the second battle of Targul-Jiu. The strategic value of the Sereth front had been recognised long before the war. When, after the Congress of Berlin, Rumania had passed

into the camp of the Central Powers and war with Russia was expected to result from one of the many Balkan crises of those years, it had become the regular strategic plan of the Rumanians, in case of defeat in the open, to withdraw into the mountainous region of Western Moldavia, but to bar the entrance into Wallachia along the Lower Sereth. On the other hand, in case of a surprise attack by Russia, the defences of the Sereth were to secure for Rumania a safe *place d'armes* in which she could have concentrated her armies. With



RAILWAY STATION AT FAUREI ON THE SERETH.

Destroyed by the Russians during the retreat.

that purpose in view a system of fortresses and a series of minor groups of forts were built along the river. They came to be known as the Sereth lines. First planned by the famous Belgian engineer, Lieut.-Gen. Brialmont—the same who had built the fortified lines round Bukarest—the work was completed under the supervision of German experts. Galatz, between Lake Brateshu, the Danube and the Lower Sereth, formed the eastern bastion of the line. Its fortifications consisted of 10 groups of batteries, arranged in three lines on a front of about 10 miles, about four miles from the town. Nomoloasa, at the point where the Sereth offers the greatest facilities for a crossing, formed the centre of the system. Its fortifications, extending over a front of about 12 miles, consisted of eight groups and were arranged in two lines. At the foot of the Carpathians the fortress of Focshani and the bridgehead of Cosmeshti closed the line. Focshani, situated on high ground, dominates the sector of the Sereth Valley, where it offers the least natural protection; special attention was therefore paid to its defences. They extended in a circle of about



RUMANIANS ARRESTED AS SPIES BY THE AUSTRIANS AT RIMNIC SARAT.

15 miles and formed 15 groups in three rows. For the purposes of the present war these elaborate fortifications were, however, of comparatively small value. They could serve at the best as bases for a more modern system of defence. Besides being unsuitable as against heavy artillery, they suffered from the disadvantage of having been planned mainly with a view to defence against an attack from the north.

Still the wider strategic problem of defence along the Sereth remained the same. On the two wings the front was strongly protected by high mountains and by wide rivers, whilst the centre, though no longer effectively defended by a fortress of the old style, was too narrow to admit an enemy advance as long as the wings stood firm. Moreover, an enemy offensive from the district of Focshani against the Middle Sereth would have in advancing uncovered its left flank and rear to a counter-offensive from the mountains. The German Ninth Army, having reached, on January 5, the line Plaineshti-Nomoloasa, had still some scope for action in the plain round Focshani; but unless a decisive victory was won, either on the Lower Sereth or in the Carpathian Mountains, they could not hope to break through in the centre.

On the Moldavian frontier our Allies had never allowed the initiative to pass into the

hands of the enemy. His attacks were regularly answered by counter-attacks, small local offensives were occasionally undertaken, and towards the end of November even operations on a bigger scale were carried out by the Russians against the Transylvanian passes with a view to relieving, as far as that was possible, the pressure of the enemy against the Rumanian armies in Wallachia. As a result of their untiring activity our Allies had been able to maintain themselves on the frontier-ridge practically along the entire length of the Moldavian border.

After the fall of Bukarest the southern part of the Carpathian front, between the Gyimes Pass and Mount Varful Pentilau—facing the south-eastern corner of Transylvania—became of decisive importance. The enemy front in Wallachia was wheeling round towards the north. Moldavia was threatened with an attack along convergent lines, from the south as well as from the west. Yet, as has been previously mentioned, it was obvious that the main blow could hardly be delivered across the Sereth, and that the fate of Moldavia would be settled by a battle fought in the mountains between Gyimes and Focshani.

The Carpathian front in Southern Moldavia falls into two marked divisions; the mountain ridge extending between the town of Oitoz (south-west of the Oitoz Pass) and Soveia (on

the Moldavian side) forms the watershed between the River Trotus and the Sereth and the border between the two sectors. South of the Soveia line, the numerous river-valleys, which intervene between the high parallel mountain ridges, run from west to east, slightly inclining towards the south as they approach the plain. The line of the most southern of them, the Milcov, and the branch valleys of its confluents, the Zabala, Naruja and Putna, had to be abandoned by our Allies on the enemy approaching the lower course of the Milcov in the region of Focshani. But beyond the Milcov valley, between it and that of the Tirlad, lay the Odobeshti mountain range, which, stretching practically in one line with the Lower Sereth, forms the natural extension of its front. Behind it, like reserve positions, follow several parallel ridges; between Mount 1365 and the town of Aguidu Nuou, at the junction of the Trotus and the Sereth, the ridge which forms the watershed between their basins and runs due east and west rises like a last powerful bar against an attack directed from the south into the flank of forces holding the range between the Oitoz and the Gyimes Passes. These were against the south the defences of the Trotus Valley.

The Trotus River, the only one whose valley carries a railway line connecting Transylvania with Moldavia, has its sources west of the Gyimes Pass; and, having broken through the frontier range, it flows in a south-easterly direction, parallel to the Bistritsa in the north and the Milcov in the south, till it joins the Sereth, at the eastern foot of the Carpathian Mountains. Within the 50 miles which intervene between the Gyimes Pass and the Soveia range a series of confluents join the Trotus from the south-west—the Sultsa, the Csonbangos, the Uzul, the Oitoz, the Casin, etc. Each of them is like a gate offering access from the flank to the Trotus Valley, which, with its branches extending to the north and its road and railway joining the Sereth Valley in the strategically most important sectors, opposite the Berladu-Tecuciu line, was the key to the entire system of the Moldavian defences.

The battle fought in the Carpathian Mountains was, therefore, in the first place a battle for the Trotus Valley. It did not matter if the line of the Milcov and of its confluents was abandoned, provided the southern defences of the Trotus Valley remained intact. The Trotus Valley and its gates between the



REFUGEES IN THE DOBRUDJA.

Gyimes and the Oitoz had to be held at any cost.

The fall of Rimnic Sarat, which marks the beginning of the battle for the Middle Sereth, was to the enemy the signal for an offensive in the Carpathians. In the south the operations against Deduleshti, Dumitreshti and Bordeshti were the natural continuation of the attack which from the west had been delivered against Rimnic Sarat by the army group of General Krafft von Delmensingen.

On December 27 the operations extended, however, farther to the north; from the headwaters of the Naruja and the Putna German and Austro-Hungarian troops tried to force their way against Focshani, whilst through the valleys of the Sultsa, Uzul, Oitoz and Casin an attack was opened against the Trotus line.

In the Upper Zabala Valley our Allies had gradually to retire, conforming with the general withdrawal on the front north of Rimnic Sarat. "The south wing of the army group under the command of General von Gerok, in conjunction with movements in Great (Eastern) Wallachia, has advanced into the mountains in an easterly direction," reports the German *communiqué* of December 29. "German and Austro-Hun-

garian troops in the difficult highland ground of the Transylvanian eastern frontier have stormed several positions." Also in the Oitoz Valley between Sosmezö and Harja the enemy offensive succeeded at first in scoring some successes. An extended front in the mountains always admits of surprise attacks. As lateral movements are usually difficult, reserves have to be kept some distance in the rear, and frequently several days are required before they can be brought up to the threatened sector. This was what happened in the Oitoz Valley. On December 27 the first German attacks were delivered, on the 28th fierce battles were fought for the heights east of Sosmezö, on the 29th the enemy, according to the Russian report, "succeeded after repeated attacks in taking possession of several heights in front of our positions south of the Oitoz River, thus compelling us to retire to a new position." Meantime reinforcements had reached our Allies and the enemy advance in the Oitoz Valley was arrested.

The German attack against the mountain range between the Casin and the Susitza, in the region of Soveia, was never allowed to develop. "The enemy, having assumed the offensive in the region north-west of Soveia," says the



GERMAN SOLDIERS IN BUKAREST.



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY IN THE CARPATHIANS.

Russian official report of December 31, "was defeated, and the Rumanian troops captured a large number of prisoners and a machine-gun company." In the direct neighbourhood of the Gyimes Pass the enemy's offensive succeeded in the first few days in capturing Mount Faltucanu (about 4,000 feet high), west of the junction of the Sultsa River and the Trotus.

Thus isolated battles were developing with varying results along the entire South Moldavian border; it is not possible to follow each of them in detail. Here and there the enemy scored tactical successes and gained some ground, but these gains (considerable only in the south, where our Allies had to withdraw in conformity with the retirement along the Rimnic Sarat-Focshani line) were not of a nature to affect the general strategic position. In the German report of January 9, although it tries to emphasise the fact that some gains had been achieved, one can yet clearly distinguish the note of disappointment: "The enemy is tenaciously defending the valleys leading from the Berezek (Vrancea) mountains into the Moldavian Plain. In spite of the unfavourable weather and the difficulties of the ground in the rugged forest mountains, our troops daily press back the enemy step by step."

One last success the enemy was yet to score by his convergent attack from the Zabala and Milcov valleys and from the direction of Rimnic Sarat. On January 8 his troops entered Focshani and gained a line extending from the town

of Odobeshti to the bridgehead of Nanesti-Fundeni.

January 10 marks practically the end of the enemy advance in Rumania, though lively fighting still continued for another fortnight. Between Braila and Galatz, in the marshes round Vadeni, a series of battles was fought, but without any marked gain for either side. Galatz itself was repeatedly bombarded by the enemy, though no serious offensive was undertaken against the town. On January 19 a last desperate attempt against the Sereth line was made by some of the best North German regiments of General von Kühne's army group, Pomeranians, West Prussians and natives of the Altmark. After a whole day of fighting the town of Nanesti, on the right bank of the Sereth, opposite Fundeni, was captured by the enemy. The gain proved costly and barren; the Germans were unable to develop the success any farther. Lastly, the Bulgarian attempt on the south-eastern fringes of the Delta of the Danube has to be mentioned. Turning to account the severe frost which had just set in and hardened all the marshes, a Bulgarian battalion succeeded, under cover of a heavy morning fog on January 23, in crossing the St. George's Channel north of Tulcea. "Our troops by means of an impetuous night attack, which was launched without a shot being fired," says the Russian official *communiqué* of January 24, "annihilated the force which had crossed the river, capturing 5 officers, 332 men

and 4 machine-guns. Our losses were 1 officer and 41 men wounded and 1 soldier killed."

This incident closes the enemy campaign in the plain. In the mountains, beginning with the middle of January, an almost complete balance of forces was established—in many sectors our Allies were gaining the upper hand and recovering ground. But there also the extraordinarily severe winter—for weeks the thermometer registered temperatures below zero Fahrenheit—put an end to fighting on a larger scale, though minor local operations never ceased in that region, where a continuous

and swerved on them out of control, side on to the road before you knew.

"No more soft covering of snow, only hard iron nakedness. Cloudless, starry nights. The earth rings like metal, the trees snap, wolves leave the forests and run on the open road. Friend and enemy lie out on the mountain side opposite to each other, frozen to the marrow.

"No strategy has ever foreseen that this country would once become a theatre of war. These mountains look as wild and desolate as any bits of unknown Asia. Forests untouched by any woodman's hand, protected it would



WINTER IN THE MOUNTAINS.

line of trenches could not be established, and the deadlock of the plain could never prevail. The grim battle was fought both against men and nature.

Something of this mountain warfare can be seen in the description given by an eye-witness :

"Up to now winter in the forests of the Carpathians had been only playing with men ; now it showed its teeth and turned to grim earnest. In the high mountains the roads hitherto ran, like soft ribbons of velvet, over the passes. Now they were like hard bands of steel, hard, shining bands of steel, binding together the consecutive valleys. They were like perfect toboggan runs ; the lorries skidded

seen by their own loneliness and inaccessibility. Only here and there runs a little light railway looking most unmilitary and casual. Every road in these mountains is roundabout ; there is no connection from one to the other of the long valleys which traverse them, except tracks of smugglers and poachers. At the entrance of the valleys which lead from Moldavia into Transylvania, or at their exit, you may see perhaps an insignificant village ; no other human habitation near, if it be not a saw-mill or the house of the customs guard on the frontier. Fires and winds have ravished the forests. In places the great trees lie prostrate like straw, their heads to the east,

their withered roots heaving up masses of dry earth, and they are covered by an impenetrable tangle of boughs.

"Elsewhere the war has found territory prepared for it, here it breaks as a strange thing into the primeval forest. Here man has to start at the beginning the work of the reclaiming of the wilderness, not for food and habitation, but for war. Roads and railways have been made—for the war.

"The air in the valley is like ice; the high plateau on which we stand is surrounded by mountain ranges, like a little Tibet, its atmo-

splinters of trees are thrown high in the air. A she-bear with her two cubs comes stumbling on our picket, stands on her hind feet for a time before the strange apparition, swaying her head. The picket dare not shoot for fear of arousing the enemy. Man and beast stand perplexed face to face till the old bear shuffles off again into the thicket.

"Huts have been built in the wilderness, but one has to remember in the darkness the wolves which inhabit the forests. A staff-officer of our division was besieged in an outlying hut by wolves, who howled and whined



A RUMANIAN MACHINE-GUN EMBLACEMENT.

sphere dim with ice-cold winter vapours. Curiously, as you mount higher, you feel it grow warmer, in the daytime at any rate. At night the frost is uniformly cruel everywhere, and in this murderous wintry desolation men dig themselves into the iron ground, stalk each other, storm these God-forsaken and nameless heights, defend them to the death as if they were possessions of the greatest price. There is the noise of the axe in the virgin forest, roads force their way through the chaos of fallen trees.

"Buzzards and vultures hover overhead—then suddenly fly off seared as the report of a gun resounds in the forest underneath and

outside till some soldiers scared them off. The battle-fronts in this gruesome war measure by the thousands of miles, but nowhere is there a region more wild, more desolate and less inhabitable.

"I stand in the darkness in front of our hut and look at the stars which shine in a narrow strip of sky above the valley. A regular ticking sound is heard through the night, like the beating of a nervous, anxious, diseased heart. Again and again an endless, restless ticking. The typewriter. . . . In the snow-covered mountains, in the midst of primeval forests—the typewriter in the office of the staff. Perhaps the ticking signifies an order to attack, a

report of losses in battle or a request for reinforcements. Here on the Moldavian border humanity has reverted to its original wild condition, and yet this ticking tries to speak of the ages that have passed over the earth. Steadily long lines of letters are drawn, one after the other, and a faint hope revives in one's heart that there may yet be a return from our fall, a return to civilisation. . . ."

The quasi-armistice imposed on the Rumanian front by the rigours of a winter which surpassed practically all records enabled the enemy to withdraw gradually most of the German divisions, leaving the defence of the Rumanian front almost entirely to Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish troops. On the side of our Allies the enforced rest was used for a thorough reorganization of the Rumanian army. Even the units which to the very end remained in the fighting line were one by one re-formed behind the lines. Lessons drawn from the events of the preceding campaign were translated into practice. General Averescu was now in charge of the entire army, and had for chief of the General Staff General Presan; the appointment of these two distinguished leaders to the task of

reorganization was received with the greatest satisfaction everywhere in Rumania, and did much to restore confidence in the future. They were the only army commanders whose reputation was even raised by the campaign of 1916 and whose troops had been compelled to retreat, not by the enemy, but by circumstances over which they themselves had no control.

"The strictness of General Averescu is well known in his army," wrote the correspondent of *The Times* from Rumanian headquarters under date of February 10, 1917. ". . . There is no pardon for a coward, whoever he may be. I was present a few days ago at the execution of a wealthy young cavalry reserve officer. He retired his detachment from a position without reason or order; he was tried and shot four days later. If General Averescu is strict with delinquents, the brave know that they will find in him their best friend and protector. His contact with the army under him is so close that he gets to know of the smallest act of bravery, and rewards, as far as possible personally, the man who has done it.

"The commanders of the divisions are all young men. The greater part of the generals who took part in the autumn campaign have



TURKISH MACHINE GUN.



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY.

been removed. Some have been pensioned, some given insignificant commands in towns, and some tried. The new divisional commanders have given proof of their ability during the campaign, and some of them who had at the outbreak of war only the command of a regiment successfully lead a division to-day. The same procedure has been used with the staff officers. Those who owed their situation only to seniority have been replaced by younger officers who have given proof of their capacity.

"All these changes have had a wholesome effect on the spirit of the troops, who feel that they are led by worthy officers. Naturally, there are to a certain extent gaps among the junior officers. The reserve officers, however, among whom the necessary selection has been made after six months' campaign, have proved themselves reliable leaders.

"While groups of this army are in the trenches, other groups are behind to be re-organized. The new recruits, which have been drilled for several months, are brought and incorporated in the old units. Two or three weeks of war-drilling with the men of the old army are sufficient for the new recruits; and the units re-formed in this way are sent to the front, to replace other groups which are brought behind the lines and reorganized in the same way."

Whilst the armies of the Central Powers

were advancing into Rumania, the entire Press in Germany, as well as in Austria, was trying to stimulate the war-weary public not merely by tales of victories, but also by prospects of booty—by promises of bread and oil. One of the richest agricultural regions of the world, the greatest oil-producing country in Europe (if Trans-Caucasia is considered part of Asia), was being added to the victims of the Germanic Powers! In 1915 the Rumanian harvest comprised 2,500,000 tons of wheat, 800,000 tons of barley, 800,000 tons of oats, and 2,600,000 tons of maize. Between January and July, 1916, 2,300,000 tons of corn were imported into Germany and Austria-Hungary. The corn supplies which the enemy now hoped to seize were to be no less this year, and in his expectations even much greater and certainly very much cheaper. Almost equally pressing was the need of oil supplies. Although Austria had in the summer of 1915 recovered the Galician oil fields, their production had remained, chiefly owing to the indolence and mismanagement of the Government, very small and wholly insufficient for the requirements of the Central Powers; their average monthly output amounted only to about 50,000 tons. But in the oil-bearing zone of Northern Wallachia, in the district of Ploeshti alone, 1,500,000 tons were treated through the refineries in 1915, and this gave, among other products, 25 per cent. of petrol. But although 98 per cent. of the refined products

exported during that year from Rumania had gone to the Central Empires, hardly any petrol was included among them, the Rumanian Government having decided to treat petrol as contraband. These accumulated stores of petrol the invader expected to seize in the country.

Very soon he was to meet with disillusionment. A very considerable part of the Rumanian harvest had been bought up by the British Government, and still more was bought in view of the enemy invasion. The Rumanian Government, as well as its Allies, now saw to it that whatever stores could not be removed should be rendered useless to the enemy. Enormous stores of corn and oil were destroyed. In many places the corn and oil were mixed together—a combination which the enemy does not seem to have expected. With horror the Germans watched this destruction. How could anyone be so wicked as to destroy treasures badly needed by the Germans? Endless outpourings of indignation flowed through the German Press: that same Press



AN OIL-WELL IN RUMANIA, SET ABLAZE BY THE BRITISH.

From a German drawing.

which regularly justified every wanton act of vandalism committed by Germans on the property of other nations—the cutting down of fruit trees, the breaking of the peasant's agricultural tools, the burning of villages, and the ruin of towns. But Rumania and her Allies

were not to touch that which was their own; they were to leave it as booty to the Germans! The burning of every oil tank or grain elevator was a shameful destruction of "works of civilization."

Naturally, German newspapers tried at first to assure the public that a small part only of the oil fields and corn stores had



COL. NORTON GRIFFITHS, D.S.O., M.P.
The British officer who undertook the destruction of the oil-wells.

suffered; the comforting tale about the rich loot which was to tender to all the German needs was not to be abandoned suddenly. Yet it had to be admitted that in the oil-producing regions round Ploeshti the destruction had been very extensive, and had been "carried out in a manner not merely skilful, but elaborate." The wooden towers over the bores were for the most part destroyed; in all cases they were made useless. All the machine-houses were burnt down, and the machines and cranes smashed to pieces. All the oil reservoirs were set on fire. The underground plant was made useless for a long time to come. The bores were filled with countless quantities of short iron stakes, the extraction of which involves very much work; all kinds of objects were thrown down the bores. The permanent riches of the country, the soil and its oil mines, naturally remained intact. But, by the systematic work of destruction,

the Germans were deprived of its accumulated products and precluded from exploiting its wealth. In view of this severe disappointment, the Germans had to seek comfort somewhere. One Munich paper, with truly Teuton ingenuity, found it in the thought that after the war, despite all black lists, new machinery for the Rumanian oil fields would be imported from Germany. "To what purpose, then, all this English vandalism, which only gives us further opportunity to celebrate the triumphs of German technical skill and to open a rich market for the German engineering industry? . . . The English deed of annihilation has therefore only furnished a means of strengthening our exchange and acquiring a new market for our industry."

With regard to corn also, the inflated hopes had gradually to be reduced to modest dimensions. Towards the end of December, 1916.

even worse than that which they had practised in Poland and Belgium. According to a trustworthy report published in *The Times* of March 1, "the whole of the civilian population between 18 and 42 were compelled to work for the enemy," who, moreover, "requisitioned everything, leaving the population hardly enough to eat." Of the richer families many members were deported to Germany as hostages, and subjected to ill-treatment of the most outrageous kind. In order to deprive the Rumanian population of its last protectors and to relieve themselves of the presence of independent, impartial witness of their proceedings, the German Government requested neutral governments represented in Bukarest "to recall their representatives, since the departure of the Rumanian Government from Bukarest, the capture of the fortress, and the institution of military administration, leave no room for diplomatic activity."



REMAINS OF OIL TANKS AT PLOESHII DESTROYED BY THE BRITISH.

the semi-official Press in Germany began to publish inspired warnings against exaggerated hopes of economic relief from Rumania. One by one the supply of different foodstuffs was analysed, and the one under consideration was usually found deficient.

Meantime, in Rumania the Germans vented their wrath of disappointment on the helpless population. A system of government was introduced, certainly equally bad and possibly

On January 13, 1917, the American and Dutch Ministers had to leave Rumania.

In Volume IX. (pp. 401-433) an account was given of Rumanian politics during the opening two years of the war. The decision reached at the Crown Council of August 27, 1916, was the most important in Rumania's whole history. As such it was approved by the overwhelming majority of thoughtful



RUSSIANS BOARDING A BARGE ON THE DANUBE.

In the background ships are being loaded with machinery.

Rumanians. Not only were they attracted by sentimental and historical associations to the Entente Powers, not only did they see that only through their assistance could they achieve the liberation of their brothers beyond the Carpathians; they felt, beyond that, that the whole course of Rumania's future was at stake. The only hope for progress in Rumania lay in the infusion of new life into a country which still suffered from the effects of Turkey's misrule and Europe's neglect.

By a majority the Crown Council decided on entering the war. There were, however, dissentients. The three Conservative ex-Premiers—Carp, Maiorescu, and Th. Rosetti—remained obstinately attached to their tenets of a lifetime. Admiration of Prussian efficiency, which had played a spectacular part in the material exploitation of modern Rumania, was reinforced in their minds by their view of Russia as an Eastern autocracy, fated to tyrannize over others for a time, but ultimately

doomed to decomposition. True to their principles they voted against intervention. Their decision was of little import, for though widely respected they had no longer any following in the country. More interesting was the position of Marghiloman. To the last he had kept up a lively agitation against war, and on the morning of the Council his papers appeared with the usual attacks on the Entente Powers and eulogies of German science and prowess. What he said at the Council was not published, but he refrained from openly recording his vote against intervention. He might well say afterwards that against his better judgment he refrained from opposing what was clearly the will of his King, of the responsible Ministers and of the majority of the politicians of the country. His press acquiesced in the accomplished fact of war, and on August 30 *Steagul*, eschewing further comment, put on a war dress and exhorted the nation to prepare for a grim struggle.



A GUNBOAT ON THE DANUBE.

In the distance a pontoon bridge, which has been opened to let the gunboat pass.

Assuming the rôle of whole-hearted patriot the same paper proceeded some days later to inveigh against the Magyars and accuse them of having by their intransigence made war inevitable.

The Press naturally "boomed" the war, and found in the opening stages of the Transylvanian campaign much material for patriotic exhortation of the nation. Octavian Goga, the Transylvanian poet, in the columns of *Epoca*, hailed with joy the "decision that the sun which rises to-morrow in fire and blood shall shine on Great Rumania." Another great

quels and picturesque stories. Perhaps it was wisest so, for enemy agents were everywhere, but Rumanian journalists found these new restrictions somewhat irksome and sarcastically appealed to the Minister of Public Instruction for "at least the liberty allowed to the Russian Press."

There had been some expectation that the declaration of war would be followed by the formation of a National Government. Bratianu, however, preferred to keep in his own hands the control of affairs. The only change made was the taking of his brother, Vintila Bratianu,



A CHARGE OF RUMANIAN CAVALRY.

interventionist organ, *Universul*, declared: "The die is cast. The destiny of Rumania and the whole Rumanian race from the Theiss to the sea, from the forests of Maramuresh to the Danube, is now in the hands of our brave army." The hitherto impassive Government organ, *Viitorul*, was no whit less vehement. "Our holy war," it wrote, "the day which the entire Rumanian race has awaited for centuries, the day of its full union, has come." Even the Marghilomanist papers were swept along perforce in the stream of patriotic enthusiasm. Only the frankly pro-German papers of Carp and his party were silent. *Moldova* and similar papers no longer appeared. But, indeed, the Press counted for little. The censorship was very strict. Little was allowed in the way of war news except official communi-

into the Cabinet as Minister of War, a post hitherto held by Bratianu himself. There were, indeed, difficulties in the way of the formation of a coalition. It was impossible for Take Ionescu and Filipescu to work as whole-hearted colleagues with a man like Marghiloman, whom they had for a long time past denounced as a "traitor to the race." Yet Marghiloman remained the nominal head of the old Conservative party, and it was impolitic to slight him or estrange him further. As events moved the Germanophiles moved with them. The barbarous and wanton outrages of German aircraft on Bukarest apparently impressed even Maiorescu, according to one paper's testimony. Marghiloman was moved to denounce German atrocities through his papers. Early in November, after the Battle

of Targul-Jiu, he went a step farther and confided to a correspondent of the *Petit Parisien*: "From to-morrow I will do everything for national unity. From a partisan of peace I have become a partisan of war. . . . My one desire now is final victory." It looked for the moment as though he were qualifying for a place in a new Coalition Government, which was again in the air. Further, he may well have wished to recover for his party a con-



ALEXANDER MARGHILOMAN,
Pro-German
Conservative
leader.



PETER CARP,
Former Prime Minister
and leader
of the
Conservative Party.

siderable section of those who sixteen months before under the leadership of Filipescu had left him and united with Take Ionescu's Conservative Democrats on an interventionist basis. Filipescu himself did not live to see more than a few weeks of the war for which he had contended. He died on October 14, without seeing—as *Adeverul* expressed it—the "Great Rumania of his dreams." Journals of all parties united to call him "a great patriot, an unsurpassed Rumanian," and over his grave pronounced eulogies which, for party reasons, they had not accorded him during his life. Filipescu had, indeed, subordinated to the great dream of realizing the union of the whole Rumanian race all his own personal and party feelings. It says much for him that he, a boyar of the boyars, should have loyally cooperated for two years with Take Ionescu and his democratic followers. Filipescu knew well that the incorporation of Transylvania meant the end of the rule of the Conservative party and of the boyar class in Rumania. But he loyally accepted the inevitable reform of the franchise and agrarian conditions since they were indispensable to the achievement of the pan-Rumanian dream.

Filipescu did not see the victory of Targul-

Jiu, but he also escaped the month of disaster which followed and which concluded with the fall of Bukarest on December 6. The Rumanian authorities hurriedly left the city and the capital was transferred to Jassy. There, on December 22, assembled the Rumanian Parliament. It was an hour of gloom. Two-thirds of the country was in the hands of the enemy and the prospect for the future was black. The leaders of the nation showed themselves, however, undaunted in adversity. Before the defeats—on October 10—King Ferdinand had declared to the special correspondent of *The Times*:—

Rumania has not been moved by a mere policy of expediency, nor has her determination to enter this war been the outcome of any cynical material policy, or of bad faith to the Central Powers, but it has been based on the biggest principles of nationality and national ideas. . . . The Rumanians will not falter in their allegiance to the cause, nor can the enemy wear them from their faith in England the Just, in France their Latin brother, and in Russia their immediate neighbour.

Now in his Speech from the Throne he reaffirmed his faith in this cause.

In order to defend the interests of our race and to assure the unity and future of Rumania it was our duty to join in the war. . . . Our Army has sustained the struggle according to the glorious tradition of our ancestors and in a manner which justifies our looking forward to the future with absolute confidence. Up to now the war has imposed upon us great hardships and sacrifices. We shall hear these with courage, for we maintain absolute confidence in the final victory of our Allies, and in spite of difficulties and sufferings we are determined to struggle at their side with energy unto the end. . . . Before the common peril we must all show an ardent patriotism and unity of heart and mind; we must surround with love and admiration our soldiers who are defending the ancestral soil trodden by the enemy.

The Prime Minister, M. Bratianu, appealed in equally stirring terms for the union of all parties in the national cause. He expounded the difficulties Rumania had had to fight against, difficulties of geographical position and military inferiority to her powerfully equipped foe. Reviewing Rumania's international policy in the past, he showed the necessity of her intervention in the war if she was to secure her future independence and the union of the whole race. Rumanians might rest assured they had taken the only possible path, the path of honour. No peace short of full victory, which her Allies assured her, was possible. "Our faith is intact. . . . It encourages us to pass through the sufferings and griefs of the moment, to go unhesitatingly forward." M. Bratianu's great rival, M. Tako Ionescu, had no hesitation in fully responding to his appeal. He promised the full support of his party to the Government in

the national cause. In such a war there could be no half-measures.

No one can be neutral, still less passive. That would mean allowing others to dispose of us at their will. . . . The duty of the Government is to tell the country that we should have entered into the war even if we had not believed in victory; that we did not act from calculation, but from a sense of duty, that whatever may be our sufferings and our losses, even if we had to face total exile, general ruin and the destruction of everything, it would still be a small price to pay for the blessing of national unity. . . . Confident in victory, we accept all pains and all sufferings, since it will be given to us to write the epic of Rumania.

Perhaps the most eloquent spokesman of the nation and the whole Rumanian race was the distinguished historian, Professor Iorga. He dwelt only on the past in so far as it threw out hopes of a brighter future. He paid an eloquent tribute to the patriotism of the King and passed from him to the fortitude of the army, and particularly of the peasant soldiers, "that part of the people most worthy of sympathy and the least rewarded for its efforts." Iorga put in an earnest plea that the long-promised measures



KING FERDINAND OF RUMANIA.

M. Ionescu never wavered in this faith, and four months later asserted in an article in *The New Europe* :—

I urged my country, with all my power, to enter into this war; and, if my heart bleeds at the sight of the misfortunes which have befallen it, my conscience tells me that if I had to make the decision again I could not act differently. But if from all this tragedy nothing should emerge but a German peace on the basis of the *status quo*, I should feel I had committed a crime. . . . Were Rumania doomed to suffer all the torments of hell, I should continue to say "No peace till Germany has been defeated." It is by urging on the war that we can most truly serve the cause of humanity.

of land reform to which the King had alluded in his Speech should no longer be delayed and that the Rumanian agricultural class "should no longer be a stranger on the soil which the blood of their dearest has hallowed anew by their sacrifice."

National unity was not merely hymned in Parliament. It was formally expressed by the formation on December 24 of a Coalition Government. M. Bratianu took into his own hands the responsible post of Minister of



A MARKET CART IN THE DOBRUDJA.

Foreign Affairs, replacing M. Porumbaru. The latter and three of his colleagues retired from the Cabinet. In their places several members of the "Fusionist" party—which since Filipeseu's death had been under Take Ionescu's leadership—entered the Government. M. Mihai Cantacuzino became Minister of Justice. M. Greeceanu, leader of the Filipesean party in Moldavia, took the portfolio of Commerce, M. Mirzeseu that of Agriculture and Domains, and Dr. Istrati, who had been President of the Rumanian Academy, that of Public Works. The Ministers of Justice (Antonescu) and Agriculture (Constantinescu) were transferred to the departments of Finance and the Interior respectively. The former Minister of Finance (Costinescu) remained in the Cabinet without portfolio, but M. Mortsun (Interior) left the Government. Two new Ministers without portfolio—a post now legalised by Parliament—were M. Take Ionescu and M. Pherekyde (a veteran Liberal, hitherto President of the Chamber). M. Vintila Bratianu and M. Duca remained Ministers of War and Education respectively. The formation of this National Government made a good impression. It represented the rally of the whole nation in the hour of disaster. It gave, further, some tangible assurance that the reform of the

franchise and land question alluded to in the Speech from the Throne would not remain a mere party promise but would be brought forward at the earliest opportunity in Parliament.

While the nation's representatives were witnessing to Rumania's unshaken resolution in the Moldavian capital, a very discordant note was struck by two Conservative politicians who had remained behind in Bukarest. It will be remembered that the old "Junimist" Conservative leader, Carp, had to the last protested against Rumania's intervention in the war on the side of the Entente. At the decisive Crown Council of August 27 he declared to the King: "I give you my three sons, I suspend the publication of my paper (*Moldova*) because I do not wish to occasion further unpleasantness, but, as Rumania's victory must be Russia's victory, I wish Rumania to be beaten." Ever since that day he had retired from public life and avoided the King and Government. Now, after the German occupation of Bukarest, M. Carp expressed his views to a representative of the *Neue Freie Presse*. He complained that his warnings about the danger of intervention and of trusting Russian promises, warnings which had been neglected, had now proved to

be well founded. He spoke bitterly of M. Bratianu's policy and regretted that Rumania's years of peaceful development had been interrupted by an unnecessary and calamitous war. Pro-German as his words were, they none the less were sincere. Carp in his old age represented a type of mind which lives in the past rather than in the future. He could not see either the fatal consequences for Rumania, as for the rest of the world, that Prussia's victory would involve or the inevitable approach of the Russian Revolution which would alter the whole connotation of the word "Russia."

Carp did not allude to the vexed question of Transylvania and the oppression of the Rumanians of Hungary. His former colleague, Marghiloman, was less reticent. Marghiloman had had occasion to alter and modify his attitude towards the war during the past six months. The fall of Bukarest, however, revived all his old faith in Germany. To Bratianu's invitation to participate in the new National Government at Jassy he replied with a refusal and stayed behind at Bukarest as President of the Rumanian Red Cross. On December 21 the Hungarian paper *Világ* published an interview with him. Marghiloman insisted that he had always opposed Bratianu's desire for war and had refused to



PEASANT WOMEN.

countenance intervention by taking any part in a National Government. He reiterated his



PEASANTS IN A MARKET TOWN OF THE DOBRUDJA.

old distrust of Russia and her aims on Constantinople. As for Transylvania, Marghiloman roundly denied that there was any Rumanian Irredenta in Transylvania and the Banat. "The Rumans of Hungary do not gravitate across the frontier. This conviction was always the basis of my policy. They are loyal citizens of Hungary." Such were the amazing statements of the ex-leader of the Conservative party. Possibly his asseverations that the Rumans of Hungary were loyal citizens of Hungary and his praise of their leaders, Mihaly, Vaida and Aurel Popovici, may have had the laudable purpose of attempting to conciliate Magyar feeling towards the much suspected Rumanian population of Hungary. If it had not this intention, but was meant as a literal statement of fact, it was ludicrously untrue.

The Magyars themselves disproved it. Early in February, indeed, the Hungarian Government began to extort from Rumanian public men and newspapers in Hungary professions of loyalty to the Hungarian Crown and of whole-hearted co-operation in the war. Papers like the *Gazeta Transilvaniei* were forced to protest against the Entente's attempts to "liberate" them, and to declare that they "had nothing in common with the Rumanians of the

Kingdom in character, aspirations or feeling." On February 14 the *Pester Lloyd* published a long address to Count Tisza signed (necessarily) by a number of prominent Rumanian ecclesiastics and public men in which they declared that "we wish to have nothing to do with the liberation spoken of by the Entente, and we hold fast to the inviolability of our Hungarian fatherland. . . . We know that the Hungarian Crown is called to safeguard the cultural, economic and political development of the Hungarian Rumans." Preaching on this text *Pesti Hirlap* went to the length of calling the Rumans "Ruman Magyars," and declared that the chief lesson drawn from the war was that everyone in Hungary should henceforth learn to understand the Magyar language.

So much for paper declarations of loyalty. The real facts as to the attitude of the Rumanian population in Hungary were disclosed by Hungarian deputies themselves. On February 24 a certain Schmidt, in the Hungarian House of Representatives, inveighed against the "traitorous" attitude of "a large part of the Ruman population of Transylvania," who all along cherished the desire for union with Rumania. The Rumanian Intelligenza, he declared, had openly fraternised with the



AUSTRIAN FIELD POST-OFFICE ON THE SERETH.



AUSTRIAN DONKEY CONVOY IN THE CARPATHIANS.

invading Rumanian armies. He demanded that these "traitors" should be treated with "Draconic severity; perhaps to-day the moment has come to free Transylvania from the nightmare of the so-called Rumanian Question." A week later, in the same House, a member of Tisza's party, Bethlen, declared that in a number of places in Transylvania the population of all classes had joyfully welcomed the invaders and joined and aided them in their operations. When the Austro-Hungarian troops had begun to advance, these people had departed voluntarily with the enemy in the hope of returning later with him. But when they realised that the Rumanian army would not return they began to make their way back secretly, and afterwards, seeing that no harm happened to them, great numbers returned openly. Bethlen therefore demanded severer measures. In reply to these two deputies' complaints of the Government's slackness, the Hungarian Minister of Justice (Balogh) declared that "the Government is taking active measures to punish these traitors. Nine public prosecutors with their staffs are at work and are cooperating with the Honvéd Military Courts in Transylvania to clear up the many thousands of more or less important criminal cases and to bring them before the competent Courts of Justice. No traitor has gone unpunished and no guilty Ruman has been let out

of prison. To-day there are more than a thousand persons in prison, so there can be no talk of suspected persons being left at large. The law concerning the confiscation of the property of traitors will be vigorously enforced." That the last promise was kept is shown by a statement of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* of March 11, that already there had been 600 cases of confiscation of property. The *Zeit*, again (of March 9), announced that the trial of 16 Rumanians had just been concluded at Klausenburg (Cluj). The ringleaders were David Pop and Spiridion Borits, accused of furnishing the Rumanian military authorities with information. Both of them with seven accomplices were sentenced to death, and others to various terms of imprisonment. These instances are merely a few of the many that might be adduced to show the wretched plight of the Transylvanian Rumanians.

The Speech from the Throne to the Rumanian Parliament on December 22 had alluded to the need for franchise and agrarian reforms. Both Rumanian Government and people were determined that these promises were not to remain empty words. Early in March the King in an address to his troops reaffirmed the promise. Parliament had been adjourned till May 17, but meanwhile the Coalition Cabinet proceeded to draw up a scheme of reform. For the complicated three-college system of election, in

which considerations of wealth and education militated against any adequate representation of the huge peasant vote, was to be substituted not only universal but direct and equal suffrage. The old system was a reminiscence of Prussia with which modern, democratic Rumania could well afford to dispense. The outbreak of the Russian Revolution on March 12 spurred on the Rumanian reformers to translate the King's promises into Acts of Parliament. Further, the land question was once again approached. Cuza's law of 1864 establishing a limited peasant proprietorship had proved inadequate to meet the peasants' ever-growing need of more land of their own. The Government formulated a scheme by which some 120,000 acres of Crown and State lands were freely made over to the peasants. A further 800,000 acres were to be compulsorily purchased from the big land-

holders on fair terms. The result of the changes would be to bring the percentage of land owned by the peasants from 53 to 85. It was not to be expected that the landed classes in Rumania would greet these changes with enthusiasm. But they understood that the cause of national unity and Rumania's future demanded them. Accordingly Bratianu's mixed Liberal-Conservative Cabinet unanimously decided on the proposed reform. The Conservatives felt, as their late leader Filipescu had felt, that though universal equal suffrage might be premature, and even unwise, it was, if necessary, a small price to pay for the achievement of Rumanian national unity at home and beyond the Carpathians. The Jews, too, were assured of a removal of their grievances and a full share in the rights, as in the duties, of Rumanian citizenship.



CHAPTER CLXXXV.

VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE WAR (II.).

CHAPTER CLII—BATCHES OF AWARDS—COMPARATIVE NUMBERS—AWARDS TO NEXT-OF-KIN—A TUNNELLER'S EXPLOIT—TWO TERRITORIALS' CROSSES—INDIVIDUAL ACTS—LIEUT. BRANDRAM JONES AND MAJOR BRABAZON REES—THE DRUMMER'S "CHARGE"—CORPORAL SANDERS'S ENDURANCE—HEROIC RESCUES—PTE. VEALE'S FINE DEED—AFTER-DEATH HONOURS—A CHAPLAIN'S CROSS—MAGNIFICENT CONDUCT—A HUNTING-HORN RALLY—BRAVE SURGEONS—FATHER AND SON V.C.'S—SIR EVELYN WOOD AND THE V.C.—VARIOUS CASES—COL. FREYBERG—A BANK CLERK'S COURAGE—A BOMBER'S DEED—A BRAVE FAILURE—AN AIRMAN'S SACRIFICE—COM. LOFTUS JONES, R.N.—LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS AGAIN—MAJOR BROMLEY—A "MYSTERY" V.C.—CORNWELL AND ROBINSON.

THE valiant exploits for which, during the first two years of the war, the Victoria Cross was awarded were described in Chapter CLII. (Vol. X). The amazingly varied nature of the achievements of soldiers and sailors on land and sea and in the air were dealt with and instances were given of exceptional personal prowess. The very first of the Crosses were won by heroes of the old Regular Army in the momentous opening days of the war, at Mons, Le Cateau, and later at the Marne and elsewhere; and afterwards courageous Colonials and Indians who were serving in near and far countries were added to the roll of fame. Additions were provided by the Battle of Jutland, which gave to posterity the lasting memory of the impressive heroism of Loftus Jones, commander of the old destroyer, *Shark*, and Jack Cornwell, the boy whose unflinching bravery when mortally wounded sent through

Vol. XII—Part 148.

all British hearts such a thrill of pride and admiration as had not been known since the triumphant stand of the handful of the 24th at Rorke's Drift. The deeds that were chronicled relating to that long period of the war were unsurpassable; but their character was maintained in the achievements for which the Cross was subsequently awarded to officers and men of the Navy and the Army.

A remarkable feature of the awards which were made at the beginning of the third year of the war was the largeness of the number of Crosses gazetted within a very short period. Early in August, 1916, nine awards were published together; no fewer than twenty were announced at one time in September, 1916, eight of these being after-death awards; in that month also a further batch of twelve recipients was made known, and altogether, in a period of seven weeks, the extraordinary number of forty-five Crosses was gazetted.

Though at first sight it seemed that the coveted honour was being conferred more liberally than at any previous period, this was far from being the case; indeed, there was, if anything, a decrease in the proportion of awards, for now the British forces concerned were numbered by the million, whereas the Old Immortals who bore the burden of the fight with the German hosts in the opening weeks of the war numbered less than a hundred thousand. The date of the gazettes gave no clue to the period of the performance of the act of valour, for the forty-five included three Crosses which had been given in connexion with the Battle of Jutland.

The awards of the Cross were made in comparatively large numbers: but the actual percentage of recipients was extremely small, in view of the vast numbers of officers and men who were on active service in the Navy and the Army. A thorough understanding of the relative value of the first of all military distinctions was given in the House of Commons

on November 23, 1916, by Mr. Forster, Financial Secretary to the War Office, in answer to a question by Colonel Page Croft. Mr. Forster pointed out that not all those recommended for honours by officers commanding battalions or other units were awarded honours or rewards; but the number of "immediate rewards" was very large. He gave the numbers of such



(Gale & Pelden.)

CAPTAIN T. WRIGHT, R.E.

awards gazetted for the period from July 1—nearly five months. This total was 17,376; yet it contained only 77 Victoria Crosses, compared with the following: D.S.O., 333; M.C., 2,309; D.C.M., 1,576; M. Medal, 12,430; M.S. Medal, 651. These numbers were not, however, complete, as many other rewards had been given which had not yet been gazetted. The details furnished striking proof of the Army's gallantry in the field. To the fact that not all recommendations were acted upon was to be attributed the occasional appearance of reports of the winning of the Victoria Cross which subsequently proved to be baseless.

As the result of inquiries which were brought to his notice the Secretary for War announced, early in November, 1916, that any war medal which it might be decided to issue in commemoration of the war would be given, in the case of deceased officers and men who would, had they survived, have been entitled to it, to the next-of-kin. The Victoria Cross was included in this decision, and on November 16, at Buckingham Palace, the King handed to no fewer than nine persons, as next-of-kin, the Crosses won by their relatives. These recipients were as follows: Mrs. Walford, awarded



SAPPER WILLIAM HACKETT R.E.

to her husband, Capt. G. N. Walford, R.A.; Mrs. Wright, awarded to her son, Capt. T. Wright, R.E.; Mrs. Vallentin, awarded to her son, Captain J. F. Vallentin, The South Staffordshire Regiment; Mr. John Liddell, awarded to his son, Captain J. A. Liddell, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Royal Flying Corps; Major Charles Turner, awarded



SERG. JOHN ERSKINE,
Scottish Rifles, T.F.

to his son, Sec.-Lieut. A. B. Turner, Royal Berkshire Regiment; Mr. William Williams, awarded to his son, W. C. Williams, Able Seaman, Royal Fleet Reserve; Mrs. Cornwell, awarded to her son, John Travers Cornwell, Boy, First Class, R.N.; Mr. Robert Drake, awarded to his son, Corporal A. Drake, The Rifle Brigade; Mrs. Barber, awarded to her son, Private E. Barber, Grenadier Guards. Similar presentations were subsequently made.

Dated "War Office, August, 1916," the nine V.C.'s which opened the roll of highest honour for the war's third year, included two posthumous honours, one to Captain John Leslie Green, R.A.M.C., and the other to Sapper William Hackett, R.E. Green's act was truly noble. Though himself wounded he went to help another wounded officer who was hung up on the enemy's wire entanglements. He succeeded in dragging the officer to a shell-hole, and dressed his wounds, in spite of continuous throwing of bombs and rifle grenades. Green made a splendid effort to crown his courageous and unselfish work by trying to take the wounded officer into safe cover, and he had nearly done so when he was killed.

Hackett afforded another glorious example

of self-sacrifice. The explosion of an enemy mine entombed him and four others in a gallery. For twenty hours these five prisoners, battling with sliding earth, menaced by a horrible death, worked to free themselves, and at the end of that long period they had succeeded in making a hole through the fallen earth and broken timber and had the joy of meeting the outside party and seeing salvation just at hand. Hackett helped three of his fellow-prisoners through the hole. He could easily have followed and secured his own safety; but the fourth man had been seriously injured and the gallant sapper refused to leave him. "I'm a tunneller," he said, "I must look after the others first." The hole was getting smaller, the peril was growing, yet the sapper resolutely refused to leave his injured comrade—then the gallery collapsed and the two were again buried alive. For four days the rescue party worked desperately in their attempt to reach the two men; but they failed. It is hard to find words that adequately express appreciation of such an act of courage and self-sacrifice. "Sapper Hackett, well knowing the nature of sliding earth, the chances against him, deliberately gave his life for his comrade."



CAPTAIN J. L. GREEN, R.A.M.C.

Two Territorials—Acting-Sergeant John Erskine, Scottish Rifles, T.F., and Private Arthur Herbert Proctor, Liverpool Regiment, T.F.—

was believed to be dead, show signs of movement, he ran out to him, bandaged his head, and remained with him for fully an hour, though



PRIVATE GEORGE STRINGER,
Manchester Regt.

were included in the nine for deeds which strongly resembled each other. Erskine, in circumstances of great danger, rescued a wounded sergeant and a private, under continuous fire. Later on, seeing his officer, who



PRIVATE A. H. PROCTOR,
Liverpool Regt., T.F.

he was repeatedly fired at, whilst a shallow trench was being dug to them. Having done this, Erskine helped to bring in his officer, giving him the shelter of his own body, to lessen the chance of his being hit again. Proctor showed the same conspicuous bravery and disregard of personal safety when, noticing some movement of two wounded men who were lying in the open, in full view of the enemy, at about 75 yards in front of our trenches, he went out and ran and crawled to them. He got the two men under cover of a small bank and dressed their wounds. He ministered not only to their bodily welfare by this attention and giving them some of his own clothing to keep them warm, but he also encouraged them by promising that they should be rescued after dark. He had gone out entirely on his own initiative, he had acted under heavy fire, and regained our trenches while still heavily fired at; but he had the intense joy of knowing that his promise had not been made in vain, for at dusk both the wounded men were brought in alive.



PRIVATE G. W. CHAFER,
East Yorkshire Regt.

Fine resourcefulness and swiftness to act marked the exploit of Private George William Chafer, East Yorkshire Regiment. While our trenches were being heavily bombarded and attacked a man who was carrying an important written message to his Company Officer was half buried and made unconscious by a shell. Chafer instantly realised the critical importance of the situation, and on his own initiative took

the message from the man's pocket. He was severely wounded in three places, but he ran along a ruined parapet, under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, and only just managed to deliver the message when he collapsed from the effect of his wounds.

High individual courage and determination characterised the conduct for which the Cross was awarded to *Privato* George Stringer, Manchester Regiment, who, by a most resolute

Munster Fusiliers, showed "unflinching courage" while in command of a raiding party. Just as he entered the enemy's lines he was severely wounded by a bomb, which broke and mutilated all the fingers of his right hand; but the subaltern carried on, "his voice being clearly heard cheering on and directing his men." He was urged to retire, but refused. Half an hour later, during the withdrawal, he was helping to rescue other wounded men



THE RUNNER.

stand, holding his ground single-handed, saved the flank of his battalion and made a steady withdrawal possible. An enemy position had been captured and Stringer had been posted on the extreme right of his battalion to guard against any hostile attack. The battalion was subsequently forced back by an enemy counter-attack; but Stringer held his ground and kept the enemy back till all his grenades were expended.

Lieut. Arthur Hugh Batten-Pooll, Royal

when he received two more wounds; he, however, declined assistance and managed to walk to within 100 yards of our lines when he fainted and was carried in by the covering party.

Uncommon features marked the two remaining cases of the nine, in which the Cross was awarded to Lieut. Richard Basil Brandram Jones, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and to Captain (temporary Major) Lionel Wilmot Brabazon Rees, R.A. and R.F.C. With his

platoon Jones was holding a crater which had been recently captured from the enemy. At about 7.30 p.m. the enemy exploded a mine forty yards to the lieutenant's right, at the same time putting a heavy barrage fire on our trenches and isolating the platoon. The enemy then attacked in overwhelming num-

sighted what he thought to be a bombing party of our own machines returning home. Rees went up to escort them, and it was not until he was getting near that he found that they were not friends at all, but a party of about ten enemy machines. He was immediately attacked by one of the hostile machines, but after a short



CAPT. (TEMP. MAJOR) L. W. B. REES,
R.A. and R.F.C.

bers; but Jones set an extraordinarily fine example by shooting no fewer than fifteen of the enemy as they advanced. Not only did he do that, but he added further to his example by deliberately counting aloud the enemy as they fell. He maintained his stirring lead until his ammunition was finished, then he took a bomb, but while getting up to throw it he was shot through the head. Such an example was irresistible, and fired by their leader's spirit the men, when they had neither ammunition nor bombs left, hurled stones and ammunition-boxes at the enemy, and kept up this defiant defence until only nine of the platoon were left, and the surviving remnant was forced to retire.

The achievement of Major Rees was an illustration of the unforeseen development of aerial activity in connexion with the war; and it was possible only to such men as those who were to be found in the air battle squadrons of the Allies. He was on flying duties when he



LIEUT. R. B. BRANDRAM JONES,
Loyal North Lancashire Regt.

fight it vanished, damaged, behind the enemy lines. Five other machines then attacked the lonely airman at long range; but he dispersed these on coming to close quarters, after seriously damaging two of them. The airman might well have been content with such a splendid result against overwhelming odds, but he was far from satisfied, and seeing two other enemy machines going westward he gave chase. On getting nearer, however, he was wounded in the thigh, and so temporarily lost control of his machine. Fortunately he soon righted it, and instantly closed with the enemy, firing, until his ammunition was quite exhausted, at a range of only a few yards. "He then returned home," to quote the official words—and they crown the cool splendour of the deed—"landing his machine safely in our lines."

On September 11, 1916 there was published the list of twenty awards of the Cross which formed one of the most moving collections of heroic deeds ever brought together. There



CAPT. (TEMP. LIEUT.-COL.)
A. CARTON DE WIART, D.S.O.

was at times a regrettable vagueness in the official details; a want of clearness and cohesion which made it difficult to grasp the grandeur of an achievement, and it was open to question whether it was needful to suppress all indication of locality and date and even of the theatre of war.

Initiative and inspiring example marked the deeds for which the Cross was given to six of the twenty—Captain (temporary Lieut.-Col.) Adrian Carton de Wiart, D.S.O., Dragoon Guards; Drummer Walter Ritchie, Seaforth Highlanders; Private John Leak, Australian Infantry; Second Lieut. Arthur Seaforth Blackburn, Australian Infantry; Corporal George Sanders, West Yorkshire Regiment, and Private James Hutchinson, Lancashire Fusiliers. It was largely owing to Colonel Carton de Wiart's "dauntless courage and inspiring example" that a serious reverse was averted. In forcing our attack home he showed the utmost energy and courage, stubbornly maintaining ground regardless of cost. In organizing positions and supplies he unhesitatingly exposed himself, and passed unflinchingly through fire barrage of the most intense kind. Drummer Ritchie's act was of the sort that never fails in its purpose when the British soldier is concerned. Solely following his own inclination he reached

and stood on the parapet of an enemy trench and repeatedly sounded the "Charge," the thrilling notes of which rose high above the sound of heavy machine-gun fire and bursting bombs. The situation was critical, for men had lost their leaders and had become disorganized, and some were wavering and retiring; but the scattered units rallied to the drummer's call and followed his inspiring lead. Having done this fine work he steadfastly pursued his duty by carrying messages over fire-swept ground throughout the day.

Blackburn and Leak added to the glorious reputation which the Australians had won by such achievements as those for which Victoria Crosses were awarded for their valour at Lone Pine Trenches in the Gallipoli Peninsula, on the night of August 9, 1915. Blackburn was directed, with 50 men, to drive the enemy from a strong point. So determined was he to carry out the purpose he had in mind that he personally led



DRUMMER WALTER RITCHIE,
Seaforth Highlanders.

four separate bombing parties against an enemy trench, sustaining many casualties in doing so. He took 250 yards of trench in face of fierce opposition, then he crawled forward, with a



PRIVATE J. LEAK,
Australian Infantry.

sergeant, to reconnoitre, and having done that he returned and attacked and captured 150 yards more of the trench, and established communication with the battalion on his left.

Leak also distinguished himself in the difficult capture of an enemy strong point. He jumped out of a trench, rushed forward under heavy machine-gun fire at close range, and threw three bombs into an enemy post from which

So admirable was his leading and so infectious was his example that when reinforcements came up the whole trench was recaptured.

Very splendid was the deed of Corporal Sanders. As so often happened in the advances against hostile trenches, he found himself isolated and thrown upon his own resourcefulness. Thirty men were with him, and this small band he organized defensively, instilling into their receptive hearts the stern need of holding their position at whatever cost. One night passed, and when the morning came he repelled an enemy attack and rescued some prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the foe. Later on two strong bomb attacks were beaten off. The day passed slowly, and it was not until after 36 hours of most exhausting effort that Sanders was relieved, and brought the survivors of his party, 19 strong, back to our trenches. The task which had been fulfilled was one that needed special courage and endurance, and it was made infinitely more difficult by the fact that throughout the whole of the 36 hours the party were without food and water, for during the first night, unmindful of their own extremity and urgent need, they had given all their water to the wounded.

Then came the case of Private Hutchinson. "This gallant soldier" was the leader in an attack, and entering an end trench he shot



SECOND-LIEUT.
A. S. BLACKBURN,
Australian Infantry.



PRIVATE JAMES
HUTCHINSON,
Lancashire Fusiliers.



CORPORAL
GEORGE SANDERS,
West Yorkshire Regt.

bombs were being thrown and outranging our own; then he jumped into the post and bayoneted three unwounded enemy bombers. Subsequently, when his party was forced to fall back before overwhelming numbers, he kept on bombing and was always the last to withdraw.

two sentries and promptly cleared two of the traverses. The purpose of the assault having been achieved and a retirement ordered, Hutchinson on his own initiative undertook the dangerous task of covering the retirement, so well and bravely acting that the wounded were

removed in safety. And he did all this despite the fact that from first to last he was exposed to fierce fire from rifles and machine guns at close quarters.

it necessary to leave the officer in a shell-hole ; but at dusk the undaunted Veale went out again with volunteers to bring him in. This dangerous task was being carried out when an



PRIVATE T. W. H. VEALE,
Devonshire Regt.



PRIVATE W. JACKSON,
Australian Infantry.



PRIVATE MARTIN O'MEARA,
Australian Infantry.

Secondly, the score of awards published on September 11, 1916, included a considerable proportion of cases in which the Cross was given for that display of unselfish heroism with which the honour is inseparably associated. There were six such cases—those of Private Theodore William Henry Veale, Devonshire Regiment ; Thomas George Turrall, Worcestershire Regiment ; Robert Quigg, Royal Irish Rifles ; William Frederick Faulds, South African Infantry, and Martin O'Meara and William Jackson, Australian Infantry. All these men were privates, and theirs were the old, yet ever new and noble, tales of rescues of brother soldiers in the face of almost certain death.

Take the case of Veale, of the "Bloody Eleventh." He was twenty-four years old. He heard that a wounded officer was lying out in the front, and promptly went in search. The soldier found the officer "lying amidst growing corn within fifty yards of the enemy." He dragged him to a shell-hole, returned for water, and took it out. He meant to carry in the officer, but found that he could not do this single-handed, and so he went back for help. Volunteers were available—volunteers were never wanting in the British forces when there was exciting work to do against an enemy—and with two of them Veale returned to the wounded officer. They secured him and began to carry him away. While doing this one of the party was killed, and heavy fire made

enemy patrol was seen approaching ; but the British soldier was not to be robbed of the triumph which he had so hardly fought for and was so nearly his. He instantly went back and got a Lewis gun, and with the fire of this he so well covered his party that the officer



PRIVATE T. G. TURRALL (Worcestershire Regt.) shows his Cross to his little daughter on leaving the Palace.

was carried into safety. Veale, in a letter home—he was the son of a builder at Dartmouth—gave an account of the rescue. He said that while he was in the trenches a cry for help was heard in front. A few minutes previously a man had been seen waving his hand, and it was supposed that a German wished to surrender. But on hearing the cry Veale left the trench, crossed the open under fire, and was surprised to find a wounded British officer close to the Germans. "I crawled back again," he said, "and got two more men and a corporal to come out with a waterproof sheet, which we put him on. We got about eighty yards, and when going over a bit of a bridge they shot the corporal through the head. I made the officer comfortable in a hole. I went back for a team and also for water. When evening came I led the way for our chaplain (Captain Duff) and Sergeant Smith. We reached him just before dark, and as we were about to carry him in we 'spotted' the Germans creeping up. I, not thinking, stood up, and ran like hell about 150 yards to the trenches for my gun. I raced out again, and covered him and the others while they got him in."



PRIVATE W. F. FAULDS,
South African Infantry.

Another wounded officer gave cause to Private Turrall to display his splendid qualities as a fighting man. The officer in charge of a small party carrying out a bombing attack against the enemy was badly wounded, and the party, which had penetrated the position to a great depth, was forced to retire. For three hours, under continuous fire from machine guns and

bombs, completely cut off from our own troops, Turrall stood by the wounded officer, and when our counter-attack had made it possible to do so he carried him into our lines.

Quigg's case was very similar. Early one morning, after he had advanced three times to the assault, he heard that his platoon officer was lying out wounded, and so, not once nor



[Lafayette.

TEMP. MAJOR S. W. LOUDOUN-SHAND,
Yorkshire Regt.

twice, but seven times, he went to look for him, under heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The record said nothing more of the wounded officer, but each time he went out Quigg brought in a wounded man, the last being dragged in on a waterproof sheet from within a few yards of the enemy's wire. Quigg was engaged for seven hours in "this most gallant work, and finally was so exhausted that he had to give it up."

Jackson's conduct was singularly brave. Several members of a party which was returning from a successful raid were seriously wounded by shell fire in "No Man's Land." Jackson got back safely, with a prisoner. Handing over the captive he at once went out again and helped to rescue a wounded man. He set forth afresh on the same desperate errand, and succeeded so far that, with a sergeant, he was bringing in another wounded man; but his arm was blown off by a shell, and the sergeant was stunned. In spite of his terrible

injury Jackson managed to return to our trenches and get help, and, not content with that, he went out again to look for his two wounded comrades; setting from first to last a splendid example of coolness, courage and determination.



TEMP. SEC.-LIEUT. D. S. BELL,
Yorkshire Regt.

Martin O'Meara received the Cross for repeatedly going out and bringing in wounded officers and men, from "No Man's Land," under the inevitable heavy fire, his deeds extending over four days of very heavy fighting. In addition to this O'Meara volunteered and carried up ammunition and bombs through a heavy barrage to a portion of the trenches, showing an utter contempt of danger, and undoubtedly saving many lives.

Remaining in the list of the living recipients amongst the twenty was Private William Frederick Faulds, who afforded another splendid example of unflinching courage crowned with success. A bombing party under Lieutenant Craig tried to rush across forty yards of ground which lay between the British and the enemy trenches, but most of them were killed or wounded in the attempt. Craig was unable to move, and he lay helpless on the fully-exposed ground between the two lines of trench. To add to the extreme peril of the situation it was full daylight. But Private Faulds, with two other men, climbed over the parapet, ran out, and picked up the helpless officer and carried him back; one of Faulds's companions was severely wounded. Two days later Faulds went out again, but this time alone, to bring in a wounded man. He carried his burden to a dressing station nearly half a mile away,

afterwards rejoining his platoon, and did all this notwithstanding the continuance of an artillery fire so intense that it was believed that any attempt to bring in the wounded would result in certain death.

Such were the various acts which marked the granting of a dozen of the twenty Crosses; even more moving were the remaining eight, for these were given to the dead, so that their work might follow them and they might live again in memory. A very striking fact was that no fewer than three of the eight Crosses were awarded to late members of the Yorkshire Regiment—Temporary Major Stewart Walter Loudoun-Shand, Temporary Second Lieutenant Donald Simpson Bell, and Private William Short. Loudoun-Shand's last act was reminiscent of the courage which Grenville showed off the Azores, and bluff old Benbow displayed when, hurt to death, he sat on a chair on deck and continued to direct the battle. The major, whose company, in trying to climb over the parapet to attack the enemy's trenches, was temporarily stopped by very fierce machine-gun fire, instantly leaped on to the parapet, helped them over it, and encouraged them in every way; nor did he stop even when mortally wounded, for he insisted on being propped up in the trench, and did not cease his effort till he died. Bell saved many lives, and



PRIVATE W. SHORT,
Yorkshire Regt.

ensured the success of an attack by creeping up a communication trench and then, followed by Corporal Colwill and Private Batey, rushing across the fire-swept open and attacking a machine-gun, shooting the firer with his revolver, and destroying the gun and the

crew with bombs. Five days later, while performing a very similar act of resource and valour, the young officer was killed. Short's act was well worthy to rank with his officer's achievements. Foremost in the assault—for nearly a year he had constantly volunteered for dangerous enterprises—he was bravely bombing the enemy when he was severely wounded in the foot. He was urged to go back, but refused, and went on with his bomb-throwing. Later a shell shattered his leg, so that he could not stand, but he lay in the trench, and his indomitable spirit enabled him to adjust detonators and straighten the pins of bombs for his comrades. He died before he could be taken from the trench.

In the work of saving life Temporary Lieutenant Geoffrey St. George Shillington Cather, Royal Irish Fusiliers, lost his own. From seven o'clock at night until midnight he searched the deadly "No Man's Land" and brought in three wounded men. He continued his search at eight next morning, brought in a



REV. W. R. F. ADDISON,
Temp. Chaplain to the Forces (4th Class).

fourth wounded man, and arranged for the subsequent rescue of others, to whom he gave water. At half-past ten he took out water to another man, and was going farther when he was killed. The whole of his devoted duty was done under fire and in full view of the enemy.

Dramatic was the end of Private James

Miller, Royal Lancaster Regiment, who was ordered to take an important message, under heavy shell fire, and bring back a reply at all costs. He was forced to cross the open, and as soon as he had left the trench he was shot through the back, the bullet coming out



[Swaine

TEMP. LIEUT. G. ST. G. S. CATHER.
Royal Irish Fusiliers.

through the abdomen; yet, compressing with his hand the gaping wound which had been made, he delivered his message, then staggered back with his answer, and, having delivered it to an officer, fell at his feet.

Private Thomas Cooke, Australian Infantry, was ordered, after a Lewis gun had been disabled, to take his gun and gun team to a dangerous part of the line. He obeyed, and did fine work; but at last he was the only man left. Alone he remained at his post and went on firing the gun; and he was found dead beside it when help was sent.

Magnificent conduct throughout a day by Company Sergeant-Major Nelson Victor Carter, Royal Sussex Regiment, was ended by his death. He was in command of the fourth wave of an attack, and managed with a few men to reach the enemy's second line, where he caused heavy loss with bombs. He was forced to retire to the enemy's first line, but captured a machine gun and shot the gunner with his revolver. He then carried several wounded men into safety, but was mortally wounded, and died in a few minutes.

Again a bomber, Private William Frederick McFadzean, Royal Irish Rifles, knowing well his peril, gave his life in his determination to save others. He was in a concentration



PRIVATE J. MILLER,
Royal Lancaster Regt.



**CO. SERGT.-MAJOR
N. V. CARTER,**
Royal Sussex Regt.



**PRIVATE
W. F. McFADZEAN,**
Royal Irish Rifles.

trench, opening a box of bombs for distribution before an attack, when the box slipped down into the trench, which was crowded with men, and two of the safety-pins fell out. McFadzean instantly realised the danger to his comrades, and heroically hurled himself upon the bombs. These exploded, and the private was blown to pieces—but only one other man was injured.

The list of twelve Crosses, which was announced on September 26, 1916, was headed by the name of a clergyman—the Rev. W. R. F. Addison, temporary Chaplain to the Forces, who had had a varied early life and had roughed it in a Canadian lumber camp. He was of the robust fighting parson type, and set a rousing example. He carried a wounded man and helped several others to the cover of a trench, after binding up their wounds under heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. He encouraged, too, stretcher-bearers who were under heavy fire to go forward and collect the wounded.

Several kindred acts were the cause of the award to others of the twelve. Sergeant C. C. Castleton, Australian Machine Gun Section, gave his life most nobly during an attack on the enemy's trenches. Twice, under intense fire, he went out, and each time brought in a wounded man on his back; he had gone out for the third time, and was returning with another wounded man, when he was shot in the back and instantly killed. For helping wounded men under fire, and for carrying a wounded man into safety, under very dangerous conditions, the Cross was awarded to Second Lieutenant E. K. Myles, Welsh Regiment, who,

on several occasions had gone out alone. Acts of just the same nature were those of Corporal S. W. Ware, Seaforth Highlanders, who sacrificed his life in saving others; Private J. H. Fynn, South Wales Borderers, who, in Mesopotamia, helped and saved wounded under continuous fire, and Captain A. B. Buchanan, also of the South Wales Borderers, who, amongst other acts, saved a brother officer who was severely wounded. This officer, during an attack, was lying out in the open, about 150 yards from cover. Of two men who went to help him one was hit instantly, whereupon Buchanan unhesitatingly went out



SERGT. C. C. CASTLETON,
Australian Machine Gun Corps.

and, with the help of the other man, carried the wounded officer to cover, to the inevitable accompaniment of gun and rifle fusillade. Still under heavy fire, Buchanan returned and

dug-outs, and at last climbed out of his trench and assisted the last man over the parapet. From this time he was not seen, though parties searched for him, and doubtless his devotion



SEC. LIEUT. E. F. BAXTER,
Liverpool Regt.



SEC. LIEUT. E. K. MYLES,
Welsh Regt.



CORP. S. W. WARE,
Seaforth Highlanders.

completed his gallant achievement by bringing in the wounded man.

Very noble was the manner of the death of Edward Felix Baxter, a second lieutenant of the Liverpool Regiment. During two nights, before a raid on a hostile line, he was wire-cutting, so close to the enemy's trenches that the enemy could be heard on the other side of the parapet. Once, at extreme peril to himself, he smothered a bomb in the ground, and so prevented many



LIEUT. (TEMP. CAPT.) A. B. BUCHANAN,
South Wales Borderers.

casualties and an alarm from being given to the enemy; later, at the head of stormers, Baxter was the first man in a trench, having shot a sentry with his revolver; he helped to bomb

claimed his life. Baxter, who was thirty years of age, was chief commercial master at Skerry's College, Liverpool. He was a very well known North of England motor cyclist, and won many successes both in track racing and road trials. At the outbreak of war he enlisted as a despatch rider; but in 1915 he obtained a commission in a Territorial battalion of the Liverpool Regiment.

Killed while rallying and reorganising infantry parties who had lost their officers was the end of temporary Captain E. N. F. Bell, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, after doing many gallant things that did not come within the normal duties of his Trench Mortar Battery. Enfilading machine-gun fire having hung up our front line, Bell crept forward and shot the machine gunner, then, three times, when our bombing parties were unable to advance to clear the enemy trenches, he went forward alone and threw trench mortar bombs amongst the enemy. Before he was killed, and when he had no more bombs available, he stood on the parapet, under intense fire, and with complete coolness and effect used a rifle on the enemy, who were counter-attacking.

Another sacrifice was that of temporary Lieut. T. O. L. Wilkinson, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, who, after the most valiant conduct in getting an abandoned machine gun into action, scattered enemy bombers; then he made two exhausting efforts

to bring in a wounded man, but in the second attempt, just before reaching the man, he was shot through the heart.

"His conduct throughout was magnificent," was the official comment in the case of Private A. Hill, Royal Welsh Fusiliers. His battalion having deployed under very heavy fire for an attack on the enemy in a wood, Hill dashed forward, and unexpectedly meeting two of the enemy, bayoneted them both. Ordered later to get into touch with the company, he discovered that he was cut off and was almost

surrounded by about twenty of the enemy. No such craven thought as surrender entered this British soldier's mind—instantly he set to work to scatter and confound his enemies, and did both, for when he had finished hurling bombs at them he had killed and wounded many and the rest had fled, leaving him in triumph on his own especial battlefield. After this glorious deed Hill joined a sergeant of his company and helped him to fight his way back to the lines; but he was not even then satisfied, for, hearing that his Company Officer and a



HOW PRIVATE FYNN WON THE VICTORIA CROSS.

scout were lying wounded, he went out and helped to bring in the wounded officer, while, happily, the scout was rescued by two other men. Add to these things the capture of two of the enemy and bringing them in as prisoners, and the record is completed of the achievements



[Lafayette.
TEMP. CAPT. E. N. F. BELL,
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.

for which, on an unnamed date, in an unmentioned place, Hill won the Victoria Cross.

The list of twelve was completed by the addition to the Indians who had specially distinguished themselves by gaining the Cross of Naik Shahamad Khan, Punjabis. He, while in charge of a machine-gun section in an exposed position, showed extraordinary determination and courage in preventing the enemy from penetrating our line. The corporal beat off three counter attacks, and worked his gun single-handed after all his men except two belt-fillers had become casualties. After his gun was knocked out by hostile fire he and the two fillers held their ground with rifles and did not withdraw until ordered to do so. Three men were sent to help the naik, and with these he brought not only his gun but also his ammunition back and a severely wounded man who was unable to walk. This exhausting work he crowned by returning and removing all the remaining arms and equipment, except two rifles.

The story was told of one of the recipients of the Cross that he rallied his command to the tune of an old hunting horn. This was Lieutenant-Colonel J. V. Campbell, Coldstream

Guards, who had been appointed to the D.S.O. for services in the South African war. Colonel Campbell headed a list of fifteen recipients, published on October 26, 1916, which contained three outstanding instances—the case of Major W. La Touche Congreve, D.S.O., M.C., Rifle Brigade, son of a V.C. hero; Captain N. G. Chavasse, M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C., son of a bishop, and “Todger” Jones, a private of the Cheshire Regiment who, single-handed, captured 102 prisoners.

Colonel Campbell's conduct was distinguished by personal gallantry and initiative which, “at a very critical moment turned the fortunes of the day and enabled the division to press on and capture objectives of the highest tactical importance.” The two first waves of his battalion had been decimated by machine-gun and rifle fire, and, seeing this, he took personal command of the third line, rallied his men and valiantly led them against the enemy machine guns, which he captured, killing the *personnel*.



MAJOR & BT. LT.-COL. J. V. CAMPBELL,
D.S.O., Coldstream Guards.

Later in the day, after consultation with other unit commanders, he again rallied the survivors of his battalion, and at a most critical moment led them against the objective through a very heavy hostile fire barrage; and he was one of the first to enter the enemy trench. Subsequently Brigadier-General Campbell—he had

been promoted—who was master of the Tanat Hunt, and Major Longueville, D.S.O., were at Oswestry presented by the Mayor, on behalf of the inhabitants, with addresses recording the deeds for which they had received their honours. Describing the charge which was made, the general said that though the Coldstream Guards suffered heavy losses, yet when they reached the journey's end he turned to Longueville and said, "Never mind; Tanat side has it!"

Congreve's high courage was displayed during a period of fourteen days before he lost his life

the M.C. There were circumstances which gave the instance unusual interest and invested it with sadness, for the gallant officer was the son of a V.C. hero—Lieutenant-General W. N. Congreve, C.B., who was decorated for conspicuous bravery in saving the guns at Colenso, where he was wounded—and he had been but recently married to Miss Pamela Cynthia Maude, daughter of the well-known actor, Mr. Cyril Maude. Major Congreve received the D.S.O. and the M.C. for an act of great resource and courage, for which he had been recommended the Victoria Cross. On November 1,



TEMP. LIEUT. T. O. L. WILKINSON,
North Lancashire Regiment.

while calmly doing his duty. His gallant deeds were constant and his personal example was at all times an inspiration to those around him. In addition to showing this great bravery consistently he performed several of those acts of valour for the recognition of which the Cross exists. When Brigade Headquarters were heavily shelled, with many casualties resulting, he helped the medical officer to remove the wounded to places of safety, though he was suffering severely from gas and other shell effects. On a later occasion he showed "supreme courage" in tending wounded under heavy shell fire. Finally returning to the front line to ascertain the situation after an unsuccessful attack, he was shot and instantly killed whilst writing his report.

In all the personal presentations by the King of decorations to next-of-kin there was no case more striking than that of Major Congreve, for he was the first officer in the British Army to win the V.C., the D.S.O. and



PRIVATE A. HILL,
Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

1916, at Buckingham Palace, the King presented to the widow the decorations which had been awarded to the Major, and His Majesty said how deeply both he and the Queen regretted that so gallant an officer had died. On March 21, 1917, the widow gave birth to a daughter, and a month later the infant was christened at St. Paul's Cathedral, Lady Bertha Dawkins representing the Queen and standing sponsor on her behalf.

The posthumous bestowal of the Cross on Major Congreve caused Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., to write a letter to *The Times*, in which he said: "The first name in the list of the gallant 15 recipients is that of Lieutenant-Colonel J. V. Campbell, Coldstream Guards. . . . His father, my staff officer, Captain the Honourable Ronald Campbell, Coldstream Guards, was killed in 1879, when performing an act of extraordinary courage in my presence,* and for which, as I reported

* This was during the assault of the Inghelene Mountain, Zuhiland, on March 28, 1879. Sir Evelyn

officially, I should have recommended him for the Cross had he survived; an officer and a private who followed him received the Cross. More appreciative views of noble deeds have now amended the rules of the coveted Order." The marshal's letter gave special interest to the list of fifteen, showing, as it did, that the father of another of the recipients was practically a hero of the Cross.

Chavasse and Captain W. B. Allen, M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C., were worthy members of that exceptionally heroic band of surgeons of which Martin Leake may well be called the head. Allen, seeing that a limber had been struck by a shell and the ammunition exploded, causing



BT. MAJ. WM. LA TOUCHE CONGREVE,
D.S.O., M.C., Rifle Brigade.

several casualties, rushed across the open, utterly regardless of the heavy fire, and began to dress the wounded, his promptness undoubtedly preventing many of them from bleeding to death. During the first strenuous hour he was hit four times by pieces of shell, one of which fractured two of his ribs; but

Wood ordered the dislodgment of some Zulus, who were causing our troops much loss, from strong natural caves commanding the position in which some of our wounded soldiers were lying. As there was some delay in carrying out the order, Campbell, with Lieutenant Henry Lyons and Private Edmund Fowler, both of the 2nd Battalion The Cameronians, rushed forward over a mass of fallen boulders, and between walls of rocks which led to a cove in which the enemy lay hidden. The brave trio were forced to advance in single file. Campbell, who was leading, was the first to reach the mouth of the cave, from which the Zulus were firing, and there he met his death. Undaunted, Lyons and Fowler, who were close behind, immediately dashed at the cove, from which led several subterranean passages, and firing into the chasm below, forced the Zulus to forsake their stronghold. Lyons remained at the mouth of the cave for some minutes after the attack, while the fallen officer's body was carried down the slopes of Inhlobane.

without even mentioning this at the time, he went on with his work and did not stop until the last man was dressed and safely removed. Then he went to another battery and tended



CAPT. N. G. CHAVASSE, M.C., M.B.,
R.A.M.C.

a wounded officer; and only when this was done did he go to his dug-out and report his own injury.

While doing the same kind of dangerous work Chavasse was wounded in the side by a shell splinter. This injury he sustained while carrying an urgent case into safety, the journey being over 500 yards of shell-swept ground. Afterwards at night he took up a party of twenty volunteers, rescued three wounded men from a shell hole only twenty-five yards from the enemy trench, buried the bodies of two officers, and collected many identity discs—and these things he did although he was fired on by machine guns and bombs. Besides these acts Chavasse for four hours had searched for wounded on the ground in front of the enemy's lines. In all he saved the lives of some twenty wounded men, apart from the ordinary cases which passed through his hands; and "his courage and self-sacrifice were beyond praise." This officer was a son of the Bishop of Liverpool, and was a well-known athlete.

Sergeant Albert Gill, King's Royal Rifle Corps, courted almost certain death—and it came to him. The right flank of the battalion was very strongly counter-attacked, and the enemy, after killing all the company bombers, rushed the bombing post. Gill at once rallied the remnants of his platoon, none of whom were skilled bombers, and reorganized his

defences, this being a most difficult and dangerous task, as the trench was very shallow and much damaged. Creeping up through the thick undergrowth, the enemy soon afterwards



CAPT. W. B. A. ALLEN, M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C.

to duty. His platoon had suffered severely in advancing to a forward position. Sergeant Jones led forward the remainder, and having occupied the position, held it for two days and nights, without food or water, till he was relieved. On the second day he drove back three counter-attacks, inflicting heavy losses, and it was entirely due to him that the men retained their confidence and held their post.

There were many instances of these displays of tenacity by starving men. Captain A. C. T. White, Yorkshire Regiment, for four days and nights, under heavy fire, repeatedly attacked, held a position at a redoubt, and finally, by a very bold and clever counter-attack, cleared the enemy, who had assaulted in greatly superior numbers, out of the southern and western faces. Though short of supplies and ammunition his determination never wavered; he repeatedly risked his life, and was the life and soul of the defenders.

Second Lieutenant G. G. Coury, South Lan-



SERGT. D. JONES,
Liverpool Regiment.



SERGT. A. GILL,
King's Royal Rifles.



PRIVATE (ACTING CORP.)
L. CLARKE, Canadian Infantry.

nearly surrounded the courageous sergeant's little band, and at about twenty yards' range began sniping. To be exposed was almost certain death, yet the sergeant took his chance in standing up to direct the fire of his men. He was killed immediately, but before he fell, a splendid example of supreme devotion to duty, he had saved a very dangerous situation; he had shown his men where the enemy were, and thus enabled them to hold up their advance.

Another sergeant—David Jones, Liverpool Regiment—showed great ability in handling his troops and uncommon bravery and devotion

to duty. His platoon had suffered severely in advancing to a forward position. Sergeant Jones led forward the remainder, and having occupied the position, held it for two days and nights, without food or water, till he was relieved. On the second day he drove back three counter-attacks, inflicting heavy losses, and it was entirely due to him that the men retained their confidence and held their post.

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his party became casualties. Whilst he was building a "block" he was counter-attacked by a party of about twenty of the enemy, with two officers. Clarke advanced towards them, and after emptying his revolver discharged two enemy rifles which he had picked up. One of the enemy officers then attacked him with a bayonet and wounded him in the leg, but Clarke shot him dead, whereupon the enemy ran away, pursued by the corporal, who did not desist until he had shot four more and captured a fifth. The corporal was later ordered to the dressing-station, but he returned to duty next day. Clarke afterwards died.*

Another of these fifteen recipients, Private Thomas Hughes, Connaught Rangers, having



PRIVATE T. HUGHES,
Connaught Rangers.

* The first presentation of a Victoria Cross in Canada was made by the Governor-General, the Duke of Devonshire. This was done in the case of Corporal Clarke, who came from Winnipeg, the decoration being given to his representative. It was estimated that more than 30,000 people attended the ceremony.



TEMP. CAPT. A. C. T. WHITE,
Yorkshire Regt.

been wounded in an attack, had his wounds dressed and immediately returned to the firing line. Seeing an enemy machine gun, he dashed out in front of his company, shot the gunner, and, single-handed, captured the gun. He was again wounded, but managed to bring in three or four prisoners as a finish to his bravery and enterprise.

A Scots Guardsman, Lance-Sergeant Fred McNess, was another recipient of the Cross, who carried on when wounded very severely in the neck and jaw. Leading his men with the greatest dash in a heavy engagement, he reached the enemy's first-line trenches. Finding that the left flank was exposed and that the enemy was bombing down the trench, McNess organized and led a counter-attack. Despite his wounds, he continued to pass through the barrage of hostile bombs so that he could bring up fresh supplies of bombs to his own men. Until he was utterly exhausted by loss of blood he, after establishing a "block," continued to throw bombs and encourage his men.

It seemed, indeed, as if wounds became a matter of course and no excuse for not carrying on, for another recipient, Sergeant W. E. Boulter, Northamptonshire Regiment, during an attack on a wood was severely wounded in the shoulder. But Boulter advanced alone over the open under heavy fire and bombed a

hostile gun team from their position. This gallant act saved many casualties, and it was of great military value, for it materially expedited the task of clearing the wood of the



SEC.-LIEUT. G. G. COURY,
South Lancashire Regt.

enemy, and so covering the flank of the whole attacking force.

Some of the doings of the winners of the Cross, especially the men in the ranks, were of a nature to reduce any enemy to despair. There was the case of Private "Todger" Jones. "Todger's" real name was Thomas Alfred. While with his company consolidating the defences in front of a village he saw an

enemy sniper 200 yards away. He went out, and though one bullet went through his helmet and another through his coat, yet he returned the sniper's fire and killed him. "Todger" then saw two more of the enemy firing at him, although they were showing the white flag. He had been warned of the misuse of the white flag by the enemy, but this did not prevent him from going out and making for an enemy trench. He engaged and shot the two snipers, and, having disposed of the three whom he could reach with his rifle, he, single-handed and unsupported, held on until he reached the trench, where he found several occupied dug-outs. Still alone, and in the utmost peril, "Todger" Jones methodically set to work and "disarmed 102 of the enemy, including three or four officers, and marched them back to our lines through a heavy barrage." That was the official statement regarding an act of unsurpassed audacity and success. A sergeant who witnessed the deed said that while they were under fire Jones exclaimed, "If I'm to be killed I'll be killed fighting and not digging." "Todger" then seized his rifle and made his way towards the German trench. Afterwards, when his comrades joined him, they found him standing by his prisoners in a big hollow. He was threatening them with bombs and they were all holding up their hands. The soldier ordered the captives to put on their coats, and his comrades helped him to round them up.



SERGT. W. E. BOULTER,
Northamptonshire Regt., receiving the congratulations of his friends.

Of his own deed "Todger" modestly said that when he reached the entrance of the dug-outs he addressed a German, who spoke good English, and told him that if the lot did not surrender "our lads would be over in thousands and cut them to pieces. He gave them the

"Todger" Jones's exploit was paralleled by that of Lieutenant J. V. Holland, Leinster Regiment, gazetted at the same time. He gallantly headed a party of bombers against dug-outs, starting with twenty-six and finishing with only five; but he had captured about



PRIVATE J. C. KERR,
Canadian Infantry.



PRIVATE T. A. ("TODGER")
JONES, Cheshire Regt.



LANCE-SERJT. F. McNESS,
Scots Guards.



LIEUT. J. V. HOLLAND,
Leinster Regt., with his bride.

message, and they came out of the dug-out one by one." The sergeant declared that the men in the trenches went almost wild when "Todger" returned at the head of his prisoners. Later on "Todger" unexpectedly returned to his home at Runcorn, and was given such an overwhelming reception that he sought refuge by taking to his heels down a side street and rushing into his old parents' house.

fifty prisoners. He was far from well when he did this, and later was forced to go to hospital.

This extraordinary feature of prisoner-making characterised another deed—that of Private J. C. Kerr, Canadian Infantry, who was bayonet man during a bombing attack. He found that bombs were running short, and running along the parapets under heavy fire until he was close to the enemy, he opened fire at point-blank range and inflicted heavy loss. Thinking that they were surrounded, the enemy surrendered, and sixty-two prisoners and 250 yards of trench were taken. Kerr's courage and devotion were shown by the fact that before the attack one of his fingers had been blown off by a bomb. Afterwards, with two men, he escorted back the prisoners under fire, and then returned to report himself for duty before having his wounds dressed.

The *Gazette* of November 25, 1916, announced the award of the Cross to three officers, two sergeants and two privates. This list of seven recipients was notable because one of the officers, though only a young lieutenant of about twenty-three years of age, held the rank of Lieutenant-colonel. This was Lieutenant (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) Roland Boys Bradford, Durham Light Infantry, who had already received the Military Cross. The list was further interesting because the two privates belonged to the Middlesex Regiment, the old "Die-Hards." Bradford afforded one more instance of brilliant leadership in a very young

officer saving a critical situation. His battalion was in support on the right flank of his brigade and of the Division. A leading battalion had suffered very severe casualties and the commander had been wounded and its flank had become dangerously exposed at close quarters to the enemy. The peril of the situation was increased by the fact that the battalion was raked by machine-gun fire. Bradford, at the request of the wounded commander, asked to be allowed to command the exposed battalion as well as his own; and on permission being given he immediately hurried to the foremost lines, and "by his fearless energy under fire of all descriptions, and his skilful leadership of the two battalions, regardless of all danger, he succeeded in rallying the attack, captured and defended the objective, and so secured the flank."

Fearless leadership and great resource characterised the acts for which the Cross was awarded to Temporary Second Lieutenant Tom Edwin Adlam, Bedfordshire Regiment, that fine Old Sixteenth whose conduct in the war had put aside for ever the genial gibe of "The Peacemakers" and "Thou Shalt Not Kill," for at one time the regiment had no honours on its colours and its first Cross was not gained until May 1, 1915, when, near Hill 60, the gallant Private Edward Warner entered a trench which had been vacated by our troops owing to a gas-attack and, alone, displayed the utmost bravery. His courage cost him his life from gas-poisoning, but he had won the first Victoria Cross for his regiment. His was one of the minor operations of war; so was that of Lieutenant Adlam, who found himself near a portion of a village which had defied capture on the previous day, yet had to be taken at all costs so that operations might develop. The subaltern, under deadly fire, hard pressed for time, rushed from shell-hole to shell-hole, collecting men for a sudden rush. For this purpose he also collected many enemy grenades. He was soon wounded in the leg, but was able to out-throw the enemy; then, watching for and seizing his chance, he led a rush, took the position, and killed the occupants. This he did in spite of his wounds; he also continued to lead his men in bomb attacks throughout the day. Next day he again showed the utmost courage. He was wounded for the second time, and though he was prevented from continuing to throw bombs, he went on leading his men, and by his example, valour and skill "produced far-reaching results."

For twice rallying his company under the heaviest fire during an attack and finally leading the only three available men into an enemy trench, where he remained bombing until two of them had become casualties and enemy reinforcements had arrived, then carrying his wounded company-sergeant-major back to our trenches, a distance of 70 yards, and afterwards carrying three other soldiers—for these fine things and his general valour and endurance Temporary Second-Lieutenant Henry Kelly, West Riding Regiment, was awarded the Cross. His conduct was in special keeping with



Swaine.
LIEUT. (TEMP. LIEUT.-COL.) R. B.
BRADFORD, M.C.,
Durham Light Infantry.

the spirit of the sturdy "Havercake Lads"—of whom he was one—the old 33rd, of which the Duke of Wellington was in command when he landed at Ostend in 1794 to join the British Army in the Low Countries,

The Dublin Fusiliers, whose four Crosses had been all gained in the Indian Mutiny, were now, through Sergeant Robert Downie to win their first Cross in the Great War. When most of the officers had become casualties Downie, reckless of danger, which was great because of heavy fire, moved about and reorganized the attack, which had been temporarily checked. He was alone, the situation was perilous; but he rallied the wavering line by shouting, "Come on, the Dubs!" He rushed as he shouted, and the line, fired instantly by his valour and enthusiasm, rushed with him. The sergeant

hurled himself upon the enemy, and with his own hand accounted for several of them; in addition, he rushed upon a machine-gun, killed the team and took the weapon, and this he did though he had been wounded early in the fight. He remained with his company and gave valuable help while the position was being consolidated. The real nature of his achievement is the better understood when it is remembered that the position was an important one

bravery never faltering and his skill remaining to the last. Turnbull did not live to know of the high honour which had been bestowed on him, for later in the day he was killed while bombing a counter-attack from the parapets of our trench. The official report well described him as "this very gallant soldier."

The pair of "Die-Hards" were Private Frederick Jeremiah Edwards and Private Robert Ryder, both of whom showed amazing



[Daily Sketch.]

V.C.'S AT THE PRESENTATION IN HYDE PARK, JUNE 2, 1917.

In khaki, left to right: Private Hughes, Private Cunningham, Capt. White, Col. Bradford, Lieut. Palmer, and Capt. Allen.

and that it had stubbornly resisted four or five previous attacks.

Another sergeant, James Young Turnbull, Highland Light Infantry, included in the seven, showed continued and persistent courage during a long spell of fighting. He and his party had captured a post which was apparently of great importance to the enemy; then he was subjected to severe counter-attacks throughout the day. The party was "wiped out" and replaced several times during the day, but Sergeant Turnbull never weakened in his resolution to hold the post, the loss of which would have been very serious. Almost single-handed he maintained his position, his

promptness and initiative. Edwards's part of the line was "held up" by machine-gun fire and all his officers had become casualties. In the confusion which followed—and there was indication of retirement—Edwards, swiftly realizing the situation and acting solely on his own initiative, rushed out alone towards the gun and knocked it out with bombs. His promptness, coolness and utter disregard of peril made further advance possible and saved a dangerous situation. Ryder's act was precisely the same in its essentials. His company, too, was "held up" by heavy rifle fire, all his officers had become casualties, and the attack was flagging for want of leadership. Abso.

lutely alone, Ryder dashed at the enemy trench, which he cleared by "skilful manipulation of his Lewis gun." This intrepid assault most materially helped the subsequent advance of the sergeant's comrades and was the means of turning what might have been a failure into success.

Both Downie and Turnbull belonged to Glasgow. It was related of Downie that he was one of a family of sixteen, and his wife one of seventeen; and that when he left for the front he declared that he would bring back something worth looking at—not a German helmet, but a V.C. He was known as a fine boxer, and on one occasion, when outside a boxing booth at an English fair, he said to his wife: "Wait till I see this, Lily." He entered the booth, and on reappearing it was observed that he had a silver medal, also a black eye. Turnbull had won fame as a cricketer, and later, in the Army he became celebrated even amongst the wonderfully skilled bombers, and it was said that he could throw bombs farther than any other man in the Army. Once he bombed uninterruptedly for sixteen hours, the missiles being of German make. At another time he played a machine gun on the Germans for twelve hours on end. The spirit and endurance that possessed him were summed up in his answer to his colonel's question: "How do you feel?"—"As fresh as paint, sir."

Freyberg, of the Royal Naval Division (attached Royal West Surrey Regiment). This officer had already been appointed to the D.S.O. For enduring courage and brilliant leadership Colonel Freyberg's achievement was unsurpassed by any act for which the Cross was



PRIVATE R. RYDER, MIDDLESEX REGT. SERGT. R. DOWNIE, ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS.

conferred. To begin with he carried an initial attack straight through the enemy's front system of trenches, but after the capture of the first objective his command was much disorganized owing to mist and a heavy fire of all descriptions. The officer personally rallied and re-formed his own men, as well as men from other units who had become intermixed, and he inspired them all with his own contempt of danger. In due course he led his men to the



SERGT. J. Y. TURNBULL, HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY.

TEMP. SEC. LIEUT. T. E. ADLAM, BEDFORDSHIRE REGT.

TEMP. SEC. LIEUT. H. KELLY, WEST RIDING REGT.

The extraordinarily fine qualities of leadership which characterised many of the British officers and had been rapidly developed by the war were illustrated by the case of Captain (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) Bernard Cyril

successful attack of the second objective, and many prisoners were captured. By this time Colonel Freyberg had been twice wounded, but he again rallied and re-formed all the men who were with him, and, although under heavy

artillery and machine-gun fire in a very advanced position and unsupported, still he held his ground for the rest of the day and throughout the night. On the following morning, having been reinforced; he organized an attack on a strongly fortified village, and such was his dash and enterprise that the village was captured and 500 prisoners were taken. For the third time the officer was wounded, and later in the afternoon he was again wounded, this time seriously, but he refused to leave the line until he had issued final instructions.



PRIVATE F. J. EDWARDS,
Middlesex Regiment.

"The personality, valour, and utter contempt of danger on the part of this single officer enabled the lodgment in the most advanced objective of the Corps to be permanently held, and on this *point d'appui* the line was eventually formed." Such was the close of the official version of the gallant colonel's performance. The award was gazetted on December 15, 1916, but, in accordance with the system which had been adopted for some months, no mention was made of the time or place of the brave and brilliant leadership.

Colonel Freyberg was by birth a New Zealander. He was not yet twenty-eight years of age. Born in Wellington, he developed both the physique and resourcefulness that were essential for the success of some of the enterprises which he undertook in the war. He won fame throughout Australasia as an exceptionally fine swimmer; he grew to be six feet in height, and broad and powerful in proportion; he achieved renown as an oarsman, a footballer and a boxer, and his physique won for him the affectionate nickname of "Tiny." Leaving New Zealand he went to America, and drifting to Mexico found full scope for his adventurous aspirations; he fought in the Civil War. In 1914 Freyberg came home, joined the Royal Naval Division, and was wounded in the hand at Antwerp. With good service to his record he went to Gallipoli with his battalion, being already a lieutenant-commander. In Gallipoli he again distinguished himself. General Paris was in charge of a force which was to make a feint landing at Bulair, the narrow neck of the Peninsula. Freyberg was given charge of the party, but, while prizing the honour, he proposed an alternative scheme which, he believed, would protect the lives of the men. This idea was that he should take coloured flares and swim ashore, that he should then light the flares, as if a landing was anticipated, and then swim out again to a waiting destroyer. This he did, stripping, and painting his face and shoulders a dark colour, so that he should not be seen swimming. Freyberg landed on the beach, lit the flares, made a reconnaissance, and swam off again, but owing to the darkness and the current he missed the boat which was to pick him up, and it was almost two hours before he was hauled on to the deck of the destroyer, more dead than alive. This remarkable feat of endurance and resourcefulness, more suggestive of an adventure from Mayne Reid or Fenimore Cooper than a sober act of modern war, won for the young officer the D.S.O. The circumstances of the winning of the Cross were finely told in the official story, but it may be added that in gaining it the young colonel excelled even himself. A high officer of his Army Corps described his act as a magnificent example of a "one-man show," and it is certain that Freyberg saved the Corps from serious trouble.

Similar resourcefulness and courage were shown by Private Herbert William Lewis,

Welsh Regiment, whose Cross was announced at the same time as Colonel Freyberg's. During a raid on enemy trenches this soldier was twice wounded, but he refused to have attention and coolly searched enemy dug-outs. For the



SERGT. E. J. MOTT, PTE. H. W. LEWIS,
Border Regt. Welsh Regt.

third time he was wounded, but still declined to be attended to. Three of the enemy were now seen to be approaching, and single-handed, regardless of his wounds, this fine example of the British soldier attacked them and made them all prisoners. Retirement became imperative, but while withdrawing Lewis went to the assistance of a wounded man, and, in spite of his own wounds, brought him, under heavy shell and rifle fire, to our own lines. Having done that he collapsed. These two cases, closely resembling each other in many respects, were typical of the spirit and resource which enabled so many British officers and men, against great odds and in circumstances of extreme danger, to do the seemingly impossible.

Pre-war visitors to the Bank of England would hardly have expected that one of the young bank clerks would have it officially said of him that his example of cheerfulness and resolution were beyond all praise, and that his personal example of courage had been such that it had won for him the Victoria Cross. Eugene Paul Bennett, a young Bank of England clerk, was a temporary lieutenant in the Worcestershire Regiment. He was a born soldier and leader, and this he proved in the position of peril in which he was placed in battle. He was in action and found that the first wave of an attack had suffered heavy casualties. Its commander was killed and the line was wavering; thereupon Bennett advanced at the head of the second wave and showed so much valour and resolution that he

reached his objective, though by that time he had but sixty men. He then found himself isolated with his small party, but his cheerful courage and resourcefulness never left him. He set to work at once to consolidate his position, though he was under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from both flanks. To add to his difficulties he was wounded, but he held bravely on, retaining his command, directing and controlling. His wonderful example saved a very dangerous situation, and the record said that "there is little doubt that but for his personal example of courage the attack would have been checked at the outset." Bennett was presented with a sword of honour by the Bank of England.

This award to the bank clerk was made known on the last day of the year 1916. It was accompanied by the announcement of the bestowal of a Cross on an officer who had distinguished himself in the old and gallant way of rescue. This recipient was Captain William Anderson Bloomfield, Scouts Corps, South African Mounted Brigade. Again there were points of similarity in cases in which the



CAPT. (TEMP. LIEUT.-COL.) B. C. FREYBERG,
Royal West Surrey Regt. and Royal Naval Division.

Cross had been awarded. Bloomfield was in an advanced and isolated position in which he was heavily attacked and some of his men were wounded. Finding that the enemy were working round his flanks, he evacuated his wounded, and subsequently withdrew his command to a new position, himself being amongst the last to retire. When he reached the new

position Bloomfield found that a wounded corporal, D. M. P. Bowker, had been left behind. The corporal was helpless; to reach him meant the crossing of more than 400 yards of open ground swept by heavy fire. To attempt a rescue was to risk almost certain death, but the captain took the risk. He started out. Machine gun and rifle rained their bullets on the ground around him, but he crossed the danger zone in safety and reached the corporal. He secured him and faced again the murderous fire. For the second time he escaped, and with his heavy burden he returned to safety. This exploit was essentially of the character of deeds for which in earlier years the Victoria Cross had been almost exclusively awarded.

Bombing and killing a party of ten of the enemy, amongst other exploits, while alone and single-handed, won the Cross for Private



(Daily Sketch.)

PRIVATE J. CUNNINGHAM,
East Yorks. Regt.

John Cunningham, a lad of nineteen years, of the East Yorkshire Regiment. After the enemy's front line had been captured Cunningham went up a communication trench with a bombing section, but desperate opposition soon



TEMP. LIEUT. E. P. BENNETT,
Worcestershire Regt.

reduced the rest of the section to casualties. Collecting all the bombs from the casualties, the fearless young soldier went on alone and hurled his bombs at the enemy until they were expended. Then he returned for a fresh supply, and with these he again proceeded to the communication trench, where he met a party of ten of the enemy. "These he killed and cleared the trench up to the enemy line."

Private Cunningham's achievement was made known in the middle of January, 1917, and at the same time there was published the little story of the act for which Private David Ross Lauder, Royal Scots Fusiliers, was awarded the Cross. Lauder's performance was one of those expressions of swiftness of thought and execution which had become peculiarly associated with the winning of the Cross. It was a mere trifle, an episode, in warfare; but it had in it all the intense thrill of the dramatic unexpected. When with a bombing party retaking a sap Lauder threw a bomb, which, however, failed to clear the parapet and fell amongst the bombing party. There was no time to smother the bomb and widespread death seemed certain, but Lauder instantly put his foot on the bomb. The explosion came and blew off the private's foot, but his splendid sacrifice saved the rest of the party, who were unhurt.

A member of a London publishing firm, Lance-Sergeant Frederick William Palmer, Royal Fusiliers, was awarded the Cross for his bravery, control, and determination. Palmer enlisted as a private, and served with dis-



SEC. LIEUT. F. W. PALMER.

tingtion in Gallipoli. His conduct in the field won for him the Military Medal, and he was Lance-Sergeant when he achieved the honour of the Cross. While some operations were in progress all the officers of his company were shot down, whereupon Palmer took command. Under point-blank machine-gun fire he cut his way through wire entanglements, rushed the enemy's trench with six men, and having dislodged the hostile machine-gun which had been hampering our advance, he established a block. The sergeant then collected detached men from other regiments, and for nearly three hours held the barricade against seven determined counter attacks, under an incessant barrage of bombs and rifle grenades. While temporarily absent, searching for more bombs, the enemy made an eighth counter attack, drove in Palmer's party, and threatened the defences of the whole flank. The sergeant had been blown off his feet by a bomb, and was greatly exhausted, yet he rallied his men, drove back the enemy, and maintained his position and averted what might have been a serious disaster. In addition to winning the Cross he was given a commission in his old regiment.

The posthumous heroes of the Cross included two officers whose story was one of those brave failures which in some respects are even more impressive than a glorious achievement. These

were Lieutenant Humphry Osbaldeston Brooke Firman, R.N., and Lieutenant-Commander Charles Henry Cowley, R.N.V.R., and their joint act of gallantry was performed in an attempt to re-provision the force which was besieged in Kut-el-Amara early in 1916. On the evening of April 24, at eight o'clock, the *Julnar*, with a crew from the Royal Navy under Firman, assisted by Cowley, left Fellahie in an attempt to reach Kut. The enterprise was of the most hazardous and desperate character, and all the officers and men who manned the little craft were volunteers. These were readily forthcoming, because the adventure was one that appealed with special force to British seamen. It was a case of running the gauntlet, of trying to rescue the perishing; it was a repetition of one of the many forlorn hopes to succour a sorely pressed and gallant British garrison beleaguered by a powerful



PRIVATE D. R. LAUDER,
Royal Scots Fusiliers.

enemy. The little army which was imprisoned in Kut was starving and urgently in need of such supplies as the *Julnar* carried, and she had on board no less than 270 tons. The departure of the little ship was covered by all the artillery and machine-gun fire that could be brought to bear for her help and protection,

with the object of distracting the enemy's attention. But the area of her operations on the river was narrowed and confined, and she was discovered by the Turks and furiously shelled as she steamed up the stream. There could be little doubt as to her fate in the hearts of the anxious friends who had seen her start



LIEUT. H. O. B. FIRMAN, R.N.
(River Tigris).

on her desperate but noble mission, and there was grief but not surprise when, at one o'clock next morning, General Townshend, who was in command at Kut, reported that the Julnar had not arrived, and that at midnight a burst of heavy firing, which had suddenly ceased, had been heard at Magasis, about $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles by river from Kut. There was no question that the bold venture had failed, and as a matter of fact next day the Air Service reported that the Julnar was in the hands of the Turks at Magasis. It was soon learned that the two officers had been killed, and that the rest of the crew, including five wounded, were prisoners of war. The gallant Firman had served in the Navy for about fourteen years, and had the Persian and Somaliland medals to his credit; and his brave brother officer, Cowley, had done uncommonly good work throughout the Mesopotamian Campaign in command of the *Medjidieh*. In reporting on the undertaking the General Officer Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," said he trusted that the services of the officers might be recognized by the posthumous grant of some suitable honour. On

January 31, 1917, it was announced that the Victoria Cross had been awarded to each of them.*

Even amongst the consistently splendid acts for which the Cross was given there were achievements of outstanding courage and endurance, and of such were the deeds of not a few of the posthumous recipients of the decoration. Nothing nobler could be imagined than the heroism of Sergeant Thomas Mottershead, R.F.C., who gave his life in saving his observer, "in France." While flying at an altitude of 9,000 feet the petrol tank was pierced and the machine set on fire. "Enveloped in flames," the official record stated, "which his observer, Lieutenant Gower, was unable to subdue, this very gallant soldier succeeded in bringing his aeroplane back to our lines, and though he made a successful landing, the machine collapsed on touching the ground, pinning him beneath wreckage from which he was subsequently rescued. Though suffering extreme torture from burns, Sergeant Mottershead showed the most conspicuous presence of mind in the careful selection of a landing place, and his wonderful endurance and fortitude undoubtedly saved the life of his observer." Mottershead died of his injuries. On February 12, 1917, it was announced that the King had awarded the Victoria Cross to him.

It was inevitable that in a war of such vastness and complexity there should be delay in ascertaining and making known the facts in connexion with some of the deeds of valour for which the Victoria Cross was awarded. Such a case was that of Commander Loftus William Jones, of H.M.S. *Shark*, torpedo-boat destroyer, who was killed in the Battle of Jutland on May 31, 1916, but whose posthumous Cross was not announced by the Admiralty until March 6, 1917. His proved to be one of the most moving and noble of all the splendid acts of the war for which honours had been given; it stood out as a glorious achievement even amongst unsurpassed performances of officers and men of the Navy. During that memorable fight, in the afternoon Commander Loftus Jones led a division of destroyers to attack the German battle-cruiser squadron. A shell hit the *Shark's* bridge and put the steering-gear out of order. Very soon afterwards another shell disabled the main engines and left the

* The operations in connexion with the advance towards Baghdad are fully described in Chapter CLVIII. (Vol. X.)

vessel helpless. The commanding officer of another destroyer, seeing the Shark's plight, came between her and the enemy and offered help, but he was warned by Loftus Jones not to risk being almost certainly sunk in trying to assist him. Loftus Jones had been wounded

then went to the midship and only remaining gun and personally helped to keep it in action. All this time the shattered destroyer was under very heavy short-range fire from enemy light cruisers and destroyers. The gun's crew of the midship gun was reduced to three, and of that



MRS. MOTTERSHEAD RECEIVES FROM THE KING THE V.C. WON BY HER HUSBAND, SERGEANT THOMAS MOTTERSHEAD, R.F.C.

in the leg, but he went aft to help to connect and man the after wheel. Already the fore-castle gun and its crew had been blown away, and very soon the after gun and crew were destroyed in the same way. The commander

valiant trio one, an able seaman, was badly wounded in the leg. Soon after he had reached the midship gun the commander had a leg shot away above the knee by a shell, but in spite of this terrible wound he continued to give

orders to his little band, while a chief stoker improvised a tourniquet round his thigh. The commander maintained a wonderful courage and calmness, so much so that, noticing that the ensign was not properly hoisted, he ordered another to be hoisted. He now realized that the ship could not survive much longer, and as a German destroyer was closing he ordered the few survivors to put on lifebelts. Scarcely had this been done when the Shark was torpedoed and sank. The survivors were picked up



[Lafayette.

COMMANDER LOFTUS W. JONES, R.N.
(H.M.S. Shark, Jutland).

during the night by a neutral vessel, but they did not include the officer who had so valiantly tried to save his little ship. The Distinguished Service Medal was awarded to the survivors of the Shark for their services during the action. These heroic men were:—Stoker P.O. Charles Filleul, A.B. Charles Cleeborg Hope, A.B. Charles Herbert Smith, A.B. Joseph Owen Glendower Howell, Stoker 1st Class Thomas Wilton Swan, and P.O. William Charles Richard Griffin. The award to Petty Officer Griffin had been already gazetted.

Four Crosses were awarded for the battle of Jutland—those to Loftus Jones and Boy Cornwell (Cornwell's case will be dealt with presently): one to Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, and one to Major F. J. W.

Harvey, R.M.L.I. A striking circumstance in connexion with these honours was that three were posthumous. The survivor was Commander Bingham, who was decorated for "the extremely gallant way" in which, in the destroyer Nestor, he led his division in their attack, first on enemy destroyers and then on their battle-cruisers. The officer finally sighted the enemy battle fleet, and, followed by the one remaining destroyer of his division, the Nicator, he, "with dauntless courage," closed to within 3,000 yards of the enemy, in order to attain a favourable position for firing the torpedoes. During this attack the Nestor and the Nicator were under concentrated fire of the secondary batteries of the High Sea Fleet. The Nestor was subsequently sunk. At first reported killed, it was afterwards officially announced that the commander was a prisoner of war in Germany. Harvey was mortally wounded, and almost the only survivor after the explosion of an enemy shell in "Q" gun-house; yet while in this state he had presence of mind enough to order the magazine to be flooded. This cool, courageous conduct and devotion to duty saved the ship. Soon after performing this splendid act Harvey died.

Nearly two years passed before a striking sequel was officially announced to the award of three Victoria Crosses to a captain, a sergeant and a private of the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, in connexion with the landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula. In Chapter CLII. it was stated:—

The right of selection which is authorized by the Victoria Cross Warrants was exercised in connexion with the performance of many officers and men of the 1st Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers on April 25, 1915. Three companies and the headquarters, while landing at Gallipoli, to the west of Cape Helles, were met by a very deadly fire from hidden machine guns which caused a great number of casualties. The survivors rushed up and cut the wire entanglements, in spite of a terrific fire from the enemy, and, after "supreme difficulties," the cliffs were gained and the position maintained. This was one of the cases in which many men perform many acts of valour, when, indeed, all participants deserve the decoration of the Cross. Not all, however, could have the distinction awarded to them, and accordingly it was left to the survivors to select the recipients, and their choice fell on a gallant trio composed of Captain Richard Raymond Willis, Sergeant Alfred Richards and Private William Keneally, all of the 1st Battalion of the fine old 20th Regiment of Foot.

These awards were made known in the *London Gazette* of August 24, 1915; on March 15, 1917, it was officially announced that the Victoria Cross had been awarded to Captain (temporary Major) Cuthbert Bromley (since drowned), Sergeant Frank Edward Stubbs



MAJOR F. J. W. HARVEY, R.M.L.I.

(since died of wounds) and Corporal (now Sergeant) John Grimshaw, 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, in connexion with the operations on April 25, 1915. The wording of the last-named awards was almost identical with that of the awards to Willis, Richards and Keneally, and Bromley, Stubbs and Grimshaw were also selected by their comrades as having performed the most signal acts of bravery and devotion to duty during the landing. The gallant Bromley's fate was tragic. After the landing he was wounded and sent to Alexandria. He returned to Gallipoli and was again wounded. He had recovered and was on his way back to rejoin his division when he was drowned in the loss of the Royal Edward on August 14, 1915. An interesting incident was a note accompanying the announcement of March 15 stating that consequent on the award of the Victoria Cross the award of the Distinguished Conduct Medal to Grimshaw, which was gazetted on November 16, 1915, was cancelled.

A high tribute to Bromley as a comrade and leader was paid by a correspondent in *The Times* of March 26, 1917. Of Bromley, who was the eldest son of Sir John Bromley, of Sutton Corner, Seaford, he said :

It was the wonderful spirit fostered by Bromley during years of *cameraderie* and fine example in the regiment which brought success at Cape Helles on the early morning of April 25, 1915. His personal influence was immeasurable. He had made the Lancashire Fusiliers the champions in all India in military training, boxing, football, and cross-country running. Those men who followed him ashore under hellish fire had true discipline. . . . Half the battalion won through that morning. The others died or fell wounded in the boats, in the water, on the beach, on the cliffs, or on the high ground gained and held while reinforcements were landed to push the

advantage won. Three days later, on April 28, when the brigade major of the 86th Brigade led the attack on the Krithia Wood, Bromley went forward with him. Another brigade had had to withdraw; Bromley and the men who loved him went forward and won. When the successful survivors reorganized under cover, Bromley went forward to reconnoitre with the brigade major and three other ranks up to the ground rising to the outskirts of Krithia itself, when he was wounded in the knee. He was got back by Sergeant Burtchell, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and his wound was dressed; it was then discovered that he had also a bullet in his back which he had received three days before and never spoken of except to the man who had bandaged the wound. Before his wounds were healed Bromley was back, and found himself in command of the battalion, fresh from the fierce fighting of June 4. How he was welcomed! . . . Then came June 28. The battalion was ordered to leave its trenches in daylight and attack across the open. Bromley led it. He was hit in the foot just over the parapet. Two stretcher-bearers—bandsmen, only lately band boys—jumped to him. He made them carry him on to direct the attack, and, when it failed, against all chances he was carried back alive. Only ten of the original battalion were left unwounded. The wound was serious and Bromley was sent to Alexandria. When able to hobble he begged his way on board the Royal Edward to come back to the Peninsula. She was torpedoed, and it was like Bromley to stay on board and go down with her while any men remained unplaced in the boats. Fine swimmer as he was—he had once swum from Gozo to Malta—he was drowned before he could be picked up; it is believed that he was struck by a piece of wreckage. Thus he died; to live now in the memory of England, placed among the great men who have deserved, and won, the Cross of a soldier's self-sacrifice.

So wrote of the fallen hero one who knew him well. It was a splendid tribute, and conveyed an understanding of the conquering spirit of the successors of the men who at Minden in



[Swaine.]
COMMANDER THE HON. E. B. S.
BINGHAM, R.N.



CORP. (NOW SERGT.)
GRIMSHAW,
Lancashire Fusiliers.



SERGT. F. E. STUBBS,
Lancashire Fusiliers.



CAPT. (TEMP. MAJOR)
BROMLEY, C.B.,
Lancashire Fusiliers.

1759 repulsed every charge of the enemy. That was the battle in which the regiment was posted near some gardens and took roses to decorate their hats; and thus adorned, on August 1, they went on fighting and won the honour of "Minden" for their colours and the name of "The Minden Boys" for themselves. The tribute was one which applied not only to Bromley, but also to his brave companions; it showed how right was the principle adopted of letting the battalion itself choose the recipients of the Cross—yet when all were so distinguished it was hard to make a choice.

"For most conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice" the Cross was awarded to Second Lieutenant George E. Cates, Rifle Brigade. Cates's deed was remarkable because it was almost precisely a repetition of one or two specially



SEC. LIEUT. G. E. CATES,
Rifle Brigade.

cool, self-sacrificing acts for which the Cross had been given. He was engaged with some other men in deepening a captured trench when, with his spade, he struck a buried bomb. The bomb immediately began to burn, where upon Cates, with the noble purpose of saving the lives of his comrades, unhesitatingly placed his foot on the bomb. There was an almost instant explosion, and Cates was killed; but his swift decision and resolute courage saved the lives of others.

What was spoken of at the time as a "mystery V.C." was awarded to Commander Gordon Campbell, D.S.O., R.N. The first intimation that this officer had received the honour was in the announcement, in the *Court Circular* on March 8, 1917, that the King conferred the Victoria Cross on Commander Gordon Campbell at Buckingham Palace on the previous day. It was not until April 21 that the *Gazette* announced that the Cross had been granted to the commander, "In recognition of his conspicuous gallantry, consummate coolness, and skill in command of one of H.M. ships in action." That was the full story; those were the only details that were made public, and this circumstance, in connexion with the fact that the officer received the Cross before it was actually gazetted, invested the case with an air of mystery to which public attention was drawn; but any curiosity that was, naturally enough, aroused was not gratified. Commander Campbell had been appointed to the D.S.O. on March 31, 1916.

"Wonderful work" was the official description of an act for which an Overseas officer was awarded the Cross, the announcement

being made on March 10, 1917. This recipient was Captain Henry William Murray, Australian Infantry,* whose conduct had already gained for him the D.S.O. Commanding the right flank company in an attack, his skill and courage resulted in the position being quickly



CAPT. H. W. MURRAY, D.S.O.,
Australian Infantry.

captured. Very severe fighting followed, and three heavy counter-attacks were beaten off, "these successes being due to Captain Murray's wonderful work." The company throughout the night suffered heavy casualties through concentrated enemy shell fire, and once the gallant band was forced to give ground for a short way; but Murray rallied his command and saved the situation by "sheer valour." He encouraged his men, he headed bombing parties, he led bayonet charges and he carried wounded men to safe places; he was from first to last a glorious example and a constant inspiration, and the case was one of the by no means small number afforded by the war of a British fighter performing a series of valorous acts for which the Cross was given. Gazetted


* On June 2, 1917, in Hyde Park, the King held his first public Investiture, when 351 war decorations were bestowed. These included eleven Victoria Crosses, as follows:—The D.S.O. and bar and the V.C., Major Murray; the V.C. and the M.C., Captain Allen, R.A.M.C.; the V.C. and the Military Medal, Sec. Lt. Palmer, Royal Fusiliers; the V.C., Lt.-Col. Bradford, Durham Light Infantry; Captain White, Yorkshire Regiment; Private Cunningham, East Yorkshire Regiment; Private Hughes Connaught Rangers. Next-of-kin received the Crosses which had been awarded to Sec. Lt. Geo. Cates, Rifle Brigade; Sergeant Erskine, Scottish Rifles; Sergeant Mottershead, R.F.C. and Pte. Fynn, South Wales Borderers.

also on March 10 was the award to Sergeant Edward John Mott, of the Border Regiment. His was another of those rousing instances of a man tenaciously enduring notwithstanding heavy wounds and utmost peril. During an attack the sergeant's company was held up at a strong point by machine-gun fire. Mott had been severely wounded in the eye, but despite this heavy handicap he rushed at the gun. There was a fierce struggle between him and the gunner, but the unequal contest ended in the capture of both gun and gunner. This exploit was not all that went to the credit of the Border sergeant that day, for it was owing to his dash and enterprise that the left flank attack succeeded.



[Swain.]
COMMANDER GORDON CAMPBELL,
D.S.O., R.N.

In the earlier days of the war, before the mind of the public had become numbed by the vastness of the naval and military operations, and when comparatively small events aroused a thrill, there were doings on land and sea and in the air which roused the public to something like extravagance of enthusiasm. Such a display of feeling took place in connexion with the exploit of Michael O'Leary; yet later, more than once, when acts as remarkable were



PRESENTATION OF DECORATIONS BY THE KING, HYDE PARK, JUNE 2 1917.

gazetted as having been rewarded with the Cross, their heroic achievers remained unknown, even by name, to the vast majority of people. There had to be outstanding features in a case to impress it on the public mind, and two such instances arose in connexion with the battle of Jutland and the destruction of a German airship at Cuffley. These events added to the roll of fame the names of John Travers Cornwell and William Leefe Robinson. Cornwell's story rang throughout the Empire. He was only a boy, under sixteen and a half years of age; yet no record of the Cross was more impressive than that of his behaviour in the Jutland battle: mortally wounded early in the action, he remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders, until the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him. Some time elapsed before the steadfast courage of the boy was made known. Meanwhile he had been brought ashore, he had died at Grimsby of his wounds, and through one of the stupid blunders which are inseparable from officialdom he had been buried in what was no better than a pauper's grave. No sooner was the truth known of the lad's last hours of life and the manner of his death than public opinion demanded a befitting reinterment. Accordingly the body was exhumed, and there was an impressive funeral in Manor Park Cemetery. A few months afterwards the boy's father, Eli Cornwell, who had joined the Army, was buried in the same grave.

Jack Cornwell represented the great class which had done so well throughout the war; he had not been long away from an elementary school, and, rightly enough, steps were promptly taken to ensure the driving home of the splendid lesson of duty and patriotism that he had taught. A committee was formed to organize a national memorial, and early in February, 1917, that body were able to report that up to date they had received remittances from 28,400 schools and 485 individual subscribers, amounting to £21,849 13s. 11½d. A picture of the boy standing by his gun, with Admiral Sir David Beatty's report of the incident, occupied a position of honour in more than 12,000 schools. At Buckingham Palace, on February 9, 1917, the Queen received the members of the Jack Cornwell Memorial Fund Committee, who presented to her the first instalment of the proceeds of the appeal. Admiral Lord Beresford presented an

address explaining the objects of the fund and the means adopted to carry them out. One form of the memorial was a contribution of £18,000 collected in the schools and by scholars of the United Kingdom to the "Star and Garter" Fund, and it was proposed as another part of the scheme to place a portrait of Cornwell in each of the contributing schools. In accepting a cheque for £18,000, the Queen said: "I am glad to know that in every school where the scholars have contributed to this memorial a picture of Jack Cornwell will be placed, which will serve to remind future generations of scholars in those schools of the lasting glory that attaches to the performance of duty."

On March 23, 1917, a large company witnessed at the Mansion House the presentation to the Board of Admiralty of Mr. Frank O. Salisbury's picture, "John Cornwell, V.C., on H.M.S. Chester." Sir Edward Carson, the First Lord, received the picture on behalf of the Admiralty. The picture showed the lad standing by the side of a gun, which had just been fired. The inscription gave the official details of Cornwell's act. The artist unveiled the picture, and in formally presenting it to the Admiralty, said that the studies were taken on board the Chester. Cornwell's brother sat for the portrait. The captain, on being asked for a title for the picture, replied that he knew of none which was more appropriate than this: "Thou hast set my feet in a large place." In accepting the gift on behalf of the Admiralty, Sir Edward Carson paid a high tribute to the dead lad's courage and example. "I ask people who grumble," he said, "if they ever heard the story of John Travers Cornwell. . . . I feel that this boy, who died at the post of duty, sends this message through me as First Lord of the Admiralty for the moment to the people of the Empire: 'Obey your orders, cling to your post, don't grumble, stick it out.'" Dr. Macnamara, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Board, intimated that the picture would first of all pass into the keeping of the Admiralty and in due course it would go to the Devonport training establishment. The Mansion House ceremony was attended by the young hero's mother.

Never in the history of the Cross had there been anything to compare with the act for which the honour was awarded to the young flying officer William Leefe-Robinson. Vast crowds of English people saw the terrible doom

of a raiding airship at Cuffley, near Enfield, very early on the morning of Sunday, September 3, 1916. It was quickly known that the airship had been attacked from an aeroplane by Lieut. William Leefe Robinson, Worcestershire Regiment and Royal Flying Corps, who, in spite of great difficulties and danger, "sent it crashing to the ground as a flaming wreck." Robinson had been in the air for more than two hours, and had previously attacked another airship during his flight. Extraordinary interest was shown in the fact that a Victoria Cross had been won actually in England. Monetary and other rewards fell to the intrepid airman's lot and he was given promotion. Deep interest in him was renewed in April, 1917, when it was officially reported that Flight-Commander Robinson, V.C., was "missing." On April 13, a week after he was reported missing, a Berlin official telegram announced that the flight-commander was shot down on April 6 by a German battle airman; later it was reported that his assailant had been killed, and finally it became known that Robinson was a prisoner in the hands of the Germans.

War's inexorable call required that men who had faced death against overwhelming odds and had survived to win great glory should return to zones of danger. They went, and in not a few cases lost their lives in battle. Few details were given as to the manner of their end. "News has been received that Private Henry Fynn, V.C., South Wales Borderers, of Bodmin, has died of wounds received in action." So ran the published reports on April 9, 1917, of a hero's end, and that brevity was representative. A few days later *The Times*, under the heading, "Two V.C.'s Killed," very briefly announced the death in action of Drum-Major Kenry, Gordon Highlanders, and Sergeant John Erskine, Scottish Rifles. The very curtness and colourlessness of the intimations emphasized the vastness of the war's operations.

Just as in the earlier history of the Cross there were famous episodes like those at Lucknow for which the honour was awarded, in later years such deeds as the defence of Rorko's Drift and the saving of the guns at Maiwand, so in the Great War, with the immortal Regulars, there were the achievements of Bradbury, of the horse gunners, and Michael O'Leary, of the Irish Guards, and with the New Army such acts as that of

Trooper Potts, of the Yeomanry. But there stood out conspicuously the valour of the lonely airman who sent down a German airship and her crew in flames to English soil, of the dying commander who fought his shattered destroyer to the end, and, more than all, because he was so little more than a child, the steadfast courage and inflexible obedience to duty of John Travers Cornwell, who, mortally wounded, stood in noble isolation till the battle ended.

The following is a list of the Victoria Crosses the award of which was made known between August, 1916, and March, 1917:

- Addison, Rev. W. R. F., Temp. Chaplain to the Forces, 4th Class, Army Chaplains' Dept.
 Adlam, Temp. Sec. Lieut. T. E., Bedfordshire Regt.
 Allen, Capt. W. B. A., M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C.
 Batten-Pooll, Lieut. A. H., Royal Munster Fusiliers.
 Baxter, Sec. Lieut. E. F., Liverpool Regt.
 Bell, Temp. Sec. Lieut. D. S., Yorkshire Regt.
 Bell, Temp. Capt. E. N. F., Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
 Bennett, Temp. Lieut. E. P., Worcestershire Regt.
 Bingham, Com. the Hon. E. B. S., R.N.
 Blackburn, Sec. Lieut. A. S., Australian Infantry.
 Bloomfield, Capt. W. A., Scouts Corps, South African Mounted Brigade.
 Boulter, Sergt. W. E., Northamptonshire Regt.
 Bradford, Lieut. (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) R. B., M.C., Durham Light Infantry.
 Bromley, Capt. (Temp. Major) C., Lancashire Fusiliers.
 Buchanan, Lieut. (Temp. Capt) A. B., South Wales Borderers.
 Campbell, Com. G., D.S.O., R.N.
 Campbell, Major and Brevet Lieut.-Col. (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) J. V., D.S.O., Coldstream Guards.
 Carter, Co.-Sergt.-Major N. V., Royal Sussex Regt.
 Carton de Wiart, Capt. (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) A., D.S.O., Dragoon Guards.
 Castleton, Sergt. C. C., Australian Machine Gun Corps.
 Cates, Sec. Lieut. G. E., Rifle Brigade.
 Cather, Temp. Lieut. G. St. G. S., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
 Chafer, Pte. G. W., East Yorkshire Regt.
 Chavasse, Capt. N. G., M.C., M.B., R.A.M.C.



BOY (FIRST CLASS) JOHN TRAVERS CORNWELL.
Painted for the Admiralty by Frank O. Salisbury.

*[From the print issued by the Fine Arts
Publishing Company on behalf of
the John Cornwell Memorial Fund.]*

- Clarke, Pte. (acting Corpl.) L., Canadian Infantry.
- Congreve, Brevet Major W. La T., D.S.O., M.C., Rifle Brigade.
- Cooke, Pte. T., Australian Infantry.
- Cornwell, J. T., Boy, First Class, R.N.
- Coury, Sec. Lieut. G. G., South Lancashire Regt.
- Cowley, Lieut.-Com. C. H., R.N.V.R.
- Cunningham, Pte. J., East Yorkshire Regt.
- Davies, Corpl. J., R. Welsh Fusiliers.
- Downie, Sergt. R., Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
- Edwards, Pte. F. J., Middlesex Regt.
- Erskine, Acting Sergt. J., Scottish Rifles, T.F.
- Faulds, Pte. W. F., South African Infantry.
- Firman, Lieut. H. O. B., R.N.
- Freyberg, Capt. (Temp. Lieut.-Col.) B. C., D.S.O., Royal West Surrey Regt. and Royal Naval Division.
- Fynn, Pte. J. H., South Wales Borderers.
- Gill, Sergt. A., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
- Green, Capt. J. L., R.A.M.C.
- Grimshaw, Corpl. (now Sergt.), J., Lancashire Fusiliers.
- Hackett, Sapper W., Royal Engineers.
- Harvey, Major F. J. W., R.M.L.I.
- Hill, Pte. A., Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
- Holland, Lieut. J. V., Leinster Regt.
- Hughes, Pte. T., Connaught Rangers.
- Hutchinson, Pte. J., Lancashire Fusiliers.
- Jackson, Pte. W., Australian Infantry.
- Jones, Sergt. D., Liverpool Regt.
- Jones, Com. Loftus W., R.N.
- Jones, Lieut. R. B. B., Loyal North Lancashire Regt.
- Jones, Pte. T. A., Cheshire Regt.
- Kelly, Temp. Sec. Lieut. H., West Riding Regt.
- Kerr, Pte. J. C., Canadian Infantry.
- Khan, Naik Shahamad, Punjabis.
- Lauder, Pte. D. R., Royal Scots Fusiliers.
- Leak, Pte. J., Australian Infantry.
- Lewis, Pte. H. W., Welsh Regt.
- Loudoun-Shand, Temp. Major S. W., Yorkshire Regt.
- McFadzean, Pte. W. F., Royal Irish Rifles.
- McNess, Lce.-Sergt. F., Scots Guards.
- Miller, Pte. J., Royal Lancaster Regt.
- Mott, Sergt. E. J., Border Regt.
- Mottershead, Sergt. T., R.F.C.
- Murray, Capt. H. W., D.S.O., Australian Infantry.
- Myles, Sec. Lieut. E. K., Welsh Regt.
- O'Meara, Pte. M., Australian Infantry.
- Palmer, Sec. Lieut. F. W., Royal Fusiliers.
- Proctor, Pte. A. H., Liverpool Regt., T.F.
- Quigg, Pte. R., Royal Irish Rifles.
- Rees, Capt. (Temp. Major) L. W. B., Royal Artillery and R.F.C.
- Ritchie, Drummer W., Seaforth Highlanders.
- Robinson, Lieut. W. L., Worcestershire Regt. and R.F.C.
- Ryder, Pte. R., Middlesex Regt.
- Sanders, Corpl. G., West Yorkshire Regt.
- Short, Pte. W., Yorkshire Regt.
- Stringer, Pte. G., Manchester Regt.
- Stubbs, Sergt. F. E., Lancashire Fusiliers.
- Turnbull, Sergt. J. Y., Highland Light Infantry.
- Turrall, Pte. T. G., Worcestershire Regt.
- Veale, Pte. T. W. H., Devonshire Regt.
- Ware, Corpl. S. W., Seaforth Highlanders.
- White, Temp. Capt. A. C. T., Yorkshire Regt.
- Wilkinson, Temp. Lt. T. O. L., North Lancashire Regt.



CHAPTER CLXXXVI.

THE EVOLUTION OF NAVAL ENGINEERING.

BEGINNINGS OF STEAM IN THE NAVY—PADDLE WHEEL AND SCREW PROPELLER—SURFACE CONDENSERS—INCREASING STEAM PRESSURES—DOUBLE AND TRIPLE EXPANSION ENGINES—WATER-TUBE BOILERS—INVENTION OF PARSONS' STEAM TURBINE—THE TURBINIA—GENERAL ADOPTION OF THE TURBINE—ADVANTAGES OF GEARED TURBINES—FORMS OF GEARING, MECHANICAL, HYDRAULIC AND ELECTRICAL—COAL AND OIL FUEL—FORCED DRAUGHT—OIL-FIRED FURNACES—INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES—POSSIBILITY OF APPLICATION TO LARGE SHIPS—TRAINING OF NAVAL ENGINEERS—THE SELBORNE-FISHER SCHEME—COMMON ENTRY—THE ENGINE ROOM DEPARTMENTS IN ACTION.

IN the present chapter it is proposed to give an account of the engineering factors which made the ships of the British Navy, regarded as moving units, not as fighting machines, what they were at the opening of the Great War. Among these factors three were of outstanding importance on the material side, at least in the progress of the preceding 25 or 30 years: the adoption of water-tube boilers, the introduction of the steam turbine, and the use of oil fuel, whether for raising steam in boilers or for the direct production of power in internal combustion engines. But, important as they were, they must be looked upon as merely the later stages of the constant and never-ending struggle for more power with less weight of machinery and fuel which had been going on ever since mechanical propulsion was brought into the Navy, and the changes that preceded them, though perhaps dwarfed by the distance from which they must be viewed, were not less momentous in their own day.

It is interesting to note that the three great changes referred to above must all be associated with the name of Lord Fisher, for he was at the Admiralty, with the exception of an interval of a few years, throughout the period

in which they were brought about. They were also all initiated during the term of office as Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet of Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir A. J. Durston, who was appointed in 1889. Durston's principal assistant for many years before his retirement in 1907 was Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir Henry J. Oram, who had a large share in the work, and actively extended and developed it, after succeeding him as head of the engineering department of the Navy, especially by the adoption of mechanical gearing in conjunction with the turbine. Indeed, it has been said that during the ten years Sir Henry Oram held office—he retired in June, 1917, a few months after the death of his predecessor—greater progress had been made in naval machinery than in the preceding 50 years. He was succeeded by Engineer Vice-Admiral G. G. Goodwin, who as Deputy Engineer-in-Chief had been associated with him throughout his term of office.

In 1914 the Navy's experience of steam was less than a century old. It was in 1820, eight years after Henry Bell's *Comet*, which began to ply on the Clyde in 1812, had demonstrated the commercial possibilities of the steamboat, that the Admiralty had built for



H.M.S. "DEVASTATION," 1873.
The first British Battleship without Sails.

them at Rotherhithe the *Monkey*, of 210 tons displacement, with Boulton & Watt engines of 80 nominal horse power. In succeeding years she was followed by sundry vessels more or less similar, but they were not, strictly speaking, warships, being used for towing and general purposes. The paddle wheels by which they were propelled were, indeed, not well suited to naval purposes. The wheels themselves were exposed to damage by the enemy's fire, it was impossible to protect the shafting and other machinery by which they were driven by placing it all below the water line, and the paddle-wheel boxes offered difficulties in connexion with the working of the guns. Nor did the paddle wheel lend itself to the application of high powers, though this objection was of little weight in the early days when the pressure of steam used was only 4 lb. per square inch and high powers were not available. Paddle-wheel warships of considerable size were, indeed, ultimately built—in the middle of the century the *Terrible*, a paddle-wheel steam frigate (cruiser), had a displacement of about 3,000 tons with engines that developed nearly 2,000 indicated horse power—but steam did not come into its own in the Navy until the merits of the screw propeller were recognized. Even then it was a good many years before sail was completely ousted. The ill-fated *Captain*, which was launched in 1869 and capsized in the Bay of Biscay in the following year, was fully rigged, with tripod masts and a large spread of sail, and

the first sea-going battleship in the British Navy to depend wholly on steam for propulsion was the *Devastation*, of 9,060 tons, the building of which was begun in 1869.

The screw propeller reached the stage of practical test in the thirties, in the hands of F. P. Smith and Captain John Eriesson. In 1840 the Admiralty carried out trials with the




[Elliott & Fry.
ENGINEER VICE-ADMIRAL SIR A. J.
DURSTON,
Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet, 1889-1907.




ENGINEER VICE-ADMIRAL SIR H. J. ORAM,
Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet, 1907-1917.

Archimedes, which had been built in 1838, by private enterprise, to demonstrate the advantages of the system; but although the results were sufficiently favourable to induce Brunel, after further experiments of his own, to modify the design of his Great Britain and employ a screw propeller instead of paddle wheels, as he originally intended, they did not move the authorities to action. The force of public opinion, however, caused the question to be reopened a few years later, and in 1845 the Admiralty pitted the Rattler, of 880 tons and 200 horse power, fitted with a screw, against the Alecto, of the same size and power, but fitted with paddle wheels. At sea the Rattler proved the faster, but perhaps the most convincing test was when the two vessels, fastened stern to stern, both steamed ahead at full power, and the Alecto was hauled backwards at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots. More experiments were made between the screw steamer Niger and the paddle-wheel steamer Basilisk in 1849. In the result the superiority of the screw was so thoroughly vindicated that the paddle wheel was discarded, and by the time of the Crimean



AN OLD TYPE OF ENGINE WITH SIDE LEVER FOR PADDLE-WHEEL SHIPS.
A favourite type from 1820 to 1860.



OSCILLATING ENGINES FOR PADDLE-WHEEL STEAMER.

War the British Fleet contained screw vessels of all classes.

The screw as compared with the paddle wheel has the advantage of being protected from shot and shell by the water in which it is immersed, while the machinery by which it is driven is placed low down in the ship, the upper decks being thus left clear for the guns, and if it is not entirely below the water line it can be readily protected by armour. Moreover, it permits the employment of large powers, which concurrently with its adoption were becoming available through improvements partly in the boilers and partly in the engines.

In the early boilers the heat was transferred to the water from the furnace gases during their passage through a single flue, but in 1840-50 tubular boilers came into use in which the single flue was as it were split up into a number of smaller tubes, thus increasing the extent of the heating surface. This construction was more compact and weighed less, and it enabled the steam pressure to be raised to 14 or 15 lb. per square inch above atmosphere. In the next two decades the steam pressure was brought up to 30 or 35 lb. per square inch, and this increase was accompanied by, and its extension rendered possible on account of, an important change in the method


of condensing the exhaust steam after it had done its work in the cylinder. In the old engines this steam was cooled and condensed by being brought into contact with jets of sea water. The condensate thus formed was nearly as salt as sea water, and while it could be used as feed water to the boilers when the steam pressures and therefore the temperature of the water in the boilers were fairly low, the case was different at pressures above 35 lb. per square inch, because at temperatures corresponding to such pressures the salts in sea water begin to be deposited and form an injurious scale in the interior of the boilers. An expedient which had been suggested in the 'thirties was therefore adopted, and the cooling water was kept separate from the exhaust steam. For this purpose either the steam was passed through a series of tubes round the outside of which cold sea water was circulated, or the water was passed through the tubes and the steam circulated outside them. The result of this method of "surface condensation" was that the condensed steam was kept free from contamination by sea water, and could safely be returned to the boilers.

The obstacle which jet-condensation presented to the use of higher pressures being

thus removed, stronger forms of boiler were devised to enable them to be realized in practice, and rectangular or box boilers, not being strong enough for pressures exceeding about 40 lb. per square inch, gave way to various forms of cylindrical boiler, the pressures in which were carried up to 180 lb. per square inch. This brings the development of boiler pressure down to about the year 1889, which forms a convenient stopping point, since it not only stands on the verge of a new era in steam

generation for the British Navy, marked by the adoption of water-tube boilers, but also saw the passing of the Naval Defence Act, which effected an enormous increase in the strength of the British Fleet.


To return to the development of the engines, those first used with the screw propeller were of the same type as had latterly been employed with the paddle wheel. The earliest paddle-wheel engines were of the side-lever or beam type, but they gave place to direct-acting



FOUR-CYLINDER "MAUDSLAY" ENGINES OF H.M.S. "DEVASTATION" OF 1844.

This was a wooden paddle frigate with engines of the twin-cylinder type arranged in pairs and working on two cranks at right angles.

designs, such as Penn's "oscillating" engine, and the Maudslay "double cylinder" type. In the former the cylinder swung on hollow trunnions, through which the steam passed. In the latter there were two cylinders placed vertically side by side on the floor of the ship and working a single crosshead, an extension of which passed down between the two cylinders. The connecting rod was attached to the bottom of this extension, the object of the arrangement being to give it sufficient length.




SECTION OF TRUNK ENGINE.

The screw needed a faster rate of rotation than the paddle wheel, and to enable the slow-running paddle-wheel engines to meet this condition the engineers of the day preferred to have recourse to mechanical gearing rather than to risk experiments with engines having a higher speed of revolution. A large toothed wheel was therefore mounted on the engine shaft and arranged to work into a smaller toothed wheel or pinion carried on the screw shaft. The teeth were in several rows and staggered, those of the large wheel being made of some tough wood inserted in the periphery, while those of the pinion, which were cast, were of iron.

This arrangement, which forms an interesting anticipation of that adopted later with the turbine, though in that case the purpose was to reduce the rate of revolution of the propeller shaft, not to increase it, was continued until about 1860, when with the aid of the higher boiler pressures which had then become available engines were constructed to run at sufficiently high speeds to enable them to drive the screw shaft directly. Differing from the paddle-wheel engines, the cylinders of which were placed either vertically on the bottom of the ship or in an inclined diagonal position, these were arranged horizontally. Space being limited transversely across the beam of the ship, various devices were adopted in order to get a sufficient length of connecting rod. Thus the Maudslay "return connecting rod" engine had double piston rods, one

above and the other below the crank shaft, communicating with crossheads and guides fitted on the opposite side of the crank to that of the cylinder. In the Penn "trunk" engine the piston had attached to it a hollow trunk working through a steam-tight stuffing box in the end of the cylinder and the connecting rod was attached to a gudgeon pin in its centre, the arrangement being in fact similar to that followed subsequently in the motor-car engine. Later, when twin-screws came into vogue, the Humphreys direct-acting horizontal type, with the connecting rod between the cylinder and the crank, became the standard type.

The next great change in the arrangement of the engines was the introduction of the inverted vertical type, with the cylinders placed above the shaft. This type, which eventually became universal in all screw steamers not driven by turbines, was adopted for large naval ships in 1885, though the horizontal engine was retained in sloops and gun boats for a few years longer. Its advantages had long commended it to the mercantile marine, but the naval engineer hesitated in adopting it because it could not, as could the horizontal type, be placed entirely below the water line. However, this difficulty of protection was got over by the aid of armour and by carrying the coal bunkers round the engine room, so that a projectile would have to pass through a mass of coal



HORIZONTAL ENGINES OF H.M. ARMOUR-CLAD SHIP "VALIANT," 1862.


These engines had return connecting rods, the two piston rods of each cylinder being placed one above and the other below the crank axle.

before it could reach any portion of the engines that projected above the water line.

Meantime, again as a result of the higher steam pressures obtained through the adoption of the surface condenser and improvements in boiler construction, another great innovation was introduced in the shape of compound or double expansion engines. These were generally adopted in naval vessels, between 1870 and 1885, but again it cannot be said that the Admiralty showed unseemly haste in taking

advantage of the innovation, for it had been successfully applied to marine purposes by John Elder in 1854. The steam pressure at first used with it in the Navy was 60 lb. per square inch, but gradually rose to 90 lb. about 1880 and finally to 120 lb. The principle consisted in dividing the expansion of the steam, and therefore the work it did, between two cylinders, instead of completing it in one. Sometimes the smaller or high pressure cylinder in which the first portion of the expansion took place was arranged in tandem with the larger or

triple expansion, in which the expansion of the steam was effected in three stages, and even to quadruple expansion, with four stages, though the latter was not employed to any extent in the Navy. Triple expansion was tried in 1874 by Dr. A. C. Kirk in the *Protonis*, but the experiment was marred by the unsatisfactory behaviour of the boilers. Kirk was more successful in a second attempt in 1881 with the *Aberdeen*, employing a pressure of 125 lb., and in 1885 triple expansion engines began to be fitted in new ships for the Navy. The steam



HORIZONTAL ENGINES OF H.M.S. "AJAX, 1848."

These were the first direct-acting screw engines fitted in the British Navy. The illustration is an end view, showing the two cranks at right angles.

low pressure cylinder in which the expansion was completed, the two pistons being carried on one rod; but more generally the two cylinders were placed side by side. There were then two piston rods acting on cranks set at right angles to each other. In the case of large engines the second expansion was sometimes divided between two cylinders, because the size of a single cylinder would have become inconveniently great; in that case there were three pistons, with three cranks generally set at equal angles to each other.

With increasing steam pressures it was found advisable to extend the compounding principle


pressure was at first 130 lb., but was soon increased to 155 lb., which remained general until 1895. But in the cruisers *Powerful* and *Terrible*, which were launched in that year and ran their trials in 1896-97, there was a jump to 210 lb. at the engines, reduced from 250 lb. in the boilers, and in subsequent ships the pressures were raised to 250 lb. at the engines (300 lb. in the boilers). In those cruisers, which were of 25,000 horse power, divided between two screws, the last stage of the expansion was carried out in two equal low-pressure cylinders, so that there were four cranks. With this arrangement, which became standard for battleships and cruisers of over 10,000 h.p.,

not only could the low-pressure cylinders be kept of reasonable size, but reduction of vibration was facilitated, by placing the cylinders in such order and setting the cranks at such angles as to balance the engines as perfectly as possible.

The advantages of the compound as compared with the single-stage expansion engine were summarized by Sir Henry Oram (*The Marine Steam Engine*, by Sennett & Oram) as being (1) reduction of the maximum stresses on the framing, and consequent reduction of weight and cost; (2) increased regularity of turning moment and consequent increased


efficiency of the propeller in the water; and (3) more economical use of the steam in the cylinders and consequent increase of power from a given expenditure of heat. He stated that the gain in economy of fuel with even the 60 lb. compound engines over ordinary surface-condensing engines with steam at 30 lb. pressure might be taken as at least 30 per cent., and that of triple expansion engines with steam at 130 lb. to 150 lb. over compound engines with steam at 90 to 100 lb. as 15 to 20 per cent.

The following figures, taken from the same book, will give an idea of the extent to which the weight of the machinery in relation to the



COMPOUND INVERTED VERTICAL ENGINES, 1864.

The high-pressure cylinders (on top) were arranged in tandem with the low-pressure ones (below).



TRIPLE-EXPANSION INVERTED VERTICAL ENGINES.

power developed was reduced by the improvements described so far :

Date	Character of Machinery	Weight per indicated horse-power. Cwt.
1832	Flue boiler, 4 lb. pressure, side-lever engine driving paddle wheel	13½
1850	Tubular boiler, 14 lb. pressure, oscillating engine and paddle-wheel	4½
1860	Box boiler, 20-25 lb. pressure, horizontal single expansion engine, jet condenser and screw propeller	3½
1870	Box boiler, 30-35 lb. pressure, horizontal single expansion engine, surface condenser, screw propeller	3
1890	Cylindrical boiler, 155 lb. pressure, triple expansion inverted vertical engines, screw propeller	1½-1¾


In a previous paragraph reference was made to the jump in steam pressure seen in the cruisers *Powerful* and *Terrible* in 1895. This jump was due to the adoption of water-tube boilers, which have already been mentioned as being one of the three great factors in the progress of naval engineering in the quarter of a century preceding the outbreak of the war. Innumerable forms of water-tube boilers were constructed, but the cardinal feature in all of them was the same—that the water is contained in the tubes round which the heated furnace gases play, in contradistinction to the old tank or fire-tube type in which the gases on their way to the funnel pass through the

tubes, on the outside of which is the water that is to be heated.

The water-tube boiler was not new in idea, and dates back at least to the beginning of the nineteenth century ; but in spite of the efforts of numerous inventors and constructors they retained disadvantages which were held to render them unsuitable for use in the Navy. Perhaps, indeed, too much was made of those disadvantages, because tank boilers appeared to satisfy the demands of the engine designer, and there was a natural reluctance to make drastic changes in practice until they became inevitable. By the 'nineties, however, it had become evident that the tank boiler had about reached the end of its tether, and could not well be made in large sizes to meet the requirements of the high-steam pressures needed to enable full advantage to be taken of the multiple expansion principle. The Admiralty were therefore practically forced to make the change, though their engineering advisers would have been spared much criticism and tribulation of mind had they been content, as it must be confessed they had been in the case of some other developments, to allow the mercantile marine to make the initial experiments and overcome the difficulties that are inseparable from any radical innovation. But if they had elected to tread this primrose path of least resistance the ships of the British Fleet would have had to wait long for water-tube boilers, since at the time of the Great War

they had found but little favour in British merchant vessels.

The Admiralty began tentatively by fitting water-tube boilers in some of the smaller vessels, but their first large experiment was made in the *Powerful* and *Terrible*. For these cruisers they settled on the *Belleville* type, which had been used with satisfactory results in the French Navy for more than ten years, and they had the justification for their choice that this was the only large tube type of water-tube boiler which had been tried at sea under ordinary working conditions on a considerable scale. That some defects and difficulties




BELLEVILLE BOILER.

should be found in working a new device with which the boiler-room staffs were not familiar was not surprising—and the influence of the personal factor is shown by the fact that there were instances of these boilers proving a success in one ship, while a precisely similar installation of them in another precisely similar ship was set down a failure. The troubles which occurred were, however, seized upon by the adherents of the tank boiler, and such an outcry was raised against the *Belleville* in particular and the water-tube type in general that in 1900 the Admiralty appointed a committee to investigate the matter. An interim report issued in 1901 was in general unfavourable to the *Belleville*, which it advised should not be fitted in future new ships, but the opinion was expressed that the advantages of water-tube boilers for naval purposes were so

great, mainly from the military point of view, that, provided a satisfactory type was adopted, they would be more suitable for use in the Navy than the cylindrical type. In the next two or three years the Committee carried out a number of special comparative trials with different types of boiler, and when in 1904 they issued their final report—the last of ten—they expressed themselves as satisfied that the *Babcock & Wilcox* type (as used in the *Hermes*) and the *Yarrow* large tube type were satisfactory and suitable for use in battleships and cruisers. For small cruisers they thought it probable that a boiler such as the *Yarrow* large tube type would give better results than the “express” small tube type previously fitted, while for torpedo-boat destroyers they regarded some form of boiler with small tubes closely packed as absolutely necessary to obtain the required ratio of output to weight of boiler.

In consequence of this report the *Babcock & Wilcox* and the *Yarrow* types were fitted in about equal numbers in large warships; and in 1909 Sir Henry Oram was able to declare that, although boilers had been until quite recently a constant source of anxiety to the Admiralty, serious troubles were then seldom met with. In the *Babcock & Wilcox* type the tubes are slightly inclined to the horizontal, and at each end are connected with sinuous headers from which pipes lead to a receiver above the tubes. Heated by the furnace below, the water rises up the inclined tubes to the upcast headers, whence it passes through the pipes to the receiver, to return down the downcast headers to the other and lower ends of the tubes. The steam is led off to the engines from the upper part of the receiver, which is kept about half full of water. In the *Yarrow* there is a steam receiver in the centre above and two water chambers at the sides below, the three being disposed triangularly, and the heating surface is formed by two groups of straight tubes, $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter, joining the receiver with each of the two water chambers. The *Yarrow* “express” type is of similar construction, except that the size of the tubes is smaller.

The three military requirements on which the Water Tube Boiler Committee laid stress as being necessary in naval boilers were (1) rapidity of raising steam and of increasing the number of boilers at work; (2) reduction to the minimum of danger to the ship through damage to the boilers by shot and shell; and (3) the




YARROW BOILER, WITH SUPER-HEATER; SECTION AND ELEVATION.

possibility of removing damaged boilers in a very short time and without opening up the decks or removing the fixtures of the hull. They declared that these requirements are met by the water-tube boiler to a greater degree than by the cylindrical, and they regarded them as being of such importance as to outweigh the advantages of the latter type in economy of fuel and cost of upkeep. The rapidity with which steam can be raised—in some forms it can be done within half an hour of lighting the fires—is a consequence of the small quantity of water in the tubes, and this in turn is partly responsible for the smaller weight of the water-tube as compared with the tank type of equal power, the lightness of the component elements in relation to their strength being another contributing factor. In the course of their trials the Committee got a maximum output of 200,000 lb. of steam an hour from the Babcock and Wilcox boilers of the *Hermes*, or 410 lb. of steam per ton of boiler. With the Yarrow boilers in the *Medea*, weighing 330 tons, the output of steam was 157,000 lb. an hour, or 478 lb. per ton of boiler. But in the *Minerva* the tank boilers weighed 567 tons for an output of 167,100 lb. of steam under forced draught, or 295 lb. per ton, while in the Cunarder *Saxonia* the cylindrical boilers weighed 1,000 tons, but the output of steam was only 132,600 lb. an hour, or 132.6 lb. per ton.

Those present at the Diamond Jubilee Naval Review held at Spithead in 1897 were greatly interested in a small vessel of the torpedo-boat

class which darted at enormous speed along the lines of warships after the Royal procession had passed. The patrol-boats whose duty it was to keep the lines clear were hopelessly outclassed in point of speed, and the only way in which they could check the intruder's lawless proceedings was to place themselves athwart her course and thus drive her out of the lines. This vessel was the *Turbinia*, built by the Hon. C. A., afterwards Sir Charles, Parsons, and embodying an invention which in a few years was destined to revolutionize the propelling machinery of the British and other navies.


Sir Charles Parsons, the youngest son of the third Earl of Rosse, of telescope fame, a few years after graduating at Cambridge as eleventh wrangler in 1877, devoted himself to the development of the rotary steam engine. The oldest form of steam engine known, the æolipile of Hero of Alexandria (about 130 B.C.) was of this type, consisting of a hollow pivoted globe supplied with steam the reaction of which as it issued from nozzles caused the whole apparatus to rotate in the opposite direction to that of the steam outflow; but the efforts of various inventors had failed to utilize the principle in a practical way until success was reached by Sir Charles Parsons. It was in 1884-85 that as a result of many experiments he produced a rotary engine or turbine of about 10 horse-power which was successfully used for driving an electrical generator, and in the following five years some 300 of these machines were made



BABCOCK & WILCOX BOILER.

ranging up to a power of 75 kilowatts. So far as the engine or motor part was concerned, the first machine consisted of two groups of 15 successive turbine wheels or rows of blades on one drum or shaft within a concentric case. The moving rows or rings of blades or vanes were attached to the shaft, projecting outwardly from it, and nearly touching the case, while between them were rows or rings of fixed or guide blades projecting inwardly from the case and nearly touching the shaft. Thus a series of turbine elements or wheels was constituted, each complete in itself and each comprising one row of fixed blades and one row of moving blades. The steam, after doing its work on one wheel or element, passed on to the next, preserving its longitudinal velocity without shock, and gradually falling in pressure and expanding as it passed through the different rows of blades. Each successive row of blades was made rather larger than the one before in order to accommodate the increasing bulk of the expanding steam.

In Sir Charles Parsons' own words the steam in a turbine passes through a forest of fixed and moving blades, just as water flows from a lake of higher level (the boiler) through a series of rapids and intervening pools to a lake of




FIXED AND MOVING BLADES OF A TURBINE.

The arrows show the course of the steam.

lower level (the condenser). In its flow it repeatedly gathers a little velocity from the small falls of pressure, which is as soon checked and its energy transferred to the blades, over and over again. 50 to 100 times or still oftener. The result of splitting up the fall in pressure of the steam into small fractional expansions over a large number of turbine elements in

series is that the velocity of the steam is nowhere great, and thus a relatively moderate speed of rotation of the turbine suffices for the highest economy. In considering how the power is developed it must be remembered



ARRANGEMENT OF TURBINE BLADES.

that the steam flows through the turbine with a force ten times that of the strongest hurricane, and although the force acting on each blade is small, perhaps only a few ounces or in the largest blades a few pounds, the summation of these little forces mounts up to an aggregate of many thousands of horse-power in large machines. In the engines of the *Mauretania* and *Lusitania*, of nearly 80,000 horse-power, there were some 880,000 blades, varying in length from $2\frac{3}{4}$ to 22 inches, and large as these installations were they were merely the pre-runners of others of still greater power.

The Parsons turbine, like the primitive machine of Hero, was of the reaction type, as opposed to the impulse type. The latter type in its most elementary form may be regarded as a wheel provided with vanes which are blown round by the steam impinging upon them. In reaction turbines the steam, leaving a row of fixed blades at a high velocity, is guided so as to strike the adjoining row of moving blades in a series of jets, causing them to rotate. Then, traversing their curved inner surfaces it leaves them as it were with a kick, which further assists in their rotation, and strikes the next row of fixed blades, from which it is again thrown off upon the succeeding row of moving blades. This process is continued through many stages of fixed and moving blades until the energy of the steam is exhausted; indeed, one of the great merits of the turbine is that it is able to utilize the energy of the steam when expanded to the very attenuated vapour densities produced by the best condensers. The reciprocating engine



HOISTING WATER-TUBE BOILERS ON BOARD.


can take advantage of only about two-thirds of the whole range of expansion and cannot deal with very low densities of steam, one reason being, among others, that the low-pressure cylinders would have to be of such enormous size as to be impracticable. Hence in its use

cannot be made of steam expanded to a pressure of less than 7 lb. absolute (about half an atmosphere). The turbine, on the other hand, can use steam at a pressure of only $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. absolute, equivalent to a vacuum of $28\frac{1}{2}$ or 29 inches in the condenser. With turbine

machinery, therefore, good condensing arrangements become imperative, for the sake of economy in steam consumption. Sir Charles Parsons recognized this fact from the first, and his jet vacuum augmentser was an important contribution to the practical solution of the problem.

and moving discs, and so on through the whole series to the exhaust, the action being the same as in the parallel flow type.

The question of the application of the turbine to marine propulsion was taken up in 1894, when a small company, the Marine Steam Turbine Company, of which Sir Charles Parsons



THE ORIGINAL PARSONS TURBINE, EXHIBITED AT THE SCIENCE MUSEUM SOUTH KENSINGTON.

For the first five years after the manufacture of Parsons turbines was begun they were all constructed on the parallel flow principle, which from the first he had considered the most suitable for his purpose and on which he therefore concentrated his attention. But in consequence of a partnership dispute he lost his rights over the patents that covered it and was debarred from continuing to work on it. In these circumstances he reluctantly turned his attention to another type of turbine, that with radial flow. In this there were a series of fixed discs, with interlocking flanges at the periphery, forming when placed together co-axially a cylindrical case with inwardly projecting annular discs. On the shaft were keyed a similar series of discs, the faces of the fixed and moving discs lying a short distance apart. From the faces of the fixed discs projected rows of guide blades which nearly touched the moving discs, and in the same way from the moving discs projected rows of blades which nearly touched the fixed discs. When steam was admitted to the casing, it passed outwards through the rows of fixed and moving blades between the first fixed and moving discs, then inwards towards the shaft at the back of the first moving disc and outwards again between the second fixed

and moving discs, and so on through the whole series to the exhaust, the action being the same as in the parallel flow type. The question of the application of the turbine to marine propulsion was taken up in 1894, when a small company, the Marine Steam Turbine Company, of which Sir Charles Parsons was managing director, was formed with the object of carrying out exhaustive tests. The prospectus summarized the advantages to be obtained from the new system in connexion with the propulsion of ships as being increased speed, increased carrying power of vessel, increased economy in steam consumption, reduced initial cost, reduced size and weight of machinery, reduced cost of attendance on machinery, diminished cost of upkeep of machinery, and largely reduced vibration. The construction of successful land turbines had involved much more than what may be called the steam part of the problem. For example, special bearings had to be designed to suit the high speeds of rotation (the first small Parsons turbine made 18,000 revolutions a minute), the mode of lubrication had to be considered, methods of the fixing the blades in position had to be worked out, and attention given to governing and numerous mechanical details. But when it came to marine propulsion it was recognized that other fundamental problems were involved, the most important being the adaptation of the screw propeller to the high speed at which the turbine had to revolve if it was to work with reasonable efficiency and economy.

Various model experiments with propellers

had already been made by Sir Charles Parsons when, in 1894, the Marine Steam Turbine Company erected works at Wallsend-on-Tyne and began to construct the *Turbinia*. The vessel was 100 ft. long and 9 ft. in beam, and at a draught of 3 ft. she had a displacement of about 44 tons. The boiler fitted was of the water-tube type, with straight tubes $\frac{1}{2}$ -in. in internal diameter, and the heating surface was 1,100 square feet, with 42 square feet of grate area. The turbine drove a single shaft, and had to be of the radial flow type, as when it was designed Sir Charles Parsons had not recovered his patent rights over the parallel flow principle. The preliminary trial of the vessel was run on November 14, 1894, but in spite of numerous variations in the propellers—first with a single screw, and later with multiple screws—the results were disappointing, because the speed obtained, $19\frac{3}{4}$ knots, was not nearly so great as it should have been considering the horse power developed by the engine, which was ascertained to be 960 at 2,400 revolutions. It may be mentioned that to make this measurement special apparatus had to be devised. In a reciprocating engine the power can be calculated from the diagram drawn by an instrument known as an indicator, which shows the pressure within the cylinder at all points of the stroke of the piston; but this arrangement is not applicable in the case of the turbine. Sir Charles Parsons therefore inserted a spring coupling between the turbine and the propeller shaft, and from the compression of the springs, or the extent to which the engine shaft was twisted in relation to the propeller shaft, calculated the power that was developed. Subsequently various torsion meters, embodying much the same principle, were devised. When a shaft is rotated it is twisted to an extent that depends on the quality of the steel and the load that it carries. Therefore if the amount of twisting that is caused by a certain load on a given shaft is known, and the extent to which the shaft is actually twisted when in use is measured, as it can be by a torsion meter, the power that the engine must be developing to produce that twist can be calculated. The result is usually expressed in the case of turbines as shaft horse-power.

The trouble with the *Turbinia* in her first form was traced to a phenomenon known as cavitation, which had been noticed in 1893 by Sir John Thornycroft and Mr. Sydney Barnaby during the trials of the *Daring*, a 27-knot



torpedo destroyer. It is caused by too much work being asked of the screw; the blades tear through the water, producing cavities which contain no air but only vapour of water, and into which the water cannot flow quickly enough to fill them up, the result being that the power of the engine is wasted in forming and maintaining these cavities, instead of usefully employed in driving the ship forward. It was therefore resolved to divide the power in the *Turbinia* between three shafts instead of concentrating it on one, and to build new turbines, this time on the parallel flow principle, the rights over which had been recovered. Three separate turbines were provided, each driving its own propeller shaft, and were connected in series, so that the expansion of the steam was divided between the three instead of being completed in one. The first portion of the expansion was effected in the high-pressure turbine placed on the starboard side, the second portion in the intermediate turbine on the port side, and the final portion in the low-pressure turbine in the centre. As turbines can run in only one direction, and cannot be reversed like reciprocating engines, another



THE "TURBINIA," THE FIRST TURBINE-DRIVEN STEAMBOAT, 1896.

turbine for going astern was placed forward of the low-pressure turbine on the central propeller shaft. Each shaft carried three screws of improved design.

The result of these changes was that the vessel attained a speed of $32\frac{3}{4}$ knots on the measured mile, and from tests made by Sir J. A. Ewing in 1896 it appeared that the maximum speed was obtained when the outer or wing propeller shafts were running at 2,230



PARSONS TURBINES, OUTER FIXED CASE AND INNER REVOLVING DRUM OR ROTOR.

revolutions a minute, and the middle shaft at 2,000. At the Naval Review she was pressed to steam $34\frac{1}{2}$ knots, representing about 2 300 horse-power. She thus developed 100 horse-power for every ton of her machinery, which, including turbines, boilers, shafting, etc., weighed 22 tons, the turbines alone weighing only 3 tons 13 cwt. At 31 knots she consumed $14\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of steam per horse-power, equivalent with a good marine boiler to less than 2 lb. of coal per horse-power a result better than was

obtained in a torpedo-boat or torpedo-boat destroyer with ordinary triple expansion engines. Her reversing turbine gave her a speed astern of $6\frac{1}{2}$ knots, and she could be brought to rest from 30 knots in 36 seconds, and from rest up to 30 knots in 40 seconds.

After the success of the *Turbinia* the Parsons Marine Steam Turbine Company, an enlargement of the syndicate which had built that ship, received an order from the Admiralty for a turbine-driven torpedo-boat destroyer, the

Viper, of the same dimensions (210 ft. long, 21 ft. beam) as the usual 30-knot vessels of that class. She had four shafts, each with two screws.* Each of the outer shafts had one high-pressure turbine, the steam from which was taken to two low-pressure turbines, one on each of the inner shafts, the four turbines being of about equal power. On each of the two inner shafts there was also an astern turbine in a separate casing forward of the low-pressure turbines; these astern turbines ran in a vacuum when not in use. With her full trial weights on board, when her displacement was 370 tons, the Viper showed a mean speed of 36·58 knots on an hour's full power trial, her fastest run on the measured mile being 37·113 knots, nearly 43 miles an hour. This latter speed meant a horse-power of about 12,300, or about double that obtained from triple expansion reciprocating engines in 30-knot destroyers of similar dimensions but only 310 tons displacement. The Viper ran ashore and was wrecked near the Channel Islands in August 1901, and six weeks later the Cobra, another somewhat larger torpedo-boat destroyer, which had been fitted with turbine engines, was lost in a storm in the North Sea.

Another destroyer, the Velox, launched in the following year, was of the same dimensions as the Viper and was fitted with the same arrangement of turbines. In addition, however, she was provided with two triple expansion reciprocating engines of 150 horse-power each, which could be coupled to her two inner shafts. The intention in fitting these was to increase economy at low cruising speeds, when the efficiency of the turbines fell off, and they were used at speeds up to 12 or 13 knots, the steam from them being passed into the main turbines. At higher speeds they were disconnected. In the destroyer Eder, launched in 1903, two cruising turbines, one high-pressure and the other low-pressure, were fitted in place of such engines, with the same object.

An extension of the use of turbines to larger ships was made in 1902, when it was decided to fit them in the Amethyst, one of four 3,000-ton cruisers then building. Here there were only three screw shafts. The central one was driven by a high-pressure turbine, and each of the side ones carried a cruising turbine forward and a low-pressure one aft, one of the cruising tur-

bines being high-pressure and the other low-pressure. Comparison between the performance of the Amethyst and her three sister boats having triple expansion reciprocating engines was very definitely in favour of the turbine machinery. While the limit of the other ships, with the same boiler power, was about 22·3 knots, the Amethyst easily steamed at 23·6 knots, and that with a coal consumption about 10 per cent. less. At low speeds, of about 10 knots, she was, however, less economical, but at about 14 knots she came to an equality with the other vessels. The actual weight of the machinery was the same in all of them to within a few tons, but the turbines of the Amethyst



H.M.S. "VIPER," AN EARLY TURBINE TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYER.

were substantially lighter in relation to their power, for at the speed of 23·6 knots it was calculated they gave 26 horse-power per ton, whereas the reciprocating engines of the Topaze, one of the sister ships, gave only 18·3 horse-power per ton.

The final triumph of the turbine came when the committee appointed by the Admiralty in 1905 recommended its adoption in the Dreadnought, and thenceforward it became the standard method of propulsion for the steam vessels of the British Navy. The reasons officially assigned for this decision were saving in weight and reduction in number of working parts; reduced liability to breakdown; smoothness of working; ease of manipulation; saving in coal consumption at high power, and therefore in boiler-room space; saving in engine-room complement; and increased protection from damage

* The practice of fitting more than one screw on each propeller shaft was afterwards abandoned.

by shot and shell owing to the engines being lower in the ship. That the turbine system was not without disadvantages was recognized, but it was felt that the advantages much more than counterbalanced them. From the point of view of sea-going speed there was no difficulty in deciding in its favour, and the chief question about which doubt arose was in connexion with the provision of sufficient stopping and turning power for purposes of quick and easy manœuvring. It was considered, however, that all the requirements promised to be fully met by the adoption of suitable machinery.

For the large ships the four-shaft arrangement was adopted, the outer or wing shafts being driven by high-pressure turbines and the inner ones by low-pressure turbines. For the sake of manœuvring power astern turbines were provided on all four shafts. As Sir Henry Oram recorded, previous experience indicated that turbines would yield the same power as reciprocating engines with the use of 15 per cent. less steam, and accordingly in the Dreadnought a reduction of about 15 per cent. was made in the usual boiler proportions. This action was justified by the trial results, for whereas in

reciprocating engines 16 lb. per indicated horse-power would be a fair average, her steam consumption for turbines only at full speed was found to be 13·48 lb. per shaft horse-power, the initial steam pressure at the turbines being 164 lb. per square inch by gauge. In three subsequent ships, according to Sir Henry Oram, the figure was reduced to just over 13 lb. per shaft horse-power, the steam pressure being 147 lb. per square inch. In the battle-cruisers of the Indomitable class, in which the turbines of 41,000 shaft horse-power were much greater in size and revolved more slowly than those of the Dreadnought, the boilers were made about 4 per cent. smaller proportionately than in the latter ship. The economy, however, surpassed anticipations, the steam consumption of the turbines at full power being only 12·03 lb. per shaft horse-power, with an average steam pressure of 123 lb. by gauge: at the high-pressure steam turbine; and without going into further details it may be said that still better results were obtained later. It will be noticed how the adoption of the turbine brought with it the advantage of permitting the boiler pressures to be greatly reduced from those of 250 or



FIRE-ROOM OF A WARSHIP FITTED WITH BABCOCK BOILERS

300 lb. per square inch which had been reached in 1895 in the effort to make the most of the triple expansion reciprocating engine.

The economy in steam consumption, which was assisted by the "closed exhaust" system whereby the energy remaining in the exhaust steam from various auxiliary engines of the single-cylinder type was turned to useful account in the main turbines, was naturally accompanied by a decrease in coal consumption, which in the three Indomitable cruisers was reduced at full power to an average of just under $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. per shaft horse-power per hour. This meant an increase in the radius of action for a given quantity of fuel, or alternatively a reduction in the quantity that had to be carried for a given radius of action. There was also a decrease in the weight of the propelling machinery in relation to power, and as time went on it was reduced, including all necessary auxiliaries, from about 140 lb. to about 100 lb. per shaft horse-power in battleships. In small fast ships like torpedo-boat destroyers, in which the machinery is of lighter construction than in large ships, striking reductions in weight were also achieved. In a destroyer with triple expansion reciprocating engines the weight of the machinery, including the water in the boilers and spare gear, was 58 lb. to 62 lb. per horse-power. The substitution of turbine engines, still with coal-fired boilers, knocked off 8 or 10 lb., but with oil-fired boilers it came down to 33 lb., and the use of steam with a moderate degree of superheat reduced it to 30 lb. A comparison of these results with the weight of 1,540 lb., which, as already recorded, was required for the development of one horse-power in a naval ship of 1832, shows the enormous improvements that were realized by the engineering branch of the Navy in the course of about 80 years.

In order to promote the economy of steam and fuel at lower speeds—an important matter seeing that warships spend much of their time in cruising at speeds which do not require the use of the full power of their engines—a cruising turbine was fitted on each of the inner shafts of the Dreadnought, but subsequently this arrangement fell into disfavour, the view adopted being that the increased economy secured by the cruising turbines was not worth the extra complication, cost and liability to injury entailed by their use. The alternative measures that were adopted for the purpose, such as the addition of a cruising element in the

shape of an extra stage of shorter blades at the initial end of the main high pressure turbines, with by-passing arrangements, or the fitting of a velocity compounded impulse turbine wheel for the initial stages, cannot be dealt with here,




[Elliott & Fry.

THE HON. SIR C. A. PARSONS, K.C.B.
Inventor of the Parsons Turbine.

and for information about them, so far as it can be published, reference may be made to Mr. Alexander Richardson's book on the *Evolution of the Parsons Steam Turbine* and to the chapters on marine engineering contributed year by year to the *Naval Annual* by the same writer. Something, however, may be said about what Sir Charles Parsons once called the "inherent and permanent idiosyncracies" of the steam turbine and the screw propeller, since the subject leads up to the question of different forms of gearing in connexion with turbines

- In general terms it may be said that the screw propeller is essentially a slow-speed device. The steam turbine, on the contrary, is essentially a high-speed one. High-pressure steam expanding into a vacuum moves at an enormous velocity, and it is shown by theory, and confirmed by experience, that in the turbine, in order to obtain as much power as possible from a given amount of steam, the velocity of the moving blades relatively to the fixed or guide blades should be about half the velocity of the

steam. In a turbine of large diameter and large power the fulfilment of this condition is compatible with a reasonably low speed of revolution, because the peripheral velocity of the moving blades is high owing to their radial length from the shaft; but with small machines of small diameter the required blade velocity can be got only by increasing the rate of revolution of the shaft, and if the shaft is coupled



[Engineering.]

MECHANICAL GEARING OF THE
"VESPASIAN."

direct to the propeller, in the usual way, the propeller revolves at excessive speed for efficiency. This was the difficulty found in the application of the turbine to vessels requiring speeds not exceeding 16 or 17 knots, but evidently it would be solved if the speed of the propeller could be reduced in relation to that of the turbine, so that both could be designed to run at speeds that would ensure good performance for both. This can be effected by gearing, of which three types are possible—mechanical, hydraulic and electrical.


Mechanical gearing, it will be remembered, was introduced in the early days of the screw propeller in order to get a faster rate of revolution than was attainable with the existing slow-running engines intended for paddle wheels. When Sir William White was Chief Constructor, he considered the possibility of applying it for

the opposite purpose, of reducing the revolutions of the screws in connexion with high-speed reciprocating engines, and at his suggestion Dr. A. C. Kirk worked out a design for use in a cruiser, though it was not put into practice on account of the defects of gearing as then made. In the light of subsequent improvements Sir Charles Parsons, however, made some experiments about 1896, and in the following year a 22 ft. launch, fitted with a 10-horse-power turbine running at 20,000 revolutions a minute, was built by the Parsons Company, and provided with helical spur gearing, by which the two screw shafts were driven at 1,400 revolutions, a reduction of about 14 to 1. The speed was about 9 miles an hour. Dr. de Laval had also introduced helical gearing for reducing the very high speeds attained by his impulse turbine.

Some twelve years later Sir Charles Parsons renewed his experiments with helical gearing on a much larger scale. A cargo steamer, the *Vespasian*, of 4,350 tons displacement, was purchased, and after she had been thoroughly overhauled, her existing machinery, a set of triple expansion engines of about 900 horse-power, was tested for coal and water consumption in order to obtain data for comparison. They were then taken out and replaced by geared turbines, the original propeller, shafting, and boilers being retained. There was a high-pressure turbine on the starboard side, and a low-pressure one on the port side, their shafts each carrying pinions which geared into a wheel mounted on the propeller shaft. The revolutions of the turbines, 1,400 a minute, were thus reduced to 70 in the propeller shaft. At this rate of revolution, which represented the full power of the ship with the old reciprocating engines, it was found that the turbines gave an economy of 15 per cent., increased by subsequent minor alterations to 22 per cent. After the vessel had been employed for about a year in carrying coal from the *Tyno* to Rotterdam, and had travelled about 20,000 miles, the gear, which was entirely enclosed in a casing and continually sprayed with oil by a pump, was removed for examination, and the wear on the teeth of the pinion, which was of nickel steel, was ascertained to be less than two-thousandths of an inch. The loss in transmission through the gear was not actually measured, but on the basis of previous tests with experimental gears it was believed to be not more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

After this successful demonstration, mechanical gearing was applied to two cross-channel turbine ships belonging to the London and South-Western Railway, the *Normannia* and *Hantonia*, which were put into service in 1912. They were twin-screw vessels, and the power for each screw was derived from one high-pressure and one low-pressure turbine. The screws were designed to give a speed of $19\frac{1}{2}$ knots at 315 revolutions a minute, and the reduction gearing was so calculated that at this

stated that 15 vessels, including ocean-going passenger steamships, cargo vessels, and destroyers, had been, or were being built, with geared turbines on the Parsons system and an aggregate exceeding 100,000 horse-power. He also pointed out that everyone familiar with warship design must realize the exceptional importance necessarily attaching to economies of weight, space, and consumption of steam and fuel made possible by the use of smaller quick-running turbines of high efficiency which trans-



SUGGESTED ARRANGEMENT OF TURBINES FOR A BATTLESHIP.

rate of revolution of the screw shafts the high-pressure turbines made 2,014 revolutions a minute and the low pressure ones 1,392. On the six hours full speed trials both ships slightly exceeded the designed speed with the turbines developing about 5,000 shaft horse-power. The coal-consumption was about 1.34 lb. per shaft horse-power per hour, and on six months' service at a speed of 18 knots they consumed nearly 43 tons a double trip, whereas another slightly larger vessel with direct coupled turbines, running on the same service at the same speed, used 72 tons per double trip.

In the same year as that in which these vessels were put into service, Sir William White

mit their power through reducing gear to the screws. This observation was confirmed by the statement made in the *Naval Annual* for 1914 that by gearing the weight of the turbines was being reduced to an amount which more than counterbalanced the weight of the gearing, and that there was a saving of space in the arrangement of the machinery. It was also mentioned in the *Annual* that geared turbines were working with a consumption of about 11 lb. of saturated steam per shaft horse-power per hour, that mechanical gearing was then fitted for the transmission of 15,000 shaft horse-power on one shaft, and that ratios of reduction as high as 26.2 of the turbine shaft

to 1 of the propeller shaft were being used, ratios of 4 or 6 to 1 being employed in high-speed torpedo-boat destroyers and light armoured cruisers.


As an example of a possible method of applying and working gearing in a large ship, reference may be made to a design proposed before the Institution of Naval Architects by Sir Charles Parsons in 1913 for a four-screw battleship of about 60,000 shaft horse-power. Each screw was to be driven by a separate and independent set of turbines. To take the outer or wing shafts first, there was to be on each one high-pressure and one intermediate-pressure turbine forward of the gearing, and aft of it two low-pressure turbines, each incorporating an astern turbine in the same casing. Each of the ahead turbines was to drive a separate pinion, the four pinions of each set engaging with one wheel mounted on the screw shaft. A clutch was provided in the design, enabling the engines to be disconnected from the screw shafts when desired. On the two inner screw shafts there were similar installations of turbines, but with two additions. The first of these consisted of two high-pressure cruising turbines placed between the main high-pressure and intermediate turbines and driving direct on the screw shafts, from which they could be detached by a clutch. The second addition was two complete sets of cruising turbines (each comprising a high-pressure and

a low-pressure cruising turbine, the latter combined with an astern turbine) placed aft of the main engines and driving the two inner screw shafts through gearing. A clutch enabled these cruising installations also to be disconnected at will. The object of these arrangements was to secure practically the same consumption of steam per shaft horse-power throughout the whole range of speed. At low speeds the two forward cruising turbines would be used, and at intermediate speeds the aft cruising installations, the main engines being cut out by means of the clutches. The consumption of oil fuel at full power was expected to be about 0.7 lb. per shaft horse-power per hour.

In the United States a considerable amount of attention was given to mechanical gearing for marine and other purposes by Admiral G. W. Melville and Mr. J. H. Macalpine. The distinctive feature of their system, with which Mr. George Westinghouse was also associated, lay in mounting the pinion in a floating frame. Their argument was that however perfectly the teeth might be cut, the slightest error of alignment of the pinion, which is long in proportion to its diameter, would produce great inequality of distribution of pressure along the teeth. The method they adopted for freeing the design from this delicacy of alignment was to mount the pinion bearings in a very stiff frame, supported near the middle of its length by the



THE "JUPITER," U.S. NAVAL COLLIER:
The first electrically propelled ship of the American Navy.



FÖTTINGER HYDRAULIC TRANSFORMER.

bedplate but (where the teeth were not in mesh) free to move about an axis transverse to the axes of the gear and the pinion. Thus the position of the pinion axis at any moment was partly determined by the interaction of the teeth, the result being great equality of distribution of tooth pressure. It was claimed therefore that such a floating frame gear would work satisfactorily with the pinion sensibly out of line, thus overcoming the difficulty of bad distribution of tooth pressure caused by minute errors of alignment, and that a higher average tooth pressure could be employed than with a rigid gear, reducing the weight of the apparatus in relation to the power transmitted. It may be mentioned, however, that no need for any such arrangement was found with the Parsons double helical gear, provided the teeth were cut with absolute accuracy, to ensure which special machinery was devised.

The floating frame system, which was adopted in a good many merchant ships, was fitted experimentally by the United States naval authorities in a naval collier, the *Neptune*, of 20,000 tons displacement, in order that comparative tests might be carried out between her and a sister ship the *Cyclops*, propelled by ordinary triple expansion reciprocating engines, and another sister ship, the *Jupiter*, having turbines and electrical transmission gear.

An example of hydraulic gearing applied to marine propulsion is afforded by a German invention, the Föttinger transformer. Here the steam turbine is coupled directly to a water turbine or pump, the hydraulic pressure developed by which in turn drives a second water turbine or motor mounted on the propeller shaft. Separate water circuits are provided for going ahead and going astern, that


for the latter purpose being arranged in such a way that the direction of the water is reversed so as to drive the propeller shaft in the opposite direction. It follows that in whichever way the screws are being turned the steam turbine always rotates in the same direction and no astern turbine is required. The system, with which it was said an efficiency of 90 per cent. could be guaranteed in large installations, was fitted in the *Königin Luise*, a pleasure steamer belonging to the Hamburg Amerika Line. This vessel came to England in May 1914, and ran a series of demonstration trials in the Solent for the information of Admiralty and other engineers. Less than three months later she took her place in the German Navy as a mine layer, and the sinking of her on August 5 by the *Amphion* and the Third Destroyer Flotilla was the first blood of the war and the first success in it of the British Navy.

As has just been recorded, electrical gearing or transmission was tried experimentally by the United States Navy Department in a collier in which electrical energy generated by a turbine-driven dynamo was used to drive electric motors on the propeller shafts. Two years' experience with this vessel led to the decision to adopt electrical gearing in the *New Mexico*, first called the *California*, a battleship with an estimated displacement of 32,000 tons, which was laid down in 1915. Here two turbines, of 37,000 shaft horse power, were to drive four propellers at 175 revolutions a minute, giving a speed of 22 knots. Each turbine was to be coupled to a bi-polar alternator, the current from which was to be taken to four electric motors, one on each shaft. These motors were to be connected for either 24 or 36 poles. At moderate speeds the plan was to

use only one of the generators, and under this condition a speed of 15 knots was expected with the 36-pole connexion and 18½ knots with the 24-pole. With either connexion changes of speed were to be effected by changes in the turbine speed. The weight of the propelling machinery, apart from boilers and condensing auxiliaries, was estimated at 530 tons, and the General Electric Company, who were responsible for it, guaranteed that the steam consumption per shaft horse power should not exceed 11·9 lb. at full speed and power, 11·1 lb. at 19 knots, 11·4 lb. at 15 knots, and 14·6 lb. at 10 knots.

But a still bolder step was taken when it was decided to adopt electric drive on the same principle for the new American cruisers of the 1916 programme, with a length over all of 874 ft., a beam of 91 ft., a draught of over 30 ft., and a displacement of 34,800 tons. Turbines of 180,000-200,000 shaft horse-power were to drive four screw shafts through electric motors, and the speed expected was variously stated at from 32 to 35 knots. Apparently space could not be found on the engine deck for the huge range of boilers required to supply steam for machinery of such enormous power, and it was accordingly arranged to place a number of them on a higher deck.

Before leaving the subject of electrical gearing, mention may be made of an interesting Swedish system, the Ljungström, which, according to the Annual Report of Lloyd's Register for 1915-16, was being applied in two mercantile vessels under construction in Great Britain, one of 1,500 shaft horse-power with a single screw, and the other of 5,400 horse-power with two screws. In this turbine there were no stationary blades, but the steam passed across two sets of blades which revolved at equal speed in opposite directions, the effect therefore being the same as if one set of blades were stationary while the other revolved at double their velocity. Each half of the turbine was directly coupled to its own alternator, producing three-phase current of a frequency of about 50 a second at a voltage of about 800. The alternators of each set were electrically locked, ensuring exactly equal speed, and consequently equal power, on each rotating half of the turbine. Two sets of turbo-alternators were provided in each vessel, and the two alternators of each set worked in parallel. They had each only one pair of poles, but the two motors to which they supplied current had each five pairs of poles and therefore rotated at one-fifth of their speed. These motors were connected to pinions with helical teeth which geared in the ordinary way into a large gear wheel



LJUNGSTRÖM TURBINES.

Upper casing removed, exposing the turbine and steam chests and the ends of the rotors.



STOKEHOLD OF A COAL-FIRED BATTLESHIP.

secured to the screw shaft, and the combination of electrical and mechanical gear enabled the turbine running at 3,600 revolutions a minute to turn the screw at 76 revolutions. The turbines always ran in the same direction, reversal of the screw being effected electrically by the motors. Variations of speed down to about 80 per cent. of the maximum were obtained by altering the supply of steam to the turbine, and for lower speeds the regulation was effected by interposing resistances in the circuit.

Britain possesses enormous reserves of coal

of qualities suitable for naval purposes, and the Admiralty steam coals produced in the Rhondda Valley of South Wales are famous all over the world. Coal accordingly remained the staple fuel of the British Navy for many years, and it was not until the opening of the twentieth century that, so far as naval ships were concerned, liquid fuel in the shape of mineral oil began to enter into serious competition with the solid fuel.

During the coal period, owing to the constant increase in the size and power of the engines and consequently in their demands for

steam, measures had to be taken to increase the amount of coal that could be burnt in a given time in a furnace of given size, so that the additional heat released might generate more steam without undue increase in the boiler installations. The demand for a larger supply of steam could, of course, have been satisfied, without interfering with the furnace arrangements, by providing more boilers, but this course was impracticable in warships because it would have required more space than could be spared for the purpose. It therefore became necessary to intensify the combustion by ceasing to rely simply on the natural draught produced by the funnel and supplementing it by devices that caused the fire to burn more fiercely.

An early device of this kind consisted of a steam jet placed at the bottom of the funnel, but though effective enough it wasted too much fresh water, which is a precious commodity in a ship, Jets of compressed air, instead of steam, were also used in the same way, but were not found advantageous. Another plan which was adopted in some of the ships of the Navy was to put exhaust fans in the funnel to suck away the products of combustion, and still another was to blow air into the ashpits, which had to be closed for the purpose. In 1882 the closed stokehold system of forced draught was adopted in the *Conqueror*, and subsequently came into extensive use in the Navy. With this the boiler rooms were made air-tight, and a pressure of air was maintained in them by means of fans, air-locks being provided to enable men to enter or leave them without releasing the pressure. In the *Conqueror* this arrangement increased the power of the boilers by 68 per cent. over that obtained with natural draught, with a mean air pressure of $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches, and in the *Sanspareil* six years later the boilers were made to develop 20 indicated horse-power for each square foot of grate area with two inches pressure of air. But it was found that forcing the boilers too much in this way gave rise to troubles such as leaky tubes, and before the tank type had been abandoned for the water tube type it was considered advisable to limit the forced draught to a figure corresponding to about 12 indicated horse-power per square foot of grate, and to increase the heating surface per indicated horse-power, which had been reduced so low as 1.7 square foot, to not less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ square feet.

According to one authority the weight of

coal that can be burnt per square foot of grate area per hour is approximately 16 to 20 lb. with natural draught; 25 to 28 lb. under forced draught with $\frac{1}{2}$ inch air pressure; 33 to 36 lb. with 1 inch air pressure; 40 to 45 lb. with 2 inches; 55 to 60 lb. with 3 inches, and 70 to 80 lb. with 4 inches. High air pressures, however, are not economical, for though the amount of steam generated is increased, it is not increased proportionally to the amount of coal burnt. For example, in a trial with a Babcock and Wilcox marine (water-tube) boiler, nearly 25 lb. of coal were burned per square foot of grate area per hour under natural draught and nearly 11 lb. of water were evaporated per lb. of coal per hour; but under 3 inches forced draught, while the weight of coal consumed per square foot of grate area per hour increased to over 70 lb., the weight of water evaporated per lb. of coal fell to $8\frac{3}{4}$ lb.

The first attempt to use oil for raising steam in a warship was made in America by Colonel Foote in 1863. Inside the furnace of a gunboat he fitted a retort in which the oil was gasified with the aid of steam, the gas produced being burnt in the furnace. The trial trip was successful enough, but in practice the arrangement was a failure because it soon became choked with carbon. Subsequent experiments with vaporization systems were equally unsuccessful, but they were probably responsible for Admirals Fishburn and Selwyn drawing the attention of the British Admiralty to oil fuel in the 'seventies. The time, however, was not ripe for the innovation, and no measure of success was obtained until the plan of burning the oil in an atomized, or finely broken up condition, was introduced.

In 1900, when progress in this direction had been made, the Admiralty began experiments, and the memorandum of the First Lord for 1901-2 stated that a method of assisting the combustion of coal by oil fuel was being tested in the destroyer *Surly*. While the experiments were being carried out that vessel was a standing joke at Portsmouth on account of the dense smoke poured out from her funnels.

This fact illustrates one of the difficulties that were encountered in utilizing oil fuel in the Navy, for no commander wishes to make himself conspicuous to an enemy by a trail of smoke behind his ships, and the fact that Welsh steam coal with careful stoking can be burnt with little or no smoke is one of its

beauties from the naval point of view. On the other hand, the readiness with which oil can be made to yield smoke has its advantages

on occasion, as the Germans found in sundry instances in the war, when they disguised their precise position from pursuing British ships by



COALING AT SEA.


enveloping themselves in a thick veil of smoke.

Perseverance, however, brought success, and put Great Britain, as regards the use of oil in the furnaces of warships, several years ahead of any other Power; in fact, almost exactly at the time that the problem of smokeless combustion was solved in this country, a Board of Naval Engineers on Liquid Fuel in America had to confess that they were not within sight of reaching the desired end. In the course of the next few

years many completed ships and others that were building were adapted for burning oil in combination with coal. The naval manœuvres of 1906 afforded a striking instance of the usefulness of this course, for when the King Edward class of battleships, under Vice-Admiral Sir William May, were chased by a superior force of older vessels, under Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, they were able to race away from their pursuers merely by turning on their oil sprays. After that time most ships in the Navy were fitted with appliances for burning oil, coal,



METHOD OF BURNING OIL IN A YARROW BOILER.



OIL BUNKERING AT SEA.

[Engineering.]

however, being retained as the main fuel except in the case of torpedo craft. The first flotilla of ocean-going destroyers wholly dependent on oil was created in 1909, and with the Queen Elizabeth and her sister ships of the 1912-13 programme came the "all-oil" battleship.

Very many devices have been invented for atomizing the oil, and reducing it to the condition of a fine spray or mist, the minute particles of which come into contact with abundance of air, and so are thoroughly consumed without the production of smoke. Three agents are used—steam, compressed air, and mechanical pressure. Many burners of the steam type produce a long narrow cone of flame which gives successful results in cases where there is plenty of combustion space available, but is not so suitable with the wide but comparatively short combustion spaces found with the water-tube boilers employed in naval ships. Moreover, a not inconsiderable amount of steam must be used, about 4 or 5 per cent. of the total generated, and this means a loss of fresh water which cannot be disregarded. Compressed air has theoretically the advantage that much of the air needed for combustion is supplied with the atomized oil, and the flame is shortened; but, on the other hand, the necessary air-compressors take up space which cannot always be conveniently found on a ship. The third method, in which

the oil is forced out under high pressure, pulverizing itself in its escape, has found most favour for naval purposes. The oil pumping plant required is compact, and the steam used for driving it can be recovered.

Some pressure burners impart a swirling or rotary motion to the injected jet of oil mist, which materially contributes to proper combustion. If a jet of oil mist is driven into the furnace unmixed with air, it can burn only from the exterior, no air being able to enter the flame; and as the length of the flame is governed by the distance it must travel in order to obtain sufficient oxygen from the air to be completely burnt, the flare of oil mist becomes so elongated that there is not sufficient room in the combustion space for all its carbon to be oxidized and smoke results. But if instead of the oil mist and air being allowed to flow forward as more or less independent streams, they are forced to mix by giving both of them a swirling motion, or if the air is forced by other means into the oil-mist, then the length of flame is reduced and smokeless combustion is assured within the limits of the available space. Either forced or induced draught is usually adopted to provide the furnace with a sufficient supply of air. With pressure burners the oil must be preheated in order to reduce its viscosity and make it flow more freely. This can be done conveniently by



OIL BUNKERING IN PORT.

passing it through a nest of tubes which are heated externally by steam. Measures must also be taken to ensure that the oil is free from water, even a small bubble of which may interrupt the flow in the burner.

When oil is used as an auxiliary to coal the fire bars are left in place, but the furnace fronts are provided with oil burners and independent air supply valves, which are shut off when coal only is being used. When oil is to be burnt the fires are levelled, the air supply below the bars cut off, and the oil burners with air supply above the fuel bed brought into use.

The primary attraction of oil for use in raising steam in warships is that it is a more concentrated fuel than coal. Different oils and coals both vary in calorific power, but roughly it may be said that the number of British thermal units in a pound of good coal is 14,000, and in a pound of oil 20,000. On this showing 70 tons of oil are equivalent to 100 tons of coal, supposing that in practice the heat can be transferred to the water of the boiler equally effectively, and in this respect oil is held to have the advantage. For a given weight of fuel, therefore, the radius of action of a ship is proportionately increased—Mr. Winston Churchill, in his statement to Parliament on oil fuel in July, 1913, put the

extent of this increase as "nearly 40 per cent." Other advantages are that the boilers weigh less and occupy less space, that oil can be carried in remote parts of the ship from which coal could not be brought to the boiler room, and also in double bottoms; and that it can be readily pumped on board through a pipe from tanks on shore or from an oil steamer, whereas the operation of coaling a ship is unpleasant even in harbour, and is at the best difficult at sea unless the weather is good. The number of men in the stokehold is reduced, because hand labour is not wanted for trimming and stoking, while those who are required work under better and less exhausting conditions. There are no ashes to be disposed of, and no coal dust in an "all-oil" ship. Superior control of the output of steam is obtained; an order for increased speed can be responded to more quickly, and a reduction in the demand for steam, such as is caused by stoppage of the engines, can be met without waste.

On the other hand, there are some disadvantages. The extra pumps and piping add to the complication of the machinery and also the weight; the protection obtained from the coal bunkers is lost in an "all-oil" ship, and the danger from fire is increased should the tanks be pierced by a shot and the oil allowed to escape. But the chief practical objection

hinges upon the question of supply. The British Isles contain no great oil field—or, at any rate, none has yet been proved and worked—and though no doubt the output of shale oil is capable of increase and there are possibilities of oil being distilled from coal or peat, yet we must depend largely on imports from overseas. Mr. Churchill dealt with this question in the speech already referred to, and stated that while his advisers were of opinion that some losses by an enemy's action might be anticipated, no serious effect on our naval movements need be feared from this cause in war, if the reserves were maintained in peace and so long as the British command of the sea, on which all else depended, was effectively maintained. He outlined the ultimate policy of the Admiralty as being to become the independent owners and producers of their supplies of liquid fuel, first by building up an oil reserve in this country sufficient to make us safe in war and able to override price fluctuations in time of peace; secondly by acquiring the power to deal in crude oils as they came cheaply into the market and to treat them for naval use; and thirdly, to become the owners, or at any rate the controllers, at the source of at least a portion of the

supply of natural oil required by the Navy.* But he also remarked that it was not on oil-burning ships that we depended, or were likely to depend for many years to come, for the protection of our trade routes, and from this point of view there is significance in the brightly polished shovel prominently displayed in "all-oil" ships with the inscription "Lest we forget."

Besides burning oil under a boiler and, by transferring the heat thus generated to water, producing high-pressure steam for use in a steam engine, there is another way of utilizing it for the production of power, by burning it mixed with air within the cylinder of an internal combustion engine; the heat then expands the products of combustion to many times their original volume, and the pressure thus created drives forward the piston of the engine, just as does the high-pressure steam in the cylinder of a reciprocating steam engine, and so produces

* It was in pursuance of this policy that, as the result of a favourable report by a committee sent out in October 1913 under Vice-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, the Government were authorized in June 1914 to acquire share or loan capital in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to the extent of £2,200,000. See Chapter LII., Vol. 3, p. 109.



OIL-FIRED BOILERS.

Photographed while the ship was running at full speed.

power. Being more direct than the other, this method might be expected to waste less heat, and therefore to be more economical; and in fact, whereas by the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century the possibility of obtaining one horse-power per hour by the burning of about $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of heavy oil under a boiler and using the resulting steam in turbines was at least in sight, if it had not been actually realized, at the same period one horse-power per hour could be obtained by the consumption of something like half that amount of oil in an internal combustion engine. To the naval

increasing their size and power, were manufactured only in comparatively small units yielding only a few hundred horse-power per cylinder. Accordingly, to get the large powers required to drive the large and fast ships of the Navy the complication and inconvenience of installing and working a great number of small units would have had to be accepted. Nevertheless, this difficulty did not deter responsible engineers from seriously taking up the problem, and various plans for the application of oil engines even to the larger naval ships were put forward from time to time.



OIL-MOTOR ROOM OF A GERMAN SUBMARINE.

engineer, always on the look out for means that will enable his ships to go farther with a given amount of fuel, the prospects offered by such engines, with their elimination of all the paraphernalia of boilers, would appear particularly attractive; yet apart from motor boats and some oil tank vessels they were employed in the British Navy for the propulsion of practically only submarines.

One reason was that steam turbines could be made of large sizes, giving thousands of horse-power, so that the power required for even the largest ships could be obtained from a comparatively small number of units; oil engines, on the contrary, although promising experiments were being made with the object of

For example, in 1907, Mr. James McKeelnie, of Messrs. Vickers, discussed the question before the Institution of Naval Architects, more especially from the point of view of the placing and use of heavy guns. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that one advantage of the screw propeller over the paddle wheel was that it did away with the interference to the working and training of the guns caused by the paddle-wheel boxes. But even with the screw, the funnels with their uptakes impose some disadvantage, and the guns with their ammunition hoists and connected mechanism have to be placed in positions dictated by the necessary arrangement of the boilers and propelling machinery rather than by tactical considera-

tions. If therefore by the adoption of internal combustion engines the funnels could be abolished and the decks freed from the obstructions brought about by them, considerable advantage would be gained in respect of the arrangement and working of the guns, which, for example, would have a much wider arc of training, with the result of increasing the fighting power of the ship for a given armament.

Mr. McKechnie considered a 16,000 horse-power battleship, and proposed to use a form of internal combustion engine which had been developed at the Vickers works at Barrow-in-Furness, and which could be worked either by producer gas or by oil. The ship was to be propelled by four screws, each driven by a ten-cylinder vertical gas engine, placed in the aft compartments; gas-producers of the pressure type were to occupy the central compartments, and forward of them were to be four sets of air-compressors also driven by gas engines. The weights and other particulars of the machinery, according as the ship was fitted for propulsion by steam, gas, or oil, were compared in the following table:

	Steam	Gas	Oil
Weight of machinery I.H.P. per ton ...	1,585 tons 10·1	1,105 tons 14·48	750 tons 21·33
Area occupied by machinery, engines and boilers or producers ...	7,250 sq. ft.	5,850 sq. ft.	4,110 sq. ft.
Area per i.h.p. ...	0·453 sq. ft.	0·366 sq. ft.	0·257 sq. ft.
Fuel consumption per lb. per i.h.p. per hour:—			
At full power ...	1·6	1·0	0·6
At about quarter full power ...	1·66	1·15	0·75

Nine years later, also at the Institution of Naval Architects, Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Sillince attacked the question of applying Diesel oil engines to the propulsion of warships of different classes. For large and fast destroyers he concluded that the weight of Diesel engines, roughly double in proportion to power developed that of the steam turbines with oil-fired boilers used in such vessels, put them out of the running, since it would not be compensated for by saving in fuel, and the case of light unarmoured cruisers was much the same. For large cruisers, of a power of the order of 70,000 shaft horse-power, and a speed of 30 knots, he decided, after working out various alternatives, that the only reasonable

solution was to use cylinders of only moderate power (say, 750 to 1,500 horse-power), a considerable number of cylinders per shaft, and not fewer than four shafts—preferably six or eight. With six shafts, and 12 1,000 horse-power cylinders on each, the weight would be 5,000 tons, including all auxiliaries, and with eight screw shafts, each with 12 750 horse-power cylinders, it would be 4,750 tons. It may be noted that as compared with these weights, geared turbine installations would have the advantage, though the oil engines would mean a saving in the weight of fuel to be carried for the same radius of action. For battleships, with smaller requirements of power, he concluded that with four shafts equal powers and speeds could be obtained from Diesel engines as from steam with equal weights of machinery, and that oil engines would enable the radius of action to be increased at least threefold at full speed, and fourfold at cruising speeds. But while regarding the use of oil engines for the propulsion of battleships and large cruisers as an engineering possibility, he indicated that Diesel engines had not yet been satisfactorily developed to the sizes contemplated in his calculations.

With the disappearance of sails from the ships of the Fleet—the abolition of training in masts and yards was formally announced in 1901—the task imposed on the engine-room branch became greater and greater, for just as warships were helpless without their machinery, so the machinery in turn was useless without men to work it. In 1830 the Admiralty felt it “their bounden duty to discourage the introduction of steam, as calculated to strike a fatal blow to the naval supremacy of the Empire”; in 1902 they spoke of the warship as “one huge box of engines.” In the years following the Naval Defence Act of 1889 the Navy underwent enormous and almost continuous expansion. Not only was the number of ships in it immensely increased, but, as will be evident from the preceding account of the mechanical developments of that period, the efforts of the engineering advisers to the Admiralty brought about tremendous advances in the speed and power of the individual units, with consequent increase in the responsibilities of the men entrusted with their management and manipulation.

The question of providing sufficient numbers of officers and men adequately trained for their

duties in the light of the mechanical character of the modern warship thus became of prime importance, and it was recognition of this fact that led to the promulgation, at the end of 1902, of the scheme of naval training associated with the names of Lord Selborne and Lord Fisher. Previously the engineers of the Navy had been a class apart, entering as students between the ages of 14½ and 16½ and separately trained in engineering, but without any training in executive duties. There had been a good deal of agitation for the improvement of their status

noting executive rank. Lord Fisher, indeed, with his marvellous prevision, was the first naval authority to recognize fully the value of the engineering side of the Navy and the necessity that all executive naval officers should have an engineering training.

The system of common entry was therefore instituted. Under it all officers for the executive and engineer branches of the Navy and for the Royal Marines were to enter the service as naval cadets under exactly the same conditions between the ages of 12 and 13, two years earlier



[Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co.]

AN OIL-SHIP DISCHARGING HER CARGO.

generally, and that the problems they presented had not been overlooked is shown by the fact that in 14 years 14 Orders in Council were issued affecting the engineer officers. The Selborne-Fisher scheme, which began to come into operation in 1903, recognized a fact expressed by President Roosevelt in the words: "Every officer on board a modern vessel in reality has to be an engineer whether he wants to or not; everything on board such a vessel goes by machinery, and every officer . . . has to do engineer's work." Its object was to cast an engineering tinge over all officers, and to that end it ordained that the first years of training should be the same for all of them, whatever the direction in which they might ultimately specialize. In connexion with the effect which the scheme was intended to have in the direction of unifying the executive and the engineering branches, it is noteworthy that it was Lord Fisher who was responsible for one of the latest concessions to the engineers, in the shape of the coveted curl on the sleeve, de

than the cadets under the old system. They were then to be trained all in exactly the same way until they had passed for the rank of sub-lieutenant between the ages of 19 and 20. They were to spend their first four years at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, receiving elementary instruction in physics and marine engineering and the use of tools and machines, and then were to go to sea as midshipmen for three years. During this period special attention was to be paid to their instruction in mechanics and the other applied sciences, and to marine engineering, under the supervision of the engineer, gunnery, marine, navigating and torpedo lieutenants of their respective ships; and after its expiry, on satisfactorily passing the specified examinations, they were to become acting sub-lieutenants. A three months' course in mathematics and navigation and pilotage was to follow at Greenwich, and then a six months' course in gunnery, torpedo, and engineering at Portsmouth; then, after passing more examinations, they were to be

confirmed in the rank of sub-lieutenant. At this stage their careers were for the first time to begin to diverge, and they were to be posted to the executive or the engineering branch of the Navy or to the Royal Marines, freedom of choice being allowed so far as possible. Those sub-lieutenants who elected to specialize in engineering were to go to Keyham Engineering College for a professional course, after which some were to go to Greenwich for a further course, and the remainder to sea. All would then, if qualified, be promoted to be lieutenants under the same conditions as the executives. This is an outline of the original scheme, more particularly as it affected the engineering branch, put forward in Lord Selborne's memorandum, but sundry modifications were subsequently made in it, without, however, changing its general character.

It was arranged under the scheme that the ranks of engineer officers should be assimilated to the corresponding ranks of executive officers, and that the former should wear the same uniform and bear the same titles of rank—sub-lieutenant (E), lieutenant (E), commander (E), captain (E), and rear-admiral (E), to which was subsequently added lieutenant-commander (E). At the same time it was thought desirable to harmonize the position of the existing officers of the engineering branch with the new order of things. Accordingly assistant engineers for temporary service and assistant engineers became engineer sub-lieutenants; engineers, chief engineers, and staff engineers became engineer-lieutenants; fleet engineers became engineer-commanders; inspectors of machinery became engineer-captains, and chief inspectors of machinery became engineer rear-admirals. The engineer-in-chief became an engineer rear-admiral, but the Admiralty reserved the power, which they exercised in the case of Sir A. J. Durston, the chief engineer at the time the scheme came into operation, and his two successors, to promote the officer holding that high post to the rank of engineer vice-admiral. The pay of engineering officers was also raised.

A scheme for the advancement of men in the engineering branch to commissioned rank from the lower deck was instituted at the beginning of 1914, nearly two years after a similar arrangement had been brought into force for the executive branch. Lord Selborne's memorandum had expressed the desire of the Admiralty to see their way to promote a certain proportion

of gunners, boatswains and carpenters to the commissioned ranks, and had announced that a list had already been drawn up of 60 appointments to which those officers could be advanced. The proportion of each branch of warrant officer to be promoted to lieutenant was to be the same, as nearly as possible, as the proportion of each of those branches to the combined total of the warrant officers' list, and a proportionate allotment was promised on the same principles to the warrant officers of the engineer branch.

The rank of mate (E)—that is, mate engineering—was established in January, 1914. The arrangement was that recommended candidates finally selected by the Admiralty were, after passing a qualifying examination, to be given the rank of acting mate (E), and then to attend courses at Greenwich and Keyham. Examinations followed each course, and if the acting mates passed successfully they were confirmed in their rank and appointed to seagoing ships, where they messed in the wardroom. After a minimum period of service of two years as acting mate (E) and mate (E) they were to be promoted to engineer lieutenants, and afterwards were to be subject in all respects to the regulations applying to officers of that rank. The first list of mates (E), 12 in number, was published in December, 1914, with seniority of November 1, and the first three to pass, after the two years' qualifying service in the Fleet, were promoted to acting engineer lieutenants on November 1, 1916.

From its very nature the Selborne-Fisher scheme of training could come into full operation only gradually, and its effects could not make themselves felt for many years. Indeed, in order to keep up the supply of officers, the old system had to be maintained concurrently for a period which in the case of the engineers extended to five years; and it was not until April, 1914, that the first batch of lieutenants specializing in engineering joined the Royal Naval Engineering College at Keyham for their final year of professional training, after serving at sea as commissioned officers for two years, a portion of which time they spent, like all other officers under the new scheme, in the engine room, performing the ordinary duties of junior engineer officers. The great bulk of the engineers in the ships that fought in the war must therefore have been trained under the old system, and whatever the new methods were to



BRITANNIA ROYAL NAVAL COLLEGE, DARTMOUTH.

bring forth in the future, that at least was most amply vindicated by results.

Just as a warship's engines are buried out of sight in the depths of its interior below the water line, so few of the deeds done by those in charge of them came into the light of day. The efforts of the engine-room staffs were, however, generously recognized by the admirals in command at the three great naval battles of the Falkland Islands, the Dogger Bank, and Jutland. As regards the first Sir Doveton Sturdee said in his dispatch that great credit was due to the engineer officers of the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed, and he referred specially to the case of the *Kent*, which, thanks to the "excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room staff," was able to get within range of the *Nürnberg* and sink her. As Mr. Churchill subsequently explained to Parliament, the *Kent* was a vessel 13 years old, designed to go only 23½ knots, but she was forced up to 25 knots and thus was able to catch the *Nürnberg*, which had a speed considerably over 24½ knots.

At the Dogger Bank action Sir David Beatty said the excellent steaming of the ships was a conspicuous feature, and later Mr. Churchill added that all the vessels engaged in the action exceeded all their previous records in steaming, without exception. He continued:

Here is a squadron of the Fleet which does not lie in harbour but is far away from its dockyard and which during six months of war has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden the greatest trial is demanded of their engines, and they all excel all the previous peace-time records. Can you conceive a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British machinery, of the glorious industry of the engine-room branch?

At Jutland Sir David Beatty said that "as usual the engine-room departments of all ships

displayed the highest qualities of technical skill, discipline and endurance. High speed is a primary factor in the squadron under my command [the Battle-Cruiser Fleet], and the engine-room departments never fail." Again, Sir John Jellicoe reported that while the battle fleet was proceeding at full speed to close the battle-cruiser fleet in the same action, the steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested, and he attributed great credit to the engine-room departments for the manner in which they, "as always," responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels. In another part of his dispatch he stated that failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and that several instances were reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room staffs of injured ships. The artisan ratings, he added, also carried out much valuable work during and after the action, and could not have done better.

One other passage from his dispatch may be quoted in conclusion:

It must never be forgotten that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under such conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review.

A distinguished admiral, who was a vigorous critic of the Selborne-Fisher scheme of training, once said that so far as nerve trial goes the engineer's post is an easy one. Mr. Kipling showed a much juster appreciation of the facts when he wrote the lines, "To bide in the heart of an eight-day clock The death they cannot see. . . . And die in the peeling steam."

CHAPTER CLXXXVII.

PRISONERS OF WAR. (II.)

CHANGING CONDITIONS—STATISTICS OF PRISONERS—THE BRITISH REPORT ON WITTENBERG—A RECORD OF GERMAN CRUELTY—THE TYPHUS OUTBREAK AT GARDELEGEN—STENDAL AND OTHER TYPHUS CAMPS—MR. GERARD ON GERMAN PLEASANTRIES—OFFICER PRISONERS—BLANKENBURG AND KRONACH—HINDENBURG AND THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING NURSE—THE DEATH OF PRIVATE TULLY—ROGER CASEMENT AND THE IRISH PRISONERS—PRISONERS' COMPLAINTS—FOOD—PUNISHMENTS—THE SAND BATH—EXPLOITATION OF PRISONER-OF-WAR LABOUR—HOW PRISONERS WERE KEPT AT WORK—THE MANUFACTURE OF MUNITIONS—PRISONERS AT KRUPP'S—BEHIND THE LINES ON THE WESTERN FRONT—THE AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS—BRITISH SOLDIERS AT LIBAU—SAVAGE REPRISALS ON THE EASTERN FRONT—PRISONERS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA—MESOPOTAMIA—HOW PRISONERS WERE HELPED—THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE—THE QUESTION OF PRIVATE PARCELS—THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRISONERS—THE RECORD COMMITTEE—EXCHANGE OF DISABLED MEN—DESPATCH OF WOUNDED AND INVALIDS TO SWITZERLAND—HOW THE RUSSIANS WERE TREATED—GERMAN PROPAGANDA AMONG PRISONERS—SOME INDIVIDUAL RECORDS—INDUSTRIAL CAMPS AND FACTORIES—RUSSIAN DEATH ROLL—SERBIAN PRISONERS—CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS—ESCAPES—THE OUTLOOK IN 1917.

THE history of the German treatment of prisoners of war up to the early summer of 1917 divides itself naturally into three stages. There came first a period of great neglect and vindictive, active hatred. This was followed by a time of betterment, when conditions in many camps improved, when the fierce antagonism of the civilian population had partly abated, and when men on both sides were attempting to humanize the conditions under which the prisoners lived. The third stage arrived when the Germans organized and developed a system for the exploitation of prisoner labour, to produce munitions and foodstuffs, and to replace the lost industrial manhood of the nation.

The Germans had large numbers of men on their hands. The Russians alone in Germany and Austria were roughly estimated, early in 1917, at about two millions. The Serbian prisoners numbered 150,000. No figures were to be had about the French prisoners, but they were known to be very numerous. The British prisoners in Germany numbered, in June, 1917, 1,354 officers and 34,304 of other ranks. The number of Allied prisoners in Germany—apart

Vol. XII—Part 150.

from Austria—was stated in a semi-official return in August, 1916, to be 1,663,794. Other estimates were higher. Thus Mr. Gerard, the former American Ambassador in Berlin, reckoned the number of prisoners at two millions. The total was probably much the same a year later, as the further prisoners taken would have largely compensated for those exchanged, and for the very large number—particularly of Russians—who died from tuberculosis and other diseases.

The first stage of neglect and vindictive hatred lasted until the second year of the war. Prisoners were insulted by civilians, whenever they could reach them. In many camps they were systematically ill-treated by their guards. They were poorly housed—sometimes kept wholly in the open—ill clad and ill fed. They were denied the simplest necessities of life. Their sick and dying were often left without adequate treatment. Many details of this period were given in an earlier chapter. Later information added to the horrors.

Thus the account of the sufferings of Allied prisoners at Wittenberg given in Chapter CII. was supplemented later by a report from the

British Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War. This Committee examined various returned prisoners, including the British Army doctors who were at Wittenberg, on oath. Its report appalled the civilized world.

Wittenberg Camp covered 10½ acres, and was



[Russell.

MR. JUSTICE YOUNGER,

Chairman of the Committee on the Treatment of British Prisoners of War.

built on a flat, sandy plain. The number of prisoners there, between 15,000 and 17,000, largely exceeded the accommodation of the buildings. They were mostly Russians, but there were a number of French and Belgians, and between 700 and 800 British.

The winter of 1914-15 was extremely severe. The men were insufficiently clothed, and there was little artificial heat available. The overcoats of most of the British prisoners had been taken from them on their capture, and no fresh ones supplied. Their remaining clothes were often in rags. There were many with neither boots nor socks. Their food was bad and insufficient.

The German authorities could not have adopted surer methods had they desired to cause an outbreak of typhus. This disease was known to be latent among the Russian troops. Instead of keeping the men of other nations apart, all were mixed together. Each British prisoner had as his sleeping companions

one Russian and one Frenchman. There was only one mattress for three prisoners.

Prisoners arrived covered with vermin. No attempt was made to clean them, and they had no facilities for cleaning themselves, had they wished. Lice are the great medium for conveying typhus. When the disease showed itself, a request was made that the remaining healthy English prisoners might be placed together in one compound. It was insultingly refused.

The epidemic broke out in December, 1914. The German staff, doctor, orderlies, officers, guards, immediately left the camp, drew a cordon around it, and held no communication with the prisoners until the following August, except by directions which they shouted from the outside of the wire entanglements. Food and other supplies for the men were pushed over the wires by means of chutes.

Six British medical officers, who had been detained by the Germans contrary to the Hague Convention, were sent to Wittenberg. They were Major Fry, Major Priestly, Captain Sutcliffe, Captain Field, Captain Vidal, and Captain (then Lieutenant) Lauder. They arrived on February 11, 1915. They only learned of typhus being in the camp from the guard on the train. "They visited the different compounds," says the report. "They were received in apathetic silence. The rooms were unlighted, the men were aimlessly marching up and down, some were lying on the floor, probably sickening for typhus. When they got into the open air again Major Fry broke down. The horror of it all was for the moment more than he could bear."

Major Priestly and Captain Vidal were sent to two temporary hospitals outside the camp and four officers were left inside. They found an appalling condition of things, many ill, many without attention, dirt, neglect and semi-starvation everywhere. In the improvised hospital there were no mattresses. Sick prisoners were hidden everywhere in the camp, refusing to go into hospital. There were no stretchers to carry the typhus cases on. They had to be carried on tables from which men ate their food. As these tables could not be washed, they proved an effective means of conveying the disease. The German authorities refused to permit the most elementary precautions to be taken. During the first month the daily food ration for each patient was half a *petit pain* and half a cup of milk. Their

soup camp from the camp kitchen in a wooden tub without a cover and arrived full of dust and dirt.

The four medical officers left in the camp were all attacked with the disease. Major Fry, Captain Sutcliffe, and Captain Field, died. Captain Lauder was stricken last of all. He alone of the four recovered. On March 11 Major Priestly and Captain Vidal were sent back to the main camp. They were met by Captain Field. Major Fry and Captain Sutcliffe were then dying, and Captain Lauder was in the early stages of typhus. Captain Field succumbed soon after.

"Major Priestly saw delirious men waving arms brown to the elbow with faecal matter. The patients were alive with vermin; in the half light he attempted to brush what he took to be an accumulation of dust from the folds of a patient's clothes, and he discovered it to be a moving mass of lice. In one room in Compound No. 8 the patients lay so close to one another on the floor that he had to stand straddle-legged across them to examine them."

It was extremely difficult to obtain sufficient drugs and dressings. Bed sores were common. In several cases toes or the whole foot were attacked by gangrene, dressings were not available to treat them, and consequently the limbs had to be amputated.

The three officers left, Major Priestly, Captain Vidal, and Captain Lauder, the last

named bravely resuming his duty when convalescent, threw themselves into the work of bringing order out of chaos. They secured some improvement in the diet. Clothing, boots and bedding were gradually collected. About four weeks after Major Priestly came back Dr. Aschenbach, the German doctor supposed to be in charge of the camp, paid his one visit to it. He came attired in a complete suit of protective clothing, including a mask. He made a brief and rapid inspection and did not return.

The whole administration of Wittenberg Camp was in keeping with the handling of the typhus epidemic. The cruelty there from the very commencement had become notorious. Savage dogs were kept to terrorise the prisoners. Men were frequently flogged with rubber whips, beaten at the whim of their guards and tied to posts with their arms above their heads for hours. This cruelty revealed itself in gratuitous form even during the height of the epidemic.

The dead were buried in a cemetery formed out of part of the camp. So many died that there was not room for all, and the coffins were piled one above another. "What the prisoners found hardest to bear in this matter," says the Report, "were the jeers with which the coffins were frequently greeted by the inhabitants of Wittenberg who stood outside and were permitted to insult their dead."



WITTENBERG CAMP.

Out of between 250 and 300 English cases there were 60 deaths, and had it not been for the splendid work of the British Medical Staff and orderlies few would have escaped. The British Medical Officers in their fight for improved conditions were strongly backed by Mr. Gerard and his representatives. He visited the camp and made indignant representations to the German authorities.

The record of Wittenberg was rivalled by that of Gardelegen, a large camp between Berlin and Hanover, holding some 11,000 prisoners, mainly French, Russian and Belgians, and including 260 British. Here, in February, 1915, an epidemic of typhus broke out. The conditions largely resembled those at Wittenberg. The prisoners of different nationalities were mixed together, Russians with latent typhus being placed side by side with British and French. The compounds were overcrowded. The huts for the men contained four rows of palliasses stuffed with straw or shavings. Each palliasse touched the other, and only the narrowest passageway was left between the rows. Here the men of all nationalities were packed together. They lived, slept and fed, sitting on their bags of shavings to eat their meals—for there were no tables or stools—walking over each other in

passing in and out. "They lay there sick," wrote Major Davy of the R.A.M.C., who was called to the camp, "and later on in many cases died there cheek by jowl with their fellow prisoners."

Most of the prisoners were half starved. The British and French received parcels from home. The Russians received scarcely anything, and it was nothing unusual to see a crowd of them on their hands and knees in the pit in which potato peelings were thrown, struggling to find a stray potato or a piece of rind with a little more potato on it than usual. The prisoners of all nationalities were miserably clothed. Many of them had no boots at all. Thus, out of 260 British, only about 30 had a pair of serviceable boots. One hundred who were bootless had to walk about with their feet tied up in straw and rags or in blanket slippers which they had made for themselves. Their mixed clothing was ragged bits of Belgian, French or Russian uniforms; their overcoats had, as a rule, been taken away when they were captured. They wore unspeakably filthy and swarming with vermin, being unable to keep themselves clean. Their guards, German N.C.O.'s, bullied them in a most outrageous way, driving them about with kicks and blows.

Early in February the German authorities



PARCELS FROM HOME.



A SPORTS GROUND, BUT NO SPORT.

became fearful that an epidemic was impending, and doctors, themselves prisoners of war—four French, three British, and one Russian—were sent to the camp. Three more Russian doctors came later. The three British were Major P. C. T. Davy, Captain A. J. Brown and Captain Scott-Williams. The British doctors were horrified at what they saw. Major Davy, in describing the scene to the British Government Committee wrote :

In passing through the camp on the day we arrived I had been struck by the complete silence everywhere. A few prisoners were standing or pacing to and fro, singly and in groups, in complete dejection and apathy. There was no talking or laughter, nobody was playing games. The only sounds heard were brutally shouted orders of the sentries, who were closely posted in every direction. Now, in passing from one company to another, and talking to the prisoners, one could not but be struck by the gaunt, hunted look they all bore. So much wretchedness and sickness concentrated in such a small area, such a sense of the absence of any sort of human feeling, made one utterly shocked and miserable. It was still sadder to see that what was all so horrible to me in its novelty had for them become so much part of their life that they accepted it almost without comment.

Captain Brown said that on entering the barrack room the first time the shock he received was too awful for words. He found there about 150 of the most miserable human objects he ever beheld. "The men were emaciated, ill clad, and dirty beyond description, and in most

cases were engaged in killing as many lice as possible in their clothes, "to keep the numbers down as much as possible," as one put it.

The doctors next morning met the camp commandant, Colonel Brunner, at the camp hospital. He was a man of extremely violent temper and always brutal towards the prisoners. He treated them, whatever their nationality, not as prisoners of war, but as men who had earned and were to receive rigorous punishment. He told the doctors that if they obeyed orders and did their work without complaining they would be well treated, but if not they would be punished. They saw Dr. Wenzil, the German Staff doctor of the camp, who showed them a hospital very much overcrowded and a meagre supply of drugs and dressings, about four ounces of epsom salts and three or four dozen tablets each of quinine, aspirin and calomel. There were, besides, a dozen or two bandages, an armful of gauze and lint dressings and a very small case of surgeon's instruments. This was the hospital equipment.

Typhus came and the number of cases mounted rapidly. At first the fact that it was typhus was not clearly established, but a commission of German doctors arrived and evidently satisfied itself that the disease was



INNER GATE OF LANGENSALZA CAMP, GUARDED BY A RUSSIAN.

genuine typhus. Then followed a desertion of the camp by the Germans similar to the cowardly flight from Wittenberg. In two hours not a German was left. Every German orderly disappeared, as did Dr. Wenzil and Dr. Wenzil's assistant. The German women in the prison kitchens disappeared. The German guards led back their dogs, unlocking every gate of every compound and withdrawing beyond the outermost barbed wire fence. The prisoners could not at first make out what had happened.

Later in the afternoon the French, Russian and English doctors were summoned to the outer barbed wire to meet the commandant. He told them that the camp was in quarantine. A sentry cordon had been drawn round it. Nothing of any kind was to pass out. The sentries had orders to shoot anyone who attempted to leave. He held the doctors responsible for the treatment of the sick, the discipline and good order of the camp and its general internal arrangements. He or an officer would come to the same spot daily and would receive what requisitions and representations they had to make. A bell would be hung up outside and upon its being rung someone must go to the fence to receive orders.

The doctors did their best. They had practically no drugs, no medical conveniences and not even the simplest invalid fare. The same rations were served out by the Germans for sick

and well alike: black bread, the weekly raw herring, and vegetable soup.

Dr. Wenzil ran away in vain, for soon after his departure he sickened and died from typhus, a victim of his own neglect. A new medical officer was appointed, but he never came into the camp, merely accompanying the commandant on his daily interview, standing outside the cordon. A third German medical officer was appointed later and then things began to mend. Supplies now began to arrive. Although the third man, Dr. Kranski, was elderly, he himself worked hard and did everything that he could to obtain supplies of medicines. These, however, still continued to be amazingly short.

The epidemic lasted four months and there were two thousand cases, fortunately of a mild type, so that only 15 per cent. of those attacked died. Among those who recovered very many had extremely bad sores, gangrene, large ulcers and other suppurations demanding medical dressings. These dressings were not to be had.

By the end of June the typhus had burned itself out. To many of the prisoners the relief caused by the absence of the German guards had made the experiences through the epidemic, terrible as they were, appear like a ray of light. The doctors of different nationalities had done magnificently. They had been helped by ten French Roman Catholic priests who were prisoners and who volunteered to work amongst

the sick. Eight of them contracted the disease and five died. Soldiers of all nationalities had heroically volunteered to act as nursing orderlies, although they had to live among the cases of infection without any means of protecting themselves. Twenty-two of the attendants were British. Twenty of these caught the disease and two of the twenty died. There were sixteen doctors in the camp; twelve took the fever and two died. The doctors of each nationality could not speak too highly of the devotion of their colleagues from other lands.

The German commandant on his daily visits to the outer wires expressed no regret and showed no sympathy or interest, but took up an attitude of detachment and even of hostility. From the outset he did his utmost to crush down the prisoners. Thus some football matches were promoted by the doctors, at first with balls made with rags. These were promptly forbidden. Then the British doctors started boxing amongst the men who were well. Major Davy was severely reprimanded for this and the boxing had to cease.

About the same time there was an epidemic at Stendal, where the experiences were very similar. When typhus broke out the German guards and doctors fled, leaving French and Russian doctors with the sick within a barbed-wire enclosure. The conditions at Stendal, the brutality, the harsh punishments, the abomin-

able food, and the absence of proper medical treatment or medical supplies, were such that it would be difficult to convey any adequate impression of them. The prisoners were reduced to desperation. Their midday ration was what was called potato soup, a filthy decoction with herrings' heads floating in it and smelling of rotten fish. One day the French prisoners refused the soup, which was unusually bad. According to Dr. Ribadeau-Dumas, who was sent with other doctors to Stendal, these prisoners were then made to stand motionless in two rows for a couple of hours; afterwards they were placed in a barbed-wire enclosure with some sixty prisoners from Wittenberg suspected of typhus. During the epidemic several of the French and Russian medical men fell victims. Very little was done until the disease began to spread outside among the German people. Then the Germans took some measures to treat it.

Epidemics of exanthous typhus broke out also at Langensalza and at Cassel-Niedzwehren, produced solely by the deliberate bringing together of prisoners of different nationalities, including Russians, who were well known to be carrying the contagion. When protests were made the German authorities sarcastically remarked that "the Allies must learn to know one another." Some German doctors protested against this. The com-



CONVALESCENTS AND SUSPECTED CASES OF INFECTION WAITING IN THE RAIN WHILE THEIR CLOTHES WERE BEING DISINFECTED: LANGENSALZA.

mandant of the Cassel camp said: "That is my way of fighting the war." The cases of typhus at Cassel were estimated at ten thousand, including two thousand deaths.

At Schneidemühl, in Posen, a very large camp holding mostly Russian prisoners, there came a batch of British. These were left for

fell in torrents, and rain was followed by bitter cold. They tried to erect turf huts for themselves to find some shelter. There were many wounded men among them, and these received the scantiest possible treatment and in some cases no treatment at all.

By November, 1914, when floods were



MINDEN CAMP IN OCTOBER 1914.

[National Review.]

a fortnight to shelter themselves as well as they could in holes in the ground, then they were moved to wooden barracks. They were vermin stricken and had no means of keeping clean. Their clothes were scanty and even their boots were taken from them and sabots given in their place. But for the fact that their Russian comrades in misfortune took pity on them many of the men must have died. There came an outbreak of typhus here brought on by starvation and filth. It was followed by an epidemic of cholera. Fourteen hundred men died from typhus and in one compound alone 360 died from cholera. Among those who died were twenty-one British soldiers. The German doctors deserted this camp. Some Russian doctors, notably Dr. Popoff, were left, but they were not provided with even the most elementary medicines. The epidemics ran their course.

At Minden about 13,000 French soldiers and a few score of men of other nations, including some British civilian prisoners, were turned out on a stretch of heath surrounded by a wire enclosure. There was absolutely nothing on it to shelter them. They were shut in, as one of the prisoners said, "like cattle turned out to graze." They remained there for ten weeks. Their food was very scanty. Rain

followed by frost, the condition of the prisoners was pitiable indeed. They remained in the open until November 20, when barracks which had been built for them were completed.

The spring of 1916 saw, however, a gradual improvement in the conditions of the prisoners in many camps. For this the chief credit was due to Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador. Mr. Gerard and his assistants were tireless in their efforts to better things. At the beginning the commandants of some camps tried to deceive them by changing men from bad quarters to good immediately before the visitors came, or by hanging carcasses of meat outside the kitchens to give the impression that the prisoners were being well fed. Mr. Gerard and his assistants met this by visiting many camps unannounced. They always asked for permission to talk to the prisoners alone, outside the hearing of a German officer. They invited complaints. At times they met with stubborn opposition from the German officers; sometimes they were refused permission to see particular cases of men who were alleged to be ill-treated. But there can be no doubt that for a considerable time, while Germany was anxious to placate American opinion, Mr. Gerard secured great improvements.

Thus at Parshim, a camp described earlier in the war as being as bad as anywhere, the conditions were so changed by the summer of 1916 that the outlook for the prisoners there was entirely different. Wittenberg, the camp of horrors, was given a fresh commandant and better methods. Sennelager was transformed out of knowledge. But even in the best of the camps the condition of the prisoners could scarcely fail to be an unhappy one. "You, sitting here," said Mr. Gerard later on to an audience in New York, "cannot imagine the horror of living two and a half years in a German prison camp. I know because I saw."

Mr. Gerard, speaking in New York in April, 1917, related some incidents which shed a vivid light on the conditions of the men. He said that on one occasion the *North German Gazette* stated that a number of inhabitants of a North German town had been found guilty and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment for improper and unpatriotic conduct towards prisoners of war and that their names had been published and themselves exposed to shame that their falsity might be made known to generations of Germans to come. "Good," said Mr. Gerard to himself, "at last some of these Germans are to be punished for maltreating prisoners of war!"

He directed the American consul in that town



SENTRY AT LANGENSALZA.

to make a report on the matter. The consul sent back word that a trainload of Canadian prisoners of war was being taken through the town when it was found necessary to put the train on a siding. Some of the prisoners let the people who had gathered curiously round them know that they were starving and thirsty. The townspeople thereupon gave them food and drink, and that was the crime for which they



BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY WITH NURSES,
Photographed after a medical examination at Konstanz.

were imprisoned and held up to obloquy. "I had seen small boys," said Mr. Gerard, "with German simplicity and ignorance, marching about the prison camps armed with bows and arrows and shooting arrows tipped with nails at the prisoners, but I had not previously heard anything quite like this. I had read in history that at the beginning of the Reforma-



BLANKENBURG WAR PRISON.

tion Martin Luther nailed his thesis to the door of the Cathedral. After this you know whom I would like to have nailed to that door."

Mr. Gerard went on to tell how in one camp where there was typhus fever among the Russians the Germans placed English and French prisoners with them in the typhus camp, declaring that all the Allies should stick

together, thus condemning numbers of them to certain death.

At another camp I visited they had trained German sheep dogs to bite the British, and when the guards went through the camp they took trained dogs with them, and it was seldom the animals failed to bite British soldiers. I complained in Berlin about the matter, and for a long time my complaint was unnoticed. Nothing was done until I told the Commandant that I was a very good pistol shot and that I was thinking about going out shooting some trained dogs and seeing what they would do about it. Shortly afterwards the Commandant was removed.

In some of the officer camps the provision for the comfort of the prisoners was reasonably adequate. One of the best of these was at Blankenburg, a few miles out of Berlin. Here there were 110 officers, of whom nine were British. The building was a four-storeyed house, heated throughout and lighted by gas and had been formerly used as a Home for Gentlewomen. It was surrounded by well-kept grounds, in which a tennis court had just been built. There were several moderately furnished mess and recreation rooms and a terrace used for afternoon tea. The older officers were given single rooms and were usually attended by British orderlies. Officers below the rank of major occupied the larger rooms, not more than ten in any one room, the beds being arranged in pairs one above the other. There were baths



A WORKING PARTY OF BRITISH PRISONERS.

on each floor and a general wash-room for the use of junior officers. The prisoners were allowed to remain in the garden until 6 p.m., and in the open-air court of the building until dark. Lights were turned out at 10 o'clock, and junior officers had to rise at seven in the morning. Smoking was permitted generally. It was reported that the commandant was interested in his work and evidently he did all that he could to make the conditions agreeable.

officers and men the more brutal commandants were changed. Bathing facilities were provided. The men were allowed to play football and in some camps to smoke.

This general temporary improvement did not, however, prevent a vast amount of suffering. In some cases, when friendly relations began to be established between guards and the prisoners, the German authorities censured the guards.



FRENCH PRISONERS RETURNING FROM SHOPPING IN BERLIN.

In another camp at Kronach, in Bavaria, the senior British officer devised various schemes to give his juniors certain duties which would keep them occupied every day. Lawn tennis was practically compulsory for all in a condition to play. Several officers had taken up gardening. There were opportunities for bowling, and after a time the British officers were allowed to take frequent walks into the neighbouring country. Further, the officers were allowed to use the open-air town swimming baths under parole in summer time. They had weekly religious services. There were many musical instruments in their camp and general consideration was shown to them.

In many of the camps for non-commissioned

Mr. Gerard, in a report in November, 1916, told how at the camp at Süd-Edewechter-Moor, in Oldenburg, the commandant had complained that he had difficulty in preventing some of the guards from being too easy-going with the prisoners. In order to make the guards more attentive, a prize was offered to the first who should shoot a prisoner who went into the prohibited zone between the wires surrounding the camp. The attention of the superior military authorities at Hanover was at once called to this, and they disapproved of and revoked the order. Another example of the temper of some of the German authorities was related in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* in January, 1917. According to this paper, Hindenburg was visiting

a hospital on the Western front. There were some wounded English officers there, and they were being tended by a nurse who spoke English well, having been 11 years in England. He angrily ordered her to be taken away. "I am unwilling," he said, "that the English should be better treated here than my brave soldiers who have the misfortune to be English war prisoners." The remark showed that the Marshal was misinformed about British methods. Not only were the Germans treated in hospital

in the camp at Döberitz, and that after working in the wet he had no means of drying his clothes and could get no underclothes. The men were covered with lice.

In July, 1915, he got rheumatic fever through going on daily fatigue duty, getting wet through, and having no change. He was sent to hospital, and after five weeks was convalescent, and was sent to another camp called Dyrotz, about seven kilometres from Döberitz. He had to carry all his kit on the march, and broke down and was never well after that. A little later he was put into hospital at Döberitz, where he had no treatment at all and had to depend upon an English prisoner, one of the patients. They had no drugs. When he arrived in this country he was in an advanced stage of consumption and extremely emaciated, and he died in



DRAWING THE BREAD RATIONS AT TELTOW, NEAR BERLIN.

exactly the same as British soldiers, but every effort was made to find nurses who spoke German for them, official interpreters were in attendance, and the orderlies were provided with small conversation books in order that they might readily understand the requirements of their prisoner patients.

One case that caused much indignation in England was that of Private Tully, of the Royal Marines. Tully was captured at Antwerp, at the beginning of the war—a big, strong man. He was returned to England in February, 1916, and after lingering a fortnight died at Millbank Hospital.

Mr. Herbert Samuel, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, said:—

It appears from his statements that he was confined

hospital a fortnight after his arrival. The Medical Board, who reported upon his condition, stated that it was due to exposure and insufficient food and clothing whilst a prisoner in Germany.

The trial of Roger Casement, in the summer of 1916, on a charge of high treason served to bring vividly before the British public the constancy of the Irish soldier prisoners of war. The story, already well known and dealt with in an earlier chapter, of Casement's attempts to win over the Irish was related in court by various Irish returned prisoners of war. It was told how the Irish prisoners, after refusing to act as traitors, had been punished by having Russians introduced into their ranks, and how one of them had been transferred to another camp for punishment. Only about 56

men had been induced to join Casement. Of these only one was thought fit to go to Ireland with him when he attempted to start a rebellion. The one man pleaded that he had joined to see if he could escape from Germany.

There was an unfortunate sequel to the Casement affair. Two Irish prisoners at Limburg—the camp where Casement had made his chief effort—Moran and Dewlin by name, were shot by German sentries. The German plea was that the men had attacked their sentries; the British evidence went to show that they were shot because they had refused to join Casement's Irish Brigade.

The two chief complaints made by the prisoners were about food and punishments. The British prisoners were universally agreed that the food served to them was insufficient in quantity and very bad in quality. The food varied very much in different camps. Thus

the bread ration was a little over $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. per man per day in some camps and 14 ozs. per man in others. There were places where even the half-pound ration was not reached. In some camps it was made of wholesome wheatmeal and rye, while in others it was adulterated with potato flour and was exceedingly heavy, sour and almost uneatable. In numbers of camps the official ration was bread each morning with a bowl of coffee made from acorns and without sugar or milk. At noon the prisoners were given a dish of soup made from potato flour, horse beans, soya flour, sometimes with the addition of a powerfully smelling sun-dried fish, sometimes with a minimum of meat, sometimes none at all. In the evening more coffee or soup was served.

Other camps did better than this. At Giessen the authorities printed a weekly bill of fare on the prisoners' letter paper. It was as follows:—

WAR PRISONERS' CAMP, GIESSEN.

A WEEK'S BILL OF FARE. DAILY: 300 GRAMS OF BREAD.

<i>Sunday.</i>		
Breakfast: Coffee and sugar.	gr.	
Coffee	5	
Sugar	20	
Dinner: Beef, potatoes and white cabbage.		
Beef	120	
Potatoes	750	
White cabbage	300	
Supper: Beans, starch meal, margarine and potatoes.		
Field beans	100	
Starch meal	20	
Margarine	20	
Potatoes	200	
<i>Monday.</i>		
Breakfast: Coffee and sugar.		
Coffee	5	
Sugar	20	
Dinner: Bacon, potatoes and beans.		
Bacon	30	
Potatoes	750	
Beans	150	
Supper: Herring and potatoes.		
One Herring	—	
Potatoes	600	
<i>Tuesday.</i>		
Breakfast: Coffee and sugar.		
Coffee	5	
Sugar	20	
Dinner: Pork, potatoes and cabbage.		
Pork	100	
Potatoes	750	
Cabbage	300	
Supper: Beans, starch meal, margarine and potatoes.		
Field beans	100	
Starch meal	20	
Margarine	20	
Potatoes	200	
<i>Wednesday.</i>		
Breakfast: Potato-flour, starch meal and margarine.		
Potato meal	30	
Starch meal	60	
Margarine	10	
Dinner: Potato meal, potatoes, meat and vegetables.	gr.	
Meat	30	
Potato flour	100	
Potatoes	600	
Dried vegetables	40	
Supper: Rice, sugar and dried fruit.		
Rice	100	
Sugar	40	
Dried fruit	50	
<i>Thursday.</i>		
Breakfast: Cocoa, sugar and starch meal.		
Cocoa	30	
Sugar	40	
Amylum	20	
Dinner: Salt meat, sauerkraut and potatoes.		
Salt meat	100	
Sauerkraut	250	
Potatoes	600	
Supper: Herring and potatoes.		
One herring	—	
Potatoes	600	
<i>Friday.</i>		
Breakfast: Coffee and sugar.		
Coffee	5	
Sugar	20	
Dinner: Salt fish, potatoes and soup flavouring.		
Salt fish	150	
Potatoes	750	
Soup flavouring	10	
Supper: Cheese and potatoes.		
Cheese	120	
Potatoes	600	
<i>Saturday.</i>		
Breakfast: Potato-flour, starch meal and margarine.		
Potato-flour	30	
Starch meal	60	
Margarine	10	
Dinner: Bacon, potatoes and beans.		
Bacon	30	
Potatoes	750	
Beans	150	
Supper: Rice, Sugar and Dried Fruit.		
Dried fruit	50	
Rice	100	
Sugar	40	



FRENCH PRISONERS ON THE MARCH TO THE RAILHEAD FOR GERMANY.

According to this remarkable list (100 grams = 3.5274 ozs.), the prisoners received 10½ ozs. of bread a day, coffee with sugar for breakfast, a dinner on alternate days of ¼ lb. of meat or its equivalent, 1 lb. 10 ozs. of potatoes, and 10½ ozs. of cabbage, with smaller quantities of meat on other days; and a supper of 3½ ozs. of beans, 7 ozs. of potatoes, starch meal and margarine or equivalent substitutes.

This reads excellently on paper. But the British prisoner in Germany received nothing like this, save in exceptional cases. The universal complaint of men when they came back was of starvation when they had to depend on their official diet. Dr. Taylor, an American

Punishment varied in the different camps. The slightest attempt at insubordination was ruthlessly stamped out. Prisoners caught at tempting to escape were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The most humiliating thing to the British prisoners was the frequency and the degrading nature of the minor punishments. The German non-commissioned officer placed over them, accustomed to rule his own men in many cases by occasional appeals to physical violence, did not see why he should not do the same with mere prisoners of war.

There were beatings, official and unofficial. Sometimes rubber pipes were used, the men being held down by four guards over a barrel.



BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR AT WORK AT TELTOW, NEAR BERLIN.

medical man who examined officially the diet of the civilian prisoners at Ruhleben, stated that some of the food was bad, and added, "The food provided and served during the week of the survey was not sufficient in any direction to provide nourishment for the 3,700 men concerned, had they been entirely dependent on it."

The British authorities recognized the insufficiency of the German diet, and arranged for the regular dispatch of parcels from England. But men under punishment, or who had incurred in any way the displeasure of the Germans, were not allowed to receive these parcels. The lot of many other Allied prisoners who were dependent for many months on the German official supplies was often exceedingly pitiable.

One familiar German punishment was to tie men up to stakes or trees in the open for a certain number of hours. This might be comparatively mild or exceedingly severe at the will of the authorities. Sack drill was a disciplinary measure, a sack weighing about 30 pounds being fastened on a prisoner's back, and he being compelled to run around with it for four quarters of an hour successively, with intervals of two minutes for rest. Solitary confinement in a dark cell was commonly used. Punishments like these were inflicted for such minor breaches of discipline as smoking at wrong times or failing to salute properly.

The most amazing tales of punishments came from Russian, French, Belgian and Serbian prisoners. Many of them after their return gave descriptions of the sand bath, a torture

worthy of the Middle Ages. A man would be stripped and put in a bath. A German N.C.O. would rub him hard with a very hard brush and sand, hitting him with the brush until skin was rubbed away and blood drawn.

Another form of torment was the Turkish bath. This was mainly applied to men who refused to do munition work. Various escaped French and Russian prisoners gave similar accounts of it. The man would be shut in a very hot room until at the point of fainting. Then he would be dragged out and thrown, with little or nothing on, into the open air, sometimes into the snow. This would be repeated at intervals for some weeks.

"Only after 45 days of this treatment," said two French infantrymen, Maurice and Emile Lebris, of Havre, who escaped in the summer of 1917, "were the men who refused to yield returned to camp. They came back only to die shortly afterwards of galloping consumption."

In the French Government report on Prisoners of War, published in November, 1916, some ingenious forms of using the stake punishment were described. At Königsbruck, the culprit, when tied to the tree or post, touched the ground only with his toes. At Stendal, the stake was not driven into the ground, but the prisoner had to carry it on his back, with his arms bound to it, the heavier

end being uppermost. At Sennelager there was a punishment called the "roof," when an offender was hoisted on a tarred roof and exposed there in the sun for hours.

At first, military prisoners were in many camps kept in comparative idleness, having little to do save the regulation camp duties. This idleness was so severe a trial that many of them volunteered for farm and other work. Prisoners employed on farms had, in many cases, the most endurable lot of any. They had comparative freedom, they lived in the open air, they often established agreeable relations with the farmer's families, and while their lot was very far from one to be envied, it often presented a great contrast to that of others still in the prison camps.

The economic aspects of the employment of prisoner labour on the land were described by Mr. Gerard after his return to America:

The prisoners are leased out or sent out to farms very much as convicts are sent out in the south. For instance, the proprietor of a farm goes to the corps commander of his district and asks for a certain number of prisoners of war to be allotted to him. These are furnished, and he is given an allowance of 6½d. per day to pay for their food, and he is required to pay them only 7d. per day for their labour.

That has had a very injurious result in prolonging the war, because the influential class in Germany is the class of county squires, or junkers. They live on the products of their estates. Since the war they have obtained for their produce five to six times more than in peace time and they have had the labour per-



SERBIANS SET TO CLEAN STREETS



BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY SETTING OUT FOR WORK.

formed by prisoners of war at 7d. a day. This has created a large class of people who are interested in continuing the war and a class that has most or all to do with the government of the country. One newspaper published an article calling attention to this fact. It was shortly afterwards suppressed for three days. That is their method of censorship.

Gradually the German authorities came to see the possibilities of utilizing prisoner-of-war labour to the full. Men were drafted in ever increasing numbers to mines, factories and, finally, to the manufacture of munitions. No objection would have been raised to the Germans employing their prisoners under fair conditions in such work as road-making, timber felling, agriculture or the like. But the Hague regulations distinctly forbade the utilization of prisoner-of-war labour for the manufacture of weapons, munitions, etc. This provision was after a time openly violated. British, French, Russian and other prisoners were forced to construct trenches, to make munitions, and the like. The conditions of labour imposed upon them were of the severest kind. In many cases the men were housed miserably away from the prison camps: they were roused soon after four in the morning and were kept at work from 5 a.m. until 5 p.m. Their conditions, the discipline over them, and their treatment made their lot worse than that of slaves.

A new stage in punishments was begun. The crime of refusing to work was dealt with drastically. Two instructions for the camp at Wittenberg were published in an official report in the summer of 1916. The first, signed by the Commandant, was posted up in the camp:

Notice is hereby given that on refusal to work the guard have been directed in the future, if occasion arises, to make use of their weapons.

The second was a paragraph in the instructions given to the guards themselves:

The guards are especially enjoined energetically to keep the prisoners at work. Should the attitude of the prisoner demand the use of the weapon, this should be employed without regard to consequences. In the first place, the bayonet only is to be employed.

That this was no empty threat was shown in various cases. Where the guards did not take immediate action other punishments were waiting. American official visitors to Dyrotz, in April, 1916, found that six men, including one corporal, had been returned from a working camp to the war camp charged with dilatory work. They had been placed in confinement for seven days, with bread and water except on the fourth day, when they had full camp ration. The men said, when questioned, that as far as they could see they were punished because they had been unable to do the amount of work demanded—namely, two men to unload a car in a day.



BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY ENGAGED IN FARM WORK.

Their conditions of confinement were thus described :

The six prisoners were confined in a small building made of hoards, the floor space approximately 8 ft. by 8 ft., with a gabled roof 10 ft. high. Over the door was a window, which had been closed with black tar paper. The only ventilation possible was through the cracks between the hoards. When the German N.C.O. was asked why the window was closed he replied that darkness was one of the specified conditions of the state of "arrest." It was then suggested that the window could be darkened and still left open for ventilation, since otherwise proper ventilation could not be secured. No blankets or mattresses were to be furnished save on the day on which the men received their full ration. The door was locked and a sentry posted outside the building.

A number of prisoners, particularly British and French, refused to help at all in the manufacture of weapons that could be used against their own countrymen. The Germans had one terrible weapon against them—starvation. Their parcels from home were cut off. Their food supply was cut down. Yet many of them stood out and stood out successfully.

At Krupp's there were, by the latter part of 1916, no less than 1,500 French prisoners at work and many hundreds of others of different nationalities. Some prisoners who escaped reported that various British prisoners had been forced to work with them. The beginning of the year 1917 saw a remarkable extension of this policy of exploiting prisoner labour. In

addition to about 1,700 prisoners of various nationalities available in Germany alone, the Germans seized on the industrial population of Belgium and on numbers of Poles. Everywhere, where they could be used, gangs of prisoners could be found.

Early in 1917 there was an unfortunate dispute between the Allied and the German Governments over the question of working prisoners of war within the zone of fire. The German Government charged both the British and the French with doing this, declared that it had done nothing of the kind, and announced its intention of taking reprisals. Actually the British Government had moved its prisoners far back, and the French Government had expressed its willingness to enter into an arrangement to do the same. In the month of May Lord Newton, in a speech in the House of Lords, stated that, despite the denials of the German Government, several parties of British prisoners had been secretly kept for months within four or five miles of the trenches on the German front, and treated in an extremely harsh and cruel way. They were not allowed to write home, and until some of the men escaped no one in England knew of the existence of their camps. They were given barely sufficient food to keep body and soul

together. They were robbed of their overcoats and never given even a change of clothes. They were brutally ill-used in many respects and a good many of them had died.

Lord Newton's words were based on the statement of three men of the Dorsets who were captured in front of Beaumont Hamel on January 11, 1917, and who escaped in the following April.

Their company raided a sector of the German line and captured two dug-outs. Soon afterwards it was surrounded by a considerable force of Germans, who seized about eighty rank and file and one officer. The men were taken to Cambrai. Here they found between 300 and 400 other British prisoners, some captured as early as November, 1916. They were working behind the German lines at Trescault, and were absolutely isolated. They were allowed to write post cards, but these were evidently destroyed by their guards, for they never reached home.

In mid-January, 100 prisoners were sent as a working party to Ervillers, where they were put to road-making six miles behind the German lines. They were housed in a large hut.

"Our food," said two of the men who escaped, "consisted of a quarter loaf of German black

bread (about $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.) a day, coffee without sugar and milk, in the early morning and again at 4.30, and thin soup at mid-day. The German soldiers were given for their rations a whole loaf a day, good thick soup with beans and meat in it, coffee, jam and sugar, two cigars and three cigarettes a day. Nobody here received any parcels or letters." They, of course, could not, for even the fact that they were alive had not been notified. They stayed at Ervillers for four weeks. "We never saw the Commandant. A non-commissioned officer was in charge of us."

After a month they were sent to Sauchy-Lestrée, about 12 miles behind the lines. There were about 80 or 90 now—the rest had fallen ill. "They had dysentery from eating bad swedes, which they had picked up in the fields, and they were also suffering from starvation."

Here the same farce of writing post cards that were never delivered was repeated. Men who had written at intervals during four months had waited vainly for replies. Their isolation can be imagined. Parcels, food, clothing, books, all the glimpses of relief that reach most prisoners, were denied them. Their friends at home were left to believe them dead.



BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY TREE-FELLING.

"We were never given any clothes, and had to work, live and sleep in the same garments," said the men. "We were not even given a shirt. We arrived back in the British lines in the same uniforms in which we were captured, and in which we had worked in all weathers, rain and sun. There were no means of drying them, and when we got wet we had to sleep in our wet things."

In time those who were left—there were only 60 now—were sent to Sauchy-Gauchy. Hard work, insufficient food and exposure had

Germany told how they had seen their men brought back from the prison camps on the western front. Then some men who got away from Hameln told how there had arrived there during March 30 British soldiers all so weak that they had to be carried to the camp hospital. Their appearance caused consternation among the prisoners already there. They were living skeletons. They ravenously clutched at food offered them.

"I never saw men look so bad as they did, even after they had been in hospital," said one



RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR AT DÖBERITZ DRAWING A CART.

removed nearly half. At Sauchy-Gauchy food and treatment showed some improvement. The men were housed in a disused brick kiln.

Three men saw a chance for liberty. One night they dropped outside the kiln, slipped past the sentries, and made westwards, guided by the flash of the British guns. They crossed the German trenches to the British lines, where they were received by the Australians. The corporal, who weighed thirteen stone at the time he was captured, weighed only eight stone when he got back. And he had to be carried in a stretcher before the Medical Board.

Other prisoners escaping from camps in

British private who escaped from this district in May, 1917. "We fellows could hardly eat our own food when we saw them."

In time they recovered sufficiently to tell their experiences. Some had been captured on the Somme in July, 1916. Instead of being sent to Germany they were kept working immediately behind the line, in the neighbourhood of Cambrai. They declared that they had been starved and beaten. Several had been wounded by shell fire from our own guns. Finally they became so ill that they were sent to Germany. They said that they had left numbers of our own men at or near Cambrai

and Lille. They had heard nothing from home, for only one of them had been reported as "prisoner of war."

A Canadian sergeant who was there thus described the men:

They arrived in such a weak condition that they had to be carried from the station to the hospital, and I myself helped to carry ten of them. They were in a terrible state, human skeletons and absolutely lousy, and not one of them could walk.

They had been given no clothes and almost no food in France. They were kept in hospital for some time when they came to us, but even when they left hospital I never saw such-looking people. They fell upon any food they could get. They were made to start working at Hameln long before they were fit.

While working behind the lines around Cambrai, they had been drafted about to several camps, and all the while had received scarcely enough food to keep body and soul together. Further, they had been subjected to brutal treatment, being flogged by their guards.

A private in the Gordons who escaped from Westerholt in May said that among the prisoners brought into that camp was a private in the Lancashire Fusiliers, one of the 160 men captured in October, 1916. They had been kept at work behind the lines in France. Out of 160 men taken, 40 died by January. The Fusilier broke down and was sent into Germany.

"I was first taken to Lille," said the Fusilier, "and made to work about four miles behind the German lines, between the German big guns and the front. We were very badly treated, knocked about by guards, and kept in sheds with only a little straw on the floor. We had to work all day at making roads, unloading stores, and generally clearing up. The men were dying at the rate of four a day."

When some of our men, after being broken down in health by hardships behind the front lines, were sent back to Minden Hospital, their condition excited pity even among the Germans there. One German interpreter said to them that, having been so badly treated in France, they would be allowed to write two letters and two post cards saying that they were prisoners and where they were. The other prisoners made a collection of food for them.

Immediately these facts became known to the authorities the strongest possible representations were made, and early in June Mr. Hope was able to announce in the House of Commons that an arrangement had been arrived at with the German Government for the withdrawal of British prisoners 30 kilometers behind the firing line. Two thousand British prisoners of war had already been withdrawn.



[Elliott & Fry.]

LORD NEWTON,
Of the Prisoners of War Department of the
Foreign Office.

Uneasiness over the treatment of prisoners aroused by accounts which reached England of the concealment of men on the Western Front was greatly intensified by a statement at the end of May, 1917, that the Kaiser, who had been visiting the Arras Front, had told his soldiers that they were to hate the British as heartily as their capacity for righteous wrath would permit, and that in future no prisoners were to be taken nor any mercy shown. Prisoners who might be taken were to be treated with the utmost severity.

How faithfully the Kaiser's troops obeyed these instructions was shown by an account given by two Australians captured in the Hindenburg line after a big attack on April 11. Their story was recorded by Captain C. E. W. Bean, official Press correspondent with the Australian forces in France. A thousand Australians were captured, cut off by German machine guns. They were given very little food, treated with harshness, and even many badly wounded men were forced to set out on the march to Germany. On the third day— they were pinched for hunger by this time. And possibly the villagers on their route could see it. For in every little French village through which they passed the villagers came out of the cottages and tried to get a loaf of bread through to them, or at least a drink of water. The Australians were marching, roughly in fours, with two closely set lines of guards walking

outside them. These men were taken from a resting battalion of a Prussian Guard division, and their orders clearly were to stop any food or drink reaching these famished Australians.

As the column reached the village the French inhabitants would throng the streets watching it pass. "The French would give you anything they had," one of the men said. A little girl ran out from a cottage with bread. The guard smacked her in the face. The bread they used to throw into the gutter. A Frenchman tried to give the Australians a bucket of water to drink.



FRENCH PRISONERS REPAIRING THE TRAM LINE IN FRANKFORT.

The guard upset the water and threw the pail over the man. A woman tried to give them bread. A Prussian soldier hit her in the face and knocked her down. In one place a French priest edged up with a loaf under his arm to pass it to our men. A German soldier was watching him out of the corner of his eye. An old woman, seeing this, tugged the priest back by his clothes. And this sort of scene was repeated until the Australians, however hungry or thirsty, could not bear to bring such treatment on the French for their kindness, but learned to shake their heads when offered food or drink.

Two days later they were moved by train to Lille. A woman who threw them packets of cigarettes was arrested by a military policeman. The men were divided into parties of 110 each, and each party was marched into a separate room in the upper storey of an old green fort.

For five nights and six days 110 Australians lived in the room where the escaped men were. It is the first time in our country's history that Australians have ever suffered organized torture. The room was about 50 ft. by 20 ft. The floor was tiled. For a few minutes each day the men were allowed into the yard for exercise. Their only convenience for all sanitary purposes was one barrel, which stood in the corner, uncovered. The windows had to be shut, for they slept on the tiled floor

without a blanket, though snow fell at night, and their food was too little to keep life together. They were given one-seventh of a loaf of bread—that is, one slice per man—with some fermented mangolds each day, with one cup of coffee at night and one in the morning. When the man who took the barrel each day downstairs to clean it asked for a glass of water the guard would not allow it. The cook refused a mark offered for a little bread. They were not once allowed to wash until the last day, when they cleaned up to leave.

At the end of it a German corporal came into the room. He asked them if they knew what they were there for. They said, "No." He said, "You may write and tell your people and your Government all about it—just what has happened—and say that you are here as a punishment. Seven weeks ago the German Government wrote to the British Government about the employment of prisoners near the line, and they have not yet received an answer." The Australians told him it was a lie—there was not a German prisoner within 20 or 30 kilometres of the line. These men had passed hundreds of times in our back areas companies of fat, well-clothed, happy-looking Germans 20 miles behind the British line, with Australians and Tommies alike giving them cigarettes, and only the French people, whose homes they have ravaged, showing the least resentment. But they knew their protest could make no difference.

On this day 240 of the Australians were sent by train to work on a dump close behind the front. Here they were put in a farm near a double company of English and Scotch troops and set to work unloading stores. Their food was a daily ration of one-third of a loaf, coffee before they left in the morning, and a midday stew of horseflesh and a little barley. The prisoners were driven to beg their guards to let them cut any sort of grass that could be eaten—even dandelions, stinging nettles and rape. They picked up potato peelings which the Germans threw out. On this stuff the men became so weak that, at the time the two escaped, they were falling at the rate of four a day.

Even while conditions in many of the camps in Germany itself were beginning to improve, a new problem arose. Detachments of men were picked out from different districts in the spring of 1916 and dispatched to the Eastern Front. Here for a time they were lost to sight.

Many of the men were sent to Libau, where they were put under harsh discipline. They at first received no parcels, and were not allowed to purchase food, and the food supplied to them was barely enough to sustain life. The port of Libau itself was a centre of misery. The civil population were starving and in rags. According to statements reaching England, the very women of the place were compelled by the German authorities to work at such tasks as coaling, loading ships, and the

like. The prisoners tried sometimes to buy a little food from them. Occasionally, despite the rules, a man here and there managed to purchase a loaf of black bread, the usual price being three marks. The bread was so coarse and sour that it brought on dysentery.

The prisoners were housed in a building overlooking the harbour. They slept on bare boards. They were roused at four in the morning, started work at five, and were not back until six at night. Their labour was of the heaviest kind, and they were kept at it with remorseless severity. Punishments were frequent and heavy. Men were strung up by the wrists or sent to solitary confinement on any excuse. It was not uncommon to have 20 men tied to stakes at the same time. There were four cells which the men themselves described as "absolutely Black Holes of Calcutta."

After six weeks parcels from home began to arrive. Most of these had been so delayed on the way that their bread and other perishable contents were uneatable. Naturally there was much illness, which was aggravated by the damp, raw and uncertain nature of the Baltic climate. The men looked back on their old life in camps such as Döberitz and Spandau

as days of luxury and ease. They maintained their spirits in wonderful fashion. From their windows they could see, time after time, the German Fleet go out; then they would watch for its return. When on one occasion it came back with several of the ships badly damaged the prisoners cheered each other with the news that we had won. They counted the funerals of the sailors—over 50 in three days. "This was our one recreation," said one of them afterwards.

A worse fate than confinement at Libau was in store for many of the prisoners. In February, 1917, 500 men were picked out and were told that they were to be sent to the Russian firing line as a reprisal for the British sending German prisoners to their front in France. The men were marched some distance through deep snow. Their new home was a big tent, slightly warmed by some small stoves.

Here the men lived together through the rigours of a Russian winter. Disciplinary measures against them were intensified. Their food was reduced to two meals a day, acorn coffee and black bread in the morning, and a thin soup at night. No parcels reached them. They were forbidden to smoke, even though they had tobacco. Each day they were marched



FRENCH PRISONERS AND THEIR GERMAN CAPTORS.

out to the German trenches, and kept working for 10 hours under Russian shell-fire. They had no change of clothing; some of them had no blankets; some had lost their kits on the march.

Their chief sufferings were from cold and starvation. There were 35 degrees of frost, and men were working up to their knees in snow. By early in April over 200 of the 500 had been sent to hospital badly frostbitten. A number died. Some of the letters sent home by these men, passed by the German censor, made as pitiful reading as anything in this war.

"The men are so frostbitten here, it is pitiful to see," wrote one. "Tell mother and father not to worry," wrote one of the Royal Naval Division. "If my time comes it comes. The cold alone is nearly enough to kill one. My hands are still too frozen to write well, but this is the first time they have been able to write at all." "We are suffering terribly here," wrote a Coldstream Guardsman to his wife. "We are not getting any letters or parcels from home, and continually—(word deleted by censor)—by the cold, as the weather has been intensely cold, hard frost, snow storms. The discipline is very strict and the punishments heavy, and it is just an awful and most miserable existence. We can do nothing at this end, but you in England must come

quickly to our rescue. After nearly three years of suffering and exile this punishment becomes almost unbearable. Up at 4 a.m., coffee at 4.45. We work in the trenches for ten hours under shell-fire, and get back to camp at 5 p.m., when soup is served out, but it is not enough or very nourishing. Half a loaf of bread a day. So you can guess we are—(word deleted by censor). Keep smiling! Hope it will not be long before we meet again."

"Honestly, Kit," wrote another to his wife, "I thought I was going mad! We have come through a terrible ordeal, and I am, and always will be, thankful to God for bringing me through it."

Of the British prisoners captured outside the European fighting area, those in South-West Africa and in Mesopotamia aroused most attention. The British subjects who were seized by the Germans in South-West Africa, subsequently to be released by General Smuts's Army, were exposed in most cases to every possible humiliation. The Germans evidently purposed to lower their prestige in any way they could in the eyes of the natives. Accordingly they treated them like slaves, inflicting in addition physical hardships which would have wrecked any but the hardest constitutions.

The report of an Official Commission of En-



FRENCH PRISONERS OF WAR, SOME WOUNDED, AT WIMSDORF.

quiry into the atrocities against British prisoners in German South-West Africa was published at Cape Town, in April, 1916. This report showed that our prisoners were persistently starved and that there was a complete lack of organization or central control.

When British officers complained to the Governor, Dr. Seitz, about their rations he told them that they should be most thankful for what they got. "We did not invite you to this country. You invaded the country and fought us with natives," he added.

The food allowances of the British officers were cut down as a disciplinary measure after the escape of a couple of their number. The rations of the non-commissioned officers and men were reduced almost to starvation point and were only half those issued to the German troops. Men sat in queues waiting an opportunity to drink the blood of slaughtered oxen, and they boiled the soft part of the hides of cattle in order to extract nutriment. They were not supplied with sufficient clothing.

Captain Geary, who was taken prisoner at Santfontein, was placed in solitary confinement for six and a half months in a cell, thirteen feet by seven feet, infested with bugs and in a shocking sanitary condition. He was treated harshly and callously. His food was coarse and insufficient and he was only allowed a short period of exercise each day with convicted criminals. No charge was laid against him and his protests were unheeded. Captain Munro was treated similarly to Captain Geary, but his detention was only for 24 days.

The political prisoners confined in Windhuk were mostly British. They were obliged to sleep ten in a small cell. The door was locked nightly and was not opened in any circumstances for 12 hours. There was considerable dysentery amongst the prisoners and the conditions were most disgusting.

When these facts became known a loud outcry was raised in South Africa for the punishment of the guilty German officers. General Botha, however, announced that he had been in communication with the Imperial Government on the matter and the Government assumed the attitude that it would not take revenge, although it naturally condemned in the strongest possible manner the actions disclosed in the Report.

Much concern was felt in England over the fate of the British prisoners captured by the Turks at Kut-el-Amara, and in other Mesopotamian operations.

The majority of these were Indian troops; but in addition to the Indians there were, within the Turkish Empire, fully 2,555 white men kept as prisoners. By the beginning of 1917, 483 had died in captivity, a fact which, in itself, is eloquent.

The Turks devoted some attention to the care of the British officers. General Townshend



AN AUSTRALIAN PRISONER OF WAR
AT SCHNEIDEMÜHL, IN POSEN,
In coat and boots provided by the Australian
Comforts Fund.

in particular, was treated with great distinction. The troops suffered heavily, especially immediately after their capture. They had been reduced to a very low state, physically, during the long siege. Nearly all of them were in poor condition, merely skin and bone. After the surrender they were marched across parts of Mesopotamia, sometimes many hundred miles, often under very trying conditions. They lost heavily during these marches, and



WINTER AT DÖBERITZ.

some men were reduced to cat grass. Once they reached their different destinations, however, their treatment was generally better. They were able, in many cases, to buy food from the natives if they had money. Prisoner after prisoner wrote that he was comfortable and treated with kindness. "We are allowed money and parcels," wrote one sergeant to his brother; "no papers. We are in a beautiful place, a lovely climate and they are doing everything they can to make us comfortable." This letter was typical of others.

There is no doubt but that some of the prisoners suffered great hardships, particularly sick men, from lack of medical comforts. Others found it hard to adapt themselves to Turkish conditions.

In June, 1916, alarmist reports came to England from Cairo that the British prisoners in Turkey were being badly treated. One man declared that he saw 150 prisoners at Katina, in Northern Syria, in a most deplorable condition. Their only ration was soup. Another man, who was for some time near the prisoners of war camp in the Taurus, said that more than half the men captured at Kut were dead. There were many complaints of lack of hospital treatment.

The question of how best to help our prisoners aroused from the first the close attention of the British Government. Possible aid was naturally of two kinds, the immediate relief of pressing personal needs and diplomatic or

military action—such as representations to Germany through neutral Powers, special agreements with the enemy, publicity given to the wrongs of prisoners, and reprisals against German subjects in our hands.

In order to relieve immediate necessities a number of Prisoners of War Societies was formed. Some of them were regimental, for men of a particular section of the Army, some were territorial, as for Kent or Surrey, and some were general. A Central Prisoners of War Help Committee was established in London. This, as far as possible coordinated the work of the different organizations, tried to prevent overlapping, and made itself a headquarters of information and help for the prisoners. It worked in close conjunction with the Swiss Red Cross. This stage of the organization of relief was described in Chapter CII.

The Swiss "Bureau de Secours aux Prisonniers de Guerre" cooperated with all the belligerent Powers in a way worthy of the most splendid traditions of that great body. The British section did a very extensive work in the supply of bread and other foodstuffs to prisoners.

Much invaluable service was done by the numerous voluntary committees in the United Kingdom, and the condition of the prisoners during the first two years of the war would have been almost unendurable but for their aid. It became evident in time, however, that further organization was necessary. The Central Committee in London had no power to compel obedience. There was a vast amount

of overlapping. Some prisoners received parcels from many sources, far more than they could use. Others received scarcely any, and a few none. Many privately-sent parcels were badly packed, wrongly addressed, and stocked with perishable goods that ought never to have been sent. German agents used the plan of free dispatch of parcels to send concealed information. Injudicious friends tried to smuggle forbidden articles, such as newspapers, to prisoners, with the result that sometimes whole batches of supplies were held up.

In September, 1916, the War Office and Foreign Office arranged that the Joint War Committee of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John should take over all questions relating to the welfare of British prisoners, both civilian and military. A special committee was formed, under the title of the Central Prisoners of War Committee, with Sir Starr Jameson as Chairman, supported by Sir William Garstin, the Hon. W. H. Goschen, Mr. W. E. Hume-Williams, K.C., M.P., General Sir Charles M. Clarke, Mr. N. E. Waterhouse, Mr. Rowland Berkeley, and Mr. P. D. Agnew, the last being managing director.

This Committee undertook to furnish every British and Indian Prisoner of War in Germany,

Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria, whether military or civil, with a supply of food and clothing sufficient for his needs, from December 1, 1916, onwards until the end of the war. It was given, what the former committee lacked, authority. The different care committees and regimental associations came to a certain extent under its direction, inasmuch as their parcels could not be sent without its approval, except to officers.

The Central Committee aimed at preserving the local enthusiasm of the numerous Prisoners of War organizations throughout the country, and in particular it desired to retain the gifts and personal work of the numbers of men and women who had adopted prisoners, and who had pledged themselves to see after their comfort. It determined, however, to abolish entirely the old system of private parcels, except for officers. Regulations were issued that no post office would handle a parcel for a prisoner of war unless that parcel had a special label on it issued by the Central Prisoners of War Committee. This label was only served out by the Committee to local associations which had received its permission to dispatch parcels. Each one of the workers engaged in packing or dispatching at these local associations



FRENCH PRISONERS STILL HUNGRY AFTER THEIR MEAL.

had his or her record examined. The Central Committee virtually entered into a pledge that nothing should be sent through in the parcels except articles in keeping with the regulations laid down by the German Government. A number of standard parcels were planned, and planned on a very liberal scale, and the amount of food and clothing to be supplied to each prisoner as supplementary to his German rations was ample.

There came many protests, however, from the friends and relatives of prisoners against the prohibition of private parcels. The prohibition was consequently modified to some extent, people being permitted to dispatch goods from certain well-known shops and stores.

In addition to its services for the supply of food and clothing the Committee further had a Record Department where an account was kept of the whereabouts and state of all British prisoners of war. This information was carefully collected from various sources, such as the German Red Cross list of prisoners, War Office Regimental Lists, and the like. The Committee undertook all the numerous necessary miscellaneous services required, such as meeting, and providing temporary accommodation for, repatriated men and women, the giving of information to relatives and the like. Its plans for prisoners showed a thoroughness beyond anything hitherto attempted. It came in for a certain amount of criticism, but the general opinion of those most capable of forming a judgment was that in establishing it and in giving it power to organize relief the British Government had acted on the right lines.

The diplomatic side of work for the relief of prisoners of war received at times some unfavourable comment. The British Government recognized from the beginning its duty to do everything possible to help prisoners of war by any means in its power. Some things were done promptly and well. But other things were dealt with in a way that suggested an inability on the part of the authorities to decide on, and, regardless of difficulties, to keep to, a fixed policy.

One failure of the authorities was to utilize to the full the sympathetic influence of neutral nations. A certain timidity was revealed from the beginning in giving publicity to details about the sufferings of our prisoners. Care was, however, taken to secure these details. Lord Newton time after time in the House of Lords told something of what was learned.

A Record Committee, to which reference has been made earlier in this chapter, was appointed by Sir John Simon, in September, 1915, to collect, verify, and record information as to the treatment of British subjects, military and civil, who had been prisoners in the hands of the enemy. Its full title was "The Government Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War." Mr. Justice Younger was the chairman, supported by a strong Committee, including representatives of the War Office, Home Office and Foreign Office, and Mrs. Darley Livingstone was Hon. Secretary. This Committee did its work with great thoroughness, carefully cross-examining every returned man. Save, however, in a few cases, notably in the Reports on Wittenberg and Gardelegen, the authorities failed to use this information as it might well have been used as a powerful lever to bring the influence of the world against the German policy of cruelty towards the helpless men in its power. Yet here was a case where systematic and continuous publicity could scarcely have failed to render great services in checking German abuses and in fostering those influences which undoubtedly existed in Germany favouring the more humane treatment of the men.

Most valuable work for the prisoners was accomplished, as has already been said, by Mr. Gerard. His task was later, after he left Berlin, taken over by the Dutch Minister. It was through Mr. Gerard that a mutual agreement was arrived at between the British and the German Governments to repatriate permanently disabled prisoners. The Dutch Red Cross cooperated very actively in this. Numbers of fighting men who had lost limbs or were hopelessly invalided were sent home. The appearance of our own men when they came among us was in many cases the most conclusive proof of the horrors they had endured. Some of them had so changed that their wives could not at first recognize them.

Another great stage in securing better treatment for the most helpless of the prisoners was reached by the agreement in May, 1916, that British and German wounded and invalided combatant prisoners of war should be transferred to Switzerland. In this case we were following a precedent set by our ally, France. By agreement between France and Germany one hundred consumptive prisoners of each country were sent to Switzerland, and these were followed by many others, numbering in



SIR STARR JAMESON,
Chairman of the Central Prisoners of War Committee.

all 1,247 within a few weeks. The first British party, numbering between three and four hundred, arrived in Switzerland on May 11. Other parties soon followed. Our men were welcomed by the Swiss in the warmest possible fashion. "It is difficult to write calmly about it," wrote Mr. Grant Duff, the British Minister, "for the simple reason that I have never before in my life seen such a welcome accorded to anyone, although for the last 28 years I have been present at

every kind of function in half the capitals of Europe."

Our men were bound for Chateau d'Oex. The day before they arrived the Prefect issued a notice that everyone was to wear his best clothes: every house was hung with flowers and flags and garlands stretched across the streets.

Our men were astounded at the welcome. Many of them were crying like children; a few fainted from emotion. As one private said to

the British Minister, "God bless you, sir; it's like dropping right into 'eaven from 'ell."

The British Government seemed unable to come to a fixed resolution over the question of reprisals for German outrages against British prisoners. A somewhat unfortunate and ill-considered attempt to impose special treatment on German submarine officers early in the war had brought about quick counter action in Germany and was abandoned. The proposal that German prisoners in our hands should be treated in similar fashion to our prisoners by the Germans was regarded by many with great dislike. The French Government openly adopted this policy. German prisoners in France were to be treated in the same way, put to the same labour, and fed in the same way as French prisoners in Germany.



THE VICOMTESSE DE LA PANOUSE,
Chairman of the French Red Cross Committee.

In some cases definite improvements in the treatment of the French prisoners were secured by this. But the general feeling in England was that even the policy of outrage and inhumanity in Germany would not justify the British authorities in taking harsh measures against enemy subjects in our hands.

The policy of the British Army towards its prisoners was one of great liberality. Officers and men were well fed, well housed, and well cared for. This was the opinion, not only of

British observers, but of neutral visitors, officials and others who were given every facility to observe the British methods.

The condition of the men in captivity created profound pity among all classes. Various



MRS. DARLEY LIVINGSTONE,
Honorary Secretary of the Government Committee on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

proposals were made to benefit them. One suggestion, which was strongly backed, was that all men should be released by mutual agreement after they had been prisoners of war for eighteen months. On April 21, 1917, the British Government proposed to the German that all prisoners of war who had been over two years in captivity should be released. But up to the middle of June the British Government was still awaiting a satisfactory reply. Another proposal was for the exchange of civilian interned prisoners.

The treatment of the British prisoners on the Eastern Front can perhaps be better understood when it is realized how the Germans habitually treated the Russians captured there. It became evident early in the war that Russian prisoners were invariably handled in the roughest possible fashion; that they were neglected and starved even more than other Allied prisoners, and that they were punished with a mercilessness surpassing anything hitherto known.

British and French prisoners returning from

mixed camps expressed the utmost pity for the Russians, and told incidents that they themselves had witnessed which indicated a very bad condition of things. Russian prisoners who escaped into Holland or back into



MRS. HUGH TUFNELL,

Chairman of the Prisoners Sub-Committee of the Serbian Relief Fund.

Russia told in matter-of-fact fashion tales of torture that would have been absolutely incredible had they not been supported by much corroborative evidence. "I have not seen a single escaped Russian prisoner of whom I have asked the question who has not been struck by the Germans," wrote one relief agent whose business it was to examine these prisoners. Beating was one of the least forms of torment.

In the winter of 1916 the German authorities began an aggravated campaign against the Russian prisoners, carried on clearly for the deliberate purpose of forcing the men to enlist in the German Army or to undertake munition work. A certain number, particularly Poles, gave way and joined the Germans. Large numbers of men, despite strong opposition, were compelled by starvation and torture to undertake war work.

The prisoners were divided according to their different provinces and systematic work was begun to win them over. Thus the men

of Ukraine were urged to sign papers pledging themselves to support the separation of the Ukraine from Russia. Seeing that very few of these men could read it is difficult to discover why the Germans should value their signatures or marks in place of signatures.

Poles were the subjects of a special propaganda to induce them to throw off all adherence to Russia. "Sign," the men were told, "and you will have plenty of food, plenty of clothes, a good bed, and good wages. You will be free to go about the town, and we will teach you to read and write." Those who would not sign were punished.

The following brief accounts given by escaped Russian prisoners, each made independently of the others, tell their own tale. Even allowing for exaggeration, conscious or unconscious, in some cases, it is scarcely possible to believe that men drawn from different



MRS. RIVERS BULKELEY,

Chairman of the Canadian Prisoners Fund.

camps should all agree, without any possibility of having got together, to tell the same kind of tale about their treatment. The few records given here are only examples of hundreds of others. The names and regiments of the men cannot be given for obvious reasons.

1. This man was sent from Münster Camp, to the Iron Works. He declares that those who objected to work had hot irons placed on their bodies.

2. Did field work at Wanne. Said that

prisoners were beaten even if they were ill. One form of punishment was to pour cold water over them in the morning, after which they would be made to sit on their haunches for hours.

3. This man was sent to Hermenstein and Friedrichsfeld. At first he did no work. Then he was sent to Münster II., and from there to a mine. Here, on refusing to work, he and twenty other men were severely beaten and made to stand upright for 26 hours. On the second day they were stripped of all their clothing but their shirts. They were allowed no food or drink and finally had to give in.

4. "After my refusal to work in the mines the Germans put me in the steaming room where the temperature is very high and kept me there for several hours. After that I was put in a cold cellar."

5. "The conditions of our life in Brandenburg were horrible. The food was insufficient and very bad; the punishments, the cold, the heavy work—all that told on us, and in three months 800 prisoners died in that camp out of the original 10,000."

6. This man was a non-commissioned officer. "Failing to find voluntary workers the Germans began to put some of us into separate barracks, gave us poorer food than the others and did not allow us to receive help from outside. Our boots were taken from us and we were given wooden shoes. We were then told that we were to be treated as ordinary privates. Next

morning we were driven out to work. We decided to refuse. The German guards unsheathed their swords and began beating every one of us. Some of us suffered severely. I . . . was one of them. The guards struck me about a hundred times, after which my shoulder blades were quite swollen, also my left arm above the elbow. But notwithstanding these tortures I stood at attention. The officer then jumped up and himself struck me several times with his sword, wounded me on the head and left arm. The doctor stopped the bleeding and declared me fit for work. I was ordered to stand at attention until dark, without food. Th's is how I was forced to work in sugar and iron factories."

The accounts of the escaped prisoners show that after they were made to work at the different factories iron discipline was employed to get the utmost out of them. Those sent to Krupp's works at Essen were warned that whoever refused to obey would be punished by imprisonment of from four to ten years in a fortress.

Wounded men were put at work alongside the hale. A prisoner who escaped from an iron factory at Aix-la-Chapelle told how one of his party had been wounded in the left shoulder, and the wound was unhealed. The foreman in the foundry saw that he was unfit for work and sent him back to the barracks with a guard. A German lieutenant examined him there and asked him, through an interpreter



RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR BURYING A COMRADE.



RUSSIAN PRISONERS AT FARM WORK IN GERMANY.

why he was not at work. "I am ill," said the prisoner. Thereupon the officer had him undressed and ordered him to be drenched with cold water—this was late in October—and then sent him back. There he was—starved, beaten, bleeding at the lungs and scarcely able to stand, when his comrade escaped.

Escaped prisoners agreed in declaring that the worst conditions of all were in industrial working camps and factories, especially those in Belgium. The men who were sent to work on the land were generally the most fortunate. In some districts, however, even the farming hands had a very hard time. At Altdam prisoners were harnessed to the farming machinery, six men to a harrow and twelve to a plough, thus replacing one and two horses.

A large number of the prisoners who, in the winter of 1916 were exchanged with Russians as being hopelessly unfit, had been crippled, not on the battlefield, but during their imprisonment in Germany. "The prisoners are forced to do work they have never done before, such as mining, fed on starvation rations and made to work for long hours," wrote one Russian authority. "The pay is usually 3½d. a day, for which they cannot buy food, as there is none or hardly any to be had at the canteens. They all suffer very much from lack of sugar and fat stuffs, which they are not given at all. Meat, of course, they never see. When their health fails, no attention is paid to it and they are forced by blows to go on

working till they literally drop and are taken away to hospital. When they are wounded accidentally during the work, often no care is taken of the wound, so that it gets bad, and by the time they are taken to hospital an amputation has to be performed; that is why there are so many cripples amongst the exchanged prisoners that were not incapacitated at the front."

The most convincing proof of the severity with which the Russian prisoners were treated was found in the rapidly growing death roll. During the winter of 1916 and the spring and summer of 1917 returns from many of the leading camps where the Russians were confined showed ever-increasing numbers of deaths, particularly from tuberculosis. The Russians had a grim saying: "The Germans captured two millions of us. One million are now dead."

The great distress amongst the Russians led to the formation in England of a Russian Prisoners of War Committee, presided over by Countess Benckendorf, wife of the Russian Ambassador. This Committee raised upward of £100,000 from the British public up to the summer of 1917. This entire sum was used for the direct benefit of the Russian prisoners.

An Allied soldier who returned to England from captivity in 1916 went to the Russian authorities to relate what he had seen. He said that about two thousand Russian prisoners were taken from the camp to a factory, and

were ordered to make munitions for the Germans. On their refusing to do so they were made to stand to attention every day for seven days. Seventy-five of the two thousand were brought back to the camp by a back entrance, the remainder having been left behind, no one knew where. "They presented



THE COUNTESS BENCKENDORFF,
Chairman of the Russian Prisoners of War
Committee.

a pitiable spectacle," said the soldier. "Their hair was unkempt, their cheeks sunken in, they were almost naked and they had only rags to cover their feet. The guards were ordered to bring them black bread. In their desperate eagerness to get at the bread they reached forward but were too weak for the effort. Many fell down and were unable to rise again. Some died at once and the rest were taken to hospital, where 16 died that night." Such a tale sounds incredible. The man, however, made a formal declaration before the authorities of its truth and begged the Russians he saw to do something to help their people.

Large numbers of Serbians, including many Serbian lads, were taken prisoner during the great invasion of 1915. Their numbers, so far as can be told, were about 150,000; 30,000 of these were sent to Bulgaria, and considerably over 100,000 to Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Comparatively few were kept in those parts of Serbia captured by the Austrians. Their place was taken, in the main, by Italian prisoners whose labour was used to cultivate the country on a large scale. Over 40 per cent. more of Serbian land was cultivated in 1917 with the aid of these Italian prisoners than had ever been by its own people.

The question of relief work for Serbian prisoners was first raised in February, 1916, when an English sergeant at Parelhim sent a postcard saying that there were many Serbian prisoners there in great need of food and clothing. The Serbian Relief Fund undertook to do something, and in May, 1916, a supply of bread was sent to a number of camps through the Bureau de Secours at Berne. This service of relief gradually extended until in the summer of 1917 no less than 62,500 prisoners were receiving weekly supplies.

These supplies were on a very modest scale, consisting only of, at first, a kilo, and then two kilos of bread per man per week.

It was for some time exceedingly difficult to obtain any exact details of the condition of the Serbian prisoners. Something was learnt from men who escaped from different camps. A broad difference was found generally in the treatment in Austria-Hungary and in Germany. In Austria-Hungary the prisoners suffered a great deal from the incompetence and bad organization of their captors. It was not so much that the Austrians were actively cruel to them as that they neglected in many cases to make any proper provision. As a result, very large numbers of the Serbians had so little food and such scanty means of keeping themselves clean or keeping their camps in sanitary condition, that attack after attack of typhus swept their ranks.

In Germany the organization was better, but the conditions far more rigorous. The Germans after they began to exploit the Serbian soldiers for industrial work, provided them with food, which, while it would seem miserably poor to the Englishmen and Frenchmen, did not excite so much complaint among the Serbians—men already well inured to hunger.

Conditions varied in many camps. In some they were undoubtedly very bad indeed. From information supplied by escaped prisoners and by neutrals it became possible to get some idea of the conditions in the different centres.

Konigsbrueck.—Conditions at this camp were very

bad. The food was insufficient and of poor quality, many of the prisoners being ill with stomach complaints.

Soltau.—This was the parent camp for many smaller commandos. The ration of bread allowed here was about 5½ ounces a day. Meat was supplied once a fortnight. No clothing was given to the prisoners until they were almost naked. They were not allowed to speak to each other when working in gangs.

Münster.—Here the Serbian prisoners were forced to work in munition factories, many of them being sent to the Krupp works at Essen. They were paid about 3½d. per day and allowed to speak to each other, but strictly forbidden to talk to British or prisoners of other nationalities.

Heinrichsgrün.—There were many Serbian officers here, of whom about 1,300 were always in hospital.

Manthausen.—This place was known as "the Graveyard," owing to the very heavy mortality.

Drosendörf.—The great feature in this camp was the large number of Serbians always in hospital, and the prevalence of dysentery and tuberculosis. No soap, no disinfectants and no invalid food were provided. Bread was so scarce that the Serbians could sell their loaves, sent by the Swiss Bureau, for 8s. each.

Braunau.—About 1,600 boys between the ages of eight and seventeen were interned here. Many more Serbian children were kept at *Nezside*.

One extraordinary feature of the camps for Serbians in Austria-Hungary was that soldier prisoners, civilians, women and children were all mixed up. The places were vast concentration camps, in which enormous numbers of Serbians were driven, shut in and left largely to their own devices.

In addition to the camps for the Serbians of the kingdom, the Austrians created a further



RUSSIAN PRISONERS SEARCHING FOR GARBAGE, LANGENSALZA.

series of concentration camps for Austrian Serbs suspected of disloyalty.

An interesting chapter, impossible to write in full until after the war, could deal with the escapes of prisoners. Quite a considerable number of British Russian and French officers and men got away from camps or work stations



A RESERVE HOSPITAL FOR FRENCH PRISONERS IN BERLIN.

in Germany. The Russians were particularly active in attempting to escape, largely owing to the very severe treatment they received. They knew that nothing could be worse than what they then suffered, and accordingly they made a bold plunge, often crowned with success. In some cases they only knew in the vaguest possible way the geography of the districts where they lived. They were particularly fortunate if they had a compass.

Their usual plan was to take the first opportunity of slipping off unobserved and then make straight in an estimated direction for the Dutch Frontier or for the Allied lines. They would lie hidden all day in woods, in ditches, or in rocky districts where they could not easily be seen. At night they would march on, starting as soon as the roads were quiet



BRITISH AND SERBIAN PRISONERS AT STORGARD, IN POMERANIA.

The Serbians are in rags.

and keeping on till day-break. For a single German to see them meant as a rule their re-capture. Often enough they ran out of food some days before they reached the Dutch Frontier. Then as they got near came the most exciting time of all. Would they get through? Would they be held up by wires or would German guards meet and recapture them at the last moment? The scene can be imagined of the men creeping through the

undergrowth, picking the roughest and dreariest parts and then making the final dash. Time after time escaped prisoners thought themselves arrested at the last moment by German guards only to find that they had already crossed the frontier and were safely in Holland.



SERBIAN PRISONERS AT KONIGSBRÜCK CAMP, with their bagpipes.

The Dutch uniformly treated these escaped men, of whatever nationality, with the greatest possible kindness, gave them food, clothing, and a hearty welcome and sped them on their way.

Other Russian prisoners who were put at work behind the lines on the Western Front boldly made their way at night right across the German positions into No-man's-land and risked being shot by sentries on either side. There were parts of the British Front in the spring and summer of 1917 where the cry of "Russki, Russki," was heard more than once, and where the sentry carefully covered the approaching man with his rifle, as a gaunt, famished figure crept up to him, threw himself at his feet and with tears and prayers tried to prove that he was a friend.

There were other cases where parties of men in German uniform, Russian subjects who had been forced into the German army, tried to go over in a body. This was still more dangerous and difficult. The sentries on the British side naturally suspected a trap, and the German troops on the other side had no mercy for the man caught between the lines.

In many camps plots for escape added to the zest of life. In one, a group of Russian officers had nearly completed a tunnel under the wire

entanglements when they were caught. Men spend weeks and months planning and plotting to obtain maps and compasses and to learn something of the country through which they must pass. Many men were captured an hour or two after they got away. Often the most carefully planned schemes broke down at the very beginning.

Some set to learn German that they might be able to get freely about once they got outside the walls. Some, after escaping from their prisons, took the boldest possible course

We made off across country on compass bearing. The first two nights were mostly through forest drifted deep with snow, and it was hard to make much progress. However, on the third night we stuck to roads and covered 28 miles. Each night we travelled from dark till daylight. We slept all day, covering ourselves with hay, both for warmth and secrecy. Once a party of men came and removed hay from within a few feet of where we lay hidden, but we were deep down, and they did not discover us.

Towns in Germany are ill-lighted, but not as dark as London. We travelled over 200 miles, and all that time I suppose we did not see more than a dozen men. Once a sportsman came within 15 yards of us, but we just managed to creep away without being seen. A patrol once challenged us on the road, but we had already passed him, and he took no exception to the only



FRENCH TURCOS TAKEN PRISONERS BY THE GERMANS.

and went right into German cities, even into Berlin itself, and then moved towards the frontier along circuitous routes far from the usual prisoner of war stations.

Most of the tales of the men's adventures could not be related, because they would betray plans that might yet be used by others. One officer's story summarises, however, the experience of many. It was told in *The Times* of April 16, 1917. The officer was one of a party of 80 who were sent from Friedberg to other camps. He escaped on the way. His preparations had been made carefully in advance.

words of German I knew. We soon left the road again however, and nothing further occurred.

Starting on our final journey, we were unlucky enough to be stopped by a forest guard. A belt of about 10 miles is patrolled by forest guards. The guard told us to halt, which we did, as we were only half a mile from a village, and we were afraid of giving an alarm. He told us he would shoot if we did not march at once. Then he started to bluff us, counting "Ein, Zwei," and fumbling in his pocket for an imaginary revolver. When he came to count "Drei" it fell rather flat, and he then asked to see my papers. I had a card ready, and I showed it to him.

The actual frontier at this point is in a belt of forest, somewhat similar to the New Forest. It was very difficult to keep an accurate route, but there were no wire entanglements or live wires. The sole guard is the forest force, who are generally armed with revolvers.

One would think that, living in a prison camp, one



BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR AT DOBERITZ.

would be too soft to stand the sort of thing we went through, but we arrived in perfectly good health. The whole period of the journey was bitterly cold, and our water bottles were frozen by day and night. The most unpleasant period was the last three days, when it rained incessantly.

By the summer of 1917 the problem of protecting the prisoners of war had again reached a point where there was real uneasiness among all interested in the well-being of Allied subjects in German hands. Many prisoners, both officers and men, were living under reasonably good conditions. The officers in particular, although chafing under numerous minor restrictions and deprived of their freedom, were not as a rule subject to physical discomfort. The hospital treatment for prisoners, apart from the more outlying districts, had generally improved, and in many cases the hospital authorities made reasonable provision for the treatment of the men. Some of the hospital abuses which marked the earlier stages of the war seemed now scarcely possible.

In the majority of the camps the housing accommodation, the sanitary arrangements, and the general control were on a much better basis, at least as far as British and French prisoners were concerned. There was still in some of these camps much arbitrary treatment, and reports reached England of individual cases of great harshness and oppression. But these were not so common as at first. And while the German food was more inadequate than ever, the parcels from England made ample provision for nearly all of the interned British.

Another great improvement was in the attitude of the civilians. People who two and a half years before had greeted our men with abuse and who would then, if they could, have inflicted every kind of physical violence on them, now looked pitifully and sadly at them rather than otherwise. They had passed the stage of mad exaltation and had themselves realised to the full the bitterness of war.

Why then, in view of these favourable developments, was there uneasiness?

The first uneasiness arose from fear of the effect of prolonged confinement upon our men. Numbers of our prisoners had now been in German hands for close on three years. During much of this time they had been buoyed up with hopes of speedy release, hopes constantly disappointed, ever to be renewed again. Most of these older prisoners had gone through

experiences of the most trying kind. It was felt that men could not stand much more without, in many cases, permanent and irreparable damage.

The next cause of uneasiness lay in the growing proofs that the more moderate forces



BACK FROM A GERMAN PRISON.

in Germany were being time after time defeated or overborne in their plans for more humane treatment of prisoners. There was a period when the German authorities could be induced to make some effort to remedy abuses by the argument that the facts about these would produce very harmful impressions upon neutral nations. This argument was more and more losing its effect. The great neutral nations, notably the United States, had now taken sides against Germany, and there were growing evidences of a willingness on the part of some of the authorities to adopt the most extreme courses, irrespective of what any others thought.

The growing exploitation of prisoner labour, the disgraceful means by which men were forced to consent to manufacture munitions of war against their own people, or to help to build trenches against their Allies, and instances such as the concealment for months of hundreds of British prisoners behind the Western front, were all evidences of this.

Plan after plan for the betterment of prisoners' conditions, such as the exchange of



GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR AT FARM WORK IN HAINAULT FOREST, ESSEX.

older men, and the relief of those who had been a long time in captivity, were held up by the German authorities or met by evasive answers, although they would have benefited Germans equally with British. Each month gave the British a stronger argument to use in defence of their own people, for each month during the winter and spring and summer of 1916-17 added to the number of German prisoners in British hands.

There were many proofs, however, that the Germans deliberately shut their eyes to all evidence of the way their people were treated after capture. On more than one occasion they excused their own conduct on the plea that their ill-treatment of the British was in reprisal for ill-treatment by the British of the Germans. Many things seemed to show that the German higher authorities would only with difficulty be moved from their purpose by a plea that their own people who were prisoners would be benefited.

It was felt more and more in England that one great need was for the Government clearly

to state its position on the prisoners of war question, to announce what immediate measures it would take in cases of proved ill-treatment, and to hold fast to its policy.

On more than one occasion speakers for the Government had announced the possibility of a policy of reprisal for certain things. These threats were not carried into effect. Above all, it was felt that even late in the day the authorities would still be well advised to make a complete end of the policy of semi-secrecy with which the prisoner of war question had been surrounded. They had nothing to conceal. Every visitor to the British prison camps became a fresh defender of British methods. Wide circulation of accounts of ill-treatment of prisoners certainly caused resentment in Britain against the enemy, but also did more than this. Such accounts were more than once a powerful influence in securing even partial redress of wrongs. And the desire of all classes was that no effort should be spared, no weapon unemployed, to aid our men in enemy hands.

CHAPTER CLXXXVIII.

THE WAR GOVERNMENT OF THE BRITISH PEOPLES.

IDEA OF IMPERIAL WAR CABINET—CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE EMPIRE—ITS NATURE—ITS DEFECTS IN WAR—APPROACHES TOWARDS IMPERIAL DEFENCE SYSTEM, MILITARY AND NAVAL—SUGGESTED DOMINION REPRESENTATION ON COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE—CANADIAN DEFENCE COMMITTEE—NEED OF IMPERIAL WAR COUNCIL—POSTPONEMENT OF IMPERIAL CONFERENCE IN 1915—EFFECT OF WAR ON DOMINION POLITICS—CANADA—SOUTH AFRICA—NEW ZEALAND—AUSTRALIA—NEWFOUNDLAND—MEETING OF IMPERIAL WAR CABINET—CONSTITUTIONAL READJUSTMENT POSTPONED—GENERAL SMUTS STAYS IN ENGLAND TO ATTEND WAR CABINET.


AFTER two and a half years of war it at last became clear to the rulers of Great Britain that a Cabinet representing all the self-governing States of the Empire was a necessity. On Christmas Day, 1916, the invitation was issued which resulted in the meeting of the War Cabinet and Conference in the spring of 1917.

The invitation was one of the first acts of the Government of Mr. Lloyd George, which had succeeded that of Mr. Asquith. It showed in the new British Ministry a gift of imagination that had been signally lacking in their predecessors and a defiance of convention which was full of promise for the future. Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues must have full credit for the invitation and its consequences. Many of them, however, had been members of the Coalition Cabinet under Mr. Asquith. This, with the fact that the invitation to the Dominions was issued so soon after Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister, suggests that its inspiration came from the new blood in his Cabinet.

It seemed, no doubt, natural enough at the time that the British Cabinet should be the sole repository of the Executive power of the Empire for war purposes. British Ministers had always been responsible for the internal

relations of the Empire. The control of foreign policy inevitably carries with it other definite executive powers. The authority which decides who the allies of the State are to be, and who the enemies, must know what naval and military force backs its diplomacy at any given moment. Navies are not built—armies are not organized, trained and mustered, without money. Financial provision for them had therefore to be also under the control of the men who decided foreign policy. These powers the British system concentrated in the hands of British Ministers. The Dominions had nothing to do either with the authority which they conferred or with the burden which they entailed. So it was when the war broke out. So it remained till the end of 1916.

Posterity may wonder why a system which left the supreme power of the Empire in the hands of one of its component States had been accepted with so little question before the war and remained unaltered for two and a half years after war had come. The reason can be given in a very few words. The British Empire was a peaceable State, so far as it was a State at all. Men have laboured to show the falseness of the German accusation that Great Britain—with her sea-power, her



THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1907.

Left to right: Sir Joseph Ward (Prime Minister, New Zealand), Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Prime Minister, Canada), Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (British Prime Minister), Lord Elgin (Secretary of State for Colonies, presiding), Mr. A. Deakin (Prime Minister, Australia), Dr. Jameson (Prime Minister, Cape Colony), General Louis Botha (Prime Minister, Transvaal), Sir W. J. Lyne (Australian Minister for Trade and Commerce).

world-embracing possessions, her far-reaching law—was the real author of the war. Their labours, it may be conjectured, were not so successful in some foreign countries as might be desired. There was a good deal that was specious in the German case. But its falsity is established by the single fact that the naval and military strength of the Empire rested, right up to August, 1914, upon the British voter alone. If the rulers of the Empire had designed war, if for any length of time before war broke out they had even believed that it was a contingency which had to be reckoned with seriously, it is inconceivable that it could have been so. But that is by the way. The point at the moment is, that the failure of the British people to find for their naval and military power any broader basis than they had had in the days of Queen Elizabeth was due to the fact that they sought peace and ensued it—assuming the while that all other peoples of the world did the same, or that, if they did not, they would be coerced into inaction by the more inert force of the established order of European civilization.

Upon that dream the thunderbolt of Germany crashed in August, 1914, and destroyed it. But years had to pass before its fantasies faded from the minds of the British peoples. The armies of the Dominions were mustered and came into action on the battlefields of Europe, of Asia, and of Africa. But still the strategy that moved them on the chequered board of the world-war was the strategy of British Ministers. Gallipoli was one combination of that strategy; the defence of Egypt another; the campaigns of Mesopotamia and of Persia a third; the invasion of German South-West and East Africa yet another. In all, just as in the campaigns of Western Europe, the decision of British Ministers was accepted without question by the Dominions. Strategy as the will of the executive naval and military authority of the Empire, strategy as the weapon of the diplomacy of the Empire (the Dominions said, in effect, up to the end of 1916) was no concern of theirs. It was the concern of British Ministers and of them alone. The Dominions were most scrupulous in their single-minded observance of this principle, with all its consequences. They were under orders, and they refused to criticize or eevil at the men who had to give the orders. Campaigns might fail grievously to produce the results that they were

obviously designed to produce, but the Dominions refrained even from good words. There had never been a more marvellous proof of the innate sense of discipline of the British peoples. It was magnificent; but it was not war.

A system which thus held its authority over the British peoples for so long a period after most exacting trial demands real understanding of its origins and its justifications. If it was rooted in the essential peacefulness of the British Empire, that does not explain why when the war came it was not abandoned immediately. The reason is that the British peoples were slow to imagine any other system. Even when the Lloyd George Ministry changed it by a stroke of the pen at the end of 1916 the people, not only of the British Isles but of the Dominions, failed almost completely to understand the change. The truth is that they were still obsessed by the tradition of the hegemony of Great Britain within the Empire. They might proclaim their belief that the relation of parent and child, as between Great Britain and the Dominions, was a thing of the past. They might talk about equality of status as between the States of the Empire. All this was very well in theory. But it was not so in practice, and the Dominion peoples knew that it was not so. Even the theory of the Imperial system did not support it. It was loose talk. The Imperial authority had still the right to veto Acts passed by the Dominion Legislatures. The right was practically in abeyance, but it had been used not so many years before 1914. And in very many small ways—apart from the supreme power of controlling foreign policy and its accessories—the actual sovereignty of Great Britain was proved by existing facts.

The real statesmen of the Dominions knew this perfectly well, though they were not in the habit of making a point of it in public speeches. It was recognized instinctively throughout the Dominions. They left the supreme government of the Empire to British Ministers because they had always been used to have it so. This left them free to enjoy full local autonomy. It did not interfere with their convenience. It kept them remote from the worries and tangles of European politics, of which they knew little and would have liked to know nothing. And it freed them from the financial burden of armaments, allowing them to devote their available wealth to the development of their local resources

Their hope of speedy prosperity depended on such development. British supremacy within the Empire encouraged and justified that hope.

No wonder that Germany, deliberately preparing her bid for world supremacy, looked with scorn across the "German Ocean" at



Swaine.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN, G.C.M.G.,
Prime Minister of Canada.

the British Empire. Everything seemed to show that the British peoples kept together merely by a miracle of chance, which the first touch of deliberate aggression must shatter. Yet beneath all this apparent indifference there was a deep current of reflection on the Imperial future. The pacifist dream had not seduced any but a small minority of the British people. As early as 1912 Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, was looking forward to the day when the population of Canada would rival in numbers that of the British Isles, and had ventured the reflection that British Ministers could not much longer have a monopoly of foreign policy or the people of Great Britain be much longer saddled with the sole burden of maintaining the Navy and the Army. Dominion Ministers, too, had a pretty shrewd idea of Germany's designs. "What a fantastic picture it was that Prussian militarism made for itself before the outbreak of this war!" exclaimed Sir Robert Borden in a speech made to the Empire Parliamentary Association during his visit to Europe in 1915.

"It pictured Canada, Australia, and New Zealand standing aloof and indifferent or seeking an opportunity to cut themselves aloof from this Empire. What is the actual picture to-day? They are bound to the Empire by stronger ties than ever before, and are prepared to fight to the death for the maintenance of its integrity and for the preservation of our common civilization throughout the world. What of South Africa? The Prussian picture was that it should flare into rebellion at once, cut itself off from the Empire, and proclaim its independence. What is the actual picture? The heroic figure of General Louis Botha receiving the surrender of German South-West Africa—a territory larger than the German Empire itself." The "Prussian picture" seemed "fantastic" enough in 1915. But it had haunted the minds of many thoughtful men throughout the Empire for years before 1914. Would the Empire stand the sudden strain of a European war? Would the Dominions acquiesce in a declaration of war made by the British Government practically without consultation with them? These speculations proved to be spectres of the imagination only when war came. The mere threat of war dissolved them. Four days before the British Government declared war the Government of Canada, to quote Sir Robert Borden again, "took the responsibility . . . of sending a message to His Majesty's Government stating that if war should unhappily supervene they might be assured that Canada would regard the quarrel as her own and would do her part in maintaining the integrity of this Empire." The same spirit animated the Governments of the other Dominions, and the German dream vanished with the breaking of the red dawn of war.

There had, long before August, 1914, been tentative approaches to some common system of defence for the Empire. They were mere approaches. They did not get very far. But they revealed the sense of the Dominions that the defence of the Empire could not be left much longer to Great Britain alone, and they might, if war had not broken out, have led to the gradual evolution of a system which would have put the executive power of the Empire in the hands of a body representative of the Dominions as well as of the British Isles. Thus, in 1909, a memorandum by the War Office with reference to the formation of an Imperial General Staff was circulated by

Lord Crewe, then Colonial Secretary, to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The Union of South Africa had not been formed at that time. The Colonial Secretary in his covering letter pointed out that the memorandum had been prepared in pursuance of the third resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1907, and expressed the hope that "the principles and procedure explained in it may meet with acceptance from your Government," and that it would be "welcomed as showing the lines on which action should be taken in developing and improving the existing organization of the defence forces" of the Empire. The main points in the memorandum were thus summarized by the War Office :

1. The necessity for the maintenance of sea supremacy, which alone can ensure any military co-operation at all.

timely provision for an emergency deprives military forces of much of their potential value, while adequate preparation has been proved in all recent campaigns to be a paramount factor in securing a rapid and successful decision. For these reasons, although the Oversea Dominions may be unable to undertake definite responsibility for anything beyond local defence, it would still be well, in organising for such defence, to consider the necessities incidental to the situation in which the Dominions beyond the seas desired to give effective military service in association with the troops of the Mother Country. Such a contingency has been kept in view in the accompanying paper.

It would have been well, as bitter experience showed, if that contingency had not only been contemplated by the War Office in 1909, but had inspired the definite organization of an Imperial General Staff. As it was, the War Office Memorandum seems to have had no definite result. At least, when war did come in 1914, there was no visible sign of the exist-



THE CANADIAN HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, OTTAWA.

Destroyed by fire in 1916.

2. The desirability of a certain broad plan of military organisation for the Empire, but not a rigid model making no allowance for local difficulties.

3. A conception of combination in which the armed forces of the Empire would be organised in two parts ; the first part having local defence as its function, the second designed for the service of the Empire as a whole.

The War Office appended to this summary a short statement of the conditions which they accepted as governing in practice these ideals :

The Army Council are well aware that the self-governing Dominions can give no guarantee that contingents of any given strength or composition will be forthcoming for service in any part of the Empire in the event of a great war. At the same time, they fully realised that the feelings of loyalty and affection towards the Mother Country entertained by the Overseas Dominions will operate as powerfully in the hour of trial as they did during the recent war in South Africa. But the lack of definite and

ence of any organization whatever for moving to the scene of the various campaigns bodies of troops already organized in the Dominions. As a matter of fact any scheme for constituting an Imperial General Staff in 1909, or, indeed, up to 1915, was merely a plan for putting the cart before the horse. The Dominions had never contemplated in any serious spirit the necessity of sending troops to Europe. The military organizations of Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, though they were based upon compulsion, were intended solely for the provision of a Home Defence Force. The militia of Canada was designed for the same purpose, and even for that purpose was

transparently inadequate. So that it may be said with truth that there had been no approach, up till 1914, towards the organization of any composite force, drawn from British and Dominion troops, which might be available for the service of the Empire in any field should war break out.

The naval position, from the point of view of the co-operation of the Dominions, was hardly any better. The agreement with



[Haines.]

LORD HARCOURT (Mr. Lewis Harcourt),
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1910-1915.

Australia and New Zealand which was made in August, 1909, led to the formation of the Australian Navy. But long before the war broke out the Australian Government was complaining about the practical results of that agreement. Australian Ministers were representing that they had done their part, and that the Australian Navy was in the way to become a weapon such as the agreement had contemplated. They complained that the other side of the agreement had been almost wholly ignored by the Admiralty. It "did not appear" to them, they said in a dispatch which they sent to the Colonial Secretary on August 16, 1913, "that the China and East Indies units are being provided." This was perfectly true. As a matter of fact the naval agreement of 1909 had broken

down. The tension of naval competition in Europe had become more and more severe. The threat of the German Navy compelled the Admiralty to concentrate everything in the North Sea. It was necessary to strain every nerve to maintain the minimum rate of construction that was in any way consistent with security. It became more and more difficult to wring the money for this desperate competition in arms from a Parliament which was continually being soothed by British statesmen whenever it showed signs of being apprehensive about the designs of Germany. The Admiralty were absolutely right, in these strait circumstances, to ignore the naval agreement of 1909. They had much more urgent work in hand, and no academic regard for their undertaking to Australia and New Zealand could have justified them in risking security in European waters for the sake of the programme to which they had set their hand in 1909.

The fact is that the naval agreement of 1909 was an attempt to compromise between political and military considerations. Australia and New Zealand were growing more and more anxious as they saw the increasing concentration of British ships in the North Sea. They began to feel lonely and neglected; to imagine themselves a prey, in the event of war breaking out, of any hostile warship that might be prowling about the Pacific; to reflect that the highest strategic interests of the Empire might be perfectly consistent, in the view of the Admiralty, with leaving the shores of the Pacific Dominions unprotected. There was a good deal of truth in all this. The war when it did come speedily showed that, if it had not been for the warships which Australia had built for herself, both Australia and New Zealand would have been very awkwardly at the mercy of the powerful German warships which were stationed on the coast of China. The Admiralty no doubt felt in 1909 that there was this much in the requests of Australia and New Zealand; that it could do little harm to register their approval of the construction of an Australian Navy; and thus conceded the principle. When it came, however, to having to carry out their part of the agreement, to send ships to the Pacific and to provide *personnel* and equipment, they very naturally drew back.

Thus there had been no true beginning, either on the naval or on the military side, of any

real organization of Imperial resources before 1914. Nevertheless, the need for some kind of joint Imperial action had been very generally recognized. At the Imperial Conference of 1911 Sir Joseph Ward, then Prime Minister of New Zealand, moved a resolution asking



[Vandyk.
SIR JOSEPH WARD, K.C.M.G.,
Minister for Finance in the New Zealand
Coalition Cabinet.

that the High Commissioners of the Dominions should be summoned to the Committee of Imperial Defence when naval and military matters affecting the Dominions were under consideration. The resolution was amended, and was passed in the following form:

1. That one or more representatives, appointed by the respective Governments of the Dominions, should be invited to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence when questions of naval and military defence affecting the Oversea Dominions are under consideration.

2. The proposal that a Defence Committee should be established in each Dominion is accepted in principle. The constitution of these Defence Committees is a matter for each Dominion to decide.

In the autumn of 1911 there was a change of Government in Canada, and Mr. Borden succeeded Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In the summer of 1912 Mr. Borden visited London. In private conversation with the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, and with the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Harcourt, he expressed the desire "that the Canadian and other Dominions Ministers who might be in London as members of the Committee of Imperial Defence should receive, in confidence, knowledge of the policy and proceedings of the Imperial Government in foreign and other affairs."

This suggestion was the basis of a statement made by Mr. Harcourt in a public speech soon afterwards:—

There is, on the part of Canadian Ministers and people, a natural and laudable desire for a greater measure of consultation and co-operation with us in the future than they have had in the past . . . Speaking for myself, I see no obstacle, and certainly no objection, to the Governments of all the Dominions being given at once a larger share in the executive direction in matters of defence and in personal consultation and co-operation with individual British Ministers whose duty it is to frame policy here. I should welcome a more continuous representation of Dominions Ministers, if they wish it, upon the Committee of Imperial Defence; we should all be glad if a member or members of those Cabinets could be annually in London. The door of fellowship and friendship is always open to them, and we require no formalities of an Imperial Conference for the continuity of Imperial confidence.

The suggestion thus made by the Colonial Secretary on behalf of the Imperial Government



SIR WILFRID LAURIER, G.C.M.G.,
Prime Minister of Canada, 1896-1911.

was formally accepted by the Government of Canada, who at the first opportunity stationed a member of the Canadian Cabinet permanently in London. The Governments of the other Dominions were not so favourable to the suggestion. The New Zealand Government, for instance, wrote on June 19, 1913, that they did not "consider it advisable at present for a permanent appointment to be made, but rather that, when at any time accredited Ministers of the Government of the Dominion are in England, they may be invited to attend

the deliberations of the Committee of Imperial Defence in a like manner as has been the privilege of the New Zealand Minister of Defence, Colonel James Allen, during his recent visit." The Government of South Africa were even more emphatic. On January 30, 1913, they wrote expressing appreciation of Mr. Harcourt's suggestion and of the "readiness evinced by His Majesty's Government to make



MR. JOSEPH COOK,

Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth,
1913-1914.

provision, through the machinery of the Imperial Defence Committee, for more frequent opportunities of consultation between the Imperial and Dominion Governments." The rest of this dispatch is so signal an illustration of the kind of attitude which may be adopted by the Dominions to well-meant suggestions from England, like that of Mr. Harcourt, that it may be quoted in full :—

Ministers have noted with pleasure that, as Mr. Secretary Harcourt clearly indicates, no new departure in constitutional practice is intended, but that the proposals of His Majesty's Government are simply a further expression of that spirit of mutual consultation and helpful co-operation which in the past has so happily animated the British Government in its relations to the Governments of the self-governing Dominions.

Not only have matters of grave military and naval concern to the Empire and its component parts been very fully and frequently discussed at various Imperial Defence Conferences, but, at meetings of the Imperial Defence Committee, His Majesty's Government have made to representatives of the Dominion Governments full and frank disclosures on very important aspects of Imperial Foreign Policy. In the interval between these

conferences Ministers have repeatedly received from the Overseas sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence the most valuable technical advice in regard to defence arrangements for the Union (of South Africa).

The existing machinery for consultation and suggestion has thus worked so smoothly that Ministers would be loth to see any new departure inaugurated which might in the end prove less satisfactory in practice. In particular, they doubt whether the idea of a Minister of the Union residing in London for the purpose of constantly representing the Union Government on the Imperial Defence Committee is practicable.

As long as the control of foreign policy remains, as under present conditions it must necessarily remain, solely with the Imperial Government, and the Imperial Government continue, as agreed at the last Imperial Conference, to consult the Dominions on all questions of foreign policy which affect them individually, Ministers do not think it is necessary to have a Union Minister in constant attendance at the Imperial Defence Committee.

It is always open to the Union Government either to seek advice from the Imperial Defence Committee in writing, or, in more important cases, to ask for a personal consultation between that Committee and the representative of the Union Government. In the latter case, undoubtedly the more convenient course, at any rate so far as the Union is concerned, would be that either the Prime Minister or the Minister or Ministers whose departments are more specially concerned should visit London for the purpose of such consultation.

The Australian Government, of which Mr. Cook, the Liberal leader, was then Prime Minister, gave no specific answer to Mr. Harcourt's suggestion that they should send a Minister to London to become a permanent member of the Imperial Defence Committee. Their reply, dated December 19, 1912, to Mr. Harcourt's communication, made an alternative suggestion :—

It is impracticable for any Commonwealth Ministers to visit England during the ensuing year, but in view of the great importance of the Dominions adopting a common policy and having a complete understanding on the question of co-operation for naval defence, it is suggested that a subsidiary conference should be convened in Australia, in either January or February, 1913. If this is not practicable Ministers would be prepared to attend the conference in New Zealand, South Africa, or Vancouver, Canada.

Mr. Harcourt's suggestion had been sent to Australia by telegram on December 10, 1912. The Australian reply making this alternative suggestion was also sent by telegram. It evidently took the Colonial Office quite by surprise. It was not till January 8, 1913, that Mr. Harcourt replied, and his reply then took the form of an enquiry whether the date of the proposed conference had been correctly given in the Australian telegram of December 19, as 1913. The next day the Australian Ministers replied by telegram :—

Year named, 1913, correct. Ministers desired conference might be held at once in view of general election probably occurring May next.

The subsequent communications between the Colonial Office and the Dominions about

this Australian suggestion constitute an illuminating revelation of the cumbrous machinery by which the affairs of the Empire were conducted in the year before the war. Assured by the Australian Government that they wanted a special defence conference and wanted it quickly, Mr. Harcourt recoiled almost with horror from the suggestion. "Please inform your Ministers," he telegraphed on January 10, 1913, to the Governor-General of Australia, "owing to situation of public affairs here, we find it quite impossible to hold general Naval Defence Conference at date named and places suggested. Other Dominions could not attend at short notice, and it is doubtful whether they would desire a general conference at present. Defence Minister of New Zealand is now on his way to England, and Defence Minister of South Africa comes here in May for individual consultation. After your general election we shall welcome any Minister of yours who could visit England for discussion." This telegram was sent to the Australian Government early in January. It was not till February 22 that a copy of the telegraphic correspondence between Australian Ministers and the Colonial Office was despatched from the Colonial Office to the Ministers of Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Newfoundland. Even then, as the dispatch covering the correspondence shows, it was only the appearance "in the

public Press" of "statements . . . as to a proposed conference upon naval defence" which led the Colonial Office to communicate the Australian suggestion to the Governments of the other Dominions. As a matter of fact the special Defence Conference which Australia thus suggested was never held. Towards the end of 1913 the Australian Government renewed their suggestion that such a conference should be held. But circumstances were unpropitious, and when the suggestion came to a head in March, 1914, it was found that it was impossible both for the New Zealand and for the Australian Government to send representatives to it. The conference was therefore abandoned, and almost exactly four months later war broke out.

Meanwhile the Canadian Government had taken action on the suggestion in the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1911, which has already been referred to, that a Defence Committee should be established in each Dominion. In the speech which he made to the special session of the Dominion Parliament in August, 1914, Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, described the action which had been taken in this respect. "I need not say," he said, "that in the United Kingdom amongst those most closely in touch with these matters, especially among the military and naval



PARLIAMENT HOUSE, MELBOURNE,
Lent to the Commonwealth.

authorities in the United Kingdom, there has been for many years a conviction that some effective organisation in the Dominions of the Empire should be provided so that an emer-



[Lafayette.

SIR JOSEPH POPE,
Canadian Under-Secretary for External Affairs.

gency such as that which arose so suddenly would not find us altogether in confusion." He went on to say that in January, 1914, Sir Joseph Pope, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, had submitted to him a proposal in this connexion. He then quoted a letter which he had written to Sir Joseph Pope, in which he said that he

approved of the proposal for a conference "of deputy heads for the purpose of concerting measures to be taken by the various departments of the Government primarily concerned in the contingency of an outbreak of war affecting His Majesty's Dominions, and more particularly of considering the preparation of a War Book which shall set forth in detail the action to be taken by every responsible official at the seat of Government in the event of such an emergency." The letter authorised Sir Joseph Pope to call such a conference. "The work," Sir Robert Borden added, "went on, during the winter months, and. . . I can describe what has been accomplished more conveniently by reading a memorandum which has been prepared by the Chairman, and which is as follows:—

In 1913 the Secretary of State for the Colonies communicated to this Government certain memoranda of the Oversea Defence Committee outlining the action to be taken by the naval and military authorities when relations with any foreign power become strained, and on the outbreak of war. The suggestion was conveyed that the Governments of the various self-governing Dominions might advantageously prepare a similar record in each case to meet such contingencies. By the direction of the Government these recommendations were considered by the local inter-departmental Committee (which is composed of the expert officers of the naval and militia departments, sitting together). The Committee reported that a conference of those deputy ministers whose departments would primarily be affected by an outbreak of war should be held to consider how best to give effect to the proposals of the Oversea Committee.

This suggestion was submitted to the Prime Minister, and received the approval of the Government. There-



CAMBRIDGE HONOURS IMPERIAL STATESMEN.

The honorary degree of LL.D. was conferred on the following members of the Imperial Conference on June 14, 1911: (left to right) The Agha Khan, the Maharajah of Bikanir, the Earl of Minto, Sir Edward Morris, the Duke of Devonshire, the Earl of Crewe, General Botha, Sir Joseph Ward.

upon a meeting . . . was held. At this meeting it was decided that the Secretaries should acquaint each member of the conference of the various contingencies which might arise, in the event of which the cooperation of his department would be required; thus enabling him to decide what steps would be necessary to give effect to the decisions of the Conference, and to detail an officer of his department to confer with the Secretary in the actual compilation of the War Book.

Meetings of sub-committees were subsequently held from time to time, at which the necessary action to be taken by the various departments in the event of certain contingencies arising was carefully considered and determined. Each department then proceeded to develop its own line of action in detail, the whole being subsequently co-ordinated and incorporated in one scheme, indicating the course to be followed by the Government as a whole on an emergency arising. This scheme was then submitted to and approved by the Prime Minister.

The taking of these precautionary measures proved most fortunate, as on the receipt of intelligence during the last few weeks of the serious situation in Europe this Government found itself in a position to take, without the slightest delay, such action as the exigencies of the moment demanded, concurrently with His Majesty's Government and with the sister Dominions of the Empire.

Sir Robert Borden testified to the value of the preparation which had thus been made in Canada. "I cannot overestimate," he said, "the great advantage to the country which resulted from having these matters considered, determined, and arranged in advance in conjunction with the Imperial Government. The arrangements which were instantly necessary . . . were made without the slightest confusion. All communications from the Imperial authorities were acted upon promptly and with, as I say, an entire absence of confusion. Every detail had been previously worked out with precision." It is interesting to have this record of the preparations for war which had been made in Canada. Similar preparations, though not perhaps in the same completeness as to detail, had presumably been made in the other Dominions. For all that it remains true that the foreign policy of the Empire, necessarily including the declaration of war, and inevitably involving the provision of naval and military force sufficient for war purposes, remained up to the actual outbreak of war wholly in the hands of British Ministers. The attempts to create a joint Imperial authority in naval and military matters had not been successful because such matters were essentially adjuncts to the power of war and peace. So long as the solo responsibility for the foreign relations of the Empire remained with British Ministers, so long had the people they represented to bear, in the last resort, alone, and without any other than voluntary assistance from the



(Swaine.)

THE MAHARAJAH OF BIKANIR.

One of the Representatives of India at the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference, 1917.

Dominions, the burden of providing the necessary naval and military strength.

When the war broke out it was clear at once that Great Britain alone could no longer support by herself the whole weight of this burden. The immediate recognition by the Dominions of this fact has long been a platitude. And very soon the leaders of the Dominions were beginning to say that the



[Bassano.]

THE IMPERIAL WAR CABINET AND CONFERENCE, 1917.

Left to right (seated): Mr. A. Henderson, Lord Milner, Lord Curzon, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Robert Borden, Mr. Massey, and General J. C. Smuts. Standing (in middle): Sir Satyendra Sinha, the Maharajah of Bikanir, Sir James Meston, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Walter Long, Sir Joseph Ward, Sir George Perley, Mr. Rogers and Mr. Hazen. Standing (back row): Captain Amery, Admiral Jellicoe, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Derby, General Morris, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Lambert, and Major Storr.

raising of Dominion armies must involve in the future some real participation in the foreign policy of the Empire. At first, however, the amount of work that had to be done within the Dominions themselves in raising, training, and equipping men; in providing all the elaborate organization of an army in being; in supporting it by constant reinforcements; in providing for its feeding and its health conditions, gave everyone so much to do that there was not much time to think about the future consequences of these military activities. The same, of course, applied to Great Britain. If it seems strange that there should have been no attempt to gather an executive War Council of all the leading men of the Empire there is considerable excuse for the failure to do so. The initiative had to come from the Imperial Government, and British Ministers were so overburdened with the mere executive work of the war that they shuddered at the very idea of assuming the additional responsibility of consultation with a formally summoned body of Dominion Ministers. As a matter of fact subsequent experience showed that if Dominion Ministers had been asked to come to London for a War Cabinet as soon as their local affairs allowed them to be absent, their presence would have lightened the work of British Ministers very much, and they could have determined the broad lines of Imperial foreign policy and of British strategy by sea and land in a way which might have had a profound influence on the whole course of the war. What the moral effect of such a Council might have been it is impossible to say. It is true that when the Imperial War Cabinet did meet at the beginning of 1917 its moral influence was not very perceptible, at least at the moment. There may, however, have been reasons for this which would not have operated in the case of an Imperial War Council held much earlier in the war. In the spring of 1917 the whole Empire was waiting with strained anticipation for the beginning of the Allied offensive in the West. Great hopes were built upon it. It was perfectly obvious that the strategy of the offensive must have been determined long before the Imperial War Cabinet met. Its members could not conceivably affect or amend that strategy. It was unthinkable that they should attempt to impose their will upon Sir Douglas Haig, who was commanding the British Army

in the West. By the beginning of 1917, too, the Dominion Armies had long been in the field. The effect of their assistance had been measured by experience. Not that there was any disposition in Great Britain to underestimate their value; very much the opposite. But it was by then a familiar thought that all the peoples of the Empire were in arms together.

Yet harm was certainly done by the fact that when the Dominion Armies came into the field it was the British Government alone that controlled their destination and their movements. Gallipoli was a most bitter lesson of what that meant. Very little had been said openly about this aspect of that glorious but fruitless and terribly costly campaign. But we may be sure that it was not without its effect and that that effect was wholly mischievous. However much people in England or in the Dominions might gloss it over, the fact remained that British Ministers had sent the first Australian contingent upon an expedition which, as subsequent investigation showed only too clearly, had been doomed by uncertainty, and by failure to reckon the true measure of its difficulties, right from the outset. It might have made no difference to the actual result of the Gallipoli expedition if it had been designed and initiated by an Imperial War Council having an Australian representative as one of its members. The hesitations and controversies which marred its beginning might have been just as many as they were. Its results might have been as small. But it would have made an immense difference to the whole Empire to know that the responsibility rested, not with British Ministers only, but with an Imperial War Council. That is only one instance of the kind of effect which the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet quite soon after the war began might have had. It is easy to imagine many others. Possibly the effect would not have been so great or so beneficial as, in retrospect, it may seem likely to have been. An Imperial War Council would certainly not have put everything right. The War Cabinet when it met did not find a remedy for everything that was wrong. Soon after it separated it was still possible for Mr. Holman, Premier of New South Wales, in the first public speech that he made after his arrival, to reveal the fact that the leaders of opinion in the Dominions had little more information about the real

progress of the war than the man in the street, that what they did know they got almost entirely from the newspapers, and that the result of leaving them thus without any special guidance or confidential information had been that they were unable themselves to give to their own people the lead which they would have liked to have given.

However that may be, there was really no reason why an Imperial War Council should not have met quite early in 1915. The normal



[Elliott & Fry.]

MR. W. A. HOLMAN,
Premier of New South Wales.

meeting of the Imperial Conference, as a matter of fact, was due for that year, and it would have been the easiest thing in the world to have pruned its usual excesses of discussion and to have turned it into a businesslike conference of Imperial representatives for the settlement of Imperial policy and Imperial war measures. It was not for lack of suggestion that the Government of the day failed to take this very obvious step. In January, 1915, *The Times* urged the Government to consider whether it would not be the best thing to hold the Imperial Conference in its normal course, although the Empire was at war. This suggestion was discussed all through the Empire, and it must be said that the most general tendency was to think that the spring of 1915 was not a good time for the holding of an Imperial Con-

ference. The main reason for this view was that the critics had not really troubled to understand the suggestion of *The Times*, and had assumed that what it was proposing was the usual sitting of the Imperial Conference, with all its traditional paraphernalia of agenda, and long, set discussions, and verbose but ineffective resolutions, and banquets, and luncheons with more interminable speeches. As a matter of fact *The Times* had proposed nothing of the kind. In a leading article published on January 19, 1915, it answered the objections which had been made. It explained that it did not suggest the calling of an Imperial Conference in the ordinary sense. "Can anyone doubt," it asked, "that the meeting of the representatives of the Dominions with Imperial Ministers would be an immense benefit to the cause of Imperial unity? . . . From other points of view the meeting of the Conference would be equally advantageous. . . . The peoples of the Empire are fighting this war as one nation. Dissipation of effort, inconsistencies in administrations, overlapping, misconceptions as to the best means of attaining the common end—all these lessen the nation's fighting power. Yet, with the responsible authority divided between the Mother Country and the Dominions, and between the Dominions themselves, such administrative handicaps are certain to assert themselves. What is needed is an opportunity, as soon as possible this year, for adjusting the balance between these authorities and for co-ordinating what is being done at each of these widely separated centres. Correspondence is slow and notoriously inadequate to deal with needs of this kind. A few days of personal intercourse between the men who are responsible would do more than reams of letters and floods of telegrams."

Read to-day, these words seem the most obvious platitude. Yet at the time when they were written the arguments which they urged and the suggestion which they supported were scouted almost everywhere throughout the Empire. The only prominent statesmen who supported them were Mr. Fisher, then Prime Minister of the Australian Commonwealth, and Mr. Rowell, leader of the Liberal Party in the Province of Ontario, Canada. At the moment when the suggestion was made by *The Times* Mr. Fisher was visiting New Zealand. He at once expressed the opinion that: "Many of our difficulties have arisen from the want of opportunities for the representatives of the

Dominions to meet with those of the mother country. . . . The gravest issues can only be dealt with by cable, or by dispatches which do not arrive until a month has elapsed. In my opinion a Conference this year would be of more value for all parties concerned than any yet held." A month later Mr. Fisher returned to Australia. Pressure had evidently been put on him from Great Britain. He said that he and his Ministry were still convinced of the "extreme usefulness" of a Conference and that he believed a great opportunity was being missed. But he admitted that he was impressed by the inadvisability of "embarrassing the Imperial Government with a renewal of obviously unacceptable suggestions." In Canada, meanwhile, the reception of the suggestion had been very much less favourable than in Australia. Practically all the leading men of the Dominion were against it, and indeed, as Mr. Fisher had said, it was much easier for Canadian Ministers to keep in touch with the Imperial Government than it was for Ministers of more distant Dominions like Australia and New Zealand. The one dissident in this chorus of disapproval, Mr. Rowell, emphasized particularly the value of

an Imperial Conference in 1915 from a moral point of view :

Can you [he asked] give to Germany, can you give to Europe, a more splendid manifestation of the unity of the Empire, and of the determination of all parts to see this fight through, than to have representatives from the Empire meet and take counsel together as to what we can all do and contribute to bring this conflict to a successful conclusion? I do hope that when other portions of the Empire are asking for this Conference, which by its constitution should be held this year, the Government of Canada will not drop the holding of this Imperial assembly for the benefit of the whole Empire.

The Imperial Government, however, had made up their mind that they would not have the Imperial Conference meeting in 1915. To all suggestions of the kind they opposed the bland assumption that the Conference, if held in 1915, must be the same kind of conference as it had always been, and could not be made into any other kind of conference or take more the form of a war council. This clinging to the idea of a "normal Conference" as the only kind of conference possible was conspicuous in a special statement on the matter made by Mr. Harcourt, still the Colonial Secretary, in the House of Commons on April 15, 1915. He



COLONIAL SECRETARY'S OFFICES, SYDNEY.

declared that he would "state exactly what happened in relation to this matter":

After war had broken out His Majesty's Government assumed that it would not be for the convenience of any of the parties that the normal Conference should meet on its due date, which was May of this year, but no communications on the matter passed between us and the Dominion Governments. Early in December last I was made aware privately that Mr. Fisher, the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia, was in favour of the meeting of the Imperial Conference during and in spite of the war. I communicated this fact also privately by telegraph to the Prime Ministers of all the other Dominions, and they unanimously agreed with us that the holding of a normal Conference this year during hostilities would be difficult if not impossible. In two cases at least it was said that the attendance of Ministers was impracticable. I then informed the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth that, in view of the practical unity of opinion, we hoped he would recognize its force, and he replied that he had no wish to press the matter farther. A few days ago Mr. Fisher was reported in the Press as saying with reference to the Imperial Conference "What the British Government considers to be the correct thing is good enough for my Government. That is all I have to say." And in a private letter to me, dated February 15, he wrote: "I cheerfully fall in with the decision not to hold the Imperial Conference this year, though I have not been able to convince myself that the reasons given for postponing it were sufficient. However, we have a policy for this trouble that gets over all difficulties. When the King's business will not fit in with our ideas, we do not press them"—an admirable example of the spirit in which the Dominions deal with Imperial affairs during the war.

An admirable example, indeed, and wholly

beneficial to the Empire so long as the wisdom and discretion of British Ministers were equal to the great responsibility laid upon them by this self-denying ordinance of Dominion Ministers. In this case the complacency with which Mr. Harcourt made his announcement on April 15, 1915, seems not so wholly justifiable as he evidently believed it to be at the time. It certainly did not satisfy Australia, which understood perfectly well that Mr. Harcourt had begged the whole question, and that what Mr. Fisher had suggested had not been a "normal Conference," but a special war council in which war measures might be concerted by the leading men of the various parts of the Empire. Mr. Fisher, in fact, had said so without any equivocation. He had pointed out that all the accessories of the "normal Conference" were unessential and could easily be dispensed with; and that what the Dominions wanted was to know the mind of the men who were conducting the war and what was going to be done when peace had to be made. This was exactly the business of the Imperial War Cabinet when it did meet in 1917. But at the beginning of 1915 the British Government of the day deliberately chose to ignore the possibility of holding such a Conference. They



COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE, LOOKING WEST.

must bear the responsibility. It is no light one.

Before the end of the year it was very generally recognized that a mistake had been made. One of the best illustrations of this change of view is a passage from a letter written to *The Round Table* by its Australian Correspondent in June, 1915:

What nobody seems to have emphasized [he wrote] was that the Imperial Conference held as a Round Table War Conference would have provided an excellent opportunity for the statesmen of the Empire to get into closer touch with each other upon war subjects. The difficulties in the way of the British Government would have been explained, the requirements necessary to bring the war to a successful termination stated. Ways and means could have been discussed and the parts which the various Dominions might assume suggested. The Dominion Ministers would have come back from the centre of the Empire with their minds filled with only the one thing and with exact knowledge of how they could best serve the Empire. The wonder is not so much at the failure to hold the conference as that the five nations of the Empire should have even contemplated waging such a war with no machinery for continuous consultation and no definite arrangement as to mutual cooperation.

This comment shows how completely the Imperial Government had been able to obscure the real nature of the suggestion for the holding of the Imperial Conference in 1915 by their insistence upon a "normal Conference." Either they failed to understand what the suggestion really was—a supposition which is hardly réconcilable with the recognized ability of Mr. Harcourt—or, not wanting to undertake the additional work which the presence in England of Dominion Ministers would have laid upon them, they deliberately misrepresented the nature of the suggested Empire Council. The strangest thing about their action at the time is that they seem to have thought that the only thing which the Dominions needed to be consulted about was the terms of peace. Thus on February 4, 1915, Mr. Harcourt was asked in the House of Commons whether an Imperial Conference would be held that year. He replied that "In consultation with all the Dominions it has been decided that it is undesirable to hold the normal meeting of the Imperial Conference this year." On April 15, 1915, he was asked whether he could give the House any further information as to the postponement of the Imperial Conference. He replied by making the special statement which has already been quoted. To that statement he added this comment:

In all those communications I have referred only to what I have carefully called the "normal Conference," by which I mean a full conference with all the para-

phernalia of miscellaneous resolutions, protracted sittings, shorthand reports, and resulting blue-books. This is the sort of conference which we thought unsuited to present conditions, but in January, when intimating its postponement to the various Dominions, I telegraphed to each of the Governors-General: "Will you, at the same time, inform your Prime Minister that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to consult him most fully, and, if possible, personally when the time arrives to discuss possible terms of peace?"

I need hardly add that His Majesty's Government intend to observe the spirit as well as the letter of this declaration, which I believe has given complete satisfaction to the Governments of the Dominions.

Thus the Imperial Government, in the spring of 1915, seem to have assumed that there was



[Vandyk.]

MR. ANDREW FISHER,

Australian High Commissioner in London and former Prime Minister of the Commonwealth.

no need to consult the Dominions about the carrying on of the war, to have believed that they need only be consulted when peace came to be considered, and to have satisfied themselves that this assumption was as acceptable to the Ministers of all the Dominions as it was to them. Certainly no Dominion Ministry showed itself determined at that time to insist upon consultation for war purposes. They may well have thought that the war would have little effect upon the internal politics of their own countries, and that, beyond the sending of contingents and the raising of reinforcements, the normal life of the Dominions

would go on much as usual. Each one of them was to be undeceived, if they believed that and were really completely satisfied, as Mr. Harecourt declared they were, with the promise of the Imperial Government that they should be consulted about the terms of peace.

It is impossible, in the scope of this Chapter, to describe with any completeness the intimate reactions of the war upon the life of the



[Swaine.]

MR. J. D. HAZEN.

Canadian Minister of Marine and Naval Service.

Dominion peoples. Upon each of them its effect came gradually, but more and more heavily. As their contingents reached the battlefield, and as the casualty lists began to come in, the Dominions grew slowly to realize that there was hardly a household throughout the Empire which the war would leave untouched. Their fortitude under these losses, their abounding generosity in charitable gifts to alleviate the sufferings of war-stricken Europe, their eagerness to contribute of their money to the financial resources of the Empire—the tale of these has already been told. It must suffice here to trace in the barest outline the reaction of the war upon the political life of the Dominions, and this can only be done by taking each one separately.

In Canada, from the moment of the first outbreak of the war a truce was concluded between the two great political parties. Sir

Wilfrid Laurier, the leader of the Liberal Opposition in the Dominion Parliament, immediately announced that, irrespective of political advantage, he would support Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, in all war measures. Again and again Sir Wilfrid Laurier asserted this principle. One of the most striking of the expressions which he gave to it was in a speech made in the second half of 1915:

I affirm with all my power that it is the duty of Canada to give to Great Britain in this war all the assistance that is in the power of Canada. My confidence in the present Government at Ottawa does not ooze from the soles of my boots, but at the outbreak of war I considered it my duty to support it in its war policy. I have supported it in that policy ever since, and I will support it again. The reason is that this war is a contest between German institutions and British institutions. British institutions mean freedom. German institutions mean despotism. That is why we, as Canadians, have such a vital interest in this war.

A few months later Sir Wilfrid Laurier again asserted this principle of support for the Government of Sir Robert Borden:

I am the chief of the Liberal Party, and as long as I have the honour of presiding over the destinies of the Liberal Party it will not seek a triumph by taking advantage of the situation at present existing. . . . When the war started what should have been the attitude of the Liberal Party? I have already told you that the Liberal idea was a passion for right and justice. Britain to-day is fighting in Europe for these ideas. Britain did not seek this war, but rather sought to avoid it, and she could have avoided it if she had wished to accept the shameful proposal of Germany. But she did not do so, and to-day she is fighting for the independence of Belgium and for the integrity of France and to save civilization. That is why I declared that I would support the Government of Canada, and that Canada would participate with all her forces in this glorious undertaking. You may say that I have spoken on this war only in regard to civilization, which is, no doubt, great, but what will it be for Canada; cannot Canada stand aside? No, it cannot.

Thus the party truce in Canada was sufficiently firmly established to secure for Sir Robert Borden the support of the Liberals in all the war measures that were necessary up to the end of 1916. In the normal course there would have been an election in Canada for the Dominion Parliament in the autumn of 1916. The party truce was solid enough to enable a compromise about this election to be secured. By mutual agreement the election was postponed for one year, and the statutory consent of the Imperial Parliament, which was necessary under the Dominion constitution, was given without criticism or comment. Nevertheless, there were elements in the compact of the two parties which always suggested that if the war should put too heavy a strain upon it, it might break down. Quite early in 1915 Sir Wilfrid Laurier insisted in a speech at

Montreal that the decision of Canada to take part in the war had been a free and unfettered decision :

There arose the question whether or not we were bound to take part in the war. Everybody admits

institutions. You find from the bottom rung of the ladder to the top freedom in everything. There is no conscription in Great Britain. There never was, there never will be. . . . Freedom breeds loyalty. Coercion always was the mother of resistance and rebellion.

As time went on the Liberal Party in Canada



SIR ROBERT BORDEN RECEIVES THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON,
JULY 29, 1915.

Leaving the Guildhall with the Lord Mayor.

that we were bound to defend our own shores, our trade, our commerce; to provide against the possibility of a raid; and to repel an invasion if that should happen. But were we bound to send troops to the front? . . . There is no need to go to constitutional or natural law to settle that question. We are a free people, absolutely free. The charter under which we live has put it in our power to decide whether we should take part in such a war or not. It is for the Canadian people, the Canadian Parliament, the Canadian Government, to decide. This freedom is at once the glory and honour of England, which has granted it; and of Canada, which uses it to assist England. We are absolutely free. Freedom is a concomitant of all British

began to emphasize more and more this complete freedom, as they held it, of Canada to decide her own fate. They consistently declared it to be completely consistent with the whole-hearted support of Great Britain in the war. But it became clearer and clearer that a time might come when the call which Great Britain might have to make upon Canada would shock these Liberal ideas. In the autumn of 1916 it was apparent that this time



SIR ROBERT BORDEN INSPECTING A CANADIAN ARTILLERY BRIGADE IN ENGLAND.

was approaching. It was getting more and more difficult for Canada to maintain the flow of reinforcements to the front. Two utterances of Canadian public men about this time will show by their contrast how thin the political truce was becoming. The first is from a recruiting appeal made by the Prime Minister :

Under the responsibilities with which I am invested, and in the name of the State, which we are all bound to serve, it is my duty to appeal, and I do now appeal, most earnestly to the people of Canada that they assist and cooperate with the Government and the Directors of National Service. . . . To men of military age I make appeal that they place themselves at the service of the State for military duty. To all others I make appeal that they place themselves freely at the disposition of their country for such service as they are deemed best fitted to perform. . . .

The other is an extract from the speech made by Sir Wilfrid Laurier :

I abate not a jot of my life-long profession, reiterated in the House of Commons and upon many a platform of this country, that I am a pacifist. I have always been against militarism, and I see no reason why I should change, but still stand true to the professions of my whole life.

It was, in fact, plain that if it became necessary for the Canadian Government under Sir Robert Borden to ask for conscription as the only condition for keeping up Canadian reinforcements at the front, that demand would bring them into almost inevitable conflict

with the majority of the Liberal Party. It was at this time that the Canadian Correspondent of *The Round Table* felt compelled to insist upon the difficulty of conscription in Canada :

The most profound students of the situation in Canada [he said in an article written in October, 1916] regard conscription as impracticable. In the Dominion there are 3,000,000 people who do not habitually speak the English language. There are nearly 700,000 Germans and Austrians. There are at least 700,000 or 800,000 Americans, many of whom live in compact settlements in Western Canada. Many of these have come to this country during the last 10 or 12 years, and one questions if it would be fair or reasonable to conscript them for a war in Europe. Many of these new citizens of Canada perhaps hardly yet regard themselves as citizens of the British Empire. . . . Over solid blocks of Germans and Austrians in the Western Provinces there has been more apprehension than has been admitted, while it is impossible to contend that conscription would not excite deep hostility in Quebec.

Nevertheless, it seemed more and more certain, towards the end of 1916, that the Government of Sir Robert Borden would have to declare for conscription. In that case, the attitude of Sir Wilfrid Laurier could hardly be doubtful. Almost certainly he would resist, and the party truce would then break down.

In Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, as much as in Canada, the war led to an immediate truce between the two main political

parties. In New Zealand and Australia the truce passed into a formal coalition. In South Africa formal coalition was impossible, or, if possible, was so difficult to bring about that it was deliberately left on one side in favour of the working arrangement which served to keep the Botha Government in power. In all these three Dominions, too, as in Canada, there was a dissentient minority, not very formidable and unable at any moment to control the government of the country, but still sufficiently strong to be a factor.

In South Africa an election was due in the autumn of 1915. The first Parliament of the Union had been elected in the middle of September, 1910, for five years. There was no thought here of putting off the election, as was afterwards done in Canada. The Nationalist party, led by General Hertzog, was determined to do its best to oust the Botha Government. General Botha, faced by this threat of uncompromising opposition from a large section of his own people, came to a tacit agreement with the Unionists. At one time it seemed probable that the Labour Party would exercise a considerable influence on the election; but their leader, Mr. Creswell, had been at the front in German South-West Africa, and in

his absence the extreme Socialist section of the Party had compromised itself with the electorate by exhibiting pronounced pacifist tendencies. In the result the Labour Party was utterly defeated by the Unionists in the urban constituencies, Mr. Creswell himself failing in two constituencies which he contested. The consequence of this was that the Unionists, with 40 members, were almost as strong in the House of Assembly as General Botha's party with 54 seats. On local issues there were many points of difference between them, but they were united in the resolve to prosecute the war to the end, and they had a crushing majority on this supreme issue over the Nationalists. The Nationalists had shown that in the country districts, where the electorate was predominantly Dutch-speaking, they were able to shake General Botha's prestige very seriously. They won 27 seats, and would have won many more if the English element in a number of these country constituencies had abstained from voting, instead of supporting General Botha's candidate on the war issue. But, though this was a disconcerting element in the elections for General Botha himself, he was at least certain of office so long as the Unionists continued to support him;



SIR ROBERT BORDEN ADDRESSING CANADIAN INFANTRY IN ENGLAND.



UNION BUILDING, PRETORIA.
The smaller illustration shows the central
amphitheatre.

and that support was his while he remained firm in his adherence to the war objects of the Imperial Government. The alliance thus formed between General Botha and the Unionists was uneasy in its working at times. It was tested severely, for instance, by General Botha's refusal to pay the South African contingent in Europe Colonial rates of pay on the same scale as the South African troops who fought in German South-West and East Africa were getting. But even on a point of this kind, when every instinct of the Unionists, to say nothing of their explicit election pledges,



HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, CAPETOWN.

urged them to vote against General Botha, they nevertheless refrained from doing so, realizing that his staunchness on the war issue in general merited their support of his Government at the price of any of their less essential objects.

In New Zealand, far more than in South Africa, there was whole-hearted unanimity of the very great majority of the people in support of the war. An insignificant section of Labour extremists did oppose it, but with hesitation and without any real fervour. The trouble in New Zealand was that the two Parties were so narrowly divided in Parliament, as far as numbers were concerned, and were so thoroughly agreed on the whole question of the war, that it seemed absurd to maintain all the useless and, in their case, meaningless distinction of Government and Opposition. Coalition was obviously desirable, yet it was a long time before coalition could be brought about. In June, 1915, Mr. Massey, the Prime Minister, invited Sir Joseph Ward, leader of the Opposition, to confer about the formation of a National Cabinet. When the conference met it was found that Mr. Massey had offered the Opposition five seats in a Cabinet of eleven. The two parties were practically equal in the House, and the Opposition rejected the offer, thinking that there should be equality of representation in any Coalition Government. At this juncture the Governor intervened and called another conference at Government House, Wellington, which met on August 2. Prompt agreement was the result. The new Coalition Cabinet contained five members of each Party, while there were two Ministers without portfolio. Mr. Massey remained Prime Minister. Colonel Allen, who had been the strong man of Mr. Massey's Cabinet as Minister of Defence, retained that office. Sir Joseph Ward, the Opposition leader, took the important portfolio of Finance, and the new Cabinet settled down to a peaceful, if not very adventurous, career, in complete forgetfulness of the local controversies which had divided its members.

Its one great task was to keep up reinforcements for the New Zealand Contingent in Europe. By the middle of May, 1916, as a New Zealand correspondent wrote to *The Times*, New Zealand, out of a population of 1,000,000, had a force of 50,000 men under arms, with 37,000 actually in the field. It was not easy to obtain by the voluntary system the monthly

drafts which were necessary to keep this contingent at its full strength. At the end of May, 1916, a Compulsion Bill was introduced by Colonel Allen. The Labour minority moved a hostile amendment to the second reading, but could only muster five votes as against 54 in support of it. The Bill went through with



[Vandyk.]

GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA,
Prime Minister of South Africa.

very little difficulty. For a time it was not put into force, and the Coalition Government seemed disposed to preen itself on having compulsion merely as a resource held in reserve and not really required because of the complete success of the voluntary system. But, though the Ministry kept up this profession as long as they possibly could, everybody knew that the voluntary system had failed, as it had failed in England, and as it was bound to fail in New Zealand when subjected to such a severe test. By the end of August, 1916, it had been decided to proclaim enrolment under the Compulsion Act. The proclamation was issued on September 2. But voluntary recruiting went on, though with less and less success, till the middle of November, 1916. When compulsion was at last enforced there were 1,369 men short in the drafts which were to make up the 23rd and 24th reinforcements. Only four of the 21 recruiting districts in the Dominion had filled their quotas. The Act



SIR ROBERT BORDEN, GENERAL SMUTS, AND THE MAHARAJAH OF BIKANIR
RECEIVE THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF EDINBURGH, APRIL 11, 1917.

The new freemen leaving the Usher Hall with the Lord Provost after the ceremony.

provided that a ballot should be taken in all the districts which had not supplied the full quota. The first ballot was taken on November 16, 17, and 18. The number actually drawn—4,000—was nearly three times as great as the number of vacancies to be filled. This liberal margin was to provide for losses through medical unfitness or exemption. The first ballot was watched very calmly by the people of the Dominion. The New Zealand correspondent of *The Times* wrote on December 7 that "the general feeling is one of satisfaction that a fairer, more democratic, and more businesslike method has been substituted for the uncertainties and injustices of the voluntary system." He explained, too, that "the intention is to continue voluntary enlistment for each monthly quota, but to close it down on a fixed date in every month and fill up the shortage by a compulsory ballot. This direct and regular process will dispense with the methods of moral suasion and indirect compulsion which had been found irksome, wasteful, and capricious."

In Australia the war produced reactions, as far as local politics were concerned, far more profound than in any other Dominion. When it broke out the Liberals were in power, with Mr. Cook as Prime Minister. But within a few months a General Election put the Labour

Party in their place. Mr. Fisher, the Labour leader, became Prime Minister, with Mr. W. M. Hughes, his Attorney-General, as his right-hand man. Before this election there was some attempt to bring about a compromise between the two parties on a Coalition basis. What actually took place is not very clear, though it seems certain that Mr. Hughes did make some kind of offer of a compromise to the Liberals. Mr. Fisher himself seems to have been opposed to the idea. He might have been converted to it if the Liberals had responded, though he was a stubborn man not at all prone to alter his convictions. In any case whatever the offer that was made, Mr. Cook refused it altogether, went to the polls, and was handsomely beaten. At the end of 1915 Mr. Fisher resigned the Prime Ministership and went to London as High Commissioner for the Commonwealth. Mr. Hughes was his natural successor. He had hardly assumed office before a pressing invitation from the Imperial Government to come to London to consult about war measures brought him to Great Britain. On his way he passed through Canada, where he was sworn of the Canadian Privy Council and took part in a meeting of the Canadian Cabinet. This was in February 1916. Arrived in London, Mr. Hughes attended the British Cabinet, as Sir Robert Borden had done the year before. Ho

made an immense impression in Great Britain, delivering a succession of speeches which aroused great enthusiasm by their energy, their eloquence, and their expression of an uncompromising resolve to carry the war through to the end. In his relations with the British Cabinet Mr. Hughes occupied a position of greater authority than any Dominion Prime Minister who had visited Great Britain before. It was understood that he spoke not only for Australia but to some extent for New Zealand as well. This was certainly so in all questions which involved the common interest of the two Dominions, such as sea power in the Pacific, the provision of transport for supplies from Australia and New Zealand, and so on. He had the advantage, too, of having passed through Canada on his way to England, and his meetings with Canadian Ministers gave him some right to speak with a kind of delegated authority for that Government as well. With some reluctance, as it appeared, Mr. Asquith, who was then Prime Minister of Great Britain, invited Mr. Hughes to attend the economic conference of the Allies at Paris as the representative of Australia. Canada was represented at this conference by Sir George Foster, Minister of

Commerce. The attendance of Mr. Hughes and Sir George Foster at the Paris Conference was an innovation of considerable importance. Its results were not apparent immediately, but it clearly contained the germ of very important subsequent developments.*

The prestige which Mr. Hughes won for himself in Great Britain had peculiar results when he returned to Australia at the end of August 1916. Already there had been signs of a strong movement in Australia towards compulsory service. The example of Great Britain and of New Zealand had had its effect, and it was becoming obvious that the voluntary system would only provide the reinforcements necessary to maintain the Australian divisions at the front at the cost of superhuman efforts, constant friction, and all those unpleasant elements of unfairness and disguised compulsion which had attended its later stages both in Great Britain and in New Zealand. Mr. Hughes went back to Australia firmly convinced that compulsion was necessary. He found at once that he had a task of great difficulty before him. A very strong element in the Labour Party, of which he was the

* See Vol. X, page 341.



LAMBTON QUAY, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND.

leader, was bitterly opposed to compulsion. Even before he left for England, he had found it necessary to denounce quite openly, and with his habitual vigour of language, the extreme Socialist section of his own party. The denunciation did not do much good. It was not likely to convert the Socialist extremists, and they used the opportunity of his absence in England to consolidate their influence with the

time the Labour extremists had gone to the utmost lengths in their opposition to him. Their control of the Labour machine enabled them to expel Mr. Hughes and those who followed him on the conscription issue from the Party. When the referendum campaign began Mr. Hughes found himself pursued with the utmost extreme of invective and abuse by his old Labour colleagues. The referendum was



Elliott & Fry

MR. W. M. HUGHES,
Prime Minister of Australia.

Labour Party and to establish themselves firmly in possession of its fighting organization throughout the Commonwealth. When Mr. Hughes returned and sounded his Parliamentary following on the question of compulsion he found that he could only command about half the Labour members of the Lower House, while in the Senate his opponents were altogether too strong for him. It seems likely that he could have relied on the support of the Liberals under Mr. Cook to force a Compulsion Bill through the Lower House, but the Liberal strength in the Senate was not sufficient to counterbalance his opponents there. He decided on a compromise. The question of compulsion was to be submitted to a referendum of the electorate; and he managed, though not without difficulty, to get the Bill authorizing this referendum through both Houses of the Commonwealth legislature. But in the mean-



[Elliott & Fry

SIR GEORGE E. FOSTER,
Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce.

fought with great bitterness throughout the Commonwealth. Mr. Hughes himself, it must be admitted, did not show at his best during the campaign. He had never been noted for his tact and he found it difficult to submit with good grace to the stream of personal abuse that flowed against him. As soon as the figures of the referendum began to be counted, it was clear that he had been defeated. The chief adverse vote was in New South Wales. It was sufficient to counterbalance a favourable majority in the other States. When the final figures came to be counted it was found that a majority of 61,000 had voted against conscription.

This was at the end of November. Before the year was out it was quite clear that one result of the referendum must be a political combination between Mr. Hughes and the Liberals. Again Mr. Hughes showed no great

skill in conducting the negotiation, which began towards the end of 1916. His party in Parliament was reduced to an almost insignificant minority, but he behaved as though he had a majority at his back, and began the negotiations by putting forward demands to which the Liberals could not possibly be expected to agree. It was at this moment that the invitation of the British Government to Australia to send representatives to the War Cabinet was received. For the moment the importance of the invitation seemed to escape all the leading statesmen of Australia. There was some excuse for this. The Imperial Government, as has been shown above, had laboured at the beginning of 1915 to prove that a meeting of Dominion representatives was impossible in war time. If it was out of the question at the beginning of 1915, it was natural for Australia to think that it was equally out of the question at the beginning of 1917. Thus there was a decided tendency in Australia to regard the invitation merely as an advertising dodge of the new British Government under Mr. Lloyd George, and to discount it severely for that reason. But wiser views soon prevailed. By the middle of January, 1917, Mr. Hughes had shown that, however weak he might be in Parliament, he had very substantial support throughout the country. He formed a national organization which was supported by many prominent men in each State. He carried with him the Premiers of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western

Australia, and Tasmania. Mr. J. C. Watson, who had been Labour Prime Minister of the Commonwealth, and was one of the most influential men in Australia, went with him. The programme of the new organization was summed up as a "win-the-war" policy. It soon became clear that the Liberals could not continue to hold aloof from negotiations with such an organization. Towards the end of January they suggested that a National Government should be formed consisting of representatives from each of the three parties. Mr. Hughes and his followers approved of this suggestion. The Labour extremists, who had elected Mr. Tudor as their leader, refused. By the middle of February terms had been agreed upon between Mr. Hughes and the Liberals, and a Coalition Ministry been formed. Mr. Hughes remained Prime Minister. Mr. Cook became Minister for the Navy. Mr. Pearce retained the Ministry of Defence. Everything seemed to tend towards the proper representation of Australia at the Imperial War Cabinet. Mr. Hughes intended to go himself, and had asked Sir William Irvine, one of the ablest and most respected of the Liberals, to go with him.

But difficult questions of local politics had to be settled first. An election was coming on, and unless it could be postponed, it would be impossible for Mr. Hughes to go to England. The Coalition Ministry brought forward a motion that the Imperial Parliament should be asked to extend the life of the Commonwealth



DUNTROON MILITARY COLLEGE, NEW SOUTH WALES,
On the site of the proposed Federal Capital, Canberra.

Parliament until October 8, 1917, or until six months after the declaration of peace, whichever should come first. In the House of Representatives, where the new Ministry had a strong majority, this motion was easily carried. But in the Senate the Labour extremists were still in the ascendant. There was a sordid squabble before the motion came to the vote, and charges were made against Mr. Hughes of having tried to corrupt some of his opponents in the Senate in order to secure their support. The result was that it became impossible to

In the Senate they turned a minority of one into a majority of 10. Thus the Coalition was firmly established in Australia. The Extreme Labour Party were severely defeated on the clear issue of keeping nothing back which the war demanded from Australia. Immediate steps were taken to consolidate the organization of the new Party throughout the Commonwealth, and Mr. Hughes addressed himself to the problem of obtaining the recruits necessary to fill the Australian divisions at the front.



MR. MASSEY

(after receiving the Freedom of the City of London) leaving the Guildhall with Lord Mayor Wakefield.

postpone the General Election. An election in the near foreground meant that Mr. Hughes could not go to England. The election took place at the beginning of May. The omens were favourable. In New South Wales a Coalition Ministry under Mr. Holman had defeated the Labour Extremists at a General Election of the State electorate six weeks before. The victory of the National Party in the Commonwealth elections was considerably more sweeping. Mr. Hughes and Mr. Cook together had had a majority in the Lower House before the election of 23. They increased it by 2.

Thus in all the Dominions except Newfoundland the war had made its mark upon political life by the end of 1916. In Newfoundland the population was small. The people had sent to the front a contingent which represented a very creditable proportion of their numbers. Their men had done splendidly. There was absolute unanimity about the war in Newfoundland, and the Government, under the shield of that unanimity, went on very much as it had done before August, 1914. In the other Dominions it had been necessary to modify the pre-war form of governing institutions. The old lines of division between parties had gradually been shadowed and altered. In each case a dissentient minority grumbled and intrigued against the Cabinet in power—without the chance of doing much real harm, but able to make a good deal of mischief, and a constant reminder to the majority of the need to subordinate local interests to the war-aims of the Empire.

Yet, though the British Government must have known of these effects of the war upon the Dominions, they behaved, till the end of 1916, as though there was no need to revise the old traditions of intercourse between the ruling bodies of the Empire. They lost no occasion to pay verbal tribute to the military effort of the Dominions. Anything more they seem to have thought quite superfluous. The result was real harm. The Dominion Governments chafed under the feeling that they were not trusted. Their efforts were handicapped because they did not know the mind of the British Government. They found it difficult to shape their own policy or to lead their people because they were left in the dark about the objects, beliefs and policy of the British Government. Probably the truth is that British Ministers hardly knew their own minds till 1916 was almost ended. They were incur-

bly optimistic—a tendency which, it must be admitted, they shared with their military and financial advisers. It may be that they derived it from them. In any case they left the Dominion Governments very much to their own devices and made no attempt to enlist them as participating departments, so to speak, in the war government of the Empire.



(Swaine)
SIR EDWARD MORRIS,
Prime Minister of Newfoundland.

It is true that when Dominion Prime Ministers visited England they were admitted to Cabinet meetings. This privilege was extended to Sir Robert Borden in July 1915, to Mr. Hughes in 1916, and to Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward, from New Zealand, later in the same year. This was a step forward. It brought these Dominion Prime Ministers into touch with war difficulties as they were seen by the Cabinet, and it must have given British Ministers some idea of Dominion difficulties. But the Dominion men went to the British Cabinet as guests, not as members. They went to learn and, in a lesser degree, to advise. There was no approach till the end of 1916 to the creation of a single executive authority for the whole Empire.

Long before this Dominion Ministers had warned the British Government that this must come. They said nothing explicit, and they were quite content to keep the whole question in the background till the war ended. But

they gave broad hints. The real difficulty was how to create a single executive authority for the whole Empire—an Imperial War Cabinet—without raising the whole issue of the constitutional position of the Dominions as to foreign policy and the major issues of war and peace. The Dominion leaders were quite clear that that issue could not be raised during the war. But they were equally clear that the share which the Dominions were taking in the war made a revision of the British Government's monopoly of executive power for the whole Empire necessary. It was easy to express the first thought. To have expressed the second might well have been indiscreet. But it lurks behind the entirely proper references made to the Imperial problem by Sir Robert Borden during his visit in 1915.

While the awful shadow of this war overhangs our Empire [he said in the speech which he made when presented with the Freedom of the City of London] I shall not pause to speak of what may be evolved in its constitutional relations. Upon what has been built in the past it is possible, in my judgment, that an even nobler and more enduring fabric may be erected.



(Russell)
MR. G. F. PEARCE,
Australian Minister of Defence.

That structure must embody the autonomy of the self-governing Dominions and of the British Isles as well, but it must also embody the majesty and power of an Empire united by ties such as those of which I have spoken, and more thoroughly and effectively organized for the purpose of preserving its own existence. Those who shall be the architects of this monument will have a great part to play, and I do not doubt that they will play it worthily. To those who shall be called to design so splendid a fabric, crowning the labours of the past and embodying all the hopes of the future, we all of us bid God speed in their great task.

The point, indeed, had had its place in the statement which he made when he arrived in England:

Great questions touching the status of the Dominions of the Empire and their constitutional relation to each

other will arise after the war. Upon such questions it would be idle and undesirable to dwell at present. We do not doubt that a satisfactory solution will be found; but, in the meantime, the supreme issue of the war must be our only concern.

And he returned to it again in a speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association:

In the later days when peace comes to be proclaimed, and after the conclusion of peace, it is beyond question that large matters will come up for consideration by the statesmen of the United Kingdom and the oversea Dominions. It is not desirable, nor perhaps becoming, that I should dwell upon these considerations to-day.

The great merit of the summons to an Imperial War Cabinet, sent to the Dominions by Mr. Lloyd George on Christmas Day, 1916, was that it created an executive authority for the war purposes of the Empire while leaving the constitutional issue in abeyance. This essential truth about the Imperial War Cabinet was excellently put by Sir Robert Borden in a speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association, made while the Imperial Cabinet was still sitting:

We have gathered together here from the ends of the earth to take counsel with you of the Mother Land upon the needs of the situation so as better to coordinate our common effort and consummate our common purpose. When first I spoke to you in 1912 I took leave to put forward certain views respecting future constitutional relations. Two years ago I emphasized the same considerations without dwelling upon them. The purpose which I then had at heart still remains steadfast. It may be that in the shadow of the war we do not clearly realize the measure of recent constitutional development. I shall not attempt to anticipate any conclusion which may be reached by the Imperial War Conference now sitting in London, a conference embracing India, now for the first time taking her place at the national council of Empire, as well as all the great Dominions except Australia, whose absence is deeply regretted. Except with regard to India the summoning of that conference does not mark a new stage of Constitutional development. Its present duty is to consider and, where necessary, to determine general questions of common concern which in some cases have an intimate relation to the war and to the conditions which will arise upon its conclusion.

Without further reference to the Imperial War Conference I address myself to the Constitutional position which has arisen from the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet. The British Constitution is the most flexible instrument of government ever devised. It is surrounded by certain statutory limitations, but they are not of a character to prevent the remarkable development to which I shall allude. The office of Prime Minister, thoroughly recognized by the gradually developed conventions of the Constitution, although entirely unknown to the formal enactments of the law, is invested with a power and authority which under new conditions, demanding progress and development, are of inestimable advantage. The recent exercise of that great authority has brought about an advance which may contain the germ and define the method of Constitutional development in the immediate future. It is only within the past few days that the full measure of that advance has been consummated.

For the first time in the Empire's history there are sitting in London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and both exercising well-defined powers. Over each of them the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

presides. One of them is designated as the "War Cabinet," which chiefly devotes itself to such questions touching the prosecution of the war as primarily concern the United Kingdom. The other is designated as the "Imperial War Cabinet," which has a wider purpose, jurisdiction, and *personnel*. To its deliberations have been summoned representatives of all the Empire's self-governing Dominions. We meet there on terms of equality under the presidency of the First Minister of the United Kingdom; we meet there as equals, although Great Britain presides, *primus inter pares*. Ministers from six nations sit around the council board, all of them responsible to their respective Parliaments and to the people of the countries which they represent. Each nation has its voice upon questions of common concern and highest importance as the deliberations proceed; each preserves unimpaired its perfect autonomy, its self-government, and the responsibility of its Ministers to their own electorate. For many years the thought of statesmen and students in every part of the Empire has centred around the question of future Constitutional relations; it may be that now, as in the past, the necessity imposed by great events has given the answer.

The Imperial War Cabinet as constituted to-day has been summoned for definite and specific purposes, publicly stated, which involve questions of the most vital concern to the whole Empire. With the constitution of that Cabinet a new era has dawned and a new page of history has been written. It is not for me to prophesy as to the future significance of these pregnant events; but those who have given thought and energy to every effort for full Constitutional development of the oversea nations may be pardoned for believing that they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth.

Indeed, the same thought was expressed, though not so explicitly, in the invitation to the Dominions. It was sent, as form required, through the Colonial Secretary:

I wish to explain that what His Majesty's Government contemplate is not a session of the ordinary Imperial Conference, but a special War Conference of the Empire. They therefore invite your Prime Minister to attend a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet, in order to consider urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the war, the possible conditions of which, in agreement with our Allies, we could assent to its termination, and the problems which will then immediately arise. For the purpose of these meetings your Prime Minister would be a member of the War Cabinet.

In view of the extreme urgency of the subjects of discussion as well as of their supreme importance, it is hoped that your Prime Minister may find it possible, in spite of the serious inconvenience involved, to attend at an early date, not later than the end of February. While His Majesty's Government earnestly desire the presence of your Prime Minister himself, they hope that if he sees insuperable difficulty he will carefully consider the question of nominating a substitute, as they would regard it as a serious misfortune if any Dominion were left unrepresented.

Naturally, the fact that the Cabinet to which the Dominion Prime Ministers were thus invited was to have supreme executive authority for the Empire was hardly appreciated at first by the Dominion peoples. At the end of January Mr. Lloyd George found it necessary to issue a special statement to explain it. The statement took the form of an interview with an Australian journalist:



PRESENTATION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON TO MINISTERS OF THE EMPIRE.

Seated on the Lord Mayor's right hand are (reading from left to right):—Sir Satyendra Prasanna Sinha, Sir James Meston, Sir Edward Morris (Prime Minister, Newfoundland), General Smuts, and the Maharajah of Bikanir.



CONFERENCE OF DOMINION MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN LONDON, JULY, 1916:

The Conference was held on the invitation of the Empire Parliamentary Association. The Dominion Members of Parliament listened to addresses on a number of Imperial subjects by Imperial Statesmen and Administrators. These and other subjects were debated in private. No resolutions were passed by the Conference.

"The people of the Dominions know," he said, "that I am not a Jingo. My record contains no journeys into flamboyant Imperialism. Yet I regard this council as marking the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the Empire. The war has changed us. Heaven knows it has taught us more than we yet understand. It has opened a new age for us, and we want to go into that new age together with our fellows overseas just as we have come through the darkness together, and shed our blood and treasure together."



[Russell]

MR. WALTER LONG,
Secretary of State for the Colonies.

It was obvious, however, that in Mr. Lloyd George's view the first duty before the Empire War Council will be to consider the immediate business of winning the war.

"The Empire War Council," said the Prime Minister, "will deal with all general questions affecting the war. The Prime Ministers or their representatives will be temporary members of the War Cabinet, and we propose to arrange that all matters of first-rate importance should be considered at a series of special meetings. Nothing affecting the Dominions, the conduct of the war, or the negotiations of peace will be excluded from its purview. There will, of course, be domestic questions which each part of the Empire must settle for itself—questions such as recruiting in the United Kingdom, or home legislation. Such domestic matters will be our only reservation. But we propose that everything else should be, so to speak, on the table."

"Will the discussions include the fate of the German colonies?"

"That is one obvious question. But there are many questions of equal moment. All the difficult problems connected with the making of peace, as was stated in the Government's invitation, will be threshed out in this series of meetings. The war policy of the Empire will be clearly defined. And of great importance is what I may call the preparation for peace. That will involve not only demobilization, but such other after-the-war questions as the migration of our own people to other parts of the Empire, the settlement of soldiers on the land, commerce, and industry after the war."

"You haven't hesitated to depart from precedent?"

"We certainly have not. In these days we cannot hesitate because we are breaking precedents. The Empire has thrown itself heart and soul into this war, and we should be failing in our duty if we did not take every step possible to see that its leaders get together from time to time. You don't suppose that we think that the overseas nations can raise and place in the field armies containing an enormous proportion of their best manhood, and not want to have a say, and a real say, in determining the use to which they are to be put. That seems to us an impossible and an undemocratic proposition, and that is why one of the first acts of the new Government was to ask the Overseas Premiers to come over, not to a formal Imperial Conference, but to sit in the Executive Cabinet of the Empire. And that is why we have arranged for a representative of India, which has rendered invaluable service to our common cause, to be present also."

"This implies that the Conference should meet as soon as possible."

"Certainly. The war is not won yet, and we want to concert our efforts so that we may exert our maximum strength at the critical moment. Further, we are most anxious that during the last and most trying phase of the war, the British Empire may present to the world an



SIR W. THOMAS WHITE, K.C.M.G.
Minister of Finance and Receiver-General of
Canada.

absolutely united front. Up to the present the British Government has shouldered the responsibility for the policy of the war practically alone. It now wishes to know that in its measures for prosecuting the war to a finish and in its negotiations for peace it will be carrying out a policy agreed upon by the representatives of the whole Empire sitting in plenary council together."

"What about after the war?"

"If you mean by that constitutional reconstruction, I can only say that it is too soon to talk about after the war. But I can say this. Things can never be the same after the war as they were before it. Five democracies, all parts of one Empire, cannot shed their blood and treasure with a heroism and disregard of cost which have been beyond all praise without leaving memories of comradeship and of a great accomplishment which will never die. Of this I am certain, the peoples of the Empire will have found a unity in the war such as never existed before it—a unity not only in history, but of purpose. What practical change in Imperial organi-



GENERAL SMUTS RECEIVING THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF MANCHESTER.

Left to right: Mr. Thomas Hudson (Town Clerk), General Smuts (signing the register), the Lord Mayor of Manchester, Alderman Smethurst, Mr. Walter Long (Colonial Secretary), Sir Daniel McCabe.

zation that will mean I will not venture to predict. But that it will involve some change is certain. I believe that all the statesmen of the Old Country and of the Dominions who have spoken about it are unanimous on that point. The forthcoming War Council, however, cannot deal with these fundamental post-war problems, but it may afford us some insight into the form which they may take."

The Imperial War Cabinet met towards the end of March. Australia, for the reasons already explained, was not represented. Its meetings were necessarily secret, and there could be no record of its proceedings. But there is no doubt that its results were excellent, and when its members dispersed the British Government determined to attempt to summon it every year. This was announced by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on May 17, 1917:

I think [he said] that I ought to report to the House a very important decision that was arrived at as a sequel to the recent meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet. It is desirable that Parliament should be officially and formally acquainted with an event that will constitute a memorable landmark in the constitutional history of the British Empire. The House will remember that in December last his Majesty's Government invited the Prime Ministers or leading statesmen of the overseas Dominions and of India to attend the sittings both of the Cabinet and of an Imperial War Conference to be held in this country. It is to the former body, which assembled in March and held 14 sittings before separating, that I desire to refer.

The British Cabinet became for the time being an Imperial War Cabinet. While it was in session its overseas members had access to all the information which was at the disposal of his Majesty's Government,

and occupied a status of absolute equality with that of the members of the British War Cabinet. It had prolonged discussions on all the most vital aspects of Imperial policy, and came to important decisions in regard to them—decisions which will enable us to prosecute the war with increased unity and vigour, and will be of the greatest value when it comes to the negotiation of peace.

I should like to add on behalf of the Government that the fresh minds and new points of view which our colleagues from over the seas have brought to bear upon the problems with which we have been so long engrossed have been an immense help to us all. So far as we are concerned, we can say with confidence that the experiment has been a complete success.

The conclusions of the Imperial War Cabinet are of necessity secret, but there is one aspect of them which we feel ought to be communicated to the House without delay. The Imperial War Cabinet was unanimous that the new procedure had been of such service not only to all its members but to the Empire that it ought not to be allowed to fall into desuetude. Accordingly at the last session I proposed formally, on behalf of the British Government, that meetings of an Imperial Cabinet should be held annually, or at any intermediate time when matters of urgent Imperial concern require to be settled, and that the Imperial Cabinet should consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such of his colleagues as deal specially with Imperial affairs, of the Prime Minister of each of the Dominions, or some specially accredited alterate possessed of equal authority, and of a representative of the Indian people to be appointed by the Government of India. This proposal met with the cordial approval of the overseas representatives, and we hope that the holding of an annual Imperial Cabinet to discuss foreign affairs and other aspects of Imperial policy will become an accepted convention of the British Constitution.

I ought to add that the institution in its present form is extremely elastic. It grew, not by design, but out of the necessities of the war. The essence of it is that the responsible heads of the Governments

of the Empire, with those Ministers who are specially entrusted with the conduct of Imperial policy, should meet together at regular intervals to confer about foreign policy and matters connected therewith, and come to decisions in regard to them which, subject to the control of their own Parliaments, they will then severally execute. By this means they will be able to obtain full information about all aspects of Imperial affairs, and to determine by consultation together the policy of the Empire in its most vital aspects, without infringing in any degree the autonomy which its parts at present enjoy. To what constitutional developments this may lead we did not attempt to settle. The whole question of perfecting the mechanism for "continuous consultation" about Imperial and foreign affairs between the "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth" will be reserved for the consideration of that special Conference which will be summoned as soon as possible after the war to readjust the constitutional relations of the Empire. We felt, however, that the experiment of constituting an Imperial Cabinet, in which India was represented, had been so fruitful in better understanding and in unity of purpose and action that it ought to be perpetuated, and we believe that this proposal will commend itself to the judgment of all the nations of the Empire.

The members of the War Cabinet met also in a "War Conference" to discuss other aspects of Imperial cooperation. The resolutions adopted by this Conference were afterwards published as a Parliamentary Paper [C.D. 8566]. In his speech at Edinburgh on April 11 Sir Robert Borden had given some indication of the kind of things which the War Conference, as

distinguished from the War Cabinet, were discussing :

I hope that after the conclusion of peace our eyes may be turned more closely upon the vast and varied resources of our Empire and their future potentialities. There are questions of the gravest import touching their control, development and utilization for a common purpose; the production of an adequate food supply, means of transportation and communication, the utilization of raw materials by the most effective methods for all needful purposes of national concern. We must take stock of our resources, exercise an effective control, and utilize them to the highest national advantage. There is reason to believe that before the war Germany had a more systematic and thorough knowledge of the resources and development of the Dominions than could be found in the United Kingdom. May we not hope after the war for a livelier interest in the progress and the spirit of the young nations of the British Commonwealth? Can it be denied that in the past activities or ambitions in minor European theatres have received attention that might better have been bestowed upon matters of common concern which have not been seen in their true perspective?

Outside of Europe are great theatres of action in which the future of our Empire will ultimately be worked out. In each of the Dominions the task of speedy development is an undertaking of great magnitude, and it is being carried on by a relatively small population. I speak of Canada because I know it. In that Dominion there are half-a-dozen provinces, each of which is greater in area and not less rich in resources than the United Kingdom. Are we quite sure that the work which is being carried on overseas is measurably realized here? If there is adequate vision it is clear that these considerations must continually assume larger proportions in the future purpose and activities of our Imperial



GENERAL SMUTS AND THE MAHARAJAH OF BIKANIR RECEIVE THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON.

Inspecting the Guard of Honour in Guildhall Yard.

Commonwealth. Meantime, all effort must be consecrated to the unfinished task that still lies before us in assuring through victory the defence of our inheritance and the vindication of the world's liberties.

As to the question of the formal readjustment of the constitutional relations of Great Britain and the Dominions, the resolution postponing it to a Special Conference to meet after the war appears among the resolutions of the Conference in the following form :

The Imperial War Conference are of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.

The explicit expression by the members of the War Conference, in the second part of this resolution, of their view of the principles on which constitutional readjustment should be based was doubtless intended to show their opposition to what had come to be known as the "Federal Solution." In this they endorsed the opinion of General Smuts, who afterwards said that in his opinion the resolution of the War Conference, quoted above, had disposed of federation, at least for the time. In a speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association on April 2, 1917, while the War Cabinet was sitting, General Smuts, who represented South Africa at the War Cabinet, spoke of the future constitution of the Empire in a way which showed that he for one had been able to reconcile himself to the idea of a single

Executive Cabinet for the Empire without any formal alteration of its loose constitutional ties.

On the future Constitution of the Empire I do not want to speak at any length. I do not think that this is the time or that it is necessary to do so, but I think one word of caution should be expressed. A great deal of political thinking on this difficult and most important of all subjects has already been done in the United Kingdom, and a great literature is growing up around it in this country. Let me give you one word of warning. In thinking of this matter, do not try to think of existing political institutions which have been evolved in the course of European developments. The British Empire is a much larger and more diverse problem than anything we have seen hitherto, and the sort of Constitution we read about in books, the sort of political alphabet which has been elaborated in years gone by, does not apply, and would not solve the problems of the future. We should not follow precedents, but make them. I feel sure that in the coming years when this problem is in process of solution—because it will never be finally and perfectly solved—you will find our political thought will be turned into quite new channels and will not follow what has been done anywhere else either in the old world or the new, because, after all, we are built on freedom.

We see growing up before us a great number of strong free nations all over the Empire. Nobody wants to limit the power of self-government. No single man outside a lunatic asylum wants to force these young nations into any particular mould. All that we want is the maximum of freedom and liberty, the maximum of self-development for the young nations of the Empire, and machinery that will keep all these nations together in the years which are before them. I am sure if we disabuse our minds of precedents and preconceived ideas we shall evolve, in the course of years, the institutions and machinery that will meet our difficulties.

The meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet over, the representatives of Canada, India, New Zealand and Newfoundland returned home. General Smuts remained in England. It was known that he had been of great service to the Imperial Cabinet. His military record combined with his political experience to give him a special position among the Dominion representatives. On June 18, 1917, Mr. Bonar Law announced in the House of Commons that the British War Cabinet had invited General Smuts to attend their meetings during his stay in England "in order to avail themselves" of his "special military knowledge and experience."



CHAPTER CLXXXIX

THE WORK OF THE ITALIAN NAVY.

TASKS OF ITALIAN NAVY—THE ADRIATIC—AUSTRIAN NAVY AT POLA—STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF ITALIAN NAVY—MINISTERS OF MARINE—FIRST OPERATIONS IN 1915—EXPLOITS OF DESTROYERS—RAID ON POLA—THE SUBMARINE SERVICE—WORK OF NAVAL AIRCRAFT—NAVAL ARMoured TRAINS—SUBMARINE MINING—THE UC12—AUSTRIANS BOMBARD UNDEFENDED TOWNS—WAR WITH TURKEY—TRANSPORT WORK—LANDING IN ALBANIA—TRANSPORT OF SERBIAN ARMY TO CORFU—PATROL CRAFT ACTIONS—BRITISH DRIFTERS SUNK—H.M.S. DARTMOUTH AND BRISTOL—NAVAL SUPPORT OF ISONZO OFFENSIVE—BRITISH COOPERATION—PROTECTION OF COMMERCE—SEIZURE OF GERMAN SHIPPING—LOAN OF BRITISH STEAMERS TO ITALY.

IN earlier chapters the political and military aspects of Italy's participation in the Great War have been described, but not the work done by her Navy. It is proposed here to show what were the duties of the Italian Fleet and how they were executed.

The task of the Italian seamen was influenced by the area in which it was performed, and their strategy by the nature of the geographical conditions. The Adriatic, from its northern end in the Gulf of Trieste, to its southern limit between Cape Santa Maria di Leuca and the island of Corfu, is about 460 miles in length, and its general direction is south-easterly from the shores of Venice. It is bounded by two nearly parallel shores, and its general breadth is about ninety miles. Its widest part is between Fano, north of Ancona, and Novi, in Dalmatia, where it is about 110 miles. It is narrowest between Otranto, in Italy, and Cape Linguetta, at the entrance to Valona Bay, where the distance is not quite forty miles. It was in the Straits of Otranto, between these two last-named places, that the principal work of maintaining a blockade was carried out by the Allies. It will be seen later how the comparative narrowness of these waters through-

out their whole length affected the manner in which the war developed.

The two coasts of the Adriatic differ entirely in aspect and character, and this again influenced profoundly the course of the operations. The Italian shore is comparatively shallow, lacking in commodious sheltered ports, but having, scattered along its length, a large number of populous towns. On the other hand, the Istrian, Dalmatian, and Albanian coasts are for the most part rocky and precipitous, masked by scattered islands, but possessing many excellent and safe harbours. The Italian seaboard, from Santa Maria di Leuca northwards to Buso, the boundary between Italy and Austria, is generally low, with sandy beaches, except at the few points where the land rises in rocky capes. The principal towns are Brindisi, Ancona and Venice. The first-named, which before the war was a place of considerable importance, was subsequently converted into a first-class naval base. The railway commences here, with branches to Otranto and Taranto, and passes northward within easy reach of nearly all the ports along the coast to Rimini, where it turns inshore to the larger towns of the interior. This line



MAP OF THE SHORES OF THE ADRIATIC, With inset plans of Pola and Taranto.

was made to serve a useful purpose in the defence of the coast. Ancona, which is in direct railway communication with most of the principal towns of Italy, was also improved during the war, while Venice, in spite of certain disadvantages, was a naval base and ship-building centre of great importance.

On the eastern coast of the Adriatic there were only three towns of commercial consequence, Trieste, Fiume, and Valona, but there were many harbours, most valuable from a naval point of view, including Pola, in the Istrian Peninsula, the principal headquarters of the Austro-Hungarian Navy. Fiume, in the Gulf

bay, which from its position near the entrance to the Adriatic Sea is of considerable strategic value, and was seized by the Italians as a base of operations. A word, too, must be said about the labyrinth of islands which form a fringe to the Dalmatian coast. The best known of these are Lissa and Lagosta, but all abound with ports and harbours, most suitable for the use of torpedo craft. About mid-way also in the Adriatic is the island of Pelagosa, and this place, like some of the other islands, being connected by telegraph with the mainland and used as a signal station, was occupied by the Italians. It will be seen from this descrip-



TRIESTE.

of Quarnero, was the only port of Hungary, and was connected by railway with Trieste, Vienna, and Budapest. Like Trieste, it was a shipbuilding port, and in these two centres all the larger ships of the Austro-Hungarian Navy were built. Southward along the Dalmatian coast the shore is backed at a short distance by high ranges of mountains, and deep water is to be found, as well as almost land-locked harbours, including Cattaro, a place which attained much prominence owing to its value from a strategical aspect and to the operations of which it formed the base. Between Cattaro and Valona are the ports of Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua, which at the beginning of the war were available for communication with Serbia and Montenegro, but later on fell into Austrian hands. Valona, which will also be found mentioned in the following narrative, is the principal seaport in Albania, on a spacious

tion of the Adriatic Sea that there were greater advantages in many respects on the Austrian side, and that the peculiar configuration of the eastern coast made more difficult any offensive operations against the naval forces of the Dual Monarchy. The western coast, on the other hand, owing to its paucity of harbours, its shallow waters, and its many populous towns, presented a vulnerable target to the enemy's enterprise.

From August 10, 1914, the date of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, until May 23, 1915, when Italy came into the conflict, the duty of imposing the will of the Allies upon the Fleet of the Dual Monarchy devolved upon the Anglo-French naval forces under the command of Admiralissimo Boué de Lapeyrère. The Austro-Hungarian Fleet had, without an effort, abandoned the control of the communications in the lower waters of the Adriatic, and the



ITALIAN SUBMARINE AND SUPPLY SHIP AT ANCHOR AT THE ISLAND OF PELAGOSA.

major portion shut itself up in the protected port of Pola, much in the same way that the German High Sea Fleet had gone into hiding behind Heligoland. Defended by extensive and very modern fortifications on the heights around the harbour, by numerous batteries of long-range guns commanding the entrance with its approaches, and by mines in the adjacent channels, the great naval arsenal and anchorage in the Istrian Peninsula defied attacks by ships alone. Any attempt at its reduction demanded the employment of military forces, and these could not be spared for the purpose. The task, therefore, of the Allied squadrons and flotillas was limited to the maintenance of a position of observation in the Straits of Otranto, from which any endeavour of the enemy to challenge a decision at sea could be promptly met, while ingress or egress to and from the Mediterranean was denied. Communication with Montenegro was established at the outbreak of war through the ports of Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua, and this business brought about a bombardment of Cattaro and the temporary seizure of some of the lower Dalmatian Islands from which attacks by light vessels on the line of traffic were launched. This necessarily arduous and somewhat thankless task was exercised by the Allied forces effectively, but not without some loss in the campaign of attrition by submarines,



[Italian Naval official photographs.]
LIGHTHOUSE, PELAGOSA.

which here, as in the North Sea, was the most prominent feature of the tactics adopted by the enemy.

When Italy denounced the Triple Alliance and drew the sword in the cause of the Entente Powers, her Navy was called upon to operate in what was already an active theatre of hostilities. The sphere of naval operations was, however, at once enlarged, and extended throughout the whole length and breadth of the Adriatic. Not only had the Italian Fleet to assume the responsibilities of the blockade at the Straits of Otranto and the maintenance of communications with Montenegro and Albania, but it was called upon to undertake the protection of its commercial interests and the towns along its Adriatic littoral. Furthermore, upon it devolved the duty of masking the Austro-Hungarian Fleet at Pola, and such undertakings as were required in co-operation

with the Army in the advance of the latter along the Friuli coast towards Trieste. The Austro-Hungarian Fleet, based on Pola, Fiume, and Cattaro, was a standing menace, and enjoyed behind the Dalmatian islands a freedom of action which permitted the utilisation to the fullest extent of small craft, supported in some instances by the larger ships. To meet the attacks which were made called for the utmost vigilance on the part of the Italian seamen and a continued display of the qualities of gallantry and endurance. Fortunately, during several months of neutrality, Italy had been able to utilise her industrial resources, and her ship-building yards and foundries, for completing her naval arrangements, so that when war came she was able to answer the call effectively and gradually to tighten her grip on the enemy both by sea and air. In the Northern Adriatic particularly the interdependence of the land

way to the British control of the Channel and defence of the Straits of Dover. The fall of Mount Lovtchen removed the last obstacle to the hold of the Austrians upon the Bay of Cattaro. They were now able to make full use of this magnificent anchorage, the approaches to which had been dominated by the guns upon the Mount, a circumstance which had hitherto debarred the full development of the port as a naval base. Cattaro was in some respects to the Italians what Zeebrugge had been to the British Navy. Its vicinity to the Straits made possible interference which might at any time become serious. The Austrians also utilised this port by sending some of their most powerful ships there, and from it raids by lighter craft and strong flotillas became frequent and marked by skill and dash both in plan and execution. All these matters demanded from the Italian Fleet exhibition



AUSTRIAN WARSHIPS AT THE ARSENAL QUAY AT POLA.

and sea operations was made manifest, and the seamen, by energetic aggressive action, materially assisted the work of the Army.

Later on, when Montenegro and Serbia were overwhelmed and King Constantine behaved so despicably, the burden laid on the Italian Fleet increased, and its task became yet more arduous and difficult. The withdrawal of the remnants of the Serbian Army was a great feat, and so was the transport of a military expedition to Valona. Those undertakings, and that of preventing interference with the patrol in the Straits of Otranto, are comparable in a

of the highest professional capacity and seamanship. During two years of war the enemy's fleet was condemned to a state of comparative powerlessness, and thus there was no engagement between the vessels of the larger classes, but many incidents and episodes occurred, some of them of a quite sensational nature. In every way the Italians maintained the high standard of their training and traditions, constantly and vigorously asserting their mastery over the foe.

The declaration of war by Italy found her

Navy both strong and ready, able to wield a potent influence on the course of events in the Adriatic. As regards material strength, the Italian fleet was second only to that of France in the Mediterranean. Hence, when the forces of those two Powers were united, the naval position of the Allies in that important theatre of war was very much improved. The control over the Adriatic became more stringent, and was not seriously challenged by the Austro-Hungarian Navy.


Six battleships of the "Dreadnought" class headed the Italian fighting fleet. They were of three distinct types. In a class by herself was the *Dante Alighieri*, which was launched in 1910 and completed in 1912. This first Italian "Dreadnought," of 20,010 tons, had an armament of twelve 12-in. guns, disposed in four triple turrets—the vessel being the first designed to carry her heavy guns on this principle. A feature of the ship was her high speed of 23 knots, or two knots more than the original British "Dreadnought." Following the *Dante Alighieri* came three vessels of the same tonnage, but of slightly different design. The *Leonardo da Vinci*, *Giulio Cesare*, and *Conte di Cavour* were given thirteen 12-in. guns, and the novel arrangement was adopted of three turrets mounting three weapons in each, and two turrets twin-mounted. Among the adjustments to permit of the extra weight

allotted to the main armament was the reduction of the speed to 22½ knots. There were two other "Dreadnoughts," the *Andrea Doria* and *Caio Duilio*, launched in 1913, which were similarly armed to the last-named three ships, and were, in general, improvements on them. Owing to the failure of the Austrians to challenge the command exercised by the Allied fleets, these "Dreadnought" vessels of the Italian Navy were not called upon for any fighting during the two years following the declaration of May, 1915, yet the power and strength latent in them made their influence felt on the situation at sea. An unfortunate accident deprived our Allies of the services of the *Leonardo da Vinci*. This ship, on the night of August 2, 1916, while moored in Taranto Harbour, in a position sheltering her from all possibility of hostile attack, caught fire near the aft magazine. The prompt flooding of the magazine prevented the entire destruction of the vessel, but a series of explosions occurred, and within an hour the fine ship had foundered in about 35 feet of water. It was definitely established that the explosion was not due to the spontaneous combustion of powder or shells.

Supplementing the Dreadnought divisions, Italy had, when she entered the war, an imposing fleet of pre-Dreadnought ships, both battleships and cruisers—about ten vessels of either class. The battleships ranged from



AN ITALIAN DREADNOUGHT FIRING FROM HER FORWARD TURRET.



GUN PRACTICE WITH SMALL-CALIBRE GUNS ON BOARD AN ITALIAN DREADNOUGHT.

the *Roma*, of 1907, to the *Sardegna*, of 1890, and, judged by their contemporaries in other fleets, they were all of powerful and efficient types. Italian constructors had been justly renowned for their daring and initiative in ship design. To Colonel Cuniberti, at one time

Chief Constructor of the Italian Navy, was ascribed the origin of the idea of the dreadnought or "all-big-gun ship." As regards the armoured cruisers, all but three carried 10-in. guns in their main armaments, and were thus in the nature of fast light battleships. It was

with these twenty pre-Dreadnought battleships and cruisers that the Italian fleet carried through so successfully its work during the war with Turkey in 1911-12, when although, owing to the marked inferiority of the Ottoman forces, it gained no dramatic victories, it accomplished a large amount of valuable and indispensable work in the transport of troops to Tripoli, the destruction of hostile shipping, the bombardment of enemy ports and signal stations, and in blockade work. The Italian Navy not only made possible the defeat of the Turks, but prevented the intervention of a third Power. As regards light cruisers, the construction of

arsenals at Naples, Genoa, and Leghorn had turned out vessels of this character for many foreign Powers, including Great Britain, which had ordered a submersible of the Laurenti type in 1911. There were 33 destroyers, 67 torpedo boats, and 20 submarines ready for service in the Italian Navy in May, 1915. An illustration of the capability of the crews of this branch of the service was afforded during the war with Turkey, when Captain Enrico Millo, who afterwards became Minister of Marine, took the torpedo boats *Spica*, *Perseo*, *Centauro*, *Climene* and *Astore* on the night of July 18, 1912, into the Dardanelles; the raid constituted a fine



[Italian Naval Official photograph.]

THE ITALIAN DESTROYER "INDOMITO."

this most useful class had been somewhat neglected in the few years before 1914, so that of the 16 vessels in the Italian Navy nine were over twenty years old, with a speed of less than twenty knots. The newest scout-cruisers were the *Nino Bixio*, *Marsala*, and *Quarto*, launched in 1911-12, with a displacement of 3,400 tons and a speed of 28 knots. Others, however, including some for duty as flotilla leaders, were under construction or nearing completion. Another interesting vessel similar in general design was the *Libia*, launched in the Ansaldo works at Genoa in 1912. She had been built as the Turkish cruiser *Drama*, but was seized by the Italians, before completion, on the outbreak of the war against Turkey.

In torpedo craft, both surface and submerged, the Italian Fleet was well developed. The

exhibition of nerve and judgment. In the greater war which opened for Italy in May, 1915, this daring raid was to be matched by other brilliant exploits with torpedo craft, as will be shown in the following pages. No account, however brief, of the material of the Italian Navy would be complete without mention of the various auxiliary and special ships, mining vessels, and the like, all of which helped to keep the fleet in a high state of readiness and efficiency.

The employment of the ex-light cruiser *Elba* on ballooning service indicated the attention paid to aeronautics at a time when the seaplane and the airship had not been utilized to any large extent for war purposes. In August, 1913, however, a Marine Flying School had been constituted at Venice. Several naval

airmen from here and elsewhere became famous by their exploits in the course of the war operations.

It may be well to record here that the Italian Navy had been administered in the years preceding the war by a judicious and well-tried system. Herein lay the foundation of much of its success. The outstanding feature of the Italian Admiralty was that its head had usually been a naval officer—an admiral of distinguished service or attainments. He had the title of Minister of Marine, and was fully responsible to Parliament, having a seat in either the Senate or the Chamber. A civilian Under-Secretary of State and a rear-admiral with the title of General Secretary relieved the Minister of matters of detail and routine. He was also assisted by two consultative bodies, the Superior Council of the Navy and the Committee of Designs, the former having for its President an eminent flag officer of experience and ability. Another interesting feature of Italian naval war administration was the co-ordination of effort as between the fighting fleet and the mercantile marine. Italy's merchant navy was made not



THE ITALIAN BATTLESHIP
"BENEDETTO BRIN."

Blown up in Brindisi Harbour in September, 1915.

only virtually but actually a branch of her royal Navy, directed by an Under-Secretary for Transports. When the question of the shortage in the world's carrying tonnage became acute owing to the abnormal conditions created by the war the value of this unity of control was apparent, and Signor Ancona, then Under-Secretary for Transports, accompanied the Italian delegation to the Allied naval con-

ference which met in London in January, 1917, when important decisions were arrived at concerning not only the naval operations but—as the British Admiralty announced at the time—"the use of shipping, the control of the trade routes, and other cognate problems."

When the great war broke out at the beginning of August, 1914, the post of Minister of Marine was occupied by Rear-Admiral Millo, who had been appointed in July, 1913, but in the Cabinet formed by Signor Salandra at the beginning of November, 1914, the portfolio was accepted by Admiral Viale. This officer



REAR-ADMIRAL ENRICO MILLO,
Italian Minister of Marine, 1913-14.

directed the naval side of Italy's war operations for four months after she entered the conflict in May, 1915, and then, to the deep regret of all who recognized his worth, he was compelled to relinquish the position owing to ill-health. Admiral Viale was not only an accomplished officer, but had had the rare experience of commanding a fleet in war, as he succeeded to the chief command of the Italian Fleet on April 7, 1912, while the war with Turkey was still in progress. Formerly, he had been in charge of the Second Squadron. He was in command of the Fleet when it was reviewed in state by King Victor Emanuel in Naples Bay on November 11, 1912, to mark the conclusion of the war against Turkey. The resignation of Admiral Viale was made known in the following

official statement published at Rome on September 25, 1915 :

The King has accepted the resignation of Admiral Viale, the Minister of Marine, and has instructed Signor Salandra, the Premier, to take over the post pending the appointing of a new Minister.

Admiral Viale has been suffering for a month from an indisposition which has already obliged him to go to Genoa to undergo a slight surgical operation. Although the illness was by no means of a serious nature, the Minister's absence from Rome would have had to be prolonged for some few weeks, and consequently Admiral Viale, inspired by a high sense of the heavy responsibility attaching to the military Ministers at the present moment, placed his resignation in the hands of the Prime Minister.

Admiral Viale's resignation was this morning communicated to the Cabinet, which instructed Signor



VICE-ADMIRAL COUNT THAON DI
REVEL,
Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy.

Salandra to express to the retiring Minister the keen regret of all his colleagues and their cordial wish for his rapid and complete recovery. At the personal request of Signor Salandra, Signor Battaglieri, the Under-Secretary of Stato for the Navy, will remain at his post.

In succession to Admiral Viale, Vice-Admiral Camillo Corsi became Minister of Marine, and it was an interesting circumstance that he kissed hands on his appointment at the Headquarters of the Supreme Army Command. His selection was a most natural one, for he had served as Chief of the Staff to Admiral Viale during the war with Turkey. Anxious to share in some of the fighting, he was placed in charge of the naval detachment which landed and occupied

the island of Rhodes in May, 1912, until the arrival of troops. His detachment also occupied six other Aegean Islands. Admiral Corsi, a Roman, was fifty-five when appointed Minister of Marine. He attended, as chief of the Italian delegation, the naval conference at the British Admiralty in January, 1917, when he was accompanied by Rear-Admiral Marzolo, Sub-Chief of the Naval Staff. It was the practice from October, 1915, to February, 1917, for the Minister of Marine to discharge the duties of Chief of the Staff, although in the actual working out of war plans, etc., no doubt a large amount of the staff work was delegated to his subordinate. At the time mentioned this arrangement was altered, and the responsibilities of Chief of the Staff were transferred to the officer holding the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. This change synchronized with the retirement of that popular and well-known officer, Admiral the Duke of the Abruzzi. First cousin of the King of Italy, the Duke was born in Madrid on January 29, 1873, and was educated at the Naval School at Leghorn. By his own merits, industry and daring he carved out for himself a successful career in the Italian Navy, and during the war with Turkey was in command of a division of ships operating principally in the Adriatic. He also earned fame as an enthusiast for mountaineering and for Polar exploration. In 1900, his party reached 86° 33' north, beating Nansen's previous record, and penetrating nearer to the North Pole than had been done at that time. It was in August, 1914, that he was appointed to the chief command of the Italian Navy. After exactly two and a half years in that arduous post, he requested the King to relieve him of his duties owing to reasons of health, and his successor was Vice-Admiral Count Thaon di Revel. The new Commander-in-Chief had been for some time in charge of the naval defence of Venice, and from 1913 to October, 1915, was Chief of the Naval Staff, or until that office was merged with that of the Minister of Marine, as already mentioned. Count di Revel was frequently commended for good service during the Libyan War, when he commanded the Fourth Division, Second Squadron, which bombarded the Dardanelles and sunk two Turkish ships in the harbour at Beirut. Formerly he was for four years head of the Italian Naval Academy. He was 59 years of age at the time of his selection as Commander-in-Chief, and in the interval until

he could hoist his flag, Vice-Admiral Cutinelli, who had had considerable experience as a divisional commander, and was decorated by King George in May, 1916, took charge of the fleet. The combination of Admirals Corsi



ADMIRAL VIALE,
Italian Minister of Marine, 1914-15.

and Marzolo at the Ministry of Marine, and Admirals di Revel and Cutinelli in the fleet, was a strong one, and under their leadership and guidance the Italian seamen continued to exhibit those admirable qualities which had made their work so valuable in the war. As to the spirit in which they came to their task, Admiral Mazzinghi wrote in the *Naval League Annual* for 1915-16: "Two reasons made it a debt of honour for Italy that she should take part in the European conflict: first, she could not accept the humiliation of any compensation whatever as her price of neutrality . . . ; second, it was imperative that she should oppose Teutonic arrogance and champion the rights of nations."

Following the declaration of war upon Austria-Hungary as from midnight on Sunday, May 23, 1915, the Italian Fleet at once took the sea, and proceeded to execute plans which had been carefully prepared and probably developed and improved in view of the experiences of ten months of war. Light was shed upon certain phases of the early work of the Italian seamen in *communiqués* issued

from Rome by Admiral Thaon di Revel, then Chief of the Naval General Staff. On June 2, 1915, the Admiral reported that on the previous day the Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Dalmatian Archipelago, but the enemy made no appearance. Meantime, the *communiqué* added, Italian warships had again destroyed the new semaphore and wireless stations on the island of Lissa, which had already been put out of action by the French naval bombardment in November, 1914, but which the Austrians had rebuilt. An important observation station to the north of the island of Curzola was also destroyed. On June 6, Admiral Thaon di Revel described further operations as having taken place in the Middle and Lower Adriatic. On the 5th, he said the cables uniting the continent to the islands of the Dalmatian Archipelago were cut, and all the lighthouses and observa-



VICE-ADMIRAL CORSI,
Italian Minister of Marine from September, 1915.

tion stations on these islands were destroyed. The railway between Cattaro and Ragusa was bombarded and seriously damaged. The island of Pelagosa was similarly the object of attention. After several bombardments, it was found that this place was still in use as a base for submarines, and as a signal station, and its occupation was, therefore, decided upon. On the night of July 26, 1915, destroyers and auxiliary vessels, covered by heavier forces, carried the island by a brilliant and daring coup. This uncultivated islet, as the circumstances connected with the loss of the *Nereide* later on showed, was provisioned by means of submarines. While the *Nereide*,

exploit in which the French destroyers *Magon* and *Bisson* cooperated.

Naturally, enterprises of this character, directed towards curbing the enemy's power and activity, had no small element of risk, in view of the presence of Austrian submarines. The big ships employed, especially those of



ADMIRALS CUTINELLI (marked with one cross) AND MARZOLO (two crosses).

an Italian submarine of 297 tons, was at anchor off Pelagosa, unloading supplies for its small garrison, an Austrian submarine appeared. The Italian commander, immediately the enemy's periscope was sighted, gave orders to the crew to enter the vessel and submerge, but before she could dive two torpedoes struck her, and she foundered with all hands. The island of Lagosta was also the scene of a gallant



LOADING A TORPEDO ON BOARD AN ITALIAN DESTROYER.

older types, were especially exposed, and it was hardly surprising that two of them, the cruisers *Amalfi* and *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, fell victims in July, 1915, the former on the 7th and the latter on the 18th. The *Amalfi* was attacked at dawn while carrying out a reconnaissance in force in the Upper Adriatic, and sank in about eight minutes with the loss of 70 lives. The *Garibaldi* was one of a division which had approached Cattaro, the Austrian naval base, and bombarded the railway in the vicinity at the same time that small craft operated against Gravosa. She was torpedoed to the south of Ragusa, but nearly all her crew were picked up. An Italian correspondent, supplying some hitherto unpublished particulars, stated that the old cruiser (she was launched in 1899) had caused a good deal of damage to Austria before she was sunk. She had destroyed observation posts along the coast, had bombarded land batteries, and had created such havoc against the Ragusa-Cattaro railway that all traffic was suspended for over a month. The *Garibaldi* had never, in the course of her raids, met an Austrian ship, and when sunk by the Austrian submarine U4 she was returning from one of her expeditions. Her crew, under their gallant commander, Captain Franco Fortunato Nunes, remained at their posts in the hope of saving the vessel, whilst four enemy submarines were seen in the vicinity.

As long as it was possible, the gunners of the *Garibaldi* continued firing at their assailants. One of the submarines, U4, emerged too near her prey, and was repeatedly hit. For several days afterwards, the Austrian wireless station at Cattaro sent urgent messages in cipher to U4 to report, and from all indications it was pretty certain that the *Garibaldi* had avenged herself before she sank, with the remainder of her crew drawn up on deck shouting "*Viva l'Italia.*" Confirmation of the loss of U4 was forthcoming when, some time later, another Austrian submarine, U3, was sunk in the

the alertness and initiative of the Italian seamen. The raid so took the small garrison by surprise that the commanding officer, a Hungarian lieutenant, surrendered together with 50 men, who were brought back as prisoners. The *Zeffiro* destroyed the railway station and barracks, damaged the quays and shipping, and sank several motor-boats. Again, on June 12, 1916, the *Zeffiro* was ordered to attack, and, if possible, destroy, the aerodrome at Parenzo. The destroyer reached her objective in a fog, which hampered the visibility, but which had no effect on the commander's



LISSA.

Lower Adriatic and her crew taken prisoners. Some of those men asked whether they would be sent to join their chums of the U4, which had never returned home. Of the *Garibaldi*'s crew of 540, about 500 were saved by a destroyer flotilla summoned to the scene by wireless.


If the larger units of the Italian Navy were thus actively employed, despite all that the Austro-German submarines could accomplish, even more so were the destroyers and small craft. The first noted exploit of the destroyers was the raid made on the night of May 24, 1915, by the *Zeffiro*, a boat of 325 tons, built by Messrs. Pattison in 1904, into the harbour of Porto Buso, in the Gulf of Trieste, on the confines of Italy and Austria. This stroke, delivered within 24 hours of the outbreak of war, showed vividly

decision to enter the harbour. On the quay were discovered three Austrian soldiers. The nearest was ordered by the Italian captain to catch the rope thrown and make it secure! Several sailors from the destroyer landed with the intention of capturing the three soldiers, but they were only successful in securing one, the other two escaping towards the city to give the alarm. By the time the *Zeffiro*'s commander ordered the boat to leave, the enemy batteries had opened a hot fire upon the destroyer, but the latter, notwithstanding a few injuries, directed her fire on the aerodrome and inflicted severe damage upon it. She also returned with valuable information. A month later, or as soon as the damage had been repaired by the Austrians, the *Zeffiro*, with other destroyers, again returned to

Parenzo and completely destroyed the aerodrome.

The fear inspired among the Austrians by the manner in which Italian torpedo craft were handled may be judged by an occurrence on May 3, 1916, to the south of the mouth of the River Po. Ten Austrian torpedo boats were sighted by four Italian destroyers, and in spite of their numerical superiority the former at once headed for Pola. They were chased all the way by the Italians, who shelled them continuously, and the pursuit was only abandoned when several large enemy warships were seen leaving Pola in support of the hunted torpedo boats. A flight of Austrian seaplanes unsuccessfully attempted to drop bombs on the destroyers on this occasion. Considering their work, the Italian flotillas were comparatively immune from loss. During the two years following their entry into the war, only four boats were officially reported sunk, the *Turbine*, *Intrepido*, *Impetuoso*, and *Nembo*. The destruction of the first-named is referred to later; the *Intrepido* was blown up by a mine in December, 1915; the *Impetuoso* fell a victim to a submarine attack in the Straits of Otranto on July 10, 1916, nearly all her crew being saved; while the *Nembo* was also sunk

by submarine in circumstances which demand more than a passing reference. On the night of October 16, 1916, the *Nembo* was employed in escorting the Italian transport *Bornida* to Valona when the German submarine U16 with an Austrian crew, sighted them. Deciding to attack so good a target as the troopship presented, the U boat got off a torpedo at the *Bornida*, but in the meantime the destroyer's commander had sighted the periscope and had placed his boat on the exposed side of the steamer. The torpedo struck the *Nembo*, and she began to sink, but her commander resolutely ordered her to be rushed towards the submarine in an endeavour to ram. Before this could be done the U boat had submerged completely, whereupon the destroyer used depth charges, which exploded under water. In a few minutes the submarine was obliged to come to the surface in a damaged condition, and a little later still both participants in this strange duel sank together, while the transport, with nearly 3,000 souls on board, proceeded in safety. Eleven of the submarine's crew were able to scramble into an empty boat belonging to the destroyer and rowed off towards the coast, near which they were picked up and made prisoners. Some sur-



AN ITALIAN DREADNOUGHT WITH DECKS CLEARED FOR ACTION.



ON BOARD AN ITALIAN DESTROYER.

vivors of the gallant crew of the *Nembo* were also saved.

This account of the operations of Italian destroyers during the period under review cannot better conclude than by a reference to the audacious raid made on Pola on the night of November 2, 1916. Three boats made the attempt, and their aim was to enter the waters of the harbour, effect a reconnaissance, and torpedo any warship which might be encountered and within range. To ensure their developing the highest possible speed, every particle of unnecessary gear had been taken out of the three boats entrusted with this dangerous mission. The enemy coast began to be visible about midnight, and the trio, being in mined waters, reduced their speed. Before them were the obstructions of the Fasana Channel. A solitary sailor was left in a small boat at a prearranged point to act as guard. Negotiating the fixed obstacles in the Channel in safety, the destroyers reached the waters of Pola harbour itself, and, while one proceeded further, the two others remained behind to act as escort or as might be required. For two hours the former boat carried out a minute reconnaissance among the islands, the Channel, and other places which compose and protect the harbour of Pola. The outline was then perceived of a large enemy warship, and

two torpedoes were discharged, but unfortunately the character of the nets protecting this vessel was such that the torpedoes remained caught in them, and, her presence being thus revealed, the Italian boat had to rejoin her consorts and return, which she did successfully. In spite of heavy fire from the batteries, assisted by the searchlights, the sailor on guard was picked up and no damage was caused to the raiders. Their mission, although robbed of that complete success which was hoped from it, served a useful purpose, and certainly illustrated the indomitable courage and professional skill of the officers and crews.

Turning now to the work of the Italian submarine service, the salient point to remember is that, like its counterparts in the other Allied Navies, it had few opportunities for attack, owing to the strategical policy adopted by the enemy. The first reported incident in which a submarine was concerned was the loss of the *Medusa*, a boat of 295 tons submerged displacement, built at Spezia in 1911. This boat was sunk on June 17, 1915, with the loss of all her crew except five, who were made prisoners. The curious thing was that an Austrian submarine was the means of the destruction of the *Medusa*, and this was believed to be the first time that two underwater craft had engaged in




[Italian Naval official photograph.]

ITALIAN SUBMARINE "FOCA," WHICH ATTACKED, ALONE, THE AUSTRIAN FLEET BOMBARDING ANCONA, MAY 24, 1915.

a duel. According to accounts of the circumstances, both craft were comparatively near to each other below water without either being aware of the other's presence. The *Medusa*, however, came to the surface, was sighted through the periscope of the Austrian boat, and was torpedoed and sunk. Strangely enough, the *Medusa* was soon avenged, and in like manner to that in which she was destroyed. On August 11, 1915, the Chief of the Italian Naval General Staff announced that in the Upper Adriatic the Austrian submarine U 12 had been torpedoed by an Italian submarine

and sunk with all on board. Three days later the loss was officially admitted from Vienna, when it was reported by the enemy wireless that her commander was Captain Zerch, who was the commander of U 12 when she made an attack on a French battleship in December, 1914.

Another successful attack by an Italian submarine was that made upon the Austrian gunboat *Magnet*, a 26-knot craft of 502 tons, built at Elbing by Messrs. Schichau in 1896. This vessel was torpedoed on August 2, 1916, in the Upper Adriatic. The Austrians, however,



ITALIAN SUBMARINES IN COURSE OF CONSTRUCTION.

claimed that she was able to reach harbour in a damaged condition. Two men were killed on board her and four wounded, according to the Vienna report, while seven more men were found to be missing after the attack.

In common with the submarine flotillas in other navies, the Italian boats suffered a few losses. The destruction of the *Medusa*, by an Austrian submarine, and of the *Neroide*, off Pelagosa, has already been mentioned. A third boat which was lost was the *Jalea*, which struck a mine while navigating submerged and sank. There was only one survivor of her crew, a sea-

The chronicle of achievements of the Italian naval aircraft is much more full and complete—a natural thing in view of the difference in the conditions of their employment. Cross-raiding by air was a marked feature of the operations in the Adriatic from the very beginning of the war. On May 27, 1915, the Italian naval airship M 2 flew over the Austrian base of Sebenico and dropped bombs on some destroyers at the mouth of the river Kerka, returning safely. Three days later an Italian airship was operating over the dockyard at Pola, dropping bombs on the railway, the petrol



ITALIAN SUBMARINE-CHASERS.

man named Arthur Vietri, who swam for over ten hours and was picked up near Grado.

On August 3, 1916, the loss of the Italian submarine *Giacinto Pullino* and a second submarine was officially announced from Rome. The *Pullino* was claimed by the Austrians to have been captured, with three officers and eighteen men, in the Northern Adriatic and brought to Pola almost undamaged. Both the boats had left their base on an important mission to the enemy's coast. It was made clear by these losses that the Italian submarines were employed largely for scouting purposes, in which they must have been found most useful. At the time when war began for Italy she had in service about twenty submarines, all with one exception constructed in her excellent shipyards.

depôts, and other objects, including, it was reported, the Austrian battleship, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand*, which was damaged. On June 8 the Italians suffered their first airship casualty in the war when the *Citta di Ferrara*, after an attack on Fiume, was destroyed by the Austrian naval seaplane, L 48, piloted by Lieutenant Glasing, with Naval Cadet von Fritsch as observer. The vessel was brought down south-west of Lussin, and her crew of two officers and five men captured. A week later another Italian airship passed over the enemy's entrenched camps and dropped bombs on an important railway junction at Divaca, a few miles east of Trieste. The next reported objective of the Italian airships was the great shipyard and arsenal of the *Stabilimento Tecnico* at Trieste. Here, it was announced by



FIUME: RIVA DEL LIDO.

Admiral Thaon di Revel, an Italian airship dropped bombs on July 4, 1915, and returned safely after inflicting serious damage. A further raid on these works was made on July 7, when a fire visible for 25 miles was caused by the bombs. On August 5 misfortune overtook the naval airship, *Citta di Jesi*, of the Italian air fleet, this vessel being brought down by shrapnel fire after making a raid on Pola. She fell into the sea, and her crew were captured by the Austrians.

As with airships, so with seaplanes—great use was made of the machines possessed by the Italians. One of the earliest raids was on a number of Austrian destroyers in the Fasana Canal or channel, the stretch of water already referred to, which separates Brioni Island from the mainland in the vicinity of Pola. Although it was not known whether any of the enemy boats were destroyed, several must have been damaged. From this time onward raids were constantly and frequently made by the Italian naval air squadrons upon signal stations and similar objects of military importance. A few of the more notable incidents which marked this aerial warfare may be given. In the Italian official *communiqué* on April 12, 1916, it was announced that in the Lower Adriatic two Italian seaplanes, having bombed a point on the enemy's coast and put

to flight the men guarding it, alighted on the sea and gained the shore. The four officers in the seaplanes, having landed, set fire to a house which was being used for signal purposes, blew up a small munition store, ignited several coal stacks, and destroyed the landing stage. After this effective work they waded out to their seaplanes, and flew back in safety to their base.

In spite of the provocation which, in common with the other Allies, the Italians received by the bombing of open and undefended towns their machines always kept strictly to military purposes in the raids they carried out. On August 9, 1916, an Italian official *communiqué* pointed out that enemy aircraft had on July 27 raided Italian open towns on the Lower Adriatic without any military object. The authorities at Rome refused to reply in kind, but they ordered one of their strong Caproni squadrons to attack the Whitehead torpedo and submarine works at Fiume. This raid took place on August 8, when, in spite of the heavy fire of the Austrian anti-aircraft artillery and the attacks of enemy aeroplanes, the Italian airmen were successful in dropping four tons of high explosives on the famous works, causing much damage and some fires. During the air fighting an enemy aeroplane was brought down above Muggia. One of the Caproni machines was observed landing near

Volosca, but all the others returned safely. Following up this success, a squadron of twenty-two Caproni battle-planes, escorted by Nieuport chasers, carried out in unfavourable atmospheric conditions a raid on Lloyd's arsenal and the seaplane sheds near Trieste. About five tons of high-explosive bombs were discharged at the railway establishments and the ships under construction, large fires being observed. On September 28, again, five Italian aeroplanes made an attack upon Durazzo, dropping half a ton of bombs. The Austrian account of this affair revealed the presence of a destroyer support to the attacking aircraft. It stated that two Austrian seaplanes which ascended to meet the raiders forced one of them down to the water, where it was rescued by an Italian destroyer. Another raid on Pola was made by several Italian seaplanes on December 22, 1916, while on January 11, 1917, two machines bombed the aviation ground at Prosecco, on the railway five miles north of Trieste, as well as the seaplane base in the harbour of Trieste. On the night following there was again a spirited raid on Pola, in which French machines operated. One Italian seaplane beat off three enemy

machines. Bombs were thrown by the defending Austrian aeroplanes upon the Allied torpedo craft acting as a support in the roadstead, but all the aerial and naval units returned safely.

So far the fighting reviewed has been that carried out by the regular types of warships and war craft. Many stirring episodes, however, were connected with the operations of the special vessels and appliances in the provision of which the well-known ingenuity and resource of the Italians had been exercised. A word must be given here to the exploits of the naval armoured trains. The Adriatic shore of Italy, being entirely undefended so far as coast fortifications were concerned, and having a length of no less than 500 nautical miles, at the extremities of which were situated the naval harbours of Venice and Brindisi, was peculiarly exposed to "cut-and-run" raids by the Austrians. Undeterred by the fact that the shelling of open coast towns was contrary to international law, the Austrians constantly made descents upon the Italian seaboard. On the first day of their war with Italy they sent out a large force, including at least two battleships, the *Radetzky* and *Zrinyi*, to attack



AN ITALIAN NAVAL AIRSHIP ABOUT TO ASCEND.



GULF OF VENICE.

various points along the coast from Venice to Barletta. Among other defensive measures, the Italian naval authorities decided to utilize the railway running along the coast, and a number of armoured trains, manned by sailors,

were brought into use. They were distributed at various points of the long coastline, ready to concentrate at any given spot at which an enemy force might be sighted. The trains were provided not only with heavy guns but also with anti-aircraft batteries. The value of them was demonstrated very soon. On November 5, 1916, according to an official report from Rome issued on the following day, three enemy destroyers appeared at dawn off Sant Elpidio-al-Mare, to the south of Ancona, and opened fire. One of the armoured trains was immediately ordered to the scene, and its guns came into action with such effect that the enemy units were obliged to retire. Two of the destroyers were reported to have been hit, and one of them was seen to have a list, and to be assisted by the others, as she steamed away. Moreover, not one of the Austrian shells was as effective as it might have been otherwise. A railway employee was slightly injured, and a little damage caused to private property, but for the rest the raid served no purpose, thanks to the promptitude of the sailors in charge of the armoured train. It was subsequently reported that these mobile forts had been so effective that raids upon the coast had practically ceased altogether. Each train was



VENICE: FROM THE GRAND CANAL.



ITALIAN ARMOURD TRAIN.

manned by about 70 naval officers and ratings. The organization was on the lines of a warship, and the same discipline was observed as in an ordinary naval unit.

On entering the war the Italian Navy naturally underwent a process of expansion similar to that which took place in the Allied navies, and numbers of vessels from the Merchant Service were taken up for special duties. The services of a large proportion of these mercantile auxiliaries were of such a character that little or no contemporary information was published in regard to them. Now and again, however, they figured in official reports. On December 5, 1915, the Austrian light cruiser *Novara* and some destroyers made a raid upon San Giovanni di Medua, the point on the Albanian coast which was used as a base by the Allies. The Austrians claimed to have sunk three large and two small steamers, together with five large and several small sailing vessels which were discharging war material, and to have blown up one steamer. Unfortunately for these extravagant claims, the British Admiralty on December 8 was able to publish information from Rome showing that in this descent upon the shipping off San Giovanni two small steamers only were sunk, one being of 390 tons displacement, and a few sailing craft. In regard to the Austrian

claim to have destroyed "a large motor sailing vessel" en route from Brindisi to Durazzo, this ship, said the Admiralty, was actually the *Gallinara*, of 30 tons. At other times, there were references to patrol boats and similar auxiliary vessels.

Another special branch of the Italian Navy which rendered valuable service was that concerned with submarine mining. Here, again, very little information was allowed to be published by the authorities at Rome. In this connexion, the fate of the Austrian submarine UC 12 was of special interest. On July 25, 1915, or about two months after the Italian declaration of war upon Austria, it was discovered by minesweepers that a row of 12 mines had been laid by the Austrians off one of the Italian bases. Twenty days later another string of mines, and in the same locality, was discovered, affording clear proof that a submarine minelayer was at work. Special precautions were taken to catch and punish this mysterious aggressor, and over six months later these efforts were rewarded. On March 16, 1916, a great explosion was heard in the locality, and a large volume of water was seen to rise from the sea. The commander of the naval base ordered divers to ascertain the precise fate of the submarine, and their reports being satisfactory, it was decided to raise the



Italian Naval official photograph.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERY ON AN ITALIAN ARMoured TRAIN.

wreck of the boat. A few days' hard work, and the submarine lay on one of the quays, revealing her identity as UC 12. She was built in the Weser shipbuilding yards at Bremen by Siemens Schuekert. One portion of the hull was a mass of twisted metal, but the explosion had caused less havoc in another portion, and here some material of great interest was recovered. Everything appeared to be German—boat, armament, equipment, and crew. The charts and other publications bore the seal "Kaiserliche Marine"; the German Imperial crown was engraved on the table plate on board; the clothes worn by the sailors had the mark "B.A.K." signifying "Bekleidung Abteilung—

ment, and on the 22nd took on board the mines destined for the Adriatic. The next month was occupied in reaching the desired sphere of operations. The submarine was sent by rail, in three sections, from Kiel to Pola, and arrived at the latter place on June 24, 1915. Having been put together again, it was successful in laying mines before a certain Italian base on July 25 and August 15, 1915. Apparently Cattaro became its headquarters, but it left that port in December for Cyrenaica (Port Badia, near Tohum), having transported a load of rifles and ammunition for the Arab rebels. In February, 1916, the UC 12 was off Durazzo during those terrible days of the evacuation



BRINDISI.

Kiel"; the postal correspondence came from Kiel; the private deposits of some of the crew were with the Savings Bank at Kiel; and the list of officers and sailors contained only purely German names. Nothing but the flag was Austrian on board, and this had been exchanged on June 28, 1915, at Pola—a few days before the discovery of the first mines. It must be remembered that at the time in question Italy was not at war with Germany. It was also an interesting fact that French, English, and Greek ensigns were found in the submarine, their use being obvious.

Perhaps most important of all the relics was the log-book of the UC 12. This showed that the boat entered service at the beginning of May, 1915, when it was put through trials on the Weser, and then towed by night through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. It entered Kiel on May 17 to complete with stores and equip-

ment of the Serbian Army, and mines were laid on the transport routes on the 15th and 23rd of that month, although fortunately the Italian minesweepers discovered them in time. Returning to Cattaro for a new cargo of mines, the boat set forth again to lay them, but was overtaken by the fate already described. The commander of the boat was Ober-Leutnant Frohner, and the second-in-command Ing. Ober-Aspirant Hempel. In type she was apparently similar to the UC 5, which was captured in the North Sea and exhibited in the Thames in the summer of 1916.

Something has now been said of the work of all classes of fighting craft in the Italian Navy, and it will be gathered that during the time covered by this survey—that is to say, during the two years following Italy's declaration of war—the operations were rather spasmodic in character. Raids and counter-raids, bom-

bardments of coast positions, and the like were the rule, as distinct from fleet actions. On the rare occasions on which the Austrian battleships or cruisers put to sea it was for another purpose than that of contesting a pitched battle with the Allied forces, and the tactics pursued were always those of avoiding action unless the odds were clearly in favour of Austria. Thus the first warlike act of Austria against Italy was the bombardment of several points of undefended coastline on the morning of May 24, 1915, a typical runaway raid similar to that carried out by the German squadron against Scarborough in the previous December. The following was the Italian official account of this operation issued the same evening:—

It was foreseen that as soon as war was declared offensive actions, to produce moral effect rather than to achieve any military purpose, would be undertaken against our Adriatic coast. Provision was accordingly made to meet them, and to make them of very short duration. From 4 to 6 o'clock this morning small naval units of the enemy, and in particular destroyers and torpedo-boats, did in fact fire upon our Adriatic shores. Aeroplanes even attempted an attack upon the arsenal at Venice. The enemy ships, after a very short bombardment, were forced by our torpedo-boats to clear off.

The enemy's aeroplanes were bombarded by our anti-aircraft guns, and were also attacked by an Italian aeroplane and a dirigible flying over the Adriatic. The places attacked are Porto Corsini, near Ravenna, which immediately replied, and forced the enemy to instant retreat; Ancona, where the attack was particularly directed to interrupt the railway line, and caused slight damage, easy to repair; Barletta, where the attack was made by a scout and by a destroyer which one of our ships, escorted by torpedo-boats, put to flight; and at Jesi (near Ancona), where the enemy's aeroplanes launched bombs on a hangar, though without hitting their object. No other reports concerning the operations of this unit have any foundation.

At three o'clock this morning one of our destroyers entered Porto Buso—the little island close to the Austro-Italian frontier—destroying the quay and the landing stage for the barracks. The destroyer sank all the motor boats in the harbour, and suffered no losses among her crew or damage to herself. The enemy lost two men killed and 47 taken prisoners, of whom one was an officer and 15 non-commissioned officers. They were conveyed to Venice.

Further information as to the aerial raid on Venice shows that there were two aeroplanes, which threw eleven bombs without doing serious damage. The defence was prompt and efficacious, and immediately put the hostile aviators to flight. The slight damage done to the railway by hostile aeroplanes and ships early this morning has already been repaired. The enemy's fire sank a German ship in the port of Ancona (the *Lemnos*).

The Austrian authorities issued a very long official report of the operations of their fleet on the 24th. It contained the names of most if not all of the Austrian vessels engaged, and was obviously calculated to exaggerate the importance of such raiding. The only naval success which could be claimed by the Austrians, however, was the sinking of the small Italian

destroyer *Turbine*, which was recorded as follows:—

The cruiser *Helgoland* and three destroyers bombarded *Visti* and *Manfredonia*. They encountered two Italian destroyers near *Barletta*, against which fire was at once opened. The Italian destroyers fled, pursued by the Austrians. One destroyer escaped, but the second was forced towards *Pelagosa* by two of our destroyers, the *Csepel* and *Tatra*, was rendered unnavigable by shells, which hit her boiler, and finally burning and in a sinking condition she surrendered. The *Csepel*, *Tatra*, and *Lika* rescued 35 men, among them the commander of the vessel, who were made prisoners.

This account was inaccurate in a most important particular. The Italian commander never surrendered, and his vessel sank under him with her flag proudly flying. The Chief of the Naval General Staff issued the following statement from Rome on May 28, 1915:—

We have only to regret the loss of a small old destroyer, built in 1901, of 330 tons, the *Turbine*. On the morning of May 24 this vessel was engaged in scouting duties when she sighted an enemy destroyer. She at once gave chase, thus becoming separated from the main body of the naval detachment of which she formed part. The pursuit had lasted for about half an hour when four other enemy units came up, three destroyers and the light cruiser *Helgoland*. The *Turbine* thereupon fell back on her detachment, but having been hit twice in her boilers she lost her speed. Nevertheless she continued to fight for about an hour in spite of fire which broke out on board. Then her ammunition being exhausted, her commander ordered her sea-cocks to be opened in order to sink the vessel and prevent her capture by the enemy.

The *Turbine* began to sink, but in spite of the fact that she had ceased fire, and that the crew was drawn up in the stern in such a serious plight, the enemy continued to shell her from a short distance. The commander, who had been wounded at the beginning of the action, when he saw that the vessel was about to sink, ordered the sailors to jump into the sea. The Austrian destroyers launched boats to help the swimmers, but at this moment, catching sight on the horizon of the naval detachment to which the *Turbine* had belonged, the enemy rapidly recalled his boats and made with all speed for his own coast. Our vessels, leaving lifeboats behind, pursued the enemy, opening fire. A destroyer of the *Tatra* type and the *Helgoland* were hit several times and were seriously damaged. Nine men of the *Turbine* were rescued.

The splendid defence put up by Commander *Bianchi* was and must remain a source of admiration to all seamen. With his vessel a helpless wreck, and the gun crews dead or wounded all around him, he himself suffering from an injury sustained early in the fight, he had only one thought, that of selling his life and that of his destroyer as dearly as possible. He at first gave orders to blow up the *Turbine* when further resistance was hopeless. There were, however, no explosives remaining to carry out the command. At length, with the nearest Austrian destroyer only about a hundred yards off, he gave the order to "Open the kingstons," and the *Turbine* gradually sank with her flag flying. As soon as she had realized the



Italian Naval official photograph.

ITALIAN MINE-LAYER AT WORK.

odds against her the *Turbine* had called for assistance, and according to the Austrian reports two battleships of the *Vittorio Emanuele*

type, with one auxiliary cruiser, were soon on the scene. Only flight saved the enemy from more decisive punishment. This was the only



ITALIANS SALVING AN AUSTRIAN SEAPLANE OFF ANCONA, FEBRUARY 2, 1916.

occasion during the two years after Italy's entry into the war that the Austrians sent out so many of their warships at the same time. Evidently the returns were considered to be not worth so much risk. At Ancona, for instance, no fewer than 22 Austrian vessels were present during the raid on May 24, 1915, but the damage was small in proportion. Among the private property destroyed was the enemy steamer *Leunos*, already mentioned; while the famous old cathedral of San Cisiario was also damaged. Descents on the Italian coast continued for about three months after this. On June 8, 1915, small craft attacked Punta Tagliamento, Rimini, Pesaro, and Fano. On July 19 Monopoli came in for attention. Four days later the places shelled comprised San Vito, Termoli, Ortona, Francavilla, San Benedetto del Tronto, Grottafiume, Cupra Marittima, and Pegaso; while on July 27 there were bombardments at Senigallia, Fano, and Pesaro. Similarly, during the month of August, Molfetta, Santo Spirito, Bari, and Noicattaro were the object of bombardments. After that month, however, no further raids of this kind were made by the Austrians, as the Italian counter-measures and precautions made such operations too hazardous.

It was about this time, on August 21, 1915, that Italy declared war on Turkey. The Note presented by the Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, to the Ottoman Government stated as the reason for

the Italian action the support by Turkey of the revolt in Libya and the situation which had obtained in Ottoman territory for two months inimical to Italian subjects. This had particular reference to the prevention by the Turkish authorities of Italians leaving Syria. Turkey's naval forces, even including the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau*, were comparatively negligible, and were already neutralized by the presence off the Dardanelles of a strong Franco-British Fleet, not to mention the Russian forces in the Black Sea. The new declaration of war, therefore, did not affect the naval situation.

By a decree, the text of which was published in the *London Gazette* on July 23, 1915, the whole of the Adriatic Sea was declared closed to merchant vessels of all nations, except those bound to Montenegrin or Italian ports possessing a permit of the Italian Ministry of War. The Adriatic thus became, like the North Sea, a controlled "military area." Two months earlier, or on her entry into the war, Italy had declared a blockade of the Albanian coast. It was announced that the Italian Government, considering that some ports on this coast were used by Austria for the clandestine revictualling of their small units, declared as from May 26, 1915, a blockade (1) of the Austro-Hungarian coast from the Italian frontier on the south, including all islands, ports, gulfs, roadsteads and bays, and (2) of the Albanian shore from the Montenegrin frontier on the north to Cape Kiephali, inclusive, to the south. Steps were

to be taken in conformity with the rules of international law against vessels seeking to cross the line between Cape Otranto and Cape Kiephali.

The next phase of the work of the Italian Navy, and a most important one, is summed up in the one word "transport." Operations of the greatest magnitude were undertaken successfully between the Italian mainland and the coast of Albania. These operations afforded direct and invaluable aid to the two small but gallant Powers, Montenegro and Serbia, and were of great service to the Allied cause in general. They were divided into three parts, carried out in as many periods. During the first period, the late summer of 1915, the object was the supply of food and ammunition to the sorely tried populations and armies of Montenegro and Serbia. Following this, the town and bay of Valona, the nearest harbour in Albania to the Italian coast, were occupied by an Italian force and transformed into a suitable base for naval and military use. Thirdly, there was rendered possible by the last-named the difficult undertaking of the retreat and withdrawal overseas of the remnant of the Serbian Army. Of the first phase little need be said, as the naval interest of the

attempt to send succour to the two Balkan Powers which threw in their lot with the Allies was subordinate to the political and military standpoints, and the protection afforded to the shipping by the Italian Fleet, in conjunction with the Franco-British forces, was similar to that exercised all over the seas of the world.

Of the second and third phases, however, there are some striking facts to be recorded. It was during the first week in December, 1915, that reports through enemy agencies were first circulated that an Italian expedition had crossed the Adriatic and landed in Albania. On December 16 the Rome Government was able to break its silence in this respect with the welcome announcement that the expedition was an accomplished fact. It was announced that the only action against the undertaking which the enemy had been able to accomplish was the attack made by a strong detachment of destroyers upon some small merchant ships (mostly sailing vessels), which formed part of the numerous boats employed for the provisioning of the Albanian coast. This action in no way interfered with the magnitude or frequency of the communications with Albania. It was officially declared that, in spite of all the enemy attempts, only one chartered vessel, the *Re Umberto*, built in 1892, of 1,182 tons



Italian Naval official photograph.

GONDOLA OF AN ITALIAN AIRSHIP, STOCKED WITH BOMBS.



ITALIANS LAND AT SANTA QUARANTA.

net, and one destroyer, the *Intrepido*, were sunk. Both of them struck floating mines in a part of the sea which had only just before been carefully swept, but the prompt and skilful action of escorting vessels rescued those on board, except 40 men from the transport and three from the destroyer.

Once the Italians had secured a foothold in Albania, they made rapid progress with their heavy task. At the end of December it was reported that work on the roads from Valona was being actively pushed on, especially the roads to the north, as those joined others from Durazzo to Albassan, in Central Albania. Early in January, after incredible engineering difficulties, the expeditionary force was successful in opening up a permanent line of communication, 60 miles in length, between Valona and Durazzo. Naturally large quantities of material had to be shipped across the

Adriatic, in addition to the ordinary military equipment and stores, and the immunity with which this was carried out testified to the efficiency of the naval arrangements. On February 24, 1916, the authorities at Rome were able to publish a very satisfactory report upon these operations. Since the middle of December, it was stated, there had been transported between the western and eastern shores of the Lower Adriatic 260,000 men and some thousands of animals, a total of 250 steamers being employed in the work. During the same time 300,000 ewt. of materials were transported in 100 steamers, most of which were of small tonnage, in order that they might be able to put in on the opposite shore of the Adriatic. Under the escort of Italian and Allied ships during the same period sovereigns and princes of foreign royal houses six times accomplished the same crossing, and foreign ministers and



AN ITALIAN SQUADRON IN THE MAR PICCOLO, NEAR TARANTO

political, civil, and military authorities still more frequently. The report concluded:—

The enemy attempted to impede this extensive and complex movement by continual activity in the air, by mining certain sea areas, and often by attempting to bring into action squadrons of torpedo-boat destroyers, supported by scouts or light cruisers, and, lastly, by nineteen submarine attacks. In spite of all these attempts, and the fact that the operations had to be carried on within a restricted area of water and along routes and towards points of anchorage which were necessarily obligatory, the ships were escorted so well that, apart from trifling incidents mentioned in previous *communiqués*, the sinking of only three small steamers has to be recorded, of which two struck mines, and the third was torpedoed after the unloading operations had been completed. Not a single Serbian soldier was lost at sea. Our ships and those of the Allies, whenever circumstances would allow, counter-attacked the enemy with decision and effect. In the early part of January

“as several large enemy cruisers and destroyers were threatening the retreat of the whole fleet.” Unofficially, the Austrian force was stated to have comprised the light cruiser Helgoland, two other scout cruisers and destroyers, and a submarine was also said to have been among their losses. Interesting as showing the degree of co-operation between the fleets of Italy, France, and Great Britain was the statement in the Austrian report that “amongst the enemy ships were clearly recognized a British cruiser of the Bristol and Fal-mouth type and a French cruiser.” This lively little scrap was the subject of a letter in the Austrian papers a few weeks afterwards,



[Italian Naval official photograph.]

EXPLODING A MINE IN THE ADRIATIC.

an Austrian submarine was sunk, while two more in all probability were lost during the same period, and an enemy seaplane was captured near Valona.

Of these Austrian efforts to hamper the transport operations, one on December 5, 1915, has already been referred to in connexion with the work of the auxiliary patrols of the Italian Navy. Another raid, on December 28, 1915, resulted in disaster for the Austrians. One of their destroyer flotillas left Cattaro with the intention of bombarding Durazzo, where they did. it was claimed from Vienna, shell the land batteries and sink a steamer and sailing vessel in the harbour. Allied flotillas, however, steamed out to cut off the retreat of the raiders, and engaged them. The destroyer Triglav was sunk, and her sister was forced upon some mines and blown up. The Austrian version was that the Triglav was taken in tow after being mined, but was sunk by her own crew,

the writer being an officer in an Austrian cruiser. He wrote:—

We set out two hours before dawn on an enterprise against the Italian coast and some supply ships which had been detected by our air scouts on the previous day. Our force consisted of three light cruisers and a destroyer flotilla. Shortly after leaving port we sighted an enemy submarine and chased it, but without effect. No doubt this boat signalled our approach to the enemy. For on coming within a few miles of our objective we saw a lot of smoke, and a few minutes later picked up a whole squadron of ships bearing down at high speed. There were French, Italian and English vessels in the enemy force. Our destroyers boldly advanced to the attack, the thick weather favouring them. Shots were already striking the water beyond us in the cruisers, and so our leaders signalled us to retreat at full speed. As we went we saw our destroyers getting it hot. The sea boiled under the enemy's cannonade, to which we made an effective reply. All was going well, and we were just congratulating ourselves on having got out of an ugly scrape when the destroyer Triglav, which was racing along on our port quarter, was struck by a huge shell or fouled a mine. We never knew which. Suddenly a tremendous column of smoke and water rose under her, and when this fell the boat had disappeared. Nothing

but men struggling in the water. We could not stop, as some enemy destroyers were well within range. The next astern of the Triglav was the Lika, a similar boat. She was steaming badly, having received a shot in the boilers. As we watched her she was hit twice in succession, and her speed fell off visibly. Suddenly she blew up—from what cause we never knew—and disappeared in a whirlpool of foam. Again we could not stop, but had to draw away with heavy hearts, thinking of our gallant comrades, who had gone to their death. Fortunately, many members of both crews were picked up by the enemy. Our ship was not touched at all, though we had several narrow squeaks. Even at long range the enemy's fire was so hot from their light quick-firers that it sounded exactly like the roll of a drum.

The third phase of the Italian operations off the Albanian coast may be said to have opened on January 11, 1916, when French troops landed at Corfu to prepare for the arrival at that place of the Serbian troops. A statement published jointly by the Allied Powers declared that their Governments deemed it an obligation of humanity to transfer to Corfu that portion of the Serbian Army which was then in Albania. The task of revictualling these troops would thus be simplified, it was declared, and the Powers took this step in the belief that Greece would not feel compelled to oppose a measure that would redound to the benefit of her Ally, and would in any case be of brief duration. The landing of the first troops in Corfu was satisfactorily

and expeditiously accomplished on January 15. Of course, the humane character of this undertaking of removing the battered and broken remainder of the Serbian Army, including the sick and wounded, did not influence the Austrians to withhold attacks upon the sea route over which the ships passed, but the immunity enjoyed by the Serbians, and referred to in the official *communiqué* on February 24, 1916, was maintained, so far as authoritative reports showed. On June 9, 1916, however, the Italian transport *Principe Umberto*, of 7,929 tons, was sunk by submarine in the Lower Adriatic. Three steamers transporting troops and war material, and escorted by a flotilla of destroyers, were attacked by two submarines of the Austrian flotilla, and although the latter, on being discovered, were promptly counter-attacked, one of their torpedoes struck the *Principe Umberto*, which sank within a few minutes. In spite of the life-saving facilities at the disposal of the convoy, said the Rome semi-official report, and the prompt assistance of other units in those waters, about half the troops on board the transport were lost.

Following on the successful withdrawal of the Serbians, the town of Durazzo passed from



AN ITALIAN NAVAL COASTAL BATTERY IN ACTION.



BRITISH AND ITALIAN WARSHIPS IN THE ADRIATIC.

the hands of the Allies into those of Austria, the enemy troops taking possession on February 27, 1916. On February 26 a report from Rome stated that the withdrawal of the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian troops from Albania had been completed, and that the Italian brigade at Durazzo had also embarked, the Albanian Government having left the place. The Italian Fleet, after covering the embarkation of the Italian troops, continued to bombard the roads leading to Durazzo, preventing the enemy entering the town in force, and setting the port in flames. It was a fine tribute to the skill of the Italian seamen and gunners that, in spite of the bad weather which prevailed at the time, they were able to reduce the enemy's batteries and keep the coast roads under fire until all the Italian troops which had been sent to Durazzo to cover the evacuation of the Serbians were embarked without mishap and taken to Valona. Not a single Italian gun was left behind at Durazzo, but all the old Turkish guns were abandoned and destroyed.

In a raid by the Austrian light cruiser Novara on July 9, 1916, two British drifters, forming part of the Allied patrol in the southern part of the Adriatic, were sunk with loss of life. These drifters formed part of the Allied cordon drawn across the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, and therefore covered the transport operations to and from Albania, in the same manner that the Dover patrol protected the flank of the transport of the British armies across the English Channel. The British Admiral in the

Adriatic reported that the Novara came upon a group of drifters, of which two the *Astrum Spei* and *Clavis*, were sunk, and the *Frigate Bird* and *Ben Bui* damaged, but not sufficiently to prevent them returning to port. The crew of the *Astrum Spei* were taken prisoners and among the remainder of the boats there were ten killed and eight wounded.



THE AUSTRIAN STEAMER "LEMNOS," SUNK BY THE ITALIANS AT ANCONA,

Having been caught signalling to an Austrian Aeroplane.

The incident was grossly exaggerated in the following wireless message of the enemy :—

Our cruiser Novara met in the Otranto Straits with a group of five, or—according to statements made unanimously by prisoners who were taken—five armed English patrol ships, and destroyed them *all* with cannon fire. All the steamers sank in flames, and three of them after an explosion of the boilers.

The Straits of Otranto were the scene of another patrol craft action on December 22, 1916, when several Austrian vessels opened an attack on some small guardships in the

Straits, but were immediately perceived by French destroyers. After a very lively and violent fire on both sides, the enemy, pursued by some other Italian and Allied units which had been sent to assist, succeeded in the darkness in escaping. One French destroyer and one guardship in the Straits sustained insignificant material damage. The Austrian

statement) 72 prisoners were taken. H.M.S. Dartmouth (Captain A. P. Addison, R.N.), with the Italian Rear-Admiral on board, and H.M.S. Bristol immediately drove the enemy off, assisted by French and Italian light cruisers and destroyers. The chase was kept up, with the enemy under heavy and continuous fire, till near Cattaro, when, some enemy



Italian Naval official photograph.

ADJUSTING A SEARCH-LIGHT.



Italian Naval official photograph.

RECEIVING TELEGRAPH MESSAGES.

official account mentioned four of their destroyers, and declared that on the return journey these boats encountered six powerful destroyers, understood to be of the Italian *Indonito* class.

Nearly five months later the Austrians swooped down from Cattaro and executed a raid upon the line of patrols in the Straits of Otranto, with a large measure of success, fourteen British drifters being sunk. The Admiralty announced on May 18, 1917, that from reports received from the Rear-Admiral Commanding British Adriatic Squadron, supplemented by an Italian despatch issued to the Press, it appeared that early on the morning of the 15th an Austrian force, consisting of light cruisers, which were subsequently reinforced by destroyers, raided the Allied drifter line in the Adriatic, and succeeded in sinking fourteen British drifters:

2284 Admirable	2274 Helenora
2114 Avondale	2414 Quarry Knowe
2112 Coral Haven	2711 Selby
2271 Craignoon	2186 Serene
1399 Felicitas	2155 Tait
1869 Girl Gracie	2434 Transit
2714 Girl Rose	1916 Young Linnet

from which (according to an Austrian official

battleships coming out in support of their cruisers, our vessels drew off. Italian airmen, after a battle in the air, attacked the Austrian warships outside Cattaro, and they confidently assert that one of the enemy cruisers was heavily on fire, and was being taken in tow off Cattaro in a sinking condition; one other enemy cruiser was reported by the British Admiral as being badly damaged. During her passage back H.M.S. Dartmouth was struck by a torpedo from an enemy submarine, but returned into port with three men killed and one officer and four men missing—believed dead—and seven wounded. There were no other casualties to our ships.

In this encounter the British vessels played a glorious if unsuccessful part. The high speed of the Dartmouth and Bristol enabled them to maintain contact with the flying enemy for over two hours, during which time heavy punishment was inflicted upon the Austrian light cruisers of the Novara type. On May 21 it was announced in the House of Commons that the First Sea Lord had received messages from the Italian Minister of Marine and Commander-in-Chief. The former, Admiral Corsi, telegraphed to Sir John Jellicoe: "I convey to you my warmest admiration for the

way in which H.M.S. Dartmouth, fighting against superior forces, nobly upheld the finest traditions of the British Navy." Similarly, Admiral Thaon di Revel telegraphed: "Please express Chief Naval Staff, Admiral Jellicoe, my hearty congratulations for brilliant action fought by H.M.S. Dartmouth, which, although torpedoed, was able to return safely to port."

Attention was first directed to the services of British fishermen in mine-sweeping craft in the Adriatic in January, 1917, when the Pope received in audience about a hundred of these sturdy seamen on their way south to join the drifters. Regular warships of the British Navy had been continuously in the Adriatic, of course, since war began. Among visitors to the base of the British vessels at Taranto in February, 1917, was Cardinal Bourne. On March 27, 1917, it was announced that another batch of British seamen had been visiting Rome. These men were near the Italian Dreadnought Leonardo da Vinci when she blew up at Brindisi, and, as one of them put it, "we jolly well had to give up our leave and get out the boats to help the poor chaps who were in the water." An Italian who was



[Italian Naval official photograph]

DRIFTERS IN THE ADRIATIC.

present said that numbers of the British sailors jumped into the water and rescued nearly 50 wounded men who might otherwise have been drowned.

In addition to the transport of military forces across the Adriatic, the Italian Navy also afforded direct aid to the armies under General Cadorna by assistance rendered to the flank of the troops operating on the Isonzo front. As the soldiers advanced along the coast, so the warships co-operated with them, rendering valuable artillery support, and constituting



DURAZZO: GUNS IN THE OLD FORTIFICATIONS OVERLOOKING THE HARBOUR.

a serious menace to the left flank of the Austrians. The first important outcome of this amphibious warfare was the fall of Monfalcone to the Italians on June 10, 1915. Not only was this place a port of some consequence, but it possessed a naval dockyard, and had been a building centre for small vessels of the Austrian Fleet. The light cruisers *Helgoland* and *Saida* were built at Monfalcone, and several

was carried out by light cruisers. The Italian official account stated that three batteries of artillery placed close to the Castle of Duino opened fire on these vessels, which replied, reducing one battery to silence and setting the castle on fire. At the moment considered favourable the naval and military forces began a concerted movement for the capture of the town on June 9. A strong attack was



AN ITALIAN WARSHIP IN THE HARBOUR AT TARANTO.

destroyers. The prizes taken in the harbour when the town was captured were reported to have included eleven steamers, twenty-four sailing vessels, thirty motor boats, and five aeroplanes.

The manner in which Monfalcone was seized illustrated the force of the dictum that fortified coast towns can seldom be taken by naval or military effort alone, but only by a combination of both. Naval units had bombarded the port frequently before it fell. On May 31, for instance, two destroyers penetrated into its waters for reconnaissance and to shell the electric power station and other objects of military importance. On June 5 there was another attack by destroyers in force, which appeared to be directed principally against the wharves and shipping. During both these attacks larger units of the Italian Fleet cruised in the vicinity without sighting the enemy. On June 7 also a bombardment of Monfalcone

delivered from the land side, supported by vigorous artillery fire, and with the help of the ships it was not long before the place became untenable for the enemy. The capture of Monfalcone was soon followed by that of Porto Rosega and the navigable canal lying between the two towns. Porto Rosega, at the head of the Gulf of Trieste, lies some three miles south of Monfalcone, and with its occupation all the shipyards of the district were in Italian hands. An interesting point to British people in connexion with the fall of Monfalcone was the presence in the town of what might be called a Scottish colony. The Austrian Government some time before the war granted a subvention for Austrian-built ships, and it was on account of this that the shipyards at Monfalcone came into being. Large numbers of engineers and other workmen from the Clyde and Tyne were brought there to assist in the establishment of the

industry, and there was to be seen a street of houses named "Ben Lomond," "Tyneside," "Rothesay Bay," and the like. Of the former occupants of these dwellings there was no information in the war cables at the time of the Italian occupation.

For the next two years the Italian naval forces were destined to be of great service to the armies along the Isonzo front, the flank of which they effectively guarded. In doing so they were subjected to constant attack from Austrian aeroplanes and seaplanes, but the anti-aircraft measures proved sufficient, for no losses of war vessels were reported.

In the great Italian offensive which opened in the Southern Carso in May, 1917, a new feature was the presence of British naval forces. Like the British artillery on land, these forces played a valuable part in assisting the Italians to secure the success achieved. A semi-official statement issued in Rome on May 24 gave the first indication that British warships were present in the Gulf of Trieste during this great combined naval and military attack. The statement was as follows:

At daybreak yesterday, with the object of assisting the offensive which is developing on the Carso, British monitors, with naval forces and Italian aeroplanes, made a prolonged and effective attack with heavy guns in the Gulf of Trieste, on the rear of the enemy's lines, especially the great aerial station depots and other important military objects near Proseco.

The enemy's repeated aerial attacks had no other result than the loss of two of his seaplanes—L136 and L137—which were brought down by our aviators.

Four enemy aviators were rescued by our naval units, in spite of the fire from the enemy's batteries.

All the naval and aerial units which took part in this



SHIPYARDS AT MONFALCONE.

action returned to their bases without having sustained the slightest damage.

No enemy flag was seen at sea with the exception of those on the aeroplanes which we brought down.

It was reported later that the British monitors, protected by Italian destroyers, were shelling with visible effect the railway near Nabresina, half-way between the Italian lines and Trieste; the fortifications at Proseco, a village the high belfry of which formed a conspicuous landmark; and Opicina railway junction. Profiting by the fact that the Austrians evidently did not expect to be attacked from the sea, the monitors approached near enough to the shore to be able to bombard the south-western slopes of Mount Hermada. Italian aircraft were also active in these operations, which constituted as strange and picturesque a spectacle of war as could well be imagined.

The protection of Italian commerce was a matter with which the naval authorities at Rome had before hostilities began taken pre-



THE AUSTRIAN NAVAL DOCKYARD AT MONFALCONE AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.



THE GULF OF TRIESTE.

cautions to deal, and as far as surface action against her shipping went Italy was practically immune from attack. It was another thing when the Austrians and Germans resorted to wholesale murder on the high seas in the form of destruction by submarines and mines. When the U-boat war spread to the Mediterranean in the autumn of 1915 losses of Italian ships

from this cause became unhappily frequent. The most notable disaster about this time was that of the *Ancona*. This fine 9,000-ton liner, bound from Naples via Messina to New York, was fired upon, torpedoed, and sunk about noon on November 7, 1915, off the coast of Sardinia. She had on board 572 people, including a large number of women and children emigrants, and nearly 300 were lost, including 11 American citizens. The captain of the vessel stated on his arrival at Rome that the submarine shelled the boats as they were about to be launched, and also after they were in the water. The destruction of the *Ancona* was the subject of diplomatic correspondence, the United States Government calling upon Austria to denounce the sinking as an illegal and indefensible act, to punish the submarine commander, and to make reparation for the killing and injuring of American citizens. In reply the Austrian Government alleged that the submarine commander thought the ship to be a transport; that she tried to escape, when 16 shells were fired, of which three hit; that it was during her flight at full speed that she dropped several boats filled with people, which at once capsized; and that the commander of the submarine fired a torpedo into the foremost hold because a steamer, believed to be an enemy cruiser, became visible. An indemnity was promised, while responsibility was disclaimed. As regards the unfortunate commander, it was added that "the Austro-Hungarian naval authorities arrived at the conclusion that he apparently neglected to take sufficiently into consideration the panic among the passengers,



TOWING ASHORE A SHIP'S GUNS.



THE TENDER OF AN OBSERVATION BALLOON.

Photographed from the balloon, and showing the winding apparatus for hauling it down.

which rendered disembarkation more difficult, and the spirit of the regulations that Austro-Hungarian naval officers should refuse assistance to no one in distress even if they are enemies. The officer was therefore punished for violating the instructions embodied in the rules in force for such cases”*

On March 7, 1917, shortly after the inauguration of what the Germans called unrestricted submarine war, the Italian Government decided to publish a weekly summary of shipping losses, and of the number of arrivals and departures, in conformity to the practice in France and Great Britain. The first of these tables, issued on March 12, showed that during the week ending at midnight on Thursday, March 8, 493 vessels of various nationalities, of a total gross tonnage of 391,211 tons, entered Italian ports; and 464 vessels, totalling 315,801 tons, left, without counting fishing boats and small coasting vessels. During the week the Italian merchant ships sunk by enemy submarines or mines were four steamers, including three over 1,500 tons and one under this tonnage, and three sailing vessels below 200 tons. One steamer and two sailing vessels escaped the enemy's attacks. The continued publication

of such weekly returns showed with what persistence and frequency the enemy continued to menace the trade. In each of the weeks ending on April 8 and 15 five steamers were sunk, and every week brought its toll. In spite of the risk, however, the volume of trade was well maintained. In the week ending June 17, 1917, for instance, 606 vessels of 443,170 tons arrived at Italian ports, and 531 of 481,755 tons cleared therefrom, a great advance on the figures during March.

In speeches in the Chamber and in interviews granted to the Press, Admiral Corsi, the Minister of Marine, explained as far as was possible what the Italian Navy was doing to cope with the menace. He showed that the various services dealing with the defence of the sea traffic against the submarines had been unified and placed under the direction of an admiral. The functions of the new department included not only the effective arming of merchant ships, but the awarding of prize money to those which might sink or disable an enemy submarine. Numerous coast places had been fortified and a coastguard service had been organised, with barriers and other defensive works. Methods of chasing submarines had been put into force. The Admiral regretted that the depth of the Italian seas did not permit an extensive use of nets for

* For the diplomatic history of the Ancona case see Vol. XI, page 359.



CAPTAIN DI VILLAREY, C.B.,
Naval Attaché to the Italian Embassy in London.

catching submarines, as had been done elsewhere with excellent results. He said, however, that about 200 small vessels had been employed in the Otranto Channel for some months—this was in March, 1917—and that the methods of defence were about to be still further improved by the employment of

numerous aeroplane squadrons and small airships. The demand for armaments for ships was very great, but already more than 1,000 guns were in use, 60 per cent. of the Mercantile Marine being armed. Several hundred wireless installations had also been fitted to the ships.

While they were thus active in combating the wastage of shipping due to the U boats, the Italian authorities also took steps to economise and co-ordinate the use of all their existing tonnage. In February, 1917, a Commission of Control of Maritime Traffic was appointed, and the report of this body upon the first three months of its existence showed that 75 per cent. of the Italian cargo steamers had been requisitioned on behalf of various departments of the Government, and the remaining 25 per cent., which were also under the control of the Commission, had been detailed to furnish supplies for the factories which had been taken over by the Government for the manufacture of munitions, or, in the case of smaller ships, had been employed for the importation of phosphates. Passenger ships had been taken over at reduced freights for the import of grain and other necessaries. Sailing ships of adequate tonnage were also being utilized for the import of coal, and 87 vessels, of a total tonnage of 150,000, had been put on the list by the Commission.

The Italians also benefited by the presence of a large number of German ships in their ports. Incidentally the condition in which certain of these vessels were found led to



THE PORT OF VALONA.

*Italian Naval official photo.*

AN ITALIAN DREADNOUGHT IN ACTION.

revelations of the treacherous methods of the Germans even before the world war had broken out. Thus when, in June, 1915, the Italian authorities at Naples unloaded the German steamer *Bayern*, which took refuge at that port early in August, 1914, she was found to be full of munitions. Hidden in her hold were guns, machine guns, and aeroplane parts. The *Bayern* left Hamburg with this cargo on July 3, 1914, nearly a month before Austria declared war on Serbia. Her papers contained no mention of these articles in her cargo. Early in the war the German Government demanded permission to remove the munitions, without saying a word about the guns and aeroplanes. Although it was not until August 28, 1916, that a state of war between Italy and Germany came about, long before that date the Italian Government had requisitioned the interned German ships. In the House of Commons on February 29, 1916, it was announced that 34 out of the 37 vessels had been taken over. In view of the urgent need for carrying tonnage Italy had already made an agreement with Great Britain, in January, 1916, by which the British Government had placed at her disposal 150 steamers to carry wheat, coal, and provisions, thus reducing the abnormally high rates for freight for the transport of coal, in regard to which Italy in the main depended upon England for supplies.

It must not be assumed that the havoc created among Italian shipping by enemy

mines and submarines was not offset by the destruction of some of the attacking craft. On the contrary, at an early period in the submarine war on the trade more than half the flotilla with which Austria began the conflict had been disposed of by the Allies. At various times the Italians were reported to have sunk the following enemy submarines: U 3, U 4, U 6, U 12, UC 12, and U 16. Survivors were taken prisoners from the U 3 and U 16, while, as already mentioned, the U 12 and UC 12 were salvaged. A small flotilla of enemy submarines, composed of the German boats U 7, U 8, and U 9, left Pola one day for Constantinople. Half-way there the three reported to headquarters at Pola. From that moment nothing more was heard of the trio, and Austria awaited news of them in vain.


Although the Italian Navy was not called upon, like the fleets of the other Allies, to furnish vessels for work in the outer seas, this was no doubt due to the lack of suitable ships which could be spared for such duties, and not to any lack of sympathy with the objects of the Allies in those seas. No Italian warship was mentioned as having been concerned in any way with the expedition to the Dardanelles, but it must be remembered that Italy was not at war with Turkey until six months after the beginning of that undertaking. When Bulgaria came into the war on October 14, 1915, and a blockade of the Bulgarian coast in the Aegean Sea was declared as from 6 a.m. on October 16, the Italian Navy was



SEBENICO.

represented in the Allied Fleet charged with the enforcement of the blockade. On November 11, 1915, the Italian cruiser *Picmonte*, a Tyne-built vessel of 2,600 tons, built in 1888, bombarded Dedeagatch, and on the same occasion successfully avoided a submarine

attack. Just as the Russian cruiser *Askold* had worked with the Allied Fleet off the Dardanelles, so the *Picmonte* represented the Italian Navy and Government in the operations against the Bulgarian forts and troops in Macedonia.



CHAPTER CXC.

THE "HINDENBURG" RETREAT IN THE WEST: JAN.—APRIL, 1917.

SITUATION AT END OF 1916—GERMAN EXPLANATIONS OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME—THE GERMAN SALIENT BETWEEN THE ANCRE AND SCARPE VALLEYS—THE LE TRANSLOY-LOUPART LINE—ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY—IMPORTANT BRITISH RAIDS—BEGINNING OF THE GERMAN RETREAT—"HINDENBURG" STRATEGY—GERMAN ATROCITIES DURING RETREAT—DESTRUCTION AND LOOTING—FRENCH SUCCESSES—GERMAN RETIREMENT TO THE HINDENBURG LINE—CAPTURE OF BAPAUME AND PÉRONNE—EXTENT OF THE ADVANCE AT BEGINNING OF APRIL—EVE OF THE BATTLE OF ARRAS.

ON the whole the results of the year 1916 were distinctly favourable to the Allies, for they captured large numbers of prisoners, and took or destroyed much military material. Even in Rumania the enemy had been brought to a standstill at the very time when a further advance would probably have produced great results. It was not a year of striking successes for the Allies, but the general outcome of the struggle had certainly been to their advantage. On every front the Germanic offensive had been stopped, and they whose whole tradition was to engage their troops in an untiring advance had found themselves everywhere reduced to the defensive.

The main issue of the war was plainly to be sought in the western theatre, where Germany had to deal with the British and French armies. It was scarcely surprising, therefore, to find the German official Press largely employed in explaining that their position at the end of 1916 was really far stronger than it had been before the troops had been driven back. An official *communiqué* of December 24 said: "These four weeks of relative calm" (*i.e.*, from mid-November) "which the exhausted assailants were forced to allow the defenders have once and for all sealed the fate of the Somme
Vol. XII.—Part 153

Battle. . . . All the efforts and sacrifices of the British and French in the past five months have been expended in vain. If they dared once more to attack they would have to begin all over again, the only difference being that the new German lines are now stronger and more impregnable than on July 1, for behind the first system of trenches, built within the zone of the enemy's fire, are over a dozen lines of defence constructed in the strongest fashion." A little further on we shall see what these were and in the course of this chapter we shall see that the Germans were driven out of them.

Late in December the Germans issued a detailed criticism of the Somme Battle from August to November. In it they admitted that some initial successes in gains of ground and material had been obtained by the Allies up to the middle of July, "but the month of August brought the offensive entirely to a standstill." Still at times the logic of the situation was too much even for the through-thick-and-thin official defender of the German situation, and he was obliged to record "the terrible conflagration" in the early days of September, which involved the whole 20 miles from Beaumont north-west of Thiepval to the Somme. "The fighting raged with particular fierceness after an unparalleled artillery preparation" on

the front from Ginchy to the Somme. "With desperate obstinacy the Germans held the entirely shattered front trenches, and were only driven step by step back into the second lines, where they were able to meet the blow"; *anglice*, they were forced to abandon their first line of trenches. It was admitted that Guillemont and Le Forest fell to the Allies and that Clery was taken on September 5. Then there was an interval of "repulses" for British and French.

The Germans, it may here be remarked, have an excellent plan for raising their score of "repulses"; they include trench raids, the troops engaged in which naturally retire after doing the work required of them. On the 10th the British were "generally repulsed"; but

it was not reasonable to expect a break through. Moreover, no solid argument was advanced in favour of the "disillusionment" which we were accused of suffering from. On the contrary, we went on winning further points which they were constrained to admit, though their admissions were interspersed with phrases designed to depreciate the value of our successes. Thus we "take a village, but cannot force a way through." We made a gigantic effort on October 23 "without attaining anything else than greater losses than before." "The unimportant progress made by the enemy here and there, as the result of a vast expenditure of men and munitions, was out of all proportion to his losses." From which it is fairly plain that both British and French



[Official photograph.]

A WORKING PARTY GOING UP TO CONSOLIDATE NEWLY CAPTURED TRENCHES.

still Ginchy fell on the 11th and 12th. And so it goes on. The Germans were really always successful, although they had to yield ground.

Now came the "turning point of the Battle of the Somme, September 25." "While, as a result of a great expenditure of ammunition and sacrifice of human life, it brought the Allies a greater success than they had yet attained" (the writer has now forgotten the successes of July previously admitted) "it showed the reinforced power of resistance of the German troops in the brightest light." Which, being interpreted, means that they were now able to stand up a bit better than they had been doing. "The enemy, who most certainly on the evening of this great day believed that the German front was as good as penetrated, experienced a severe disillusionment in the next few days." There was no evidence whatever to show that the Allies thought anything of the kind. Nor did the German General Headquarters really, for it had drawn attention to the fact that Mr. Lloyd George on August 22 had stated "that

were really beaten, although they failed in their blindness to recognize it. Finally, we learn that "the last week in October brought a well-marked diminution in the enemy's efforts." "Where attempts to attack were perceived, our artillery, as a rule, were able to nip them in the bud. Where they were put into operation they were repulsed with heavy losses." But still it is a remarkable fact that our advance went on, though at a slower pace, due to the advent of winter.

So far as the British were concerned the situation at the beginning of 1917 was a very favourable one. The enemy had been so handled that his line now presented a very pronounced salient between the Ancre and Scarpe valleys. A salient is always a dangerous position. It has very little resistive force, because the lines which form it are plainly liable to enfilade fire, while the salient itself cannot give so much fire as the enemy's lines which encircle it. A comparatively short further advance would give our troops the

complete command of the spur above Beaumont-Hamel, and every step forward would render the German position more and more precarious. We should obtain better means



Official photograph.

A CANADIAN TRENCH IN THE SOMME DISTRICT.

of observation, and our artillery could thereby be so well directed as to render the enemy's trenches and the communications to them very dangerous.

To keep the enemy employed and conceal from him the actual point at which the spring advance would be made, a number of minor enterprises and raids were planned to be carried out along the whole front held by the British Armies. For the advance itself enormous preparations and organizations had to be made to ensure proper means of communication and thereby render certain the accumulation of troops, guns, and munitions needed for so vast an undertaking.

Besides the positions which the Germans held immediately facing the British they had prepared a strong second position on the forward crest of the ridge north of the Ancre Valley. This consisted of a double line of trenches, with heavy wire entanglements in front of them, which ran north-west of Saillisel past Le Transloy to the Albert-Bapaume road, where it turned west by Grévillers and the Loupart Wood and then north-west past Achiet-le-Petit to Bucquoy. This system was known as the Le Transloy-Loupart line. It formed an exceedingly strong and well-situated position, but little inferior to that from which we had already driven the enemy, which had extended from Morval to Thiepval along the ridge between these two points.


Parallel to the Le Transloy-Loupart line, but on the far side of the crest on which this was situated, a third line of defences had been constructed towards the end of 1916 on the line Rocquigny-Bapaume-Ablainzeville. This was what the German writers had doubtless in their minds when they spoke of defences as formidable as those we had already captured. Probably they were right, and it must have astonished leaders and writers alike to find their men turned out of them even more easily than they had been driven from their original position on the Morval-Thiepval ridge.

The year closed quietly, but its end was distinguished from that of 1915, and still more from that of 1914, by one great difference; there was no cessation of hostilities on Christmas Day, nothing like a rapprochement between the opposing forces. Indeed, on our side there were four successful raids, nor did the usual artillery fire stop on our part or on that of our opponents. At a few points there was some recognition of the New Year. Lights were sent up in numbers, but the guns accompanied them with thunder, an appropriate



Official photograph.

CAPTURED GERMAN FRONT LINE NEAR BEAUMONT-HAMEL.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE GERMAN RETREAT TO THE "HINDENBURG LINE."

welcome to the coming year of tragedy. At one place were heard from a German trench the strains of "Auld Lang Syne." The player's memory, probably, took him back to the happier times when he had played in the band at some English watering place, and doubtless the musician devoutly wished himself back there. At some points the Germans on New Year's Day put up boards with "Why not have a peace talk?" chalked on them. The storm of bullets with which these were met showed plainly the British view on the subject.

During the early days of 1917 the situation

both productive of considerable gain, which were carried out with great energy and at small cost.

The enterprise north of Beaumont-Hamel had for its object the capture of two German posts, which dominated a German support trench, running up towards Serre and known to be honeycombed with garrisoned dug-outs. It was completely successful, and 58 prisoners fell into our hands.

The position was rushed at about 5.30 p.m. from two directions simultaneously. Throughout the day our heavy artillery had shelled



WYTSCHAETE.

[Official photograph.]

remained much the same, the bad weather and the long nights preventing any great activity. There was, however, artillery fire of varying intensity, and there were also trench raids, ours being nearly always successful, and those of the Germans being almost uniformly brought to naught. On January 4 three successful sallies from our lines entered the German trenches to the north-east of Arras and at two points near Wytschaete. Up to January 6 we took over 240 prisoners as the result of our little expeditions, or from the repulso of German attacks such as those to the south of Ypres on January 1, and on the east of Vermelles on January 2. Against this the Germans had only about 50 prisoners to show, taken on January 5 during an incursion they made into our trenches south of Loos, from which, moreover, they were speedily driven out. On January 5 two enemy posts north of Beaumont-Hamel were captured, while on the next day, to the south-east of Arras, the German works were penetrated on a front of 2,000 yards to the third line of their trenches. These two operations are worthy of more detailed description as they are typical examples of well-thought-out minor expeditions,

the front of the attack *et* a slow rate. A quarter of an hour before our infantry went over they lifted their range so as to form a barrage behind the German position and to prevent reinforcements from being sent up to it. Then a tempest of fire from trench-mortars and field guns was poured on the German works for a short time before the infantry advanced. The attack was carried out by the two assaulting forces in three separate waves.

The left attack got homo without a hitch, with the loss of one officer and five men slightly wounded, taking 44 prisoners and disposing of three dead and 20 wounded Germans. The right attack, in the course of which 12 prisoners were sent back, met with more opposition, and there was some pretty sharp hand-to-hand fighting, in which the enemy suffered considerably. The prisoners were all of the 5th Bavarian Division.

Notwithstanding the long-sustained bombardment by our "heavies," prisoners admitted that an infantry assault was not anticipated until the whirlwind bombardment began, and this was so fierce that they did not dare to leave their dug-outs. As our men in the left attack swarmed over the German parapet, a



[Official photograph.]

FITTING-UP TELEPHONE WIRES.

sentry, crouching in a funkhole, fired three or four shots, then threw his rifle away and bolted. Our troops had got in without firing a shot or throwing a bomb! Then began the work of clearing the dug-outs, our men challenging the inmates to surrender before using bombs, and meeting usually with a pretty satisfactory response. A considerable number

of revolvers were collected, and in one dug-out a machine-gun section was captured with its weapon, which was of the latest pattern, bearing the date "1916."

The big raid south-east of Arras on January 6 took place over a front of 2,000 yards, extending between Arras and Tilloy; both English and Scottish troops participated in it. It must be remembered that, on this part of the front, the enemy's defences were every bit as formidable as those we had taken on the Somme. The locality in question had always received a good deal of attention from our guns, and at 11.30 on the morning of the 6th we began to bombard the enemy's lines with exceptional severity.

Our airmen cooperated with their usual audacity and skill. The light, which was not very good, made accurate observation difficult. But still they flew in numbers over the German positions. One pilot, to confirm a somewhat uncertain first impression, came down to within a few hundred feet of the German trenches. The observers of our artillery work could see little more than the flashing and glowing of the shells bursting in the haze over the hostile trenches. Nevertheless, the spotting by the airmen for our artillery was wonderfully well done, as the infantry saw from the casualties there when they carried the hostile position. Our men, protected by a smoke barrage, made for the German lines at a few minutes past three. They were quite astounded to find no opposition worth mentioning. Practically it was only on the flanks that there were some slight scuffles and a little bombing.

When our advancing troops reached the German front line they found the wire cut to pieces and the trenches in ruins. But nobody was there—not even a machine gunner. The troops set to work to blow in the dug-outs, noted the dispositions of the works entirely unopposed, and then advanced to the second line. Here it was the same thing over again. There was such an uncanny ease about the job that it was thought the Germans had designed some new dodge and were awaiting the moment to set it working. Having destroyed whatever in the second line was not smashed by our guns, the troops went on to hunt for the Germans in their third line. But even this had been abandoned. The third line, with its wire, was in the same mess as the first, and wherever the ruin was not sufficiently complete it was soon made so. So a very

successful raid was completed, and our men returned with the most trifling casualties to their own lines.

There was no machine-gun fire when our men advanced, and very trifling shell fire struck them on their return. The material injury inflicted on the German trenches was great, but their soldiers suffered little

in the infantry fight; they ran away from it.

A small success was also obtained near Armentières on January 7, and two days later the German trenches near Hulluch were entered. On the same day the Germans made an attempt to regain the posts they had lost near Beaumont-Hamel, but were driven back



NEW YEAR'S DAY, 1917: WITH A SCOTTISH REGIMENT AT THE FRONT.

with loss, and a like fate befell two similar attacks, one on the east of Wytschaete, and the other to the north of Ypres. The next day saw three similar attempts to the south-east of Souchez which were also failures.

The unending raids might seem monotonous and without much justification to those who do not understand their reason. Really they were of great military value. They served several different purposes, the most important being that of securing accurate information as to what the enemy was doing, what he was preparing to do, and, above all, where and when he was going to try to do it. This entailed the capture of prisoners, who were taken to Headquarters and put through a rigid interrogation. Even if the prisoners would not talk, some of the objects of the raid were still accomplished by their capture. The number of the regiment which the prisoner wears on his shoulder strap, even the plate on his helmet gives a great deal of information, tells what units are at the particular spot, and hence can be deduced the brigade, the division and even the Army Corps. This is also supplemented by the personal military cards and papers which every soldier carries.

As Georg Querl, the correspondent of the

Berliner Tageblatt, remarked with reference to the British front :

“The continual patrol fighting, the never-ceasing artillery fire and the constant explosion of mines give the war of positions a very bitter form, which fills the casualty lists, even though there has been no fighting on a great scale. Of late the days have been filled with such bloody episodes. Both sides nibble at the enemy's defences, and thus position warfare has slowly reached its highest intensity.”

An important attack was made by the British on Jan. 11 against the German trench system, east and north-east of Beaumont Hamel. It commenced at dawn, and by 8.30 a.m. 1,500 yards of the German position was in our hands and 200 prisoners had been taken. An attempt to retake the lost ground was completely smashed by our artillery fire.

The result of our efforts was that before the end of January the whole of the high ground north and east of Beaumont Hamel had been taken. We had also pushed across the Beaucourt Valley, 1,000 yards north of the village of that name, and had gained a footing on southern slopes of the spur to the east of it.

First and last we had taken 500 prisoners and our casualties were exceedingly light. This



[Official photograph.]

CLEARING THE GROUND FOR A HOWITZER POSITION.



[Official photograph.]

A BIG GUN USED AGAINST THE GERMAN TRENCHES.

satisfactory circumstance was due to intimate cooperation between the infantry and artillery and especially to the excellent results obtained by our artillery fire. Its accuracy was remarkable, thanks to the observation of our aviators and to the great advantage we possessed from holding the high ground north of Thiepval which gave such a wide field of view. The destruction wrought by our shells on the German trench was annihilating, while the accuracy of our fuses and the excellence of our ammunition permitted the use of barrages which closely covered our infantry advance and forbade penetration by the enemy.

So the struggle went on through January. The British made many small advances and captured points which would be useful as stepping stones for further forward movements, the Germans made many attempts to turn this tide of gain which if slow was sure. We were successful in our endeavours, and had taken during the month 1,228 prisoners; but the Germans failed in theirs and the prisoners they took were well under a hundred.

The following regiments specially distinguished themselves in the capture of these prisoners in minor operations, raids, and patrol actions:—

- 2nd Royal Scots.
- 8th E. Kent Regt.
- 12th Royal Fusiliers.

- 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers.
- 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
- 1st Border Regt.
- 2nd Border Regt.
- 1st S. Staffordshire Regt.
- 10th Loyal N. Lancashire Regt.
- 21st and 22nd Manchester Regt.
- 8th and 10th Gordon Highlanders.
- 2nd Leinster Regt.
- 2nd Monmouthshire Regt.
- 20th, 21st, and 49th Canadian Battalions.
- Newfoundland Battalion.
- 2nd Batt. 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade.

Similarly along the French line of battle the general outcome of the encounters between the opposing forces was unfavourable to the Germans.

The gains round the Beaumont-Hamel spur were extremely useful to us, as they opened up an extensive field of action to our artillery from the dominating position which the guns were thus able to occupy. The Beaucourt valley and the western slope of the spur beyond from opposite Grandcourt to the Serre hill could be swept by their fire. This facilitated clearing the valley south of this point, and made it easier to advance our line to the crest of the hill.

On the night of February 3-4 our infantry captured a length of about 1,300 yards of the original second line of the German defences on



THE ATTACK ON THE HILL ABOVE SULLY-SAILLESEL, FEBRUARY 8, 1917.

the southern slopes of the Serre spur. The attack was stubbornly resisted, and the fortunes of the fight varied. It was continued through the day and following night, and many counter-attacks of the Germans had to be driven back. But by Feb. 5 the whole of the desired objectives had been mastered, and 176 prisoners taken, besides four machine guns. The new British position nearly level with the centre of Grandcourt threatened the defences of Grandcourt and those south of the Ancre. When our patrols advanced on the morning of February 6 they found that the latter between Grandcourt and the Stuff Redoubt had been abandoned. They were therefore occupied by our men. Further explorations showed that Grandcourt, too, had been given up, and it was taken over by 10 a.m. February 7. Later on in the day Baillosecourt Farm, midway between Beaucourt and Miraumont, was carried and 87 prisoners taken.

On February 8 Hill 153, marking the summit of the Sailly-Saillisel ridge, a point which had been long contested by the rival forces, fell into our hands. It was an important gain, as its dominating position rendered it useful for any further advance in this district.

On our Ally's front a similar state of things prevailed: both French and Germans made local attacks, especially the Germans, and numerous encounters took place between patrols. None of these were of any importance and the only point to note with regard to the latter is that many took place in that portion of the strategic front which lay between the Oise and the Argonne, where previously an almost complete state of inaction had existed.

In the Champagne there were numerous trench forays and a considerable artillery activity, but neither side gained any noteworthy advantage.

On the night of February 10-11 the advance up the Beaucourt valley was continued. The British attack was directed against an important series of German trenches to the south of Serre, some 1,500 yards long, the western end of which was already held by us. The infantry attack commenced at 8.30 p.m., following close behind our artillery barrage. The whole of the position aimed at was taken after considerable resistance, with the exception of two redoubts, which held out some days longer. A determined counter-attack from the direction of Pusieux-au-Mont was defeated, as were also

two more during the day, and another on the 12th.

British raids were also made with good results at other points along the line of contact. Thus on the 12th raids and numerous patrol attacks obtained good results against the German trenches to the south-east of Souchez, north of Neuville St. Vaast, north of Loos, and to the east of Ypres, and these were accompanied by considerably increased artillery fire both on the Somme and to the east of Ypres. The French, too, were successful in many local advances at different points of their front of battle. Along the whole Allied line the artillery was becoming livelier.

Gradually the contest increased in intensity. Observations by our airmen and those of the French pointed to fresh concentrations of German forces which were thought to indicate more active steps to stop the steady advances of the Allies; but which were, as after events showed, only the introduction of fresh troops to cover the retreat of those war-worn and weary units which had hitherto borne the brunt of the British attacks. Local encounters became more frequent and more important in character, and were almost always in favour of the British or French. On the British front during February 14-15 the artillery fire became much more vigorous, and was supplemented by many successful infantry attacks which led to the gain of important German posts, while the raiding parties obtained much very useful information.

Thus on the 14th the British captured important works to the south-east of Grandcourt on the left bank of the Ancre, while further north our troops to the north-east of Arras pushed a raid through the German first and second lines. Still more to the north, on Belgian soil north-east of Arras, where the British trenches formed a salient projecting into the German lines, they successfully maltreated the Germans and their fortifications, and took prisoners. On the other hand, the enemy attacks on our trenches were everywhere beaten back. Some minor successes were also obtained by the French in the neighbourhood of Prosnès in the Champagne, near Soissons, and further east in Alsace.

On the 14th and 15th, our gunfire was increased in intensity at many points, especially north of the Somme near Sailly-Saillisel, north-east of Gueudecourt, about Arras and near Ypres, and during the night of the latter date



WINTER ON THE ANCRE: A WOUNDED MAN CRAWLING BACK TO HIS TRENCH.

[Official photograph.]

south-east of Souchez, where more German attacks were beaten off.

The events on the French front were of a similar character—no striking successes, but continual small ones, the fighting turning out distinctly to the advantage of our Allies.

Late on February 15 the Germans made their first determined attack of 1917. It was an attempt to regain a position on the Massiges Ridge between Tahure and Massiges which they had lost in September, 1915. Here the French line formed a salient, and the Germans attacked over a front of a mile and a half. The main attack was made on Maisons de Champagne and Hill 185, and was successful to a depth of about 800 yards. But although the French lost some 900 prisoners their fire inflicted very heavy losses on their opponents. The next day the fighting died down, the Germans not persisting in their infantry attacks, though the artillery duel was continued with considerable vigour by both sides.

February 16 also marked a considerable minor gain by the French in Alsace, at Amertzwiller, where they penetrated a salient in the German lines and almost entirely wrecked the enemy's defences.

The middle of the month past, the situation on the Western front took a more active turn. The largest operation undertaken by the British so far in the New Year was commenced on the 17th. Its object was to gain the high ground at the northern end of the spur which from Courcetto came in a northerly direction. This would give a good range of observation over the upper part of the Ancre valley, where there were many German batteries defending the ground about Serre, and would command the approaches to Miraumont and Pys from the south. A secondary attack was at the same time to be made against a portion of the Sunken Road on the eastern crest of the second spur north of the Ancre, with a view to obtaining command of the approaches to Miraumont from the west. Both attacks were begun at 5.45 a.m. in very unfavourable conditions of darkness and thick mist, while the ground made very heavy going owing to the thaw which had set in. South of the river our troops penetrated over half a mile into the German defences, the left reaching to within about half this distance of Petit Miraumont. The right, being met with more resistance, did not make so much progress. The breadth of front gained was nearly a mile and

a half. On the right bank of the river an important position north of Baillecourt measuring over 1,000 yards was captured, and the attempts made by the Germans to recover it were beaten off with heavy casualties. Nearly 600 prisoners were taken in these operations, with many machine guns and trench mortars, and the German losses in killed and wounded were severe.

The next day, at 11.30, the Germans attacked our gains north of the river in some strength. But their efforts were completely foiled by our artillery and machine-gun fire, and never got near our new line.

The enemy's raids near Lens and Givenchy we repulsed, while ours near Neuve Chapelle and Ploegsteert were very successful, especially at the last-named point, where the German second line trenches were reached and considerable damage done to the surface and subterranean works.

During the night the hostile trenches round Arras and north of Ypres were penetrated with exceedingly good results, while similar attempts by the enemy south of Ypres were all stopped, as were his counter-attacks against the position we had won on the spur above Baillecourt.

The high ground here is but a little lower than that about Thiepval on the south side of the Ancre, and is the same height as that of St. Pierre-Divion. The Ancre valley is nipped in from Albert to Irls by hills some 120 feet on an average above the river. This valley was strongly defended, and hence it was better to capture the higher ground on either bank and thus turn the lower barriers which would have been difficult to force by frontal attack. It was this policy which had dictated the movements of February 17-18.

These operations did not prevent the continuance of the artillery struggle, which was severe in the neighbourhood of Ypres, on the Ancre, and at Bouchavesnes, on the Bapaume-Péronne road.

During February 19 and the subsequent night there was infantry fighting south of Souchez, and the Germans after a very severe bombardment, which caused great destruction to our works, attacked and carried one of our posts at Le Transloy, on the road to Péronne. On the other hand, during the night (19th-20th) the British made successful incursions into the enemy's lines east and south of Ypres, inflicting considerable loss on his troops and on his defensive structures.

As is well known, the German official *communiqués* had long presented the most deliberate travesties of indisputable facts. The following concrete instance of the extent to which this system was carried is worthy of note. Speaking of a raid by New Zealanders, carried out on February 21, they stated :

South of Armentières, after intense artillery preparation, several British companies forced their way into our positions, but were repulsed by a strong counter-offensive. In clearing up the trenches we found 200 of the enemy (British) dead.

The actual facts were as follows :—

The raid was delivered by New Zealand troops upon a front of 600 yards. The German defences were penetrated to a depth of 300 yards. The New Zealand men remained in the German support trenches for more than half



[Official photograph.]

SCENE IN PYES.

an hour and did much destruction. They found, indeed, the German trenches strewn with German corpses as the result of our preliminary bombardment.

Without giving the actual figures of our total casualties in killed, missing, and wounded, which were infinitely below the figure for dead alone named in the German official *communiqué*, it is perfectly certain that, if they really counted 200 dead, seven-eighths of them were German corpses. Moreover, our men brought back 44 prisoners.* Instances like these could be

hostile works south of Armentières penetrated to a considerable depth on a front of about 600 yards, many casualties being inflicted on the enemy. Near Ypres also and south-east of that town the British pushed into the hostile works on a front of over a quarter of a mile. Many Germans were killed, over 100 prisoners taken, bomb-proofs and mining shafts damaged and four machine guns taken. There was also considerable artillery activity at different points along the hostile line.

February 22. An unsuccessful attempt was



NEW ZEALANDERS GOING TO THE TRENCHES. [Official photograph.]

produced without number, but would only be tedious to the reader.

On the 20th, the German trenches near Sailly-Saillisel, La Bassée, Messines and Wytsehaete were subjected to a severe bombardment. Further east, between the Oise and the Aisne, there were lively artillery fire and some successful attacks near St. Mihiel, and also at Wattwiller, in Alsace. In these days there was no severe infantry fighting in the Champagne region, but a considerable artillery combat, especially on the 19th round Verdun, and a brisk attack on the Barenkopf, near Münster, in Alsace.

February 21 was marked by some successful British operations during the early morning, and during the day a length of German trench north-east of Gueudecourt was captured and the

made by the Germans to rush the Belgian lines near Roodeport, not far from Nieuport. Hostile attacks on the east of Vermelles and south of Neuve Chapelle were defeated and the enemy lost many men and some prisoners. The artillery activity continued, especially north of the Somme and south of Ypres, and there was a lively artillery combat on the right bank of the Meuse near Pepper Hill.

February 23. During the night of the 22nd-23rd the British to the north of Gueudecourt captured a hostile trench, some prisoners, and a trench mortar. They also gained ground south of Petit Miraumont, occupying an enemy post. There was also a successful British raid south-east of Souchez, where a number of the enemy were killed and his dug-outs damaged. German attacks east of Soissons and near Bezonvaux were defeated.

* Reuter despatch, published in *The Times* of Feb. 24.

A French advance south-west of the Malancourt Wood and east of Mouilly on the heights of the Meuse secured a few prisoners. In the Vosges a French detachment penetrated the enemy's lines north of Seccones.

It has been seen earlier in this chapter that the Germans boasted loudly of the efficacy of the positions which they had thrown up immediately behind the line captured by the British on the Thiepval-Morval Ridge and on the banks of the Ancre. On February 20 the *North*

given up gave us a dominating position over the country across which we now had to advance.

Observations of our airmen showed on February 24 that the Germans had begun their retreat. The positions at Pys, Miraumont and Serre were found to be abandoned, and were immediately occupied by our troops. They were retiring, in accordance with *their* plan, to an even stronger position from which we, in accordance with *our* plan, were in due course to expel them. The movement was extolled as a prodigy of strategic capa-



RUINS OF THE SUGAR FACTORY AT SERRE.

[Official photograph.]

German Gazette explained that "for five weeks the English have been trying to advance their front on the Ancre. . . . The successes won bear no proportion to the expenditure of strength involved. . . . Even neutrals say that the English tactics of the last few weeks have not had the slightest effect on the situation here, much less on the whole Western Front, and have been in vain." We are justified in saying, therefore, that the Germans considered their position inexpugnable. Yet while they were thus boasting as to their ability to hang on and our inability to go forward, their higher leaders had determined to abandon this wonderful position and had already come to this resolution in December. The contrast between their vapourings and their deeds needs no emphasis. We did not undervalue their decision; the occupation of the high ground thus

bility which could only have been designed and carried out by that military genius Hindenburg. The real reason for the rearward movement was a very simple one. We had thrust the Germans back from the ridge from Thiepval to Morval, and had advanced a considerable distance beyond it. The ground we thus held threatened the rear of the German trenches on the north side of the Ancre; the German leaders therefore thought it prudent to abandon the wonderful line which they had proudly boasted would stop all further attack. They left it because they had to. Their own accounts of the movement state that "during the second half of February the demolished German positions on the Ancre sector were methodically evacuated for strategical reasons." "Moreover, the trenches were so overwhelmed by the British fire that they had become unten-



THE CHÂTEAU OF COUCY BEFORE ITS DESTRUCTION BY THE GERMANS.

able." They add that the withdrawal of the line was carried out unobserved by the British, and without loss! It may here be remarked that it is always good strategy to abandon a position which cannot be held.

It is of course common knowledge that Prussians fled from Saalfeld, from Jena and Auerstedt in 1806 for "strategic reasons." So they did on many occasions under Frederick the Great, from Kolin in 1757, from Kunersdorf in 1759; and later in considerable numbers from Ligny in 1815. The future was likely to show other instances of this essentially German form of high military genius. For once the German feels himself beaten he has the habit of crumpling up.*

It is true that the German retreat had not at first been remarked. For this there was good reason. The hard weather earlier in the year had much facilitated the withdrawal of their heavy guns and a great deal of stores under cover of darkness from the rearward portions of the positions held. Then when the more visible parts of the retreat were begun the misty damp weather hampered our aviators

and prevented them from carrying out observations. But the retreat was by no means ended when it was observed on the 24th, and from that time onwards our troops were in constant contact with the enemy's rearguards and a good deal of smart fighting took place, without, however, stopping the rising tide of British success.

When the retreat commenced the Germans proceeded to loot all they could and ruin all they could not carry off. Bank strong-rooms were broken open, cash and private securities taken as at Péronne and Roye. They were not able to remove all the inhabitants, but they removed all the males who could work, and most of the women, especially the young ones, leaving but a few half-starved wretches to welcome their deliverers. They stole the excellent flour provided by the American Relief Committee for the civilian population, substituting for it (sometimes) their own wretched stuff. They blew up their mining galleries, and ammunition dumps when they were not able to fire away all the ammunition there, they wrecked everything they had time to wreck, whole villages or single houses, farms, and farm implements, trees, orchards, roads were all alike destroyed. Whenever time allowed they carted off valuable furniture and *objets d'art*. If it did not they destroyed or burned them. They vented their rage on ancient monuments like the Château of Coucy. The famous clock tower of Bapaume was

* Although Frederick was successful in the Seven Years' War this was largely due to the incompetency of his opponents. He won many victories but suffered frequent defeats. The celebrated French writer, Guibert, who wrote at the end of the eighteenth century, said of him: "Wherever the King of Prussia could manoeuvre he was successful. Almost always when compelled to fight he was beaten." (*Essai général de tactique*, p. 78.)

destroyed, the church tower of Ircles, the church of Achiet-le-Petit demolished; in short, if any building of note was left it was simply because the German savages had not time to accomplish their felon work. Cemeteries with their monuments were smashed to atoms, even the vaults of the dead were not respected. They were frequently broken open, the coffins burst asunder, and the very corpses torn from them.

The arrangements for the retreat were well considered. It was covered by a series of securely ensconced infantry posts amply endowed with machine-guns. These posts were composed of specially selected troops who were in constant communication with the main bodies of the rearguards covering the retreating columns. They were instructed to hold out to the last moment possible, and could be, and were supported when it was necessary to gain time by a more powerful resistance, by strengthening detachments. Not unfrequently counter-attacks were used to delay our advancing troops, and every device was employed to check the latter. There were mines craftily constructed to go off when trodden on or fired by a trip wire, and bombs placed in positions where they would explode on being touched.

Numerous snipers were left behind, but the end of these was a short shrift when they were caught.

February 24. The enemy on the 24th left many important positions on both banks of the Ancre. The British progressed south and south-east of Miraumont on a front of a mile, and entered Petit Miraumont.

More to the north of the Somme fighting the Germans took a British post west of Lens, but were at once driven out by a counter-attack. There was considerable mutual artillery activity at intervals during the night of the 23rd-24th, and on the 24th on both banks of the Somme, south-west of Arras, and south of Ypres. A British raid was also successful east of Vierstraat (south of Ypres) on a front of 500 yards; 55 prisoners and one machine-gun were captured, and several dug-outs, a mine-shaft, and three machine-guns were destroyed.

February 25. During the twenty-four hours to 9 p.m. the enemy continued to yield ground along the Ancre. Meeting with little opposition, small bodies of British troops pushed forward on a wide front, and by the evening the enemy's first system of defences from the north of Gueudecourt to west of Serre, includ-



[Official photograph.]

OPEN-AIR COOKERY IN A STEEL HELMET: A SCENE NEAR MIRAUMONT.

ing Luisenhof farm, Warlencourt-Eaucourt, Pys, Miraumont, Beauregard Dovecot and Serre were in our possession. Some opposition was offered both with machine-gun and artillery fire, but these being appropriately met achieved no success, and inflicted but little loss on our troops.

During the previous night the British gained a footing in the enemy's positions east of Armentières, but a hostile raiding party which reached the British trenches north-east of Ypres early on the morning of the 25th, under cover of a heavy bombardment, was immediately driven out with loss.

The French made several successful raids during the night of the 24th-25th in the Forest of Apremont (south-east of St. Mihiel) and north of Badonvillers; and on the evening of the 25th into the German line near Ville-sur-Tourbe (Champagne). The French artillery was active in the region of the Mort Homme, on the left bank of the Meuse, but elsewhere was not vigorous.

The German resistance now began to tighten up as they reached the strong secondary line of defence, which ran from a point in the Le Transloy-Loupart line due west of Beaulencourt, passing in front of Ligny-Thilloy and Le Barque to the southern defences of Loupart Wood.

The advance of the two previous days was continued on the 26th on both banks of the Ancre. Our line extended over a front of

about eleven miles from east of Gueudecourt to south of Gommecourt, and to a depth of two miles through the old German front. The British had reached the outskirts of Le Barque, Irles, and Puisieux-au-Mont.

The British raided the German trenches north of Arras and captured some prisoners, and during the night of the 25th-26th, west of Monchy-au-Bois and west of Lens, and here also prisoners were taken. During the day hostile artillery was more active than usual south of the Somme and south of Ypres. The British dealt effectively with the German guns and positions at a number of points. There was also a reawakening of hostilities on the Belgian front, where a considerable bombing engagement took place at Stienstraete and Het Sas both on the 24th and 26th.

The French artillery destroyed German organizations in Belgium in the region of the Dunes, and to the east of the Malancourt Wood (Verdun front). There was also a successful French attack on a German salient north of Tahure.

The next day (Feb. 27) the British made further progress north and south of the Ancre, having captured Le Barque during the previous night. They occupied Ligny, and established themselves in the western and northern defences of Puisieux-au-Mont, driving the Germans into their last stronghold round the church and extending our front close up to Gommecourt.

A very successful raid was made east of



WRECKAGE IN MIRAUMONT-LE-GRAND.

[Official photograph.]

Armentières, on a front of 900 yards. Our troops penetrated to the third line of German defences and did much damage, and damaged severely the enemy's works. Another British raid took place south-west of Lens, where dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements were destroyed. Artillery activity con-



[Official photograph.]

THE CHATEAU OF GOMMECOURT.

tinued on both sides north and south of the Somme.

In the Champagne district and also in the Vosges there were a lively fire of artillery and some successful French raids. The German official *communiqué* for this date runs as follows:

Numerous attacks were made by the British on our front between Ypres and the Somme, but in one only were they successful in reaching our trenches. The enemy who entered our lines east of Arras was repulsed by a counter-attack. In a few sectors only the artillery fire was heavier than usual.

Evening Report: At a few points of the Western front there was lively fighting activity at intervals.

Thus it will be seen the British advance and the German retreat were equally ignored in the information issued to the German people.

The British advance continued, and during the night of the 27th-28th they occupied Gommecourt, pushing forward a thousand yards to the north-east of this village. On the morning of the 28th the British stormed a section of enemy trench north-east of Sailly-Saillisel, and took a machine-gun and 85 prisoners. They also took Tilloy and completed the capture of Puisieux-au-Mont, together with the trench systems adjoining them. British raids in the neighbourhood of Clery reached the enemy's second line, and some prisoners were taken. Gommecourt was one of the points which we failed to hold in the attack of July 1, 1916. It

had been taken by some of the London Battalions, who held on grimly till an overwhelming artillery fire compelled them to fall back.

During the month of February the British had captured 2,133 German prisoners, including 36 officers and many guns and machine-guns. They had gained or had had abandoned to them Ligny, Thillooy, Le Barque, Warlencourt, Pys, Miraumont, Potit Miraumont, Grandcourt, Puisieux-au-Mont, Serre and Gommecourt.

Some time late in February the British had taken over a considerable portion of the line hitherto held by the French, and our position was extended to Roye, making the total length of our front 120 miles.

March 1. The Germans continued their retreat followed by the British. But the ad-



[Official photograph.]

A CAPTURED GERMAN TRENCH IN GOMMECOURT, AND THE RUINS OF THE CHURCH.

vance was limited to a breadth of one-and-a-half miles and to a depth of 600 yards. South of Souchez and also north-east of Givenchy-La Bassée, British raiding parties entered the German trenches and took some prisoners. On the other hand hostile raiding parties during the night of February 28-March 1 entered the British lines near Ablaincourt and

Rancourt and captured a few prisoners, but were soon driven back. There was considerable artillery activity about Ypres.*

During the night (March 1) and the next day there were several small encounters on the French front in the Argonne and the Champagne and some artillery fire, but nothing of special note.

The next day the British further progressed north of the Warlencourt-Eaucourt road and north-west of Puisieux-au-Mont. The German

defeated. There was still a considerable amount of German artillery available against our front line, as was shown by the battering of Saily-Saillisel, and by way of diversion against Armentières and Ypres.

On March 3 the enemy displayed a little more energy in his resistance to the British advance, throwing away quite uselessly in fruitless counter-attacks the lives of many of his men. Thus an attempt against our position north-east of Gueudecourt was stopped by



BOOTY FROM TILLOY.

Official photograph.

rearguards made several counter-attacks against British advanced positions, notably north-east of Gueudecourt and north-west of Ligny-Thilloy, but all were repulsed. The captures on the Ancre in these encounters were 128 prisoners, three machine-guns, and four trench mortars. Nor were our troops idle. Along other parts of our line they raided the German trenches near Angre, Calonne, and north-east of Loos and took some prisoners. A raid made on our trenches during the night 1st-2nd south-east of Roelincourt was easily

artillery barrage and rifle fire. The Germans, however, rushed two British posts north-west of Roye. The British made further progress north of Puisieux-au-Mont and east of Goinme-court, and their line was advanced on a front of nearly five miles for about 400 yards, the relatively small distance being due to the stubborn resistance of the enemy. A bombing attack drove the British out of a trench east of Saily-Saillisel, but an immediate counter-attack soon recovered the ground lost. A somewhat energetic attempt on the British line east of Givenchy-La Bassée was also stopped.

In the morning of March 4 the British attacked and captured the enemy's front and support lines east of Bouchavesnes, four miles north of Péronne, on a front of 1,200 yards, taking 173 prisoners and three machine-guns.

* It will be remembered that our Ypres line formed a salient projecting into the German lines, and it will be easily understood that it was necessary to keep enemy positions there under fire to damage them as much as possible and check any tendency to assault our works. Hence the frequent allusion to artillery activity in this region.

During the day the Germans made several counter-attacks, all unsuccessful. East of Gommecourt the enemy also yielded ground, and the British gained an average depth of 1,200 yards on a two-mile front. The toll of prisoners was 190, with five machine-guns and two trench mortars.

On the French front there were many minor engagements and a considerable artillery struggle at intervals along the whole line, including Alsace.

enemy in the region of the Caurières Wood increased in intensity, and at 4 p.m. a violent attack was made on a front of about two miles between the Chambrettes Farm and Bezonvaux. Between the Caurières Wood and Bezonvaux repeated enemy efforts failed, but north of the wood the enemy gained a foothold in a part of the French front trenches; all his attempts to penetrate into the wood itself were repulsed with heavy losses, and a vigorous French counter-attack the next day thrust him back



SCENE IN CAPTURED TILLOY.

(Official photograph.)

On March 5 hostile forces, probably from the German rearguard, endeavoured to stop our advance by an attack on the position near Bouchavesnes which we had won the day before, but were repulsed, losing some prisoners. East of Gommecourt the British established themselves firmly on the positions captured the previous day. Again round Arras there were successful British raids, and forty-two prisoners and one machine-gun were taken.

During the night of the 4th-5th several successful little French attacks took place north-west of Tracy-le-Val, and in the Avocourt Wood, near Troyon, and some twenty prisoners were taken. On the right bank of the Meuse the bombardment carried out on the 4th by the

from a part of the line he had seized north of the Caurières Wood.

The next day the British continued their advance north-west of Irlès and north of Puisieux-au-Mont. East of Bouchavesnes they raided the enemy's trenches. The enemy then massed his troops for a counter-attack on the trenches captured from him in that section on February 4, but was dispersed by the British artillery fire.

On the French front the fighting continued north of the Caurières Wood, the Germans endeavouring to expel the French from the portions of the trenches they had recaptured on the 5th. But all the German efforts failed under the French fire and counter-strokes. In the region north of Douaumont the artillery



A SUCCESSFUL RAID CULMINATING IN A SURPRISE ATTACK ON A GERMAN MACHINE-GUN POSITION.

struggle continued, and there were small infantry engagements at intervals along the whole line down to Alsace.

Between the Oise and the Aisne French shell fire battered the German defences to the north-west of Moulin-sous-Touvent and north of Autrèche, demolishing many of their dug-outs. On the right bank of the Meuse there were violent artillery actions all along the Cham-

brette-Bezouvaux front. There was also intermittent cannonading and considerable aerial activity on both sides.

During the 24 hours March 6-7 there was no change in the situation. The British artillery silenced hostile batteries which were shelling Ypres, and also bombarded the enemy trenches west of Messines.

Between the Oise and the Aisne the French

carried out a successful raid against the enemy's trenches at Quennevières. In the Argonne, near the Four-de-Paris, they blew up a mine and occupied the crater. There were some unsuccessful German infantry attacks north-east of Flirey, at the Bois Bouchot (north of St. Mihiel) and in the direction of Ammertzwiler. On the Verdun front the French batteries obtained some success on the northern outskirts of the Malancourt Wood. In the Eparges Wood also, the German organizations were effectively bombarded. Lively artillery fighting took place in the sectors of Maisons-de-Champagne and Embermenie.

During the night of the 7th we made a successful foray near Biaches, and the Germans raided our front trenches near Chaulnès and south of Arras. In both of these cases the attacking side took a few prisoners. A little further progress was made by the British up the Ancre Valley.

The French on March 8 won an important success, despite snowstorms which made the movement difficult. They retook the greater part of the salient captured by the enemy on February 15 between the Butte-de-Mesnil and Maisons-de-Champagne. The German position had here a front of 1,650 yards and a depth of from 770 yards. Later in the day the enemy made a counter-attack on the left of this section, but was repulsed with heavy loss after an obstinate struggle. The French took 136 prisoners. On the left bank of the Meuse the French artillery wrecked the German works between Hill 304 and the Avocourt Wood.

North of Wulverghem, on March 9, after a heavy bombardment on the previous evening, the enemy launched five raids against the British trenches and repeated the attack with four parties early on the 9th. In each case only one party effected an entrance; the enemy left some prisoners but captured a few British. South of Biaches the British forced their way into the German front line, damaged dug-outs, and brought back some prisoners and two machine-guns.

The French still progressed in the Champagne, taking more trenches north of the road from the Butte de-Mesnil to Maisons-de-Champagne. The Germans made three determined attacks against the latter point, endeavouring to retake the positions the French had won the day before, but all were defeated with heavy loss. Our Ally captured in the fighting of the 8th and 9th over 170 prisoners. At

various other points, near Crapeau to the south of Roye, in the Verdun region, and north-east of Soissons, there were raids on the German trenches or patrol encounters which yielded some advantage to the French.

March 10.—The village of Irles formed a salient in front of the Lo Transloy-Loupart line, with which it was connected by strong trenches with formidable wire entanglements in front of them. It was necessary to capture this position, which stood out from it like a large ravelin flanking the Le Transloy-Loupart line, before the latter could itself be dealt with. For the new attack it was necessary to bring up heavy guns and much ammunition, which again involved a great deal of preparatory work in the shape of road making. This took time, and a week passed before all was ready. Meanwhile our operations were limited to the establishment of advanced posts which would serve as supporting points for the great attack, and there was, of course, the usual bombardment, which grew in intensity as guns and shells were heaped up on the front. Touch was also kept with the enemy, who still clung on to this part of the field.

When the day of attack arrived, March 10, our troops went forward an hour before sunrise. They were completely successful in their assault, the whole of the enemy works round Irles and the village itself were captured, and an advance made over a front of three miles. Four trench mortars, 15 machine-guns and 289 prisoners were taken. The British losses were less than the number of the enemy captured. It was a well-planned and well-carried-out operation, which had the most complete success.

In the Champagne, during the night of the 9th-10th, there was obstinate fighting on some points of the front between the Butte-de-Mesnil and the Maisons-de-Champagne, the Germans trying to recapture the trenches taken by the French, who finally beat them back and made some further progress. On the right of this section the German attempts were stopped by the French fire. Similarly, on the right bank of the Meuse, the Germans attacked the trenches retaken by the French north of the Caurières wood. They were eventually defeated, although at first they had managed to gain a footing. Later in the day there was heavy artillery fire about St. Hilaire-le-Grand and Maisons-de-Champagne. In the regions of Lassigny, Canny-sur-Metz, and in the Woëvre,



Canadian War Records

CANADIANS MAKING A ROAD OVER CAPTURED GROUND.

north of the Bois de Jury, there were successful French raids.

March 11.—During the night of the 10th–11th, west and north-west of Lens, hostile troops massing for attack were crushed by the British artillery before they could advance. In the area south of Arras, and near Armentières and Ypres, there was considerable artillery activity during the previous night and on the day of the 11th. The Le Transloy-Loupart line of German works was heavily shelled by our artillery. This was so effectively done that the enemy was obliged to abandon his trenches and fall back on his third defence system, which extended from Roequigny by Bapaume to Ablainzeville, parallel to and in rear of the line thus given up. The retreat involved the abandonment of Grévillers and Loupart, which were promptly occupied by our troops, and preparations were at once begun for an attack on the German third line of defence.

At Nouvion there was great artillery activity on both sides. On both banks of the Meuse there was some artillery action, and an attempt of Germans on the French lines near Bezonvaux was defeated. On the right bank of the Meuse, in the region of Bezonvaux, another enemy attempt also came to naught; on the left bank, in the Forges sector, the French carried out a destructive fire against the German organizations, and blew up an ammunition dépôt. On the rest of the front there was an intermittent cannonade, especially lively in the sectors of Maisons-de-Champagne and Navarin.

During the night of March 11–12 the British improved their position near Bouehavesnes. The enemy trenches were entered by British patrols at some other points in this region, and a few prisoners were taken. South of Arras there was a successful British raid. Along the whole British line from Ypres to the South the artillery fire on both sides was most energetic.

The French, in the afternoon, again attacked the German positions to the west of Maisons-de-Champagne; they carried all the enemy trenches on a front of 1,000 yards, captured Hill 185, and entered the works on its northern slope, taking 100 prisoners. By this advance they regained all the ground they had lost in February. A violent counter-attack made by the Germans in the evening was driven back by the French fire. There were also some successful French raids. On both banks of the Meuse, near Avocourt, Douannont, and St. Mihiel, there was considerable artillery activity and the German bombardment paid special attention to Soissons.

The next day the enemy abandoned three and a half miles of his main defensive line along the forward crest of the ridge west of Bapaume. The advancing British troops, following on the enemy's rearguards, drove them back another mile and occupied the village of Grévillers and Loupart Wood. East and north-east of Gommecourt, they also made further progress towards Buequoy and Essarts. In the preceding night a German detachment succeeded in reaching the British trenches south-west of Neuve Chapelle and took a few prisoners. The Germans made another and unsuccessful effort to regain Hill

185 but were unable to turn out the French from the ground they had won. Later in the day the Germans made two violent counter-attacks against the works captured by the French on the left of the line between Mesnil and Maisons-de-Champagne, but failed to penetrate the French trenches. The fight was, however, a severe one, and between Hill 185 and Maisons-de-Champagne the struggle continued throughout the night and resulted in the French capturing some more German trenches.

During the night of the 13th-14th the British raided the enemy's trenches east of Armentières. Next day, north of the Anere valley, the British advanced on a front of over one and a half miles south-west and west of Bapaume. South of Achiet-le-Petit further progress was

served as second lines to stop our troops if they succeeded in penetrating. It was plain that the Germans liked less and less their position in the salient between Arras and Le Transloy, as each further advance of the British threatened more and more to turn their left flank there. It was also evident, as their preparations showed, that they had in mind an eventual evacuation of the greater salient north-west of Rheims between Arras and the valley of the Aisne.

The whole enemy front south of Arras had, therefore, been constantly watched for the first indications of any important rearward movement of the Germans, and on March 14 our patrols found that parts of their trenches in the neighbourhood of St. Pierre-Vaast Wood had



LASSIGNY.

also made on a front of 2,000 yards and south-west of Essarts they took 1,000 yards of the enemy's trenches. In the neighbourhood of Maisons-de Champagne the French continued to make progress notwithstanding the German resistance.

Earlier in the month certain indications had shown the British General Headquarters that the German retreat would be further extended. It was also ascertained that the enemy was preparing another line of defence farther back, which issued from his original defences near Arras and ran back in a south-easterly direction some twelve miles to Quéant and thence west of Cambrai towards St. Quentin. This main line, known as the Hindenburg Line, was supported by several switches, or flat loops, which

been abandoned. Our troops were therefore sent forward, and during the night and the next day took possession of the western edge of the wood, which was completely occupied (except for the north-eastern corner), as well as the western half of the Moislains Wood, and the German front trenches as far as the northern outskirts of Saily-Saillisel. Further information from the front led Field Marshal Haig to believe that the retreat was becoming general south of the Somme, as the enemy's line was no longer held in force, but only by rearguard detachments.

The retreat, which had originally been limited to some 12 miles, was now developing into a wide movement measuring 70 miles as the crow flies from Arras to the north of Soissons. Along the line of trenches abandoned it was

some 120 miles. Haig therefore issued orders for a general advance on March 17 on the whole front from the south of Arras to the Roye Road. As the Germans retreated, British and French trod on their heels.

Little resistance was at first offered by hostile rearguards, and where it took place it was soon overcome. By the evening of the 17th Chaulnes and Bapaume had been captured. The latter town had been completely sacked, private houses and public buildings destroyed, everything of value carried off or burnt. Our front detachments penetrated far into the enemy's positions from Damery to Monchy au Bois. The French, who had accompanied us in the advance, made equally rapid progress.

During the night of the 16th-17th north of the Aure they advanced on a front of more than 12 miles and a depth which at certain points was over two and a half miles. West of Maisons de Champagne they also made substantial progress and captured several portions of trenches. On the 17th, in the last-named sector and in the direction of Auberive, a lively artillery struggle was kept up. On the whole front between Andechy and the Oise the enemy, refusing battle, abandoned the lines which he had been holding for more than two years. The French advanced detachments entered Roye, close after the German rearguard, and found about 800 of the civil inhabitants left behind by the Germans, who had

not time to remove them. North-east of Lassigny the French reached at several points the Roye-Noyon road. In Champagne, in the region of Maisons-de-Champagne, and on the right bank of the Meuse in the Chambrettes and Bois-de-Caurières sectors, there were somewhat violent artillery actions. On the left bank of the Meuse, in the Avocourt region, the French artillery severely bombarded the German lines.

March 18.—During the night of the 17th-18th two enemy raiding parties reached the British trenches east of Vermelles. The British and French cavalry occupied Nesle.* Our men took Péronne and Mont St. Quentin to the north of Péronne. Pressing back the enemy's rearguards, they established themselves along the western bank of the Somme from Péronne as far as Epénancourt to a depth up to 10 miles, on a front of approximately 45 miles from the south of Chaulnes to the neighbourhood of Arras. During this period, in addition to the towns above mentioned, they gained possession of over 60 villages. North of Péronne equally good progress was made, and by the evening our troops entered the German trenches known as the Beugny-Ypres Line, beyond which lay open country as far as the Hindenburg Line. Beaurains, on the left of our advance, was captured after a short resistance.

The bridging of the Somme at Brie, which

* The French cavalry joined the British at Nesle.



CHAULNES.

[Official photograph.]

was commenced on the morning of the 18th, was a most important work for the advance of our troops. It formed a good example of the nature of the obstacles which were met with and of the rapidity with which they were overcome. Six gaps had to be bridged across the canal and river, some of them of considerable width and over a swift flowing stream. The work was carried out night and day and was executed in three stages. By 10 p.m. on the 18th the first stage, footbridges for infantry, was completed. The second stage, medium type bridges for horse transport and cavalry, was finished by 5 a.m. on March 20, and by 2 p.m. on March 28, four and a half days after

across, the river traffic was practically continuous.

The French also made serious progress. The whole of the ground comprised between their



ROYE: LE QUARTIER DE L'AVRE.
Above, a broken bridge at Roye; below, the
Place de l'Hôtel de Ville.

they had been begun, the third stage, heavy bridges capable of taking all forms of traffic, had taken the place of the lighter type. Medium type deviation bridges were constructed as the heavy bridges were commenced, so that, from the time the first bridges were thrown

old lines and the Roye-Noyon road from Damery to the Lagny came into their possession for a length of three and a half miles north-west of Roye, and to eight miles south-east of it. The enemy's rearguards were unable to check the pursuit, which was continued to the north of the Noyon road. Between the Auro and the Aisne, on a front of over 35 miles, the French advance continued during the day. To the north of the Auro their cavalry threw out patrols from Nesle towards the Somme, which engaged the enemy rearguards. To the north-



ORCHARD DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS.

east of Lassigny, up to the evening of the 18th, the French had made an advance of over 12 miles in depth in the direction of Ham. Further to the south their cavalry and supporting detachments, following the valley of the Oise occupied Noyon about 10 a.m. Between the Oise and Soissons the whole of the first German line as well as the villages of Carlepont, Morsain-Nouvron, and Vingre fell into their hands; they also gained a footing on the plateau to the north of Soissons and occupied Crouy.

On the left bank of the Meuse the Germans, after a violent bombardment of the Avocourt-Mort Homme front, launched a powerful attack in the evening against the French positions there; on the greater part of this front the German assault was stopped by artillery and machine-gun fire before reaching the French

lines, but in the direction of Hill 304 and on the edge of the Avocourt Wood parties of the enemy succeeded in penetrating them on a front of about 200 yards. Lively hand-to-hand fighting occurred, ending in the repulso of the enemy from nearly the whole of the position he had taken.

The pursuit of the enemy continued on the 19th, the British cavalry and advanced guards driving back the enemy's covering forces. The ground gained extended to a depth of from two to eight miles, and 40 more villages fell into our hands. By the evening our troops held the line of the Somme from Canizy to Péronne, and our cavalry and infantry patrols had crossed the river at many points. North of Péronne our infantry had reached the line Bussy, Barastre, Velu, St. Leger, Beaurains,



[Official photograph.]

THE FIRST MEN TO CROSS THE SOMME NEAR PERONNE.

The photograph shows the approach to the temporary bridge.

while the cavalry was in contact with the enemy at Nurlu, Bertincourt, Noreuil and Henin-sur-Cojeul.

The next day a considerable force of infantry and cavalry crossed to the east of the Somme. A line of cavalry outposts, with infantry supporting them, was established from Bus, through Nurlu, Hancourt to Germaine, where our right joined the French left. Morchies, to

laid waste, the fruit trees cut down. Numerous villages had been burned to the ground, the roads cut at many points, and all the bridges destroyed. The inhabitants, without shelter and food, were fed by the advancing French troops.

The French also advanced beyond Ham and Chauny and occupied a large number of localities between those two towns. Their



[Official photograph.]

SCENE IN NESLE: BRITISH ENGINEERS BRINGING UP PONTOONS TO BRIDGE THE RIVER.

the north and on the left of our line, was also occupied.

During the night of the 18th-19th the French vanguards kept in touch with the enemy and continued their advance without a stop. East of Nesle they reached the Ham-Nesle railway line at several points. North of Noyon they occupied Guiscard and pushed out patrols along the national road of St. Quentin. East of the Oise they captured the second German position. The number of French townships freed from the invader since the advance began now reached a hundred. Many of these had been treated with the usual bestial German methods, and all had been swept clear by pillage. The country had been

cavalry, operating to the north of Ham, captured a convoy moving towards St. Quentin. To the south of Chauny their detachments reached the line of the Ailette, and Soissons was entirely relieved from enemy pressure.

On the left bank of the Meuse the French recaptured the remaining portions of the trenches which the enemy gained on the 18th.

On the 20th, in spite of bad weather, the British again progressed along the greater part of their front of advance south of Arras, and 14 more villages were cleared of the enemy. South of Arras an attempted enemy counter-attack was driven off by machine-gun fire. This was evidently intended to delay the British at the point which formed the pivot

on which the German left was being wheeled back.

The French made some slight progress and always maintained contact with the enemy. The advance became harder by reason of the destruction of all ways of communication and of the bad weather.

The rapid advance of the British had also made it more and more difficult to maintain the communications at the pitch required for the proper supply of the troops, and this alone rendered it necessary to proceed somewhat more slowly. Moreover, the wide belt of devastated ground north of Péronne afforded great difficulties to the movements of guns and transport. To the south of this point the Germans had destroyed all the bridges over the Somme, and the river thus formed a very considerable obstacle. The Germans as they fell back gained the advantage of intact communications and more concentrated forces. They possessed a new strong line of fortifications from which they might emerge for counter-strokes should opportunity offer. Plainly, therefore, further preparations were necessary before we could advance again with vigour. Especially was it necessary to bring

up the heavy guns to batter the new German works before they could be assaulted, and our line north of the Bapaume-Cambrai road between Noreuil and Neuville-Vitasse was within three miles of the Hindenburg line, which entered the old German front at Tilloyles-Mofflaines.

It was further necessary to construct successive lines of defence as we advanced which would serve to rally our troops if pressed back and stem any German counter-attack. All these points were duly attended to, but they all took time.

To the north of the Somme the French cavalry pushed forward as far as the outskirts of Roupy, about five miles from St. Quentin. To the north-east of Chauny their infantry occupied Tergnier and crossed the St. Quentin canal after lively skirmishes with enemy detachments. Speaking generally, however, the pursuit had been productive of but very slight losses to the pursuers. In the evening the French carried the Château de Savrieunois, east of Ham, and the village of Jussy, in spite of a spirited defence by the garrison. South of Chauny they occupied the general line of the Ailette.



TREES FELLED BY THE GERMANS AT PERONNE IN ORDER TO OBSTRUCT THE ROAD.

[Official photograph



THE BRITISH ENTER BAPAUME.

[Official photograph]

A number of local attacks were made at many points by the Germans ; in particular five separate attacks were delivered on Beaumetz-lez Cambrai, but all failed.

In the following days, every one of which was marked by sharp encounters in which we were invariably successful with small loss, many prisoners and numerous machine-guns and trench mortars were taken and heavy losses inflicted on the enemy.

On the 21st, to the north of Ham, no change took place in the French situation ; their advanced troops remained in contact with the enemy between Roupy and St. Quentin. To the east of Ham the French forced at two points the passage of the Somme Canal in spite of a vigorous resistance by the enemy. These operations enabled the French to clear the north and east banks of the canal and to push back the Germans as far as Clastres and Montescourt. Near La Fère the French advanced to the north of Tergnier. To the north of Soissons they made good progress after several heavy engagements.

The majority of the villages which came into their hands had been utterly destroyed or were in flames when taken. By day the smoke went up from the incendiary fires ; by night the sky was lurid with their reflections. This once fair portion of France was reduced to the condition of a blackened desert. Wells were poisoned at Barleux ; at Noyon 50 girls between 15 and

20 were carried off to be " officers' servants."

The British cavalry had many opportunities during the German retreat of which full advantage was taken. On March 27 our horsemen made a well-executed charge near Villers Fauçon. The Hotchkiss guns were brought into action against the front of the village, while part of the mounted men turned the flank of the defenders by a cutting through which the railway from Roisel runs. Thus attacked in rear, the Germans made no prolonged stand and were driven back with loss of 23 prisoners and four machine-guns besides many killed and wounded.

Equancourt was captured by a single squadron. The front rank in open order with wide intervals charged down at a gallop. The Germans stood till our men were within some four to five hundred yards ; then, not liking the look of the lances, they bolted. Similarly, in the wood east of Longavesnes the Germans held their ground for a time. Here the approaches to the place were ideal for cavalry. Small woods hid our advance, and there was no great field of fire for the enemy's infantry. The men moved through the cover in small bodies which converged upon the village. There was at first some scattered rifle and machine-gun fire, but when the horsemen, disregarding this, moved swiftly down on the Germans they broke and tried to make off, but only did so with loss.

In these encounters our casualties were but few.

At the beginning of April the British troops were established on the line Sélency, Jeancourt, Epéhy, Ruyaulcourt, Doignies, Mercatel, Boaurains. From Beaurains to Doignies, where our new line practically joined our old line, we were close on the Hindenburg line, which was pivoted with its right flank on this point of juncture of the old and now German defences. The other extremity, Sélency, was also close to the left of the Hindenburg line, which, it will be remembered, stretched from near Arras by Quéant past Cambrai to St. Quentin. Between Sélency and Doignies the enemy still occupied positions in front of his main line of defence.

When April opened the British had crossed the high road which ran from Ham through Péronne and Bapaume to Arras, and were marching eastwards on the line St. Quentin-Cambrai-Douai, while the French were pushing forward on St. Quentin north-eastwards up both banks of the Somme canal, in the triangle of Ham-St. Quentin-La Fère. Our Allies had already severed, between St. Quentin and La Fère, one of the two most important of the pre-war railways—viz., the La Fère-St. Quentin-Cambrai-Valenciennes-Mons railroad—by which

the enemy's army on the Aisne largely drew its supplies, men, munitions and food from Germany. From St. Quentin to Cambrai this line bent eastward and, along the chord of the arc which it follows, ran the canal connecting the Somme and Scheldt. West of the canal and crossing it at Marcoing another railroad joined St. Quentin to Cambrai. The British south of Albert-Lo Catelot were east of this line at most places. They were advancing on Cambrai down both sides of the Bapaume-Cambrai Chaussée and were threatening from the south the railway which at Boisieux branches off from the Amiens-Arras line and proceeds through Croisilles to Cambrai.

On Sunday, April 1, the British moving on St. Quentin encountered considerable resistance at Savy. The ruined village was at points protected by several lines of wire entanglement, and garrisoned by 600 men, 50 of whom were killed and as many taken when the position was captured. From Savy parts of St. Quentin itself were visible. The church steeple was intact, but the greater portion of the town had been burned or destroyed by mines.

The next day (April 2) French patrols to the east of Savy in the regions of Dallon and Castres ascertained that the enemy's positions in the



BRIDGE-BUILDING.

[Official photograph.]



[Official photograph.]

WIREMEN ON A "DUCK-WALK" LEADING TO THE FRONT.

outskirts of St. Quentin were strongly held. East of the Oise, our Allies both south and north of the Ailette progressed beyond Vauxaillon and round Landrecourt. The British north-east of Savy expelled the Germans from the wood of that name at the junction of the St. Quentin-Marcoing-Cambrai and St. Quentin-Hain railways and captured six field guns. The German gunners who had been shelling our patrols and the troops marching between Etreillers and Vermand were suddenly fired on by our field artillery, and attacked by infantry from Savy village. They telephoned for assistance and as it did not immediately arrive they abandoned their pieces and fled towards St. Quentin. The Germans were not content to leave the guns in our possession without some effort to recover them. On the night of the 3rd-4th fresh troops were hurried out of St. Quentin for this purpose. But five of the guns had been already withdrawn from the wood by our men. For the sixth a fierce struggle ensued among the trees and shallow trenches. The Germans put up a plucky fight, but were slowly and steadily beaten back into the open fields, and the remaining gun of the German battery was then hauled away in triumph.

Meanwhile the British had made a noticeable

advance north of Savy Wood between the St. Quentin-Marcoing-Cambrai railway and the Somme-Scheldt canal. In the western outskirts of St. Quentin they had carried the villages of Holnon, Séleny and Francilly-Séleny and were within two miles of the city. St. Quentin Wood, Villecholles, Maissemy and Bihrécourt had also been captured and posts established in Templeux-Le Guerard, north-east of Roisel, in Ronssoy Wood, a little to its north, and at Vaucelette Farm, two miles to the east of Heudicourt. Simultaneously the British front was pushed forward towards Cambrai from the region of Doignies, south of the Bapaume-Cambrai road, to that of Croisilles a little to the north of the Boisleux-Cambrai railway, a distance of some 10 miles. There the advance was barred by a chain of fortified villages situated on a cross road from Doignies to Croisilles.

On April 1 a beetroot sugar factory outside Doignies, garrisoned by half a company of Germans, was rushed by a sudden attack, and at 5.30 a.m. the next day, without any preliminary bombardment, our men made for Doignies. Snow lay on the ground, the puddles were frozen and an icy wind was blowing. The British were greeted with machine-gun fire, but when they had almost encircled the



[Australian official photograph.]

BATTERED ROLLING-STOCK LEFT BY THE GERMANS NEAR LE SARS.

village the garrison exploded four mines under the roadways and retreated on Demicourt. Seven counter-attacks from Demicourt were dispersed by our artillery and aerial machine-gun fire. Just north of Doignies on the Bapaume-Cambrai road, Louverval with its chateau, for months the German divisional headquarters, was easily secured, as was Lagnicourt, north-west of it. Round Noreuil and its windmill, defended by, among other troops, details of the Prussian Second Guards Reserve Division, there was some hard fighting. The South Australians lost 60 and took 137 prisoners when capturing the village. From Longatte and Ecoust-St. Mein, the last-named village on the railway, the enemy was swiftly expelled. Croisilles, north of the railroad, and lying in the valley of the Sensée, a tributary of the Scarpe, was approached from Arras by a sunken road; but our field-guns posted between Henin-sur-Cojeul and Boiry-Becquerelle shelled the Germans out of it and the village was stormed. Several violent counter-attacks supported by howitzer fire were delivered for the recovery of Croisilles, but finally the Germans desisted from their efforts and retired towards Fontaine-les-Croisilles.

April 3 was an uneventful day for the British,

but the French after a terrific bombardment attacked the enemy's position on a front of about eight miles, lying north of the line Castres-Essigny-le-Grand-Benay between the Somme canal at Dallon, south-west of St. Quentin and the Oise. The villages of Dallon, Giffécourt, and Cerizy, and Hills 111, 108, and 121, south of Urvillers, were carried and the hold of the enemy on the apex of the triangle Ham-St. Quentin-La Fère was appreciably weakened. East of the Oise and north of the Aisne the French seized the southern and north-western outskirts of Laffaux and Vauxeny. As some set-off to these successes the Germans threw over 2,000 shells into Rheims. That day Cardinal Lueon, Archbishop of Rheims, made this entry in his diary:—

HOLY TUESDAY, April 3.—Intermittent bombardment during the morning; continuous in the afternoon. Between 10 o'clock and midnight a shell wrecks the apse of the Clairmarais Chapel, shatters the statue of the Sacred Heart, crushes the altar, and buries the holy ciborium and 10 consecrated wafers beneath a block of stone. The house of the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, and the Orphanage in the Rue de Bétheny are annihilated by 10 big shells.

The next day (April 4) the French north of the Aisne beat off violent attacks south of Vauveny, and Laffaux was the scene of desperate and continuous fighting. Moy, on the

west bank of the Oise, was captured by our Allies, also Urvillers and Grugies, a village opposite to Dallon and on the east bank of the Somme. North of the farm of La Folie the enemy was dislodged, leaving behind him three 6-inch howitzers and several Aviation Corps lorries. Beyond Dallon the French patrols entered the south-western suburb of St. Quentin itself.

Nor were the British inactive on this day. In the afternoon, amid snow squalls, they advanced from Ronsoy Wood on Ronsoy and Lempire, and stormed the village of Metz-en-Couture, north-west of Epéhy. There was also some fighting in the neighbourhood of Havrincourt Wood. North of Croisilles our line was advanced along both banks of the Sensée and slightly beyond Hénin-sur-Cojeul, to within 1,400 yards from the new enemy trenches connecting the Vimy Heights and the German positions on the outskirts of Arras with Cambrai. The villages of Ronsoy, Basse-Boulogne, Lempire and Metz-en-Couture passed into British hands between April 3 and April 5, which brought up our line a bit more against the centre of the Hindenburg defences. On April 5 we reached the western and south-western

edges of Gouzeaucourt and Havrincourt Woods. Some hundred prisoners, two trench mortars, and five machine-guns had been secured in this region. Further progress was made north-east of Norcuil and a German counter-attack was repulsed.

One feature which marked the fighting from the middle of March onwards was the more open character of the warfare. We had been successful in trench combats, and were more so when the encounters took place under conditions approximating to open fighting. Our cavalry had not only been used to cover the advance, but had also taken part in actual battle. The superiority of all arms over their opponents was proved by the fact that they drove the Germans back, and that they did it with exceptionally light losses. As the British Commander-in-Chief justly said in his dispatch: "The prospect of a more general resumption of open fighting can be regarded with great confidence."

But that was at the beginning of April, 1917, still a distant prospect.

In his dispatch of June 19, 1917, which described the events narrated in this chapter,



[Australian official photograph.]

A "CORDUROY ROAD."



AN AMMUNITION DUMP.

The curved sections of corrugated iron are used for roofing huts and dug-outs.

Sir Douglas Haig recorded his appreciation of the great skill and energy displayed by the army commanders under whose immediate orders the operations were carried out. He added that "the ability with which the troops

in the Ancre area were handled by General Sir Hubert Gough, and those farther south, on our front from Le Transloy to Roye, by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, was in all respects admirable."



A FRENCH SOLDIER'S LETTER FOR HOME.

CHAPTER CXCI.

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF KUT : JANUARY—APRIL, 1916.

THE MESOPOTAMIA OPERATIONS IN 1914 AND 1915—GENERAL TOWNSHEND INVESTED AT KUT—GENERAL AYLMER'S CONCENTRATION AT BASRA—PROBLEM OF THE RELIEF EXPEDITION—THE BATTLE OF SHEIKH SAAD, JANUARY 7, 1916—"WADI" BATTLE, JANUARY 13—MISTAKEN OPTIMISM IN ENGLAND—TURKISH SUCCESS AT UMM EL HANNA, JANUARY 21—FAILURE OF FIRST ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT—THE SCANDAL OF DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN—TERRIBLE SUFFERINGS OF THE BRITISH TROOPS—VINCENT-BINGLEY COMMISSION'S REPORT—MAJOR CARTER'S EVIDENCE—GENERAL AYLMER'S REORGANIZATION—ATTEMPTED TURNING MOVEMENT—THE SECOND FAILURE AND ITS CAUSES—GENERAL CORRINCE TAKES CONTROL—HIS PLANS—FURTHER ATTACKS AND FAILURES—ANALYSIS OF THE APRIL FIGHTING—EFFORTS OF NAVY AND AIR SERVICES—FALL OF KUT—THE MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSION—SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT—SEVERE CENSURE—THE THIRD PHASE

CHAPTER CLVIII., entitled "The Advance Towards Baghdad," gave an account of the military operations at the head of the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia during the years 1914 and 1915. Before going on to describe the second phase of the war in these regions it may be well to review in a few words the story of the first phase, and to show how matters stood when the second began.

In the late autumn of 1914, soon after the Turks entered into the war, a British expedition from India landed in Turkish Arabia and took the port of Basra on the Shatt el Arab, or Arab River. The force consisted of one division under General Barrett. In 1915 this force was increased to an army corps of two divisions, under the command of Sir John Nixon. It then pushed inland up the course of the three rivers Karun, Tigris, and Euphrates, beating the Turks in several engagements, until at the close of the summer of 1915 a great fan-shaped tract of Turkish territory more than 200 miles in depth, and not much less in width, was firmly held by British troops. These troops,

it may be observed, were not all or mainly Europeans, but in large part natives of India. The expedition now seemed to have fulfilled all its objects, which were to protect the British line of oil wells on the Turco-Persian frontier, to win the support of the Arabs, and to strike a blow at the Turkish power in Asia, thus safeguarding Egypt against attack. But, for reasons not at that time fully known, the British authorities then decided to advance from the most northerly point of the fan, Kut el Amara, on the Tigris, and if possible to seize the great city of Baghdad, a hundred miles farther on. General Townshend, who had more than once defeated the Turks, was called upon to make this attempt with a force numbering from 13,000 to 14,000 men. He got as far as Ctesiphon, eighteen miles from Baghdad, and there attacked the Turks in a strong entrenched position, the result being that although he took some trenches and a large number of prisoners he found it impossible to dislodge the enemy, and was eventually obliged to fall back upon Kut with a loss of over 4,500 killed and wounded.

The idea had been that the Turks were demoralized by successive defeats, and would make no serious stand ; but owing to want of river transport the advance had been so long delayed that they had been given time to recover, and to bring up reinforcements. They were therefore able not only to repel Townshend's attack, but to press him severely on his retreat. He reached Kut, bringing off 1,600 prisoners and all his wounded, but the later suffered grievously from insufficient medical arrangements. At Kut he decided to stand his ground and await reinforcements from Basra, where two or three divisions were assembling from overseas. The

regarding the mismanagement of the expedition, especially in the matter of medical arrangements, had aroused a strong feeling of indignation throughout the country ; and there was a general demand for a searching inquiry into the whole matter.

The present chapter deals with the second phase of the military operations, from the beginning of 1916 to the end of April in that year, and with the report of a Royal Commission which was subsequently appointed to investigate the various complaints of mismanagement.

As regards the military operations, it may be



SULIMAN PÂK, NEAR CTESIPHON :

Townshend's nearest point to Baghdad.

Turks, whose numbers had in the meantime been largely increased, now surrounded and besieged him ; also pushing on down the line of the Tigris and taking up a position across the route of any relieving force. Such was the state of affairs at the end of 1915. General Townshend had beaten off all assaults, and seemed able to hold his own in Kut, so that almost the whole of the province which the British had conquered was still in their hands ; but he was believed to have food for a few weeks only, and it was necessary, if the situation was to be completely re-established, that the Turks should be speedily defeated and driven back beyond Kut.

Meanwhile the failure to take Baghdad, and certain reports which had reached England

observed at the outset that the campaign of 1916 was altogether different in scope and character from the campaigns of the preceding years. During the first phase there were, as already shown, widely extended movements on three separate lines of advance, ending in the conquest and occupation of a great Turkish province, and an attempt at a still more important conquest far beyond. During the second phase there were practically no extended movements. On two out of the three lines of British advance—that is to say, in the valleys of the Karun and Euphrates, the right and left lines—there was hardly any fighting. On the centre line only, the line of the Tigris, was the fighting severe ; and even here the area of movement was very small. In fact, though

the losses were heavy on both sides, the whole campaign resolved itself into a series of attempts on the part of the British to drive the Turks out of successive entrenched positions upon the river below Kut. These positions, six in number, were so close together that they



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR F. J. AYLMER, -
K.C.B., V.C.,

Commanded the Relief Force until March, 1916.

practically formed one; the most advanced of them, Sheikh Saad, being at a distance of not more than thirty miles from the besieged town, as the crow flies, though the distance by river was perhaps forty-five miles. Their strength lay in the simple fact that their flanks were covered by swamps, or by country which could be inundated from the river, so that they could not be turned without great difficulty; while the flat alluvial ground on the river banks, intersected by countless irrigation channels, could easily be converted into a maze of deep and sometimes flooded trenches which presented a formidable obstacle against direct attack. The problem which confronted the British commanders in Mesopotamia was, in fact, akin to that which confronted General Buller in Natal sixteen years before. In both cases the British had to force their way through a barrier of no great depth but of great natural strength held by a determined enemy, and to

relieve a British division besieged by superior numbers. In both cases the besieged, after beating off one or two assaults, had to endure rather than fight, their main foes being hunger and sickness. The barrier in the first case was a mass of rugged mountains; in the second case a stretch of shoal water and mud. And the less solid barrier proved to be the stronger of the two.

The campaign began with the new year, 1916. Before General Townshend was completely invested, on December 7, he had sent away his cavalry brigade, which made good its retreat down the river as far as Ali el Gherbi, a point between seventy and eighty miles from Kut by the river route, or about fifty miles in a straight line. There it halted, and was reinforced by some infantry and guns from Basra. The Turks did not attack it; and behind the screen thus formed a consider-



[Elliott & Fry.]

MAJOR-GENERAL H. d'U. KEARY, C.B.,
Commanded the 3rd Division under
General Aylmer.

able body of troops was concentrated as rapidly as possible, under the command of Major-General F. J. Aylmer, for the relief of Kut. This force, the "Tigris Corps," consisted of the 6th Cavalry Brigade, the 3rd Division under Major-General Keary, and the 7th Division, under Major-General Younghusband,

with corps and divisional troops—in all perhaps 25,000 men. But the divisions were not complete. They had come from France, and had been broken up by the voyage. The officer commanding-in-chief in Mesopotamia at this time, Sir John Nixon, was obliged to leave the country soon afterwards on account of ill-health. He was succeeded by Lieut.-General Sir Percy Lake, Chief of the Staff in India, and formerly Inspector-General of the troops in Canada.

General Aylmer's position was one of great difficulty. There was now in the country a force very much larger than that which had originally invaded Mesopotamia, for fresh troops had been sent from India and Egypt, besides the two divisions which had come over from France. But in the first place the number of steamers available for river transport was small, such vessels being necessarily of a peculiar type and not procurable without long delay. They were not sufficient, therefore, for the



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BRITISH OPERATIONS FOR THE RELIEF OF KUT.

General Aylmer was an officer of engineers who had greatly distinguished himself as a young man five-and-twenty years earlier by his share in the storming of the Nilt fort in Northern Kashmir, for which he had received the Victoria Cross. He was then "an ideal R.E., full of resource . . . not only extremely gallant, but an extremely capable, hard-working officer." He had since served with credit in various capacities finally as Adjutant-General in India, and was regarded as a bold and scientific soldier, well fitted for responsible command.

concentration at the front of all the troops which might have been sent, still less for keeping so many men supplied with food and munitions of war. Nor could the troops be marched up by road in large numbers, for transport animals also were hard to get. Further, the force which could be concentrated and kept supplied was a "scratch" force, hastily organised. "Divisions and brigades, the units of which know each other and had served together in France, had therefore been broken up to meet the difficulties of transport on a


long sea voyage. There had been no time on arrival in Mesopotamia to await belated units. In many cases field ambulances had arrived after the combatant units." General Aylmer had to make up fresh formations on the spur of the moment with such units as he had got, regiments which were strangers to each other, under generals whom they did not know. His artillery was weak, especially in heavy guns. His medical establishment was not a third of what it should have been, and there were no hospital steamers, so that his sick and wounded had to depend upon the transport vessels, already insufficient in number, and wholly unfit for hospital work. Naturally he would have preferred to postpone the advance for a time, and get his force properly organized before moving on. But this he could not do, for according to the information then at his command General Townshend was anxious both as to the amount of his food supplies and as to the sufficiency of his ammunition in case of delay. It was indeed doubtful whether the food of the garrison would last beyond the middle of January; and apart from the question of supplies "General Townshend sent message after message urging the necessity for his early relief." A further consideration was that the Turks were believed to have large reinforcements on the way, and it was very desirable to strike before they arrived. For these reasons General Aylmer had to make up his mind to advance early in January, in spite of all

drawbacks, with the force which would then be concentrated. It was not as large a force as he would have liked to have, for the Turks were said to have a larger one; nor was it as thoroughly equipped in any respect as it should have been; but the need seemed urgent, and the danger of further delay too great to face.

On January 4 the advance began, General Aylmer's leading troops under Major-General Younghusband marching forward up both banks of the river towards Sheikh Saad, in front of which the Turks were said to be entrenched. This, the most easterly of the six positions taken up by them, was the most open, its flanks not being so closely protected by marshy ground as those of the positions further back. On January 6 General Younghusband's troops, having covered thirty miles of flat ground west of Ali el Gherbi, came in touch with the enemy, who were, in fact, entrenched astride the Tigris. An attempt was made to turn the Turkish right to the south of the river, but the hostile cavalry, supported by Arabs, were found to be in superior strength on this flank, and the attempt was given up. On the morning of the 7th General Aylmer arrived with the remainder of his force, and a general attack was ordered. It was not an easy one to carry out. The ground over which it had to be made was absolutely flat and devoid of the smallest cover, an expanse of dry caked mud, and the fire both from guns and rifles was very heavy. Nevertheless,



BRIDGE OF BOATS AT SHEIKH SAAD.



THE HOISTING OF THE BRITISH FLAG AT KUT.

Major-General Kemball, who commanded the troops south of the river, succeeded in carrying the enemy's trenches on that side, inflicting great loss and capturing 600 prisoners with two guns. To the north of the river General Younghusband tried to turn the enemy's left, but was checked by counter enveloping movements; and his force, unable to carry the Turkish defences, entrenched in front of them. Throughout the day the fighting was very severe, and the British losses were greater than in any battle yet fought on Asiatic soil, with the possible exception of Ctesiphon. There were 4,262 killed and wounded, of whom 133 were British officers. On the following day little progress was made, the troops being much fatigued by their exertions; but on January 9 the attack was resumed. The Turks then gave way and abandoned their remaining trenches, falling back to a second entrenched position about ten miles distant. They had not been routed, and apparently retired in fair order; but their losses in the three days' fighting were estimated at 4,500 men, and they had been fairly beaten under conditions very unfavourable to the attack.

General Aylmer's force followed them up, but heavy rain now came on, and greatly impeded the pursuit. The alluvial soil on both banks of the river soon became almost impassable for guns and transport—a sea of mud in which men on the march sank at times up to their knees, and wheels stuck fast. The troops had to bivouac night after night “in driving rain on soaked and sodden ground,” and their fatigue and discomfort may be imagined. For two or three days after the fight at Sheikh Saad any further attack was out of the question. Nevertheless the relieving force had now got more than half way to Kut, and within sound of the Kut guns. One more successful attack might bring it up to the walls. In his first advance only four months earlier General Townshend had taken Kut after one fight, upon the ground which now formed the main Turkish position, at Es Sinn. If that position could be stormed as before, Kut would now be relieved and the Turks once more driven away towards Baghdad. The confidence of General Aylmer's troops in their power to do what General Townshend had done with a smaller force was natural enough. But the months which had elapsed since that time had made a vital difference in the situation. Not only had the enemy

received large reinforcements—three or four divisions—but they had been able to complete and strengthen their lines of entrenchment under the supervision of German officers, directed by the well-known Marshal von der Goltz; and, above all, Nature had come to their help, for the comparatively dry ground over which Townshend had marched in September, when the weather was hot and the river low, had become, under the winter rains, “a veritable bog,” with a swift turbid stream 400 yards broad running through it and threatening to flood the whole country.

The immediate position upon which the enemy had fallen back after his defeat at Sheikh Saad was at a point where a small tributary runs into the Tigris from the north. Our people called it the Wadi, though the word wadi means a valley or stream-bed generally. At this time the Wadi was a considerable stream, behind which the Turks had established the left of their line, their right extending to the south of the Tigris. On both banks of the river they were strongly entrenched. Covering their left, to the north, was a swamp connected with the Wadi; and covering their right a stretch of low-lying boggy ground which, if the Tigris rose a little more, they would be able to turn into a sheet of water. The distance from Kut was apparently about 35 miles by river, or 25 in a straight line, but the estimates of distance given in the several accounts of the advance are so different that it is not possible to be exact on this point. Here on January 13 General Aylmer fought his second action. “A pelting rain and strong cold wind” had prevailed almost without intermission since the 9th, and the river was rising fast, which greatly impeded communication between the two banks; but the whole force was gradually concentrated on the northern bank, and on the morning of the 13th the troops advanced to the assault from their bivouacs in the mire. A frontal attack pinned the enemy to their trenches, where they were heavily shelled by the British artillery and by some gunboats on the river, while a portion of the British force worked round their left or northern flank. The advance across ground as flat as a billiard table, and wholly devoid of cover, was slow and costly; but before sunset it had been pressed home, and a part of the trenches had been carried. During the night the Turks abandoned the rest of them, and on the morning of the 14th the whole “Wadi



THE TURKISH SNIPER'S POST AT UMM EL HANNA.

position" was in British hands. The enemy had sustained considerable losses; but had merely been pressed back, retiring in good order, to a fresh line of trenches three or four miles further up the river; and the losses on the British side, 1,601 killed and wounded, were greater than those inflicted on the enemy.

The news of General Aylmer's success caused much satisfaction in England, where the public was becoming anxious about the safety of General Townshend's force in Kut. Unluckily, but naturally enough considering the scanty information then available, the results of the success were exaggerated, and it was believed that General Aylmer had reached Es Sinn itself, only seven miles from Kut. There was much disappointment when it became known that some twenty miles of the river still lay between him and his goal.

The point at which the Turks decided to make their third stand, Umm el Hanna, was situated at the entrance to a defile where the marshes on the north came down towards the river, leaving to be defended only a strip of ground less than three-quarters of a mile across at its widest point. This defile, several miles in depth, could no doubt be turned from the southern bank of the river; but on the southern bank also the Turks had lines of entrenchment, and the country was very unfavourable for a turning movement, as it was not only broken by patches of marsh but liable to inundation. The attack, therefore, demanded careful preparation, and the pursuing troops contented themselves at first with constructing a line of entrenchment about 1,300 yards from the enemy's line, so as to shut him in and limit his power of taking the offensive.

At this juncture, while General Aylmer was getting ready for another assault, the weather, bad enough before, became very much worse. The wind rose at times to something like a hurricane, and the rain was so heavy that the Tigris came down in flood and overflowed its banks on both sides. A bridge thrown across the Wadi, now in spate, was washed away several times, and the work of bridging the Tigris itself, here four hundred yards in width, was made almost impossible. Yet it was practically hopeless to send infantry forward against the trenches at the mouth of the defile unless artillery could be established on the southern bank of the Tigris to support the attack by enfilading fire. General Aylmer had not the weight of guns to destroy the trenches; and, failing that, frontal fire would not punish their defenders sufficiently to crush resistance. Guns and troops therefore had to be got across the river somehow, and as there was no bridge they had to be ferried over in spite of winds and waves. This was done with difficulty, but it was done; and by January 19 all was ready on the right bank for co-operation in the attack. The following day was "devoted to a systematic bombardment" of the Turkish position, and during the night "the infantry pushed forward their advanced line to within 200 yards of the enemy's trenches." "The troops had suffered much hardship from cold and exposure, but were eager to go forward."*

On the morning of January 21 the assault was delivered. At six o'clock, under cover of an intense bombardment from the guns on both sides of the river, the infantry on the northern

* Sir Percy Lake's dispatch of August 12, 1916.

bank "went over," and one column, consisting of the Black Watch, 6th Jats, and 41st Dogras, rushed the first line of enemy trenches. The rest of the attacking troops, though they got within a hundred yards of the line, could get no farther. And unhappily the partial success was short-lived. Supports were sent forward to the column in the trenches, "but losing direction and coming under heavy fire failed to reach them." Then the Turks counter-attacked, and our men, overwhelmed by numbers, were pushed back from the trenches they had captured. After further bombardment a second attack was made at about 1 p.m., and the infantry struggled forward again through the deep mud, a heavy rain squall driving in their faces, and men falling fast under the accurate fire poured upon them. This time there was not even a partial success. In spite of every effort the assault failed, and the attacking troops suffered very severely. They maintained their advanced position until dark, and then slowly withdrew to the main trenches 1,300 yards from the enemy's line. They had done their best, but the enemy had fairly held his ground, and for the British force the result of the day's fighting had been a complete and costly repulse. In one regiment the only officer who came out alive and unwounded was a young subaltern, and the total losses amounted to 2,741, including 78 British officers.

No attempt was made to renew the conflict on the following day. It had rained hard through-

out the night, "and the ground was still a quagmire and the troops exhausted." A six hours' armistice was arranged to bury the dead and remove the wounded to shelter. Happily not many wounded were found, for as far as possible they had been brought in during the withdrawal; but "vehicles and stretcher bearers could scarcely move in the deep mud," and some of those who were too much hurt to walk had remained through the night where they fell. These were now rescued and brought back to camp. After the armistice there was a full consideration of the steps to be taken for another advance. A single check, however costly, was not enough to make the relieving force, or its Commander, give up the hope of saving the beleaguered garrison. But the decision was to wait some days in order to give the troops rest and get reinforcements; and during this interval General Aylmer received news which considerably changed the situation. On January 22 General Townshend reported that by putting his troops on half rations he could hold out for 27 days. On January 25 he further reported that he had discovered in Kut a store of food concealed by the natives, and that by making use of this, and killing his horses and mules, he would be able to hold out for 84 days. So far, therefore, as food supplies were concerned the necessity for driving off the Turks without delay no longer existed; and, though there might still be a risk of General Townshend's



TURKISH PRISONERS GUARDED BY INDIAN TROOPS.

supply of ammunition running short, it became open to question whether, in view of the heavy losses sustained and other conditions, it might not be desirable to put off the further advance and thoroughly reorganize the relieving force before trying once more to break down a resistance which had proved to be so stubborn. The view taken by the military chiefs concerned was that this was the right course, and that for the present the advance should not be resumed.

So ended the first attempt to relieve Kut. It had failed, to the great disappointment of the nation; and one man in every three of



[Elliott & Fry.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR PERCY LAKE,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,

Commanded the British Forces in Mesopotamia,
January to August, 1916.

the relieving force had been killed or wounded; but there was no need for discouragement. The Turks had been driven out of two strong entrenched positions, and though they had succeeded in holding the third, they had not shown themselves superior, or equal, to their assailants. A renewed advance, with a larger and more thoroughly organized force, might fairly be expected to succeed.

Meanwhile in Kut itself the confidence of the garrison was as high as ever. General Townshend and his troops had now been besieged for seven weeks, and they had undergone no small discomfort and hardship. They

had beaten off all attacks, but not without considerable loss; and they were being subjected to daily and nightly bombardments which caused a steady tale of killed and wounded. They had some sick, too, and their medical staff was over-driven. The heavy rains had flooded some of their trenches and shelters. It was cold, and their store of fuel had run short. On January 13 they had been put upon half-rations. And on the 26th General Townshend had told his men that the relieving force had failed to break through. But he had told them also that reinforcements were on the way, and that he confidently expected to be relieved before the middle of February. He had taken the opportunity to explain to them that by their stand at Kut they were "holding up the whole of the Turkish advance;" that their countrymen in England and India were watching them, and that all were proud of the splendid courage they had shown. The troops, proud of themselves and of their leader, received the bad news without being disheartened, and with little doubt that the relieving force, whose guns they could plainly hear, would soon be with them. Meanwhile they could hold on. They were not yet hungry, and except by starvation the Turk could not overcome them. Their general had added to his confident appeal only one word of warning: "But save your ammunition as if it were gold." That they would do, and doing it they could last for months.

It seems desirable at this point to interrupt the narrative of military operations in order to touch upon a connected question, the equipment of the force serving in Mesopotamia, especially in regard to medical arrangements. It has already been said that much indignation had been aroused in England by reports as to the mismanagement of the expedition in this respect; that, in effect, the operations had been hampered by a deficiency in river transport; and that General Aylmer had been forced to advance to the relief of Kut without heavy guns, and with wholly inadequate medical establishment. As the second phase of the war in this quarter of the world was marked by repeated failures, by heavy losses, and by great sufferings on the part of the British troops, it is only just to them to explain in greater detail the disadvantages under which they laboured from the outset.

Mesopotamia is a country where the climate is exceptionally trying for troops in the field



FIELD GUNS IN ACTION AT SHEIKH SAAD.

The heat in summer is very great, rising not uncommonly to 120° in tents, while the winter months are wet and cold, with bitter winds and heavy rains, and occasional frost. The changes of weather and temperature are very rapid. In such conditions it is evident that plentiful food, and every possible comfort in the way of shelter, clothing, and medical care are necessary to health. The country is also for a large part of the year subject to inundation from the Tigris and Euphrates, and is at all times broken up by stretches of swamp. There are practically no roads, and the rivers are the only means of communication, so that for effective military operations ample river transport is indispensable. And as the masters of the country are the Turks, formidable fighting men at all times, doubly formidable when organized and equipped under German supervision, the best of troops must be at a grave disadvantage in attacking them unless also furnished with the most modern equipment of every kind.

Unhappily it soon became only too clear that the British troops in Mesopotamia were badly found in many respects. So long as they were operating at no great distance from their base at Basra, and were not in conflict with large forces of the enemy, the deficiencies in their equipment were not so obvious, or at least had not such serious consequences, as when the operations developed. From the outset there was a want of river steamers for transport above Basra; and it was known that the military medical authorities in India, controlling a service which had been starved like the rest of the Indian Army by a long-standing policy of military retrenchment, had provided for the medical necessities of the expedition on a very low scale; but for the first few months the troops managed to get on without suffering very gravely on these accounts. The winter climate was endurable if not pleasant, the want of sufficient river steamers was met by utilising country boats, and the losses were not heavy enough to bring an intolerable



A GUN IN THE MUD.

strain on the scanty medical establishment. In the second year of the war, when the original force had been doubled without a proportional increase of medical staff or stores; when the heat set in; and the advance up the course of the Tigris and Euphrates began to involve heavy fighting; then it became no longer possible to do with makeshift arrangements, or to avoid recognizing the fact that the force was in various ways unfitted for the work it had to do, and certain to suffer grievously in trying to do it. For moving large bodies of troops and their supplies, the river steamers

several operations were carried out. And, though, in spite of all, the troops in Mesopotamia succeeded in winning victory after victory until in September, 1915, General Townshend beat the Turks in their strong position near Kut and captured the town, the strain then became too great, and the defects in the organization of the force bore their full consequences.

The advance upon Baghdad, the fight at Ctesiphon, and the subsequent retreat to Kut, were described in a previous chapter. There is little room for doubt that if that



CAMEL TRANSPORT.

were wholly insufficient, so that serious delays occurred; there were no heavy guns to batter the strong Turkish entrenchments, which had to be attacked without proper preparation, and at heavy cost; there were practically no aeroplanes; the tents were, for the most part, light single fly tents, which afforded little protection against the fierce sun; the rations of the men were not, to say the least, on a generous scale, and the want of transport at times led to actual shortage; finally the medical establishment was seen to be quite incapable of dealing with the great number of wounded and sick which such conditions were certain to entail.

This statement of the position is, indeed, short of the reality, and touches only upon the main disadvantages under which the

advance had not been delayed for weeks by the lack of transport, the beaten Turks would have been routed, and there would have been no repulse at Ctesiphon; but, however this may be, it is certain that if proper transport had been available the sufferings of the troops after that battle would never have been what they were. It was then that the medical arrangements first really broke down; and the story is a pitiable one. A Commission—known as the Vincent-Bingley Commission—which was sent from India in the spring of 1916 to enquire into the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia, thus describes what occurred:

In the first place, the evidence proves that the casualties were in fact heavily under-estimated, that the medical establishment available on this occasion was inadequate to meet the demands made on it, and that

the arrangements made for collecting the wounded on the battlefield, and accommodating them pending evacuation to the river bank, were far from satisfactory. It was very difficult for wounded men to ascertain where they had to go for medical aid, and when field ambulances and collecting stations were found, the supply of food, tents, blankets, hot water, and any kind of comfort was insufficient. Further, owing to the shortage of medical personnel, many of the patients both in the field ambulances near the battlefield and at the encampments by the river bank, did not receive proper treatment. There was some delay in evacuating the wounded to Laj, where the steamers to convey them to the base were moored, and it was not until the 25th * that the last of the wounded were removed to this spot. In the meantime many suffered from exposure, want of food, and inadequate attention.

In the second place, save for two motor ambulances which were employed with great success, no proper ambulance land transport was provided for the removal of the wounded to the river bank. There were a number of steamers at Laj, some eight or nine miles from the battlefield, two only of which, however, had been in any way prepared for the reception of the sick. Many of the wounded were, it is true, able to walk or ride to the river bank, but for the conveyance of stretcher cases the two motors already mentioned, and ordinary transport carts, alone were available. We have already criticised the use of these carts for ambulance purposes, and we only wish to add that on this occasion it was productive of intense pain and suffering.

Thirdly, the lack of properly equipped hospital steamers proved, as may be well understood, in the circumstances, disastrous. In the absence of any such steamers some attempt was made to equip the *Blosse Lynch* and the *Mosul* for the evacuation of sick and wounded to the base. These two steamers were, however, only made over to the medical officers at the last moment on the journey up, when it was impossible to fit them out properly. They were already partly filled with 500 sick and wounded who, owing to the shortage in river transport, had not been evacuated to the base before the battle, in accordance with normal practice.

* The fight was on the 22nd.



INDIAN FIELD AMBULANCE CART.

The number of wounded at Ctesiphon was 3,852, and the accommodation, such as it was, which these two steamers afforded was insufficient for a fraction of that number. The result was that as soon as they were filled with patients, the remainder of the wounded had to be crowded on to other river steamers which had not been prepared in any way for the reception of sick and wounded, and many of which, indeed, were not fit for passenger traffic according to ordinary standards. The medical and subordinate personnel for these steamers, which was taken from field ambulances, was inadequate for the number of patients. The supply of medical stores and appliances and even of food was in some cases insufficient. The arrangements for cooking the food were defective and the personnel to distribute it was wanting. The arrangements for water supply were unsatisfactory, the latrine accommodation was insufficient, and there were not enough sweepers and bed pans for the necessities of those patients who could not struggle to the latrines. Finally, the wounded were huddled together as close as they could be packed on the decks, without beds or mattresses, and it was almost impossible for the medical officers to attend to them properly. In some cases the vessels had, moreover, been used for the carriage of animals, and it was impossible, in the time available, to



PADDLE STEAMER AND COVERED BARGE FOR SICK AND WOUNDED.

clean and disinfect them. As might be expected, the suffering and discomfort caused by a long journey in such conditions were, despite the untiring efforts of the medical officers and others on board, in many cases great, and we cannot doubt that the recovery of some patients was retarded by the hardships experienced and that the chances of complete recovery in others were prejudiced. The conditions varied on different steamers, as some were better equipped than others and carried fewer patients. On some vessels the proportion of slightly wounded, who were able to assist their less fortunate comrades, was larger than in others, and the discomfort resulting from the lack of attendance was less felt. On one steamer, indeed, the arrangements made were fairly good, and the number of patients was so small that there



MAJOR R. M. CARTER,

Who disclosed the failure of the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia.

was little ground for complaint. It is right also to state that on arrival at Kut, and again at Amara, all possible efforts were made to feed, dress, and tend the patients, and that some of them were either landed *en route* or transhipped to other steamers which were less crowded or better equipped.

Nevertheless, the evidence of the medical officers and of the wounded who formed part of these convoys, and of others who saw from time to time what the condition of affairs was, has satisfied us that on several of these steamers the patients suffered from cold, hunger, thirst, and want of care. Wounds which required dressing and redressing were not attended to, and the condition of many of the patients who travelled by these steamers was, when they reached Basra, deplorable. There the wounds of many were found to be in a septic condition and in urgent need of redressing. In some cases bed sores had developed, more than one patient arrived soaked in faeces and urine, and in a few cases wounds were found to contain maggots.

An Indian medical officer, Major Carter, described in the following words the arrival of one of the river convoys:

I was standing on the bridge in the evening when the

Medjidieh arrived. She had two steel barges, without any protection against the rain, as far as I remember. As this ship, with two barges, came up to us, I saw that she was absolutely packed, and the barges, too, with men. The barges were slipped, and the Medjidieh was brought alongside the Varela. When she was about 300 or 400 yards off it looked as if she was festooned with ropes. The stench when she was close was quite definite, and I found that what I mistook for ropes were dried stalactites of human faeces. The patients were so huddled and crowded together on the ship that they could not perform the offices of nature clear of the edge of the ship, and the whole of the ship's side was covered with stalactites of human faeces. This is what I then saw. A certain number of men were standing and kneeling on the immediate perimeter of the ship. Then we found a mass of men huddled up anyhow—some with blankets and some without. They were lying in a pool of dysentery about 30 feet square. They were covered with dysentery and dejecta generally from head to foot. With regard to the first man I examined, I put my hand into his trousers, and I thought that he had a hæmorrhage. His trousers were full almost to his waist with something warm and slimy. I took my hand out, and thought it was a blood clot. It was dysentery. The man had a fractured thigh, and his thigh was perforated in five or six places. He had apparently been writhing about the deck of the ship. Many cases were almost as bad. There were a certain number of cases of terribly bad bed sores. In my report I describe mercilessly to the Government of India how I found men with their limbs splinted with wood strips from "Johnny Walker" whisky boxes, "Bhoosa" wire, and that sort of thing.

Major Carter also wrote in a report on the subject:

There is but little chance of recovery for men with severe gunshot fractures who lie on the bare decks of boats and barges for 13 days, amid septic discharges, diarrhoea and dysentery, swept at night by a wind that dropped nearly to zero, without any protection against the cold, save their clothes and country blankets, which in the cases of total cripples were sodden with their own discharges and dejecta.

Such were the cruel sufferings inflicted upon the men who fought for England in Mesopotamia. It is true that the difficulties of the situation after the sanguinary repulse at Ctesiphon were exceptional; and that the skill and tenacity with which Townshend effected his retreat in the face of superior numbers, bringing away his prisoners and his wounded, were worthy of the highest praise. No one could have recognized this more fully than the members of the Commission, who "freely admit that the evacuation of the wounded at all was a great achievement, for which the military and medical authorities in the field deserve very great credit." But their tribute to the work of the men in the field only adds weight to their conclusion that the medical arrangements for the force were "lamentably defective."

And worse was to come. When a few weeks later General Aylmer advanced to the relief of Kut, as above described, he was forced by the urgency of the need to go forward with a

body of troops whose equipment, both in medical establishments and in other respects, was even more lamentably defective. The Turks had shown that they were now strong enough in numbers not only to repel the attack of a British division, but to drive it back and besiege it; and at the same time to push forward beyond it a force of 20,000 or 30,000 men, perhaps more, which must be beaten before it could be relieved. This force was known to have strengthened itself by preparing entrenched positions of a formidable character. Yet such was the lack of river transport that although there were over 50,000 British troops in the country besides the besieged garrison, little more than half that number could be sent up to the front, and it was with the greatest difficulty that they could be kept supplied with food. They had no heavy guns to batter the enemy's entrenchments, very few aeroplanes for reconnaissance work, practically no modern appliances for trench fighting such as periscopes, bombs, hand grenades and the like. Finally, no proper medical provision had been made for them, or could be made in time. Even when there had been in Mesopotamia only two divisions from India the medical establishment had been scanty. Part of it was now locked up in Kut; and what remained, supplemented to some extent by the Indian Government, had practically to do for the whole 50,000 men, the troops sent out from France having arrived without their medical kits. As before stated, General Aylmer had

therefore to advance with about one-third of the medical establishment which he ought to have had, if as much, and even that third was



A STREET IN KUT.

a "scratch" gathering of units, short in personnel and badly provided in many important respects.

Naturally, in these circumstances, when the ill-equipped force found itself obliged to assault, one after another, three strong entrenched positions held by a determined enemy approximately its equal in numbers, it sustained very heavy losses, and its medical establishment proved quite incapable of dealing with the great number of wounded thrown upon



SWAMPY GROUND INTERSECTED BY IRRIGATION CANALS MAKES PROGRESS DIFFICULT.

its hands. The result was a second breakdown worse than the first. The Commission whose report has been quoted above found it abundantly proved by the evidence before them "that, generally speaking, the energy, kindness and industry of the executive medical officers who were directly in charge of the wounded were beyond all praise"; and they held that General Aylmer himself was in no way to blame; but their comments upon the whole affair show that much blame attaches to others, and are most painful reading. At Sheikh Saad, where General Aylmer fought his first battle,

the medical staff was entirely unable to cope with the number of patients, and drugs and dressings ran short. On the 7th, when large numbers of wounded began to come in, there was not room for all of them on the Julnar, or in the few tents which had been pitched for their reception. In consequence, the great majority had to lie out all night on the river bank without shelter or sufficient clothing, food, or medical attendance.

On the following day more tents were pitched, but there was a great shortage of medical staff and equipment, and the wounded

appear to have suffered very greatly from want of food, shelter and medical treatment. . . . After the occupation of Sheikh Saad on January 9 about 2,000 of the wounded were moved to a new camp there, the remainder, numbering 1,200, being left in a camp on the left bank of the river at Musandaq in charge of a small medical staff. The condition of the camps at Musandaq and Sheikh Saad have been described to us by various witnesses, and we are constrained to find that the arrangements for the accommodation and treatment of the wounded there were very defective. The medical staff was so small that the wounds of many remained undressed for some days. The camps were in a very

unsanitary condition. The supply of surgical stores and appliances ran short, and there was practically no subordinate staff to see to the welfare of the patients. The suffering and discomfort endured by the unfortunate wounded in these camps were very great.

So it went on. When General Aylmer fought his second battle, on January 13 and 14.

the medical arrangements continued to be equally unsatisfactory. The weather conditions had by this time become very bad. . . . Even at the time when the battle of Wadi was fought the difficulty of moving sick and wounded in the rain and heavy mud was considerable, and the field ambulances attached to the force were still very inadequate. . . . We do not doubt that everything that was possible was done to assist them, but the suffering from want of food, cold, and lack of proper treatment was severe.

Then came the third battle, where General Aylmer's troops were repulsed with a loss of over 2,700 men.

The medical establishment had by this time been slightly reinforced,* but was still much below normal. The action took place about three miles from the Wadi, and shortly after it began there was a heavy downpour of rain. This made the country, which was already difficult to move in, almost impassable. The attack on the enemy's position was unsuccessful, and the casualties were very heavy. The weather was extremely cold, and the whole country was practically a quagmire. In such circumstances the sufferings of the wounded would have been very great even with the best possible organization. They were accentuated by the insufficiency of medical personnel, equipment, and stores, and by the fact that there was also for some time considerable confusion and want of organization. Throughout the day and the following night wounded and many unwounded men struggled back to the camp as best they could—walking, riding or carried on stretchers, or in transport carts. The country was a sea of mud, and

* It appears that two out of the five Field Ambulances of the 3rd Division had now arrived from France.



INDIANS ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT ON BOARD THE "JULNAR."



GUNS ON BOARD BARGES ON THE TIGRIS.

many fell from exhaustion on the way. Those who were in the camp, and unwounded men returning from the battlefield, did their best to assist their wounded comrades to shelter, but we cannot doubt that a large number failed to reach their destination, and died from exposure. Evidence has indeed been given of one case in which not only a wounded man, but the stretcher bearers bringing him in, died from this cause.

And those who did reach the camp found little comfort. The steamers which had accompanied the force were insufficient to receive the large numbers seeking shelter and warmth; and the tents were not only too few but had been pitched "on ground knee-deep in mud." Many of the wounded failed to secure any protection, and the tents were of little use to men wet through and numb with cold. "Nor were those on the steamers in much better case, for many of these vessels were not weatherproof; the men crowded anywhere they could, in gangways, in the stokehold and in the cabins for warmth; but many were, and remained for some days, wet through." Such was the state of things on the battlefield and in the camp. The Commission sums it up in these words:

The small medical staff on the spot, and officers and men not connected with the medical services, did all they could to improve matters, and to feed and assist the wounded. In spite of all these efforts the evidence conclusively shows that the sufferings of the wounded were so grievous that it would be difficult to exaggerate them.


And even when these unfortunate men were sent away down the river to the base at Basra, a journey of about thirteen days, their sufferings were not at an end.

The hardships of the voyage were much increased

during this period by the constant rain and cold that prevailed. As the steamers were not weatherproof, the patients were wet through and numb with cold, and remained in this condition for the whole journey. The steamers were overcrowded, and the defects in the arrangements, to which we have already referred, were more pronounced than on any previous occasion. . . . The conditions were, indeed, in many ways, much worse than after Ctesiphon, and when the steamers arrived at Amara the wounded were in a pitiable state, wet through, dirty, without any dry clothes or covering, benumbed with cold and very hungry. Their wounds had not been properly dressed, and in some instances cases of fracture were not even in splints. Many of the steamers were overcrowded and filthy, not only with mud and remnants of food, but also with faeces and urine. The condition of things, indeed, was so bad that it is difficult to describe it.

No wonder that when some portion of these facts began to be known a feeling of vehement indignation arose in England and India. They have been brought forward here, in the midst of the narrative of military operations, because they are necessary to a clear understanding of the position, and also because the medical breakdown reached its worst point during this period of the campaign, the first attempt to relieve Kut. In the course of later attempts the many deficiencies in the equipment of the Mesopotamia force were still painfully apparent, and led to deplorable consequences; but in the medical arrangements, at all events, there was a rapid and continuous improvement, and the sufferings of the sick and wounded, though great, were never again what they had been.

To return to the military operations. It has been said that after the repulse on



SKETCH MAP SHOWING APPROXIMATELY THE TURKISH POSITIONS ON THE TIGRIS.

January 22, and the discovery that the garrison of Kut had food for eighty-four days, General Aylmer decided to postpone his further advance, and to reorganize his force thoroughly before making another effort to break down the resistance of the Turks. Into this task of reorganization he now threw himself with all possible energy. Whether he ever hoped to do in three weeks all that had to be done, as General Townshend seems to have expected, there is nothing to show. Perhaps at first he did hope it; but if so it was soon clear to him that a longer time would be required, and the whole of the month of February was spent in preparation. There was, indeed, not much to be gained now by cutting short the period of delay. The Turks might, no doubt, bring up further reinforcements, and, of course, every day gained by them would be used in adding to the strength of their defences. But it seemed probable that the British could make better use of the time than they could, and that the result would be to increase the power of attack in greater proportion than the power of resistance. There was only one distinct limit to postponement. The real flood season on the Tigris ordinarily sets in about the middle of March with the melting of the snows in the northern highlands. As soon as the river came down in full flood the Turks would apparently be masters of the situation, for they would then be able to cut the embankments which held the river in its bed,

and to inundate the whole country so thoroughly that an advance might be impossible. Kut must be relieved before March 15 at latest. General Aylmer decided therefore that he would strengthen himself as much as possible up to the end of February, and then attack with every man and gun he had got. This plan was presumably approved by the War Office, which had now taken over from the Indian Government the control of affairs in Mesopotamia; at all events it was carried out. "Reinforcements were pushed up from the base by steamer and route march; reorganization and training were carried on at the front. On the left bank our trenches were again pushed forward towards the Hanna position. Frequent reconnaissances were made by land and air on both banks. During this period no severe fighting took place, though several minor operations were undertaken to gain information and to harass the enemy." The Turks on their side received some reinforcements, as had been expected, and they constructed at least two fresh lines of defences in the defile behind Umm el Hanna, between the great northern marshes and the Tigris. Such was the condition of affairs when the month of February came to an end.

The question for General Aylmer then was how best to strike a decisive blow at the enemy forces lying between him and Kut. If the reader will look at the small sketch plan reproduced on this page, he will see at a glance

what was the position, or series of positions, occupied by these forces. Their main line of defence was a system of entrenchments, fortified at intervals by redoubts, stretching from the northern marshes to the Tigris, and thence curving round south of the Tigris to the Shat el Hai stream, which connected the Tigris and Euphrates. The Turkish right rested on this stream, and on a strong work not far from it called the Dujaila redoubt. This line of entrenchment, known as the Es Sinn position, was only six or seven miles from Kut. It was the position where General Townshend had beaten the Turks in September, 1915, and is marked 6 on the sketch plan. But, as before stated, the Turks had thrown out in advance of this main line of defences at least five other lines, marked successively 5 to 1 on the plan. All these were astride the Tigris, but their main defences were on the northern bank. In General Aylmer's first advance, during the month of January, he had driven the enemy out of two of these lines, marked 1 and 2, but had been repulsed from the third, marked 3, in front of which his troops were now entrenched. And, lest there should be any misapprehension, it may be observed that each of these "lines" consisted not of a single trench, but of a belt of ground honeycombed

with trenches and pits for machine-guns, and backed by a well-served artillery—a belt perhaps more than a mile in depth from front to rear. To carry such a "line" by frontal assault over perfectly flat, bare ground was a formidable task, and meant heavy losses. To carry four or more in succession within a fortnight was a task which might well seem almost hopeless.

In these circumstances General Aylmer came to the conclusion that, great as the difficulties were, he must attempt a turning movement. To the north such a movement was made absolutely impossible by the great stretch of flooded marshes which covered the Turkish left. To the south of the river there was low-lying marsh land, too; but there was not as yet an impassable sheet of water. The decision was that a force should move out to the southward with all the animal transport available, carrying two days' supplies, and should try by a wide flank march to circle round three of the four remaining Turkish lines, unperceived by the enemy, and fall upon the last, the main position of Es Sinn. The exact point selected for assault was the extreme right of the position—that is, the Dujaila redoubt, and the ground between the redoubt and the Shat el Hai. It was hoped that this



REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE TURKS SURROUNDING KUT.

might be surprised and carried by a sudden attack while the attention of the enemy was fixed upon their advanced lines, which would meanwhile be threatened by the British troops to the north of the river. If this plan could be successfully carried out the whole of the Turkish positions would be turned, and made useless at one blow. A British force would be in their rear and in touch with the Kut garrison. Assuming that the force was sufficient in numbers the blow would be decisive.

Of course, the Turks or their German advisers were not wholly blind to the possibility that some attempt to turn their right flanks might

corps, formed into two columns under General Keimball and General Keary, was to make a night march of about fourteen miles, and reach the extreme Turkish right before morning. At daybreak Keimball was to attack the redoubt from the south, Keary's column supporting him by an attack from the east. The object being to effect a surprise, and strike before the enemy could bring up reinforcements, the capture of the redoubt was to be pushed through with the utmost vigour.

This night march by a large body of troops, over unknown ground, was a difficult operation, involving most careful arrangement and



TURKISH TRENCH AT ES SINN.

be made; and unluckily the beginning of March brought with it another downpour of rain, making the ground over which the turning force would have to advance impassable for the transport animals. This caused some delay, which was utilized by the enemy to strengthen their right by constructing trenches between the Dujaila redoubt and the Hai stream, where there had been a gap in the defences. But on March 7 the ground was again dry enough to make an advance possible, and on that day, with barely a week remaining before the Tigris was likely to come down in flood, General Aylmer issued his orders for the attack. These orders were that the greater part of a division under General Younghusband, assisted by naval gunboats, was to hold the enemy to his line of entrenchments north of the river, while the remainder of the

guidance. Yet it was carried out with complete success, unnoticed and unsuspected by the Turks. Starting from their several camps as it grew dark, the troops concerned, horse, foot, and artillery, were brought together at the point selected for assembly, "the Pools of Siloam." Then the Sapper Scouts, guiding themselves by the stars, led the columns forward across the open plain, nearly 20,000 fighting men with ambulances, transport, and all sorts of impedimenta, marching steadily on, hour after hour, the silence broken only by "the howl of a jackal, the cry of fighting geese," the creak of a wheel, or the clink of a stirrup iron. Throughout the long night the strain was intense and unceasing, for at any moment the advance guard might come upon a Turkish picket or patrol; and even if the march remained undiscovered by the enemy,

the slightest error in calculation on the part of the guides might mean that the columns would miss their mark, a patch of sandhills not far from Du'aila. But no mistake was made, and while it was still dark they struck the sandhills. Then they saw the flash of Townshend's guns at Kut, and all doubt was at an end; they had kept their course, and were exactly where they ought to be. "That the surprise of the Turks was complete was shown by the fires in the Arab encampments, between which we passed silently in the false dawn."* A mile or two ahead to north and west lay the Turkish line. There was time to approach within striking distance before light came. Then one rush at dawn, and the trenches would be carried. The way to Kut lay open.

So it seemed to the forward spirits in the relieving force, and they had good grounds for their confidence. But they were not to reach Kut that day. Unhappily, just as victory appeared to be within their grasp, some delay occurred, and though Keary's column was in position for the attack at daybreak, Kemball's was not ready until more than an hour later. Even so, the attack ought to have been successful, for the redoubt was lightly held, and, according to Sir Percy Lake's dispatch of August 12, "prompt and energetic action would probably have forestalled the enemy's reinforcements." But the attack was not delivered for nearly three hours longer, and by that time it was too lato. The enemy, now fully prepared, received the advancing troops with a hot fire from concealed trenches, Turkish reinforcements began to arrive from the north, stubborn fighting ensued, and though towards

* Edmund Candler, in *The Times*.

evening a portion of Keary's troops, including the Manchesters and 59th Rifles, succeeded in gaining a foothold in the redoubt, they were driven out by heavy counter-attacks. The assault had failed. During the night which followed the force remained where it was, but



[Swaine.]

MAJOR-GENERAL G. V. KEMBALL, C.B.,
Commanded a column under General Aylmer.

the troops were too much exhausted for a renewed effort to be made with any prospect of success; and in the morning, finding that the enemy's position was unchanged, and that the water supply was failing, General Aylmer decided upon withdrawal. By the night of March 9 the whole force was back in its old



A KELEK OR FREIGHT RAFT ON THE TIGRIS.
The raft is buoyed by means of inflated skins beneath the floor of logs.



QUAY SIDE AT AMARA.

might have had disastrous results; nor could he rely upon the safety of the short land route from Dujaila to his steamers on the Tigris, for this was flanked throughout by the Turks he had left in his rear when he marched round them. It must also be remembered that although the immediate neighbourhood of Dujaila was for the moment short of water, the flood season was expected in a few days, and then the Turks would be able to inundate the whole country, possibly cutting off his retreat altogether. The flank march had been a bold and risky operation at best, only to be justified by the extreme difficulty of a direct advance.

position to the north of the river. It had not been pressed in its retirement, and all the wounded had been brought back, but there could be no further advance without some delay. The second attempt to relieve Kut had broken down.*

It may seem at first sight strange that having succeeded in reaching a point so close to Kut General Aylmer should have been unable to maintain himself there, and especially that his withdrawal should have been caused, in a measure at least, by want of water in a country where water was the main obstacle to the whole advance. But it must be remembered that his line of communications, upon which his force depended for all its supplies of food, munitions of war, and reinforcements, was the line of the Tigris. He could not have left this line open for long to an attack by the Turks, which

The Commission whose report has been quoted above held that the medical arrangements on this occasion were much more successful than during the operations of January. The loss was heavy, nearly or quite 3,000 men, of whom about 2,440 were wounded. These suffered in the long march back from the battlefield to the camp, owing to the want of motor ambulances or wagons; but the field medical units attached to the 3rd and 7th Divisions had arrived at the front, and the increase of establishment made it possible not only to collect the wounded and treat them properly, but to put a fairly adequate medical staff upon the steamers used for transport to the base. "The arrangements were in many respects far from ideal," but there was much improvement, "and the wounded were received in good condition at Basra."

* It appears that General Kemball did not accept as accurate Sir Percy Lake's description of the night march, or of the attack. He seems to have thought that the time allowed for his column to get into position was insufficient, also that the Turks had been shaken by the attack and might have been attacked again on the 9th with success, and that there was water for the troops.

In Kut the news of the second failure was of course a bitter disappointment. The garrison still confidently expected relief sooner or later,

and their commander did his utmost to keep up their spirits; but the first half of February had gone by, and the whole of February, and now they knew that the floods would soon come, and greatly increase the difficulties of the relieving force. There was as yet no thought of surrender, but hope deferred maketh the heart sick, and they had been more than three months besieged. Moreover, their discomforts and dangers had increased. In February the enemy began to send aeroplanes over the town, and to drop bombs, which were at times destructive, for the garrison was cooped up in a narrow space. The shelling, too, grew heavier by day and by night. The troops suffered from cold, for there were sharp frosts at times, and fuel was nearly exhausted. They had no vegetables, and scurvy had begun to attack

at intervals and dropped bags of letters and newspapers and telegrams; but the ordinary man's share of these was very small, and the bags sometimes fell in the river or in the Turkish trenches, which was maddening.

It has been said above that during the campaign of 1916 there was hardly any fighting in the valleys of the Karun and Euphrates. What little there was took place while General Aylmer was trying to relieve Kut. In order to deter the Arab tribes on the Hai river from joining against him when he advanced in January, the British garrison at Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates moved out a short distance, and remained for a month or so watching the country to the northward. On their return in February their rearguard was treacherously attacked by Arabs from some "friendly"



LOADING STORES ON RIVER BOATS AT AMARA.

them. Their rations were sufficient to keep them alive, but not much more; and when rain came on, the constant digging required to keep the trenches from being flooded was almost beyond their powers, for the slow starvation had greatly weakened them. Their one solace, tobacco, was no longer procurable. It was a bad time for all, and specially bad perhaps for the Indians, who would not eat the meat, horse or mule or camel, which was served out to Europeans, and was offered to everyone. A few of the garrison who had been through the siege of Ladysmith 16 years before declared that this was much worse. Certainly the garrison of Kut got more news from the outside world than the garrison of Ladysmith, for British aeroplanes came over

villages. The attack was beaten off, the West Kents and 30th Mountain Battery behaving very gallantly, but there were two or three hundred casualties. A force marched out the next morning and destroyed the guilty villages—killing about 600 Arabs. This was the only fighting except on the line of the Tigris.

On March 12, after the failure of the second attempt at relief, General Aylmer was succeeded in his command by Major-General Sir George F. Goringe, who had seen much fighting in Mesopotamia. General Goringe immediately began to make ready for another advance, and as fresh troops, including the 13th Division, were now beginning to arrive from Basra, it was decided that this should take place as soon as

possible. Some minor engagements, in fact, took place on the south bank of the river, resulting in the capture of enemy trenches and prisoners. But rain fell again, and on March 15, punctual to a day, the Tigris came down in heavy snow flood, "causing extensive inundations, which compelled our troops to evacuate their advanced positions on that bank." It



CONTROLLING GUN-FIRE BY
TELEPHONE.

was fortunate that the bulk of the force was not at Dujaila. General Goringe now seems to have contemplated the possibility of making, nevertheless, another attempt to reach Kut by the south, starting lower down the river, at Sheikh Saad, and striking across country from that point. But careful investigation showed that this route also would be liable to inundation, and the idea was given up. The only alternative was to revert to the river route, and force the series of Turkish entrenchments on the north bank. This had seemed, even before the flood season, an almost desperate task, but there was nothing else to be done. And it must be carried out without much delay, for General Townshend's 84

days would end soon after the middle of April.

Preparations were at once made for the attack. Every available man was set to work in raising embankments to prevent the whole country being flooded; and in the meantime the 7th Division "continually under heavy fire and hampered by floods," was employed in sapping up to the Turkish trenches at Umm-el-Hanna, No. 3 on the sketch map, from which the British force had been repulsed on January 21. By March 28 the sap heads were 150 yards from the Turkish line.

This line was a strong one. It is described by General Lake as "a maze of deep trenches occupying a frontage of only 1,300 yards between the Tigris and the Suwaikieh marsh, and extending for 2,600 yards from front to rear." There was, in fact, not one line of trench, but a succession of lines, five at least, and perhaps many more. But, acting no doubt on German advice or example, the Turks had occupied the position lightly, with "a few companies and some machine-guns," and had kept the bulk of their force for serious fighting in positions farther back, when the British troops should have been weakened by successive assaults.

The plan of attack was much the same as on January 21. The 3rd Division was to push forward along the south bank of the river and cooperate with the main attack, which was to be delivered by the 13th Division under General Maude, upon the position on the north bank. In pursuance of this plan the 13th Division moved up on April 1 to relieve the 7th in the advanced trenches in readiness for the assault, but heavy rain fell on this and the following day, and some of the troops on the south bank were flooded out of their trenches, while the ground on the north bank became impassable. The assault was therefore postponed. On the evening of the 4th the ground had dried to some extent, and at daybreak on the 5th the assault was delivered. It was completely successful. The 13th Division leapt out of their trenches and rushed the Turkish front line, and by seven o'clock they had carried the whole position. Meanwhile, on the south bank, the 3rd Division pushed forward also, and led by the Manchesters captured the Turkish trenches on that side. It was a good morning's work. Three of the six Turkish positions had now fallen

But much remained to be done. In front of the relieving force there still lay at least three more, the third being the main position at Es Sinn, and time was running short. To add to the urgency of the situation, the river rose considerably during the day of the successful assault, and it seemed certain that a fresh flood was coming down. If it were to prove a heavy one, and raise the level of the river much more, the Turks would be able to open the embankments and inundate not only the country to the south but the ground on the north bank between the position just taken and the next one. An assault would then be impossible for an indefinite time. As this

on the Falshiyah position from 7.15 p.m. to 7.30 p.m., after which the 13th Division assaulted and captured a series of deep trenches in several lines. The position was stubbornly held by about three battalions of Turks, but by 9.30 p.m. it was completely in our hands and consolidated.

The 38th Infantry Brigade, and the Warwicks and Worcesters of the 39th Infantry Brigade, did particularly well in this assault. High praise is due to Major-General Maude, his Brigade Commanders, and all under their command for this successful night attack. The Division suffered some 1,300 casualties during this day.

Thus the fourth Turkish position had fallen, and the relieving force was now less than 20 miles from Kut by river, probably about 14 miles in a straight line. But it will have been observed that both the third and fourth positions were held by a small body of



SHEIKH SAAD.

next position was close in front of the British force, only three miles up the river, and the losses, though considerable, had not been such as to cause serious embarrassment, General Gorringe decided that he would call upon his troops for another effort the same night. He hoped to carry not only the fourth Turkish position, "Fellahieh," three miles distant, but also the fifth, "Sanna-i-yat," three miles farther back again. If attacked so soon, and by night suddenly, the Turks might be taken by surprise and rushed.

Sir Percy Lake's dispatch of August 12, 1916, gives so clear and concise an account of what ensued that it will be closely followed here. To quote his words:

After nightfall a heavy bombardment was directed

men—"a few companies" in one case, "about three battalions" in the other. It would appear from General Lake's dispatch that when General Aylmer advanced in January the first and second positions, at Sheikh Saad and the Wadi, which he captured, were much more strongly held, for the dispatch speaks of his having twice defeated "a brave enemy at least equal to himself in numbers"; and it would also appear that the third position, Unn-el-Hanna, where his troops were repulsed, was then held not by a few companies, but "by an enemy approximately their equal in numbers." General Aylmer commanded a corps of two divisions, and the dispatch therefore seems to show not only that the capture by him of the first and second positions

was a more difficult feat than the subsequent capture by his successor of the third and fourth, but that his repulse at the third was far from discreditable to him and his force. In justice to a gallant commander and his troops, whose failure to relieve Kut was severely criticized, it seems only right to point out these facts.

To return to the April advance. At 9.30 p.m. on the night of the 5th, as shown above, the fourth Turkish position, Fellahieh, was in British hands, and the fifth Turkish position, Sanna-i-yat, lay three miles ahead. The 13th Division, which had borne the brunt of the fighting during the day, and had lost 1,300 men, was now given a rest, and the 7th Division, which had till then been in support, passed through the 13th and moved forward about a mile, with orders to attack the Turkish entrenchments at dawn. The northern part of the entrenchments was the point selected for assault, and the line of direction during the night march was to be maintained by moving with the left flank along a communication trench which ran from the fourth Turkish position, now in British hands, to the fifth, now to be attacked. This seemed a sure guide. But when the 7th Division, after a short night's halt, moved on again to get close to the Turkish position in readiness for the assault, they found that the ground over which they had to march was cut by numerous and

deep cross trenches, and these greatly impeded the advance. It had been impossible to reconnoitre this ground during daylight, as the Turks were then in possession of it, and the existence of the cross trenches, an evidence of the care and labour with which the Turks had strengthened their positions, had not been detected. But they were there—a serious obstacle in the darkness—and the advance of the troops was very slow. The result was that instead of covering while it was still dark the two miles in front of them, they hardly covered a third of the distance, and when day broke they were still 2,300 yards from the enemy's entrenchments. All chance of a surprise and rush were therefore at an end, and if the assault was to be delivered it must be delivered in broad daylight after advancing for more than a mile under fire, and over ground which was described as perfectly flat, without any vestige of cover. Presumably the cross trenches had been left behind. "In these circumstances," writes General Lake, "it would have been wiser to have postponed the attack at the last moment," and it can hardly be doubted that he was right. An advance to the assault under such conditions was practically hopeless, and must involve terrible loss. But such was not the view of the men on the spot. Kut must be saved, and it was not for them to count the cost. "The advance,"



SANNA-I-YAT



SUPPLY BOATS ON THE TIGRIS.

General Lako continues, "was continued with the greatest gallantry under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, to within 700 yards of the Turkish trenches. Here the attacking lines were checked, and eventually fell back on to the supporting third line, where they dug themselves in at about 1,000 yards from the enemy." The assault had failed, and many hundreds of brave men lay dead or grievously wounded before the entrenchments they had striven in vain to reach.

It was a severe check to the relieving force, and a deep disappointment, for the rapid fall of the third and fourth Turkish positions had greatly encouraged the troops, and given some ground for belief that the Turks were losing heart. That belief could no longer be entertained, for on April 6 the enemy had shown no sign of wavering, and in any case their eventual success would have wiped out the effect of their previous defeats. They would no doubt resist stubbornly when again attacked. The chance, if it had ever existed, of keeping them on the run by a succession of swift blows was now gone. Still, Kut must be saved, and the only question was how the next attack should be delivered. It was decided that a fresh attempt must be made to storm the entrenchment, after full preparation; and that the 13th Division, which had recovered from the fatigue entailed by its two successful assaults on April 5, should try again. In

the meantime the task, hard enough in any case, was being made harder by the inclement weather. While the last attack was being carried out the river had been steadily rising, until at noon on April 6 it reached the highest level of the year. This caused extensive inundations, perhaps increased by the action of the Turks, who had it in their power to open the embankments. And to help the enemy further the wind now changed to the north, blowing the water of the marshes southwards across the right of the 7th Division, who were then still in front, and tending to narrow still more the "defile" which had to be forced. It was not easy to prevent the whole ground being flooded and all possibility of an advance put off indefinitely. General Lake writes: "Protective bunds (embankments) along both the Tigris and the edge of the marsh had then to be constructed under the enemy's fire. Our guns were surrounded by floods, and for some time the position was distinctly critical.

"The marsh continued to encroach so much upon the ground occupied by the 7th Division that all efforts had to be devoted to securing from the floods the positions already gained. On the right (south) bank the inundations rendered communication most difficult, and threatened to isolate the 3rd Division altogether."

Thus, before attacking the Turks behind their strong entrenchments, the British force



ARAB COOLIES PILING BRITISH OFFICERS' TENTS.

had to fight hard with the flood in order to keep open a road by which to approach them. For three days this fight went on, and then on the evening of the third day the ground seemed secure enough from inundation to warrant an advance. What followed may best be told in the words of General Lake:

During the night of April 8-9 the 13th Division took the place of the 7th Division in the trenches, and at 4.20 a.m. advanced to the assault on Sanna-i-yat. When within 300 yards of the enemy's front line they were discovered by the Turks, who sent up V&ery lights and flares and opened a heavy rifle and gun fire. The first line, including detachments of the 6th K.O. Royal Lancaster Regiment, 8th Welsh Fusiliers, 6th L. North Lancashire Regiment, and 5th Wiltshire Regiment, penetrated the centre of the enemy's front line trench. In the glare of the lights the 2nd line lost direction, wavered, and fell back on the 3rd and 4th lines. Support thus failed to reach the front line at the critical moment, in spite of the most gallant and energetic attempts of officers concerned to remedy matters.

Our troops, who had reached the enemy's trenches, were heavily counter-attacked by superior numbers and driven back to from 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's line, where brigades dug themselves in.

The second assault upon the Sanna-i-yat position had failed like the first, and the Turks had inflicted upon the relieving force a very bloody repulse. Their fifth position still remained intact, and 14 miles behind it by river was the sixth and main position. It was believed that the Turks had also constructed during the last few weeks a fresh position between the two. They certainly had

one on the south bank of the river, at a place called Beit Aiessa, 10 miles farther up, where were situated the "bunds," controlling the inundations. And only nine days remained of General Townshend's 84. His garrison was already known to be on very short rations, seven ounces of indifferent meal, and some horseflesh which the Indian troops would not eat, though their religious leaders had authorized them to do so. He now reduced the meal to five ounces, so that the period might be prolonged by a few days; but this was all he could do. Every pound of grain in Kut had been ground, and the wheels of the flour mill were silent. Before the end of the month the little store of meal would be exhausted, and his troops must surrender or starve. Unless the relieving force could break through very soon the fall of Kut was certain.

It may perhaps be asked here why the garrison could not do something more to help themselves—why they could not attempt to break out and join the relieving force, or at least join in a combined attack upon the Turks from front and rear. The answer is that such action had been considered, and that when the relieving force got near enough to make a combined attack possible it was evidently Townshend's intention to do all he could. More than once, when the sound of British guns

seemed to be coming nearer, the garrison had stood to arms, ready for action. But Kut was surrounded by superior numbers of the enemy, strongly entrenched, and any premature attempt to break out while the relieving force was still 20 miles away down the river could hardly end in anything but a murderous repulse, followed by the fall of the town. Even if the garrison were to succeed, against all probability, in breaking through the circle of entrenchments drawn round them they would have to fight their way down for 20 miles against overwhelming odds, without transport and probably without sufficient ammunition, leaving their sick and wounded and stores of all kinds in the hands of the enemy. It would mean in any case the loss of Kut, and almost to a certainty the destruction of the garrison. Unquestionably the best chance of saving both was to keep the flag flying in Kut, and give the relieving force time to get within reach. When they were ready to attack the last Turkish position, six or seven miles away, the garrison could help to some extent, at all events by keeping the besieging troops engaged, and possibly by doing something more. Till then, "fighting out" seemed clearly inadvisable. General

Townshend had to face the same problem as General White had been called upon to face in Ladysmith 16 years before. Both came to the same conclusion with regard to it, and both were almost certainly right.

No doubt the decision in General Townshend's case was known to and approved by the general in command of the relieving force, Gorringe, and by the commander-in-chief in Mesopotamia, Sir Percy Lake, who had come up to the front, and was in close touch with him. They had now to consider what was to be done from the outside—whether to persist in the attempt to force the Turkish position at Sanna-i-yat, or to try some alternative plan. After meeting and discussing the situation in detail they decided that, in spite of General Gorringe's former conclusion in favour of the river route, they would now follow the example set by General Aylmer a month before, and leaving one division to contain the enemy in position on the north bank of the river, try with the other two to get round by the south bank, and fall upon the right of the enemy's main position. This decision was based upon the conviction that to assault the northern position again with a prospect of success it would be necessary to resort to a systematic



A CAPTURED TURKISH 18-POUNDER KRUPP GUN.

approach by sapping, which would involve delay; while if Kut was to be relieved, the time at their disposal was very short. A part of the country over which the two divisions would have to operate was now inundated, which was a great drawback; but even so it seemed possible that the plan might result in a more rapid and complete success than they could hope to gain on the river.

Accordingly the 7th Division now again took over the trenches in front of the Turkish position at Sanna-i-yat, with orders to sap up towards it in preparation for a possible assault later on, but not to attack. The 13th Division was held back in reserve. The 3rd Division, under General Keary, was ordered to move forward to the south of the river and establish communications across the flooded area. The scheme differed from that adopted by General Aylmer in so far that the exact point aimed at was not the Dujaila redoubt, but another redoubt a little to the north on the same line, known as the Sinn Aftar. And this was not to be surprised by a night march from the British position on the northern bank of the river, but to be approached by the previous capture of the Turkish advanced entrenchments at Beit Aiessa. It was necessary to take these first because, as previously explained, they secured to the Turks the control of the river "bunds," and in the existing state of the river it would be dangerous in the

extreme to march a force by the south on Sinn Aftar, for the Turks could then, by opening the bunds, flood the country behind it, and perhaps cut it off altogether. Why they had not opened the bunds already, and thus completely protected the right of their main position, does not appear. Perhaps they thought the partial inundation was sufficient to prevent any British advance by the right bank.

If so, they were soon undeceived, for on April 12 the 3rd Division, "advancing across belts of inundation intersected by deep cuts, drove in the enemy's picquets east of Beit Aiessa, and occupied their outpost line." During the next four days, although the transport had to contend with the greatest difficulties, and the rations of the troops were often short, they pushed steadily forward, capturing some advanced trenches, repulsing counter-attacks, and bringing up guns. On the night of the 16th all was ready for an assault on the entrenchments which secured control of the bunds. On the 17th, "under cover of an intense bombardment, the 7th and 9th Infantry Brigades advanced at 6.45 a.m. and actually reached the Turkish trenches before our artillery fire lifted. When the bombardment ceased they leapt into the trenches, bayoneted numbers of the enemy, and the Beit Aiessa position was soon in our hands. The enemy left 200 to 300 dead in the



INDIANS AND THEIR CANE AND RUSH HUTS.



INDIAN MOUNTAIN BATTERY.

trenches and 180 prisoners were captured." It was a fine piece of work, and, as General Lake said, reflected great credit on General Keary and the troops under his command. Unhappily it was the last success which rewarded all the efforts of the relieving force.

A further advance was to be made next day, and with this object the 13th Division was ordered to move up and relieve the 3rd after dark in preparation for a combined movement in the morning. But before this arrangement could be carried out, at 5 o'clock in the evening, the Turkish artillery began to bombard Beit Aiessa, then occupied by the 3rd Division, and to establish a barrage in its rear, sweeping the passage through the swamps along which its communications lay. "An hour later a very strong counter-attack came from the southwest," and in spite of a heavy fire from the British guns this attack was pressed home with such determination that the portion of the division which held the river bunds was forced back, and the control of the bunds was lost. The first attack was followed by several more throughout the night, and the division had great difficulty in repelling them. After the first retirement it held firm, and at dawn the Turks drew off with a loss estimated at four or five thousand men. Two thousand dead Turks were actually counted on the ground in front of the 8th Brigade. "In this engagement," writes General Lake, "the following units particularly distinguished themselves by their steadiness and gallantry:— 1st Battalion Connaught Rangers; 27th Punjabis; 89th Punjabis; 47th Sikhs and 59th

Rifles; also the South Lances, East Lances and Wiltshire Regiments. The 66th and 14th Batteries R.F.A. did good service, also the 23rd Mountain Battery, which expended all its ammunition, and did great execution at close range. Generals Egerton and Campbell, who commanded the brigades most heavily engaged, set a fine example of coolness and gallantry in the hand-to-hand fighting which took place." The fighting was no doubt very severe, and the praise bestowed by General Lake was well deserved; but the net result was that the advance had been checked, that the formidable power of the river was again under Turkish control, and, worst of all, that the enemy had shown himself strong enough to make a dangerous attack upon a whole British Division in the field. Nor was this result altered by any subsequent operations. During the next few days there was trench fighting, and some advanced positions were consolidated; but the entrenchments at Beit Aiessa were not retaken. "The boggy nature of the ground," says General Lake, "made movement difficult, and many of the troops were worn out with fatigue." In other words, the stroke by the south at Sinn Aftar had failed; and if the relieving force was to get through at all in time to save Kut the British must storm the position on the north bank from which they had twice been repelled. And they must do it at once, for Townshend's 84 days had come to an end, and his garrison was on the verge of starvation.

The attempt was evidently a desperate one.



AEROPLANES IN THE DESERT.

but it was the only chance. During the past week the 7th Division, though frequently held up by floods, had been pushing forward its saps towards the Turkish entrenchments. It now received orders to prepare for an assault on April 20. But once more the weather turned against the British troops. "On the afternoon of the 19th the wind veered round to the north, water from the marsh flooding their trenches and the ground in front of them; the attack had therefore to be postponed." What these changes of wind meant may be judged from the description of one of them given by an eye-witness: "Yesterday afternoon we had a waterspout, a hail-storm and a hurricane. The spray was leaping four feet high in the Tigris on our left, and on our right the Suwaikieh marsh threatened to come in and join the river and flood our camp. At about sunset it broke into our forward trenches and the Turkish position facing them, a wave of water coming over the bund like a wall, swamping kit, rations, and entrenching tools. Some of the Brigade on our right had to swim."

This meant inconvenience to the Turks also—those in the trenches—but it greatly strengthened their position against attack.

On April 21 there was some dry ground again, and meanwhile the position had been heavily bombarded, so the order for an assault was renewed; but if it had been a desperate undertaking before, it was now doubly desperate, for in spite of all exertions by the weary troops the marsh had gained upon them, and the extreme width of passable ground was now only 300 yards. Over this narrow passage, swept by the converging fire of all

the enemy's guns, the devoted battalions must advance. On the morning of the 22nd the attempt was made. Under cover of artillery fire from both banks and of massed machine guns on the south bank, firing across the river, the leading brigade—there was only room for one on such a front—sprang forward to storm the entrenchments where the enemy, secure on both his flanks, awaited them with all the confidence that an almost impregnable position must give. Able to pour upon the head of the narrow column not only a concentrated shell fire but masses of troops from all sides, he could hardly have feared for the result. Nor was the result ever in serious doubt. To quote General Lake's dispatch: "The leading troops carried the enemy's first and second lines in their immediate front, several of the trenches being flooded, but only a few men were able to reach the third line."

"Large Turkish reinforcements now came up. They delivered a strong counter-attack, which was repulsed. A second counter-attack, however, succeeded in forcing our troops back, as many men were unable to use their rifles, which had become choked with mud in crossing the flooded trenches, and so were unable to reply to the enemy's fire. By 8.40 a.m. our men were back in our own trenches."

The assault had been beaten off, quickly and decisively, with a loss of 1,300 men. The wonder is that the loss was not greater.

Neither on the south bank of the river, therefore, nor on the north bank had the Turkish resistance been overcome, or even materially shaken. The buffer had been pushed in a little way—six miles or so—but it was as strong as ever, and a third of the attacking force had

been killed or wounded. General Lake sums up the situation in the following words :

Persistent and repeated attempts on both banks had thus failed, and it was known that at the outside not more than six days' supplies remained to the Kut garrison. General Goringe's troops were nearly worn out. The same troops had advanced time and again to assault positions strong by art and held by a determined enemy. For 18 consecutive days they had done all that men could do to overcome not only the enemy, but also exceptional climatic and physical obstacles—and this on a scale of rations which was far from being sufficient, in view of the exertions they had undergone, but which the shortage of river transport had made it impossible to augment. The need for rest was imperative.

That is to say that the third attempt to relieve Kut, under General Goringe, had, like the first and second under General Aylmer, finally broken down. The relieving force had proved too weak for its task, and could not push through to Kut against the stubborn fighting of the Turks. Practically it was little nearer doing so than it had been four months earlier. Its bolt was shot, and the fall of Kut was now certain.

The want of heavy guns and the shortage of river steamers, which meant a shortage of food, were only too evident during these operations; but there was at all events no

breakdown in medical arrangements. Though the medical staff was still shorthanded, and the steamer arrangements still left much to be desired, the Commission was able to report that "the wounded were, so far as we have been able to ascertain, treated promptly and adequately. Every effort was made to reduce discomfort to a minimum, and the patients were evacuated expeditiously to Amara and Basra, and thence to India."

There remains only to tell the short but honourable story of the efforts made by the Navy and Air Services to delay for a time the surrender of the garrison. For some days before the hope of relieving the place was finally abandoned the Flying Corps and Naval Air Service had been dropping into Kut fishing nets, medicines, and such small quantities of supplies as their machines could carry. It was a difficult duty, for the enemy now possessed aircraft of superior speed and fighting power, but the British machines ran the gauntlet time after time with admirable courage, though not without losses. And when the hope of breaking through by force of arms was over the Navy determined to make



INDIAN TRANSPORT WAGGONS.

an attempt to run the blockade with a cargo of food. The attempt was almost hopeless, for it meant steaming up 20 miles of winding river against a strong flood, with enemy troops holding both banks; and it could not save Kut, for even if the attempt succeeded, the quantity of supplies that could be carried would feed the garrison for very few days, as the only possible chance was to send one swift steamer at night. Of course, any attempt to make good the passage by force against the Turkish artillery could only mean the destruction of the Naval flotilla. But a single vessel, going at the fullest speed possible, might conceivably get through; and

to cut their way out could only end in useless slaughter. On April 29 Kut surrendered, and 9,000 British soldiers, of whom one third were white men, became prisoners of war. It was by far the greatest humiliation ever inflicted upon British arms in Asia. The effect in India and other Asiatic countries was perhaps somewhat mitigated by the vast scale of the war and the courage shown by the garrison during the five months' siege; but even so it was a grievous blow to the pride and reputation of the country.

The actual loss which it involved was very serious. Besides the 9,000 men who were



THE "JULNAR" LOADING SUPPLIES.

The bales are of "Bhoosa,"—dried grass—and are arranged around the decks to form a protection against rifle fire.

even a few days' delay would be something gained. Accordingly, on April 24, at 8 p.m., the *Julnar*, one of the fastest steamers on the river, with a Naval crew under Lieutenant Firman, R.N., and Lieutenant Commander Cowley, R.N.V.R., started on her desperate venture, carrying 270 tons of supplies. In spite of all efforts on the part of the British force to distract the attention of the Turks, the vessel was discovered and shelled. She escaped destruction for four hours, and got as far as Magasis, little more than eight miles from Kut. There at midnight the Kut garrison heard a burst of heavy firing, which suddenly ceased. It told the fate of the gallant *Julnar*. Both of her officers had been killed, and she was in the hands of the Turks.

For Townshend and the brave men under him no ray of hope was now left. Any attempt

made prisoners the British forces in Mesopotamia had 23 000 men killed and wounded in the course of the three attempts to relieve Kut. And there was much sickness and suffering. General Townshend had already lost 4,500 men before he was shut up and besieged. Such were the results of the order which sent him forward, against his expressed opinion, upon his march to Baghdad, and of the bad equipment of the British troops in this part of the war field. Who was responsible for these great errors?

The British Government endeavoured to answer that question, and to meet the indignation of the country, by appointing in the summer of 1916 a Royal Commission charged with the duty of inquiring into all the facts and reporting upon them.

The members of this Commission were as follows :

The Rt. Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton, G.C.S.I.,
The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Donoughmore, K.P.,
Lord Hugh Cecil, M.P.,
Sir Archibald Williamson, Bart., M.P.,
John Hodge, Esq., M.P.,
Commander Josiah C. Wedgwood, M.P.,
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, G.C.B., and
General the Rt. Hon. Sir Neville Lyttelton, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O.

They were informed that they were appointed "for the purpose of inquiring into the origin, inception, and conduct of operations of war in Mesopotamia, including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment to the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war."

It will be seen that the Commission was a strong one, including men of various political views, and representatives of the fighting services; and that its instructions were comprehensive.

It began its work in August, 1916, and sat



LORD DONOUGHMORE,
Deputy-Chairman, Mesopotamia Commission.

for about nine months, during which time it held 60 meetings, and summoned before it over a hundred witnesses. It also heard or received in addition a great number of statements from various persons; and it had before it the report of the Indian Commission previously mentioned, which had been sent to Mesopotamia some months earlier to investigate on the spot the arrangements for dealing with the sick and wounded. The Royal Commission submitted on May 17, 1917, a report signed by seven of its eight members, and a

separate report by Commander Wedgwood, together with the report of the Indian Commission, the main conclusions of which the Royal Commission adopted.

The majority report of the Royal Commission was in many respects one of the most painful documents ever presented to the country. It brought out very clearly the mistakes made in Mesopotamia, and their lamentable consequences; and it attributed heavy blame, not merely for errors of judgment, to several public servants whose reputations had till then stood



[Lafayette.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON, G.C.S.I.,
Chairman, Mesopotamia Commission.

extremely high. It regarded the expedition to Mesopotamia as a justifiable military enterprise, and found no fault with the successive advances which took place up to the occupation of Kut; but it condemned as a blunder the advance on Baghdad, and it held that there had been throughout a persistent and continuous failure to "minister to the wants of the forces employed in Mesopotamia." For the advance on Baghdad the Commission declared that the weightiest share of responsibility lay with the military commander, Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision. But they also regarded as responsible, in order, the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge; the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Beauchamp Duff; the military

Secretary of the India Office, Sir Edmund Barrow; the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Austen Chamberlain; and the War Committee of the Cabinet. For the other and more serious matter, the failure to minister to the wants of the forces, the Commission severely blamed Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff, but blamed also various other persons. The shortage of river transport, "the foundation of all the troubles in Mesopotamia," was declared to be mainly due to the Government of India in its various Departments—that is to say, in reality to these two high officials, for the Commission found that the Viceroy did not consult his Council in Mesopotamian affairs. Sir John Nixon was also blamed to some extent for not insisting sufficiently on the point. The Government of India were censured again for refusing to build a railway which Sir John Nixon had recommended. They were blamed once more in considerable measure for the medical breakdown which caused such terrible suffering to the sick and wounded; though three medical officers, Surgeons General Hathaway, Babbie, and MacNocce, were also blamed. In regard to the provision of reinforcements the Commission went so far as to declare that the Indian Government—that is, the Commander-in-Chief and the Viceroy—"resorted to procedure which, to say the least of it, was disingenuous." This was a very grave charge to bring. The Viceroy was further criticized for setting aside the constitutional Government of India by omitting to consult his Council, and dealing with all Mesopotamian matters over their heads in private telegrams to the Secretary of State. Finally, it was pointed out that he, with the Finance Member, Sir William Meyer, was largely responsible for the atmosphere of economy prevailing for some years before the war, in consequence of which the Indian Army was deliberately reduced to a condition in which it was not fit to do more than preserve internal order and conduct frontier expeditions. It is true that the Commission regarded the Home Government as also responsible for this reduction, which both Governments held to be justified by the extinction of the Opium revenue and the friendly understandings with Russia. It is true also that the Commission drew attention to the heavy demands imposed upon India by overseas expeditions other than that to Mesopotamia. And with regard to the medical breakdown they gave Lord Hardinge

credit for the utmost goodwill, reflecting only upon the manner in which he exercised his paramount authority. Nevertheless, the whole report was a seathing criticism of the Government of India, or, in other words, of Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff; for the Viceroy's Council, never having been consulted, were expressly exonerated from all share in the blame.

The separate report by Commander Wedgwood differed from the report of the majority mainly in the fact that he was even more severe on Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff than his colleagues had been. He apparently regarded the rest of the officials blamed by them as having been guilty at most of honest human error; "but censure for honest human error," he wrote, "has nothing in common with the censure we should pass on an attitude of unwillingness to help in war. If we confound mistakes with crimes the result is a dangerous leniency towards crime." And he went on to charge the two, deliberately, not with honest human error, but with having shown throughout "little desire to help, and some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war."

When these reports were published, towards the end of June, 1917, they naturally gave rise to a strong outburst of feeling. The Commission had included in the majority report a variety of comments upon the Indian military organization introduced in the time of Lord Kitchener, upon the practice of governing India from Simla, upon the Indian Marine, upon the constitutional position of the Indian Councils, and other matters. They had also submitted some proposals for reform. These comments and proposals attracted attention; but the main interest of the public was focussed upon the distressing account given by the Commission of the medical breakdown, and upon the question of personal responsibility for all the failures which the report alleged to have taken place.

As has been said, the operations discussed in this chapter constituted the second phase of the campaign in Mesopotamia. Long before the report of the Mesopotamia Commission saw the light the third phase had begun, and begun auspiciously. In February, 1917, the British forces, now under Lieut.-General Sir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., recaptured Kut, and on March 11 they entered Baghdad.

CHAPTER CXCII.

THE BRITISH PEOPLE AT WAR.

ENGLAND IN 1642 AND 1914—THE SPIRIT OF A NATION—ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE WAR—WAGES—PROSPERITY—THE BRITISH ARMY THE BRITISH NATION—SECRECY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS—THE WOMEN'S PART—CONFIDENCE AND DETERMINATION—WAR-TIME AMUSEMENTS—SPORT—MOTORING RESTRICTIONS—TRAVEL—DRINK RESTRICTIONS AND DRUNKENNESS—THE CENTRAL CONTROL BOARD—FOOD PROBLEMS AND PRICES—FOOD CONTROL—MR. RUNCIMAN—LORD DEVONPORT—LORD RHONDDA—THE KING'S PROCLAMATION—"PROFITEERING" AND SAVING—THE PRESS—WAR LITERATURE—MORALITY—LABOUR UNREST AND ITS CAUSES—DEFENCE OF THE REALM RESTRICTIONS—"IF YOU DO FIGHT, FIGHT IT OUT."

"METHINKS," wrote Milton, "I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle muing her mighty youth, and kindling her undaz'd eyes at the full midday beam."

The majestic vision of the great Puritan was conceived in a mind vehemently in revolt against civil oppression. When it was set down in writing, England was torn by civil war. It was fulfilled more than two and a half centuries later, when England and the Empire which had grown up about her were plunged into a foreign war against an evil worse even than civil tyranny. In Milton's day the whole population of London, men, women, and children, turned out day by day to dig trenches and carry stones for the fortification of the City against an army of their own blood. In the days and weeks, lengthening into months and years, which followed the entrance of Great Britain into the world-war, the whole population gradually shook off their old habits and revealed once more that pride in sacrifice, persistence of will, and indomitable strength of purpose which, whether they be shown in digging trenches and carrying stones in 1642 or in the thousand and

one forms of war-service called for in 1914, are the essential ingredients of the British spirit.

There are few things more intangible and elusive than the spirit of a nation; and there are few things more deceptive. Before the war there were many men, some in the British Isles and some abroad, who spoke as though the old spirit of Britain were dead. According to their several standpoints, they lamented or they sneered at the decay into which they believed the British people had fallen. The people had outlived their vigour. They were supine, easy-going, pleasure-loving, unorganized and undisciplined. The women were giddy and incapable of serious thought or effort, except a few unbalanced fanatics who smashed windows and horse-whipped Ministers. The men were "flanneled fools," thinking nothing of work or business and content to idle away their time in theatres, clubs, on the river or in a race crowd or a football crowd. The virility of the people had been sapped, so the croakers said. The churches were empty—a census was taken to demonstrate the melancholy fact—and to those whose first care was the spiritual wellbeing of the people it appeared that the popular conception of the social and political scheme of things had become materialistic; men's minds were so preoccupied with

making money and spending it that they had grown callous and conscienceless. Another school bemoaned the clumsy, unenterprising ways of Englishmen in industry and commerce and declared that they were dropping behind in the race of nations. Another set of critics, whose interest was in politics, talked of the growth of bureaucracy and the party machine, and scoffed at the idea that the people had a will of their own or knew how to make it effective. The "will of the people" was the sport of professional politicians and the despair of ardent democrats. It seemed, indeed, as if, in the eyes of the critics in their midst as well as outside, the British people were a nation whose men were part-time shopkeepers and part-time sportmakers, and whose women were either dolls or termagants.

It is intended here to examine how this people bore themselves under the test of war, how it affected them in their domestic and social life, and how they discovered to the world, and perhaps to themselves and their rulers, the qualities of adaptability, resourcefulness and quiet endurance which were in them. In earlier chapters a full account has been given

of the legislative and administrative measures taken by the Government for the furtherance of the war,* and it is proposed now to describe how these measures touched the people in their daily pursuits and diversions. For a proper understanding of the mind of the nation in war-time it is important to grasp two great governing facts. The one is the effect which the war had on the power of the masses to feed and clothe themselves and generally to obtain the essentials of life, and the other is the remoteness, in more senses than the geographical, of the actual bloodshed and destruction of the war. Dealing first with the economic situation of the masses, it may be said that events falsified all predictions of an immediate crisis of unemployment and distress. It is true that in the first few weeks of the war the withdrawal of men from civil occupations was accompanied by a considerable displacement of women wage-earners, and that it was not until trade had recovered from the first inevitable panic and new and grimmer industries had

* Vol. V., Chapter XC.—"Political Changes at Home," and Vol. VIII., Chapter CXXIV.—"British Administration in War-Time."



RECRUITS ENTERING A LONDON RAILWAY STATION, ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR WOMEN FOLK.

begun to arise that women found an opening for active and profitable participation in the national business of war-making. During those first few weeks there were many working-class households which found themselves confronted by the prospect of acute poverty. Enlistment had deprived them of the income of the chief wage-earner—for it is a well-known fact that married men formed a very large proportion of the early recruits—and at the same time daughters and perhaps young sons were thrown out of employment. More out of caution than from any sense of national duty, numbers of the women on whose purchases the dressmaking and drapery trades depend cut down their expenditure, and most of the factories which supply those trades dismissed the major portion of their workers. A nucleus staff was sometimes retained to carry out a Government contract, and in more than one London West End establishment it was possible to see workgirls who a few weeks before had been making expensive mantles for Mayfair plying scissors and thread in the manufacture of military shirts. These, however, were the fortunate few. In September, 1914, there were 190,000 fewer women employed in industry than in the month before the war, and the consequent loss in wages to their families was in many cases the first contribution of the poor to the sacrifices of war. The steps taken at the instance of the Queen through the "Work for Women" Fund have already been described.* It is only necessary to add here that, thanks to the educational character of much of the work carried out under that organization, many women received a training which fitted them for a permanent place in industry, that the close contact of the workroom often resulted in a better appreciation of each other by people of widely separate social classes, and that such distress as still went unrelieved was borne with uncomplaining loyalty.

The period of trade depression, however, did not last long. Gradually confidence was restored and the gates of industrial employment were re-opened. Women and girls were absorbed into their old occupations and into new employments. Wages could be earned which had previously been beyond the reach of women. Many of the men of the working-class also commanded and received higher rates of pay than they had ever earned before. Even

* Vol. IV., Chapter LXXI.—"Women's Work in the War (I.)."

the boy who had just left school could demand and insist on payment on a scale unheard of in normal times. From time to time the scale of separation allowances for the wives of soldiers was revised and made more generous. Thus it came about that a wave of comparative prosperity spread over the wage-earning classes, and though as time went on the prices of food,



WOMEN UNLOADING A COAL-VAN.

clothing and other necessities of life rose steadily, there was a remarkable absence of privation and a noticeable appearance of affluence among the industrial workers generally. Never were so few ragged and bare-footed urchins seen even in the poorest streets of the towns, never so many women and girls expensively clad. Furniture dealers did a flourishing trade, and pianos were freely bought by people for whom they had hitherto been unobtainable. Advantage was taken of the opportunity to complete the furnishing of homes until then scantily equipped with anything but the barest essentials. Advantage was also taken of the chance by prudent people, as the amount of the small subscriptions to the War Loans amply proved, to provide a reserve fund on which to draw should emergency arise.

The working classes were not alone in their prosperity. Those who employed them, it is a reasonable assumption, were reaping higher profits from the boom in industry; indeed, the

yield of the tax on Excess Profits, applied first to "controlled" businesses engaged in the production of munitions and then to all businesses, leaves no room for doubt. Much of these war-profits, like those of the workers, must have been lent to the Government to meet the expenditure of the war. How much of it was squandered it is impossible to say, but it is beyond question that the outward evidences of luxurious living among some of the dividend-taking classes, and notably the public or semi-public consumption in hotels and restaurants of costly foods and wines, were more pronounced at one stage than usual. Broadly speaking, the only class which did not benefit in pocket by the artificial stimulation of trade was the people with moderate fixed incomes. Against the rising cost of living they had no remedy but economy, and their thrift, compulsory but cheerfully undertaken, was a little-appreciated part of their contribution to the sacrifices of the war. Some of the professional classes, especially those which furnish the amenities of civilization, were practically ruined.

We have therefore to consider a people large numbers of whom derived material profit from the conditions created by the war while others not so numerous were materially less prosperous while the war lasted. There was, however, one vital respect in which the war spelt sacrifice for all, without distinction of class.

More than once it has been said that the British Army as it was arrayed against the enemy in the critical stages of the struggle was the British nation, and in the sense that it sprang from every quarter of the nation and carried with it the hopes of all the nation's myriad homes, the saying is a true one. When the obligation of the young man to give his country military service was still moral, and did not depend on an Act of Parliament, it was regarded as equally binding by those who live in mansions and those who live in tenements. At both ends of the social scale the young men "conscripted" themselves. The universities and colleges poured out their undergraduates to the last man, and provided the nucleus for the new corps of officers. Courses of study for this or that profession or for none were abruptly ended—perhaps in some cases only suspended—by the call of war. The call was heard no less clearly and answered no less promptly by the agricultural labourer and the navy. Throughout the whole range of the nation, taken either

by social grades or by occupations, the response came readily from the young manhood. Husbands, fathers, and sons—often the only son of a family with an unbroken male lineage and always the object of someone's pride and ambitions—went willingly to the recruiting office, the camp, and the battlefield. Most of them needed no urging, though some had family or business responsibilities which might well have induced them to hold back until all had to go. Thousands of them left behind wives and mothers who hid the natural feelings of women behind the proud spirit of patriotism. Nothing could be finer than the fortitude with which the women of the country sent their sons and husbands to face the uncertain fortunes of war. There was little glamour in the departure of the troops. They went away when they had finished their training and were ready for the trenches, and though they sometimes had a "last leave"—the very words bore a solemn and almost tragic significance—their actual time of sailing and destination were generally kept secret even from themselves. Now and then, however, there was an approach to the old scenes associated with the setting out for war, and women marched alongside their men from the depôt to the railway station with a band at the head. All through the war women were reminded that their men were soldiers first and sons or husbands afterwards. They could not even know at any given time in what part of any theatre of war their "soldier boys" might be. By a wonderfully efficient postal service they were able to communicate, subject always to censorship, and as a further outlet for their solicitude they were able to send parcels of food, clothing and other comforts. For the rest, save when men came home on leave, the women-folk could not forget that they had for good or ill relinquished their own claim before the country's need. The women who had no relatives in the Army, and they were few, were not to be denied an opportunity of showing that they too were proud of and grateful to the soldiers, and many a man who could claim no relatives at home found himself the recipient of letters and gifts from friends he had never known.

The Navy, like the Army, stole men away, though not against their will. The postal address of a man serving in the fleet was "H.M.S. —, e/o G.P.O." and when a woman consigned a letter or a parcel to a relative or perhaps a "lonely" sailor she had simply to trust the

Post Office and the Admiralty. Yet for all the anxiety and uncertainty, and sometimes the sad certainty brought by a short official telegram notifying them of the killing or wounding of those around whom their thoughts centred

who had gone had vanished behind a veil of secrecy. They were fighting or watching "somewhere in France" or "somewhere in the North Sea," and a rigid censorship shrouded their doings. Through the newspapers, and



[Wakefield, F. psom.]

RECRUITS OF THE UNIVERSITIES AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS BRIGADE IN TRAINING AT EPSOM.

—for almost from the first it was the rule that the next of kin should be directly informed before the casualties were published—not one word of reproach came from the women.

Here, then, was the second governing fact. While many of those left behind were prospering according to all material standards, those

from the lips of the men who returned on leave, the nation at home very gradually learned something of the horrors of the war. The sight of the ever-increasing army of broken men brought back from the trenches and scattered throughout the country made those horrors more real. But of the wrecking of homes, by

single cottages and by whole towns, and of the blasting of fair and fertile countrysides, and of atrocities committed against old men, women, and young children, the mass of the people saw nothing, except when they were reproduced on a small scale by raiders in the air or on the sea. Starvation, destitution, and misery—the accompaniments of war as they were in Belgium, Northern France, and Serbia—were



EXAMINING CASUALTY LISTS
In the first months of the War.

not seen in Great Britain. Even war's "suckling babe Taxation" did not greatly harass the bulk of the people. But for the human ties which linked the nation with its manhood in arms the war was remote, and its effects on the ordinary life of the nation were mainly indirect.

The statement of these cardinal factors does not detract in any way from the fine temper displayed by the British nation during the whole course of the war. The prosperity which it created in certain levels of society was the effect and not the object of the people's labour. Shell-making and other munitions work may have attracted women in domestic service or other normal occupations because it was well-paid work; but it was also hard work, involving often a prolonged physical strain and night labour, and it is at least doubtful whether many would have persisted in it for the sake merely of the good wages. Some, indeed, of the

women who went into munition factories, and probably all the men who volunteered to work there during their spare time—for many professional men and men of business gave up their Sundays to work in Woolwich Arsenal and other factories—thought nothing of the payment. They were "doing their bit," as they would say, and the other men and women who toiled for long hours at war work of one kind or another also revived their flagging energies by the reflection that they were helping to win the war. If there was one thing which all the people had in common it was this eagerness to help. As time went on and it became clear that victory could not be achieved without a complete mobilization of the man-power and woman-power of the entire nation it seemed as if citizenship carried with it a new obligation, and for any man or woman to be doing nothing of national importance became a reproach. There was work of many kinds to be done, some of it physically arduous and some less exhausting. By tacit consent the tasks awaiting women were allotted roughly in such a way that the more strenuous occupations fell mainly to those who were most accustomed to physical exertion and who had to work to live, the sedentary and less heavy occupations to women who were not used to manual labour but who were in need of wages, and the lightest though not the least important duties to women who could afford to undertake them without payment.

From the first the women of title or position, led by the Queen, gave time, money and ability to organising or helping on some movement for the care and comfort of the broken soldier and the bereaved among their sister-women. First and foremost, there were hospitals which needed women's aid. The superb response of the women of England to the call for nurses, the work of the Red Cross and the Voluntary Aid Detachments, form the subject of a separate chapter,* and need only be noted here. Then there were funds to be replenished for some beneficent war purpose. There were matinee performances to be arranged in support of this or that object, concerts to be promoted, bazaars to be organized. The "flag" day, an ingenious but rather over-worked plan for collecting the spare money of the multitude by selling them small button-hole emblems which secured them immunity from appeals for the rest of the day, provided another form of war

* Vol. IV, Chapter LXXI—"Women's Work in the War (I)."

service for women of the leisured classes. They created and carried on free buffets for soldiers and sailors at the railway stations, largely in response to a letter published in *The Times* from a soldier who signed himself "On Leave and Tired." They showed taste and tireless energy in the decoration and staffing of Y.M.C.A. huts in the military camps and near the railway termini. Above all, they exhausted all their thoughtfulness in contriving schemes for lightening the trials of the wounded and brightening the life of the convalescent soldiers and sailors. Tea parties were given in private houses, motor-cars were provided, groups of men were taken for trips on the river in the summer months; in short, everything that could be done to entertain the wounded was done, and in that labour of sympathy and gratitude the women of the richer classes found a field for their voluntary effort, while their sisters of other classes were making shells or driving vans. There was work for all, and, according to their individual opportunities, the vast body of the men and women who remained at home gave to it ungrudgingly their abilities and their energies. It is to the infinite credit of the people that their adaptation to the service of war was almost

wholly the result of their own initiative. Whatever preparations for war may have been locked up in the pigeon-holes of Government departments, there was certainly among them no scheme for the conversion of the nation from the peaceful pursuits of industry, commerce, science and the rest to the supplying of the manifold and unexpected requirements of trench warfare on a colossal scale; and although, when the need was realised, the Government produced the organisers, it was the voluntary effort of the people themselves which effected the transformation.

Month after month, in spite of the strain of the war on nerve and body, of the inconveniences and discomforts of a series of restrictive measures affecting some of its old-established habits, and of hardships involved in a progressive contraction of the supply of certain of the primary articles of food, the nation persevered in its toil. Now and then its even surface was ruffled by labour unrest here and a strike there, but these, as a rule, were local and transitory phenomena, and the universal chorus of disapproval which they evoked showed that the heart of the nation was sound. The secret of this calm, restrained temper and this diligent, indefatigable application to the



RUSSIAN FLAG DAY, 1917.

business of war making, whatever it cost, lay in the conviction, firmly rooted in the minds of all but a negligible fraction of the people, that they were engaged in a struggle which was not of their seeking, but from which no upright nation could stand aloof. At first, through no fault of their own, they had no clear understanding of the stern and bitter nature of the struggle. They were told little of its progress, and the little they were told was often misleading. Bad news—the loss of a ship or a trench—was often withheld from them until rumour had magnified the reverse into a catastrophe, and even when the truth was told it was not always the whole truth. Long after it was known to the few that the Army needed guns and shells, and that men were being killed for want of them, the fact was concealed from the country. For many months, although they must have known that every check on land or sea sent men flocking to the recruiting offices, the Government consistently refused to take the public into their confidence, and it was only after valuable time had been lost that they ceased to practise concealment except when it was imperatively dictated by strategic considerations. In the meantime military and naval projects, about which there was every reason for preserving the utmost secrecy, were being freely discussed over

the dinner table in the entourage of those who were responsible for their conception. The scandal of indiscretion in high places became so notorious that on March 2, 1915, public attention was called to it in a trenchant leading article in *The Times*, which urged Ministers to put an end to "thoughtless chatter of their strategical intentions among those about them." Yet all through the trying period when the Government were reluctant to tell the public how critical and protracted was the conflict in which they were involved, the faith of the nation in the cause in which it had embarked did not waver, and when the immensity of the struggle gradually came to be made known to them they only devoted themselves the more grimly to the performance of their duty. Equalled only by their belief in the justice of their cause was their confidence in the invincibility of their Armies. Not for a moment did they even contemplate the possibility of defeat. There were some who feared that they were too sanguine of success, and who deprecated undue optimism, even at the risk of being dubbed pessimists for their pains. But if the people were at any time too much inclined to take victory for granted the fault again lay with those leaders who, knowing the facts, glossed over the unpleasant and on the rest



[By permission of the proprietors of "The Bystander."]

"AT PRESENT WE ARE STAYING AT A FARM."

One of Captain Bruce Bairnsfather's most popular "Fragments from France."

built up inspiring prospects which events sometimes failed to justify. The war exploded many old creeds, political and other, and among the wreckage lies the doctrine that a country always has the government which it deserves.

The confidence of the country in its soldiers was reflected in its own splendid cheerfulness. The soldier himself, in training, at the front, or home on leave, was incurably good-humoured. The public read how, when the outlook was darkest and the work afoot was grimmest, he cracked a joke to show that he was undaunted, and the public responded to his mood. Thousands of people laughed over a number of sketches of trench life drawn by Captain Bruce Bairnsfather, in which, though critics cavilled at their crudeness and the broadness of their humour, there was pictured the irrepressible spirit of levity in which the British Army bore the rigours and risks of war and carried out its stern purpose. Hundreds and thousands of people went to see the cinematograph films taken at the battle of the Somme, and noticed that the soldier could be gay though his work was grave. Something of the same appearance of frivolity cloaking a resolute will was caught by the nation which had produced the soldiers. They refused to become sombre or austere unless gaiety or indulgence interfered with the supreme purpose. At the call to economy men and women alike scrutinized carefully their outlay on clothes; but fashion still held some of its sway—less imperious, perhaps, in its commands, and less fickle in its fancies, yet occasionally setting its seal on some distinctive style of dress. Sometimes it would borrow from the naval uniform, sometimes from the military. But in none of its changes was it extreme, and from one season to another it sanctioned a plain, serviceable costume which need not be costly but must not be drab. Surprisingly little of the unrelieved black of mourning was worn, and crêpe was scarcely worn at all. Outwardly, as well as in spirit, brightness was the rule.

Not even the darkening of the streets of London and other towns within the range of Zeppelins subdued the spirits of the people. The darkness had many drawbacks, notably when winter nights were foggy, and on those whose nerves were highly strung it may have had a subtle depressing effect; but the public as a whole regarded the gloom at first as some-


thing novel and almost amusing, and when the novelty had worn off most of them forgot it. The compensation provided by the "daylight saving" experiment in the summer of 1916 was keenly appreciated. The many difficulties which had been foreseen by those who opposed the Summer Time Act proved in most cases to be unsubstantial. A few isolated farmers in



A SIGNIFICANT POSTER.

various parts of the country—the only class which had a real argument on their side—adopted the traditional policy of passive resistance towards what they regarded as a new-fangled idea of tinkering with the clock, and suffered the penalty of considerable inconvenience. It was found, however, by a Committee appointed by the Home Office that opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of the scheme, and on their advice it was again adopted in the summer of 1917.

The war had little effect on the indoor amusements of the people. There was a period in the first months of the war when the public stayed away from the theatres. Plays had to be withdrawn, and at the music halls performers accepted percentages of the weekly takings instead of their contract salaries. This depression did not last, and by Christmas, 1914, any



[By special permission of the proprietors of "Punch."]

"OH, MOTHER, I DO THINK IT UNFAIR ABOUT THE ZELLEPIN! EVERYBODY SAW IT BUT ME. WHY DIDN'T YOU WAKE ME?"

"NEVER MIND, DARLING, YOU SHALL SEE IT NEXT TIME—IF YOU'RE VERY GOOD."

production which appealed to the popular taste could be played to satisfactory audiences. In one sense the recovery was partial. For plays of a thoughtful or serious type there was little demand. Soldiers became the most regular patrons of the theatres, and they asked for laughter, easily remembered melodies, and bright spectacle. The irresponsible form of entertainment to which the name of *revue* had been given, although it often lacked the wit and topical jest of the *revue* as it is known in France, became so popular that the theatres followed in the wake of the music halls and catered for the craze. Even in the third year of the war, when the decline of *revue* had been prophesied for months, ten of the leading theatres and halls in London still relied for their programmes on this lightest of all forms of amusement. An explanation of the demand for farce, musical comedy and *revue*, and the comparative neglect of the more sober and less amusing entertainments must be traced to the desire, particularly marked among the soldiers, to escape for an hour or two from the sterner side of life to which so many were bound by their duties. A much-prized decoration on the walls of the dug-outs in France in 1916 was a poster advertising "The

Bing Boys," the most successful of all the *revues*; and one of the first actions of hundreds of officers and men arriving home on leave from the Front was to book a seat, if one could be got, to see this merry production.

Apart from the soldiers, the theatres obtained their chief support from women, and this may account for the fact that the few non-musical plays which achieved the distinction of long runs were plays of sentiment. "Romance" and "Peg o' My Heart" were typical examples of the kind of work which found approval. For a long time there was no call whatever for plays which touched upon the war. "London Pride," a comedy which linked up the Western Front with the East End of London, eventually broke through the undefined but singularly rigid embargo. This success, it may be, was achieved because the authors allowed the people to laugh both at and with the soldiers of the new Armies, and because they satirized unmercifully some of the more familiar of the civilian humbugs whom the war had developed. Opera, as an incident of the social round, was swept away at the beginning of the war with all the other things which in days of peace were fitted into the formula known as the London "Season." Covent

Garden closed its doors, and Caruso and other highly paid cosmopolitan singers were heard only in the neutral countries. Later, however, owing mainly to the initiative of Sir Thomas Beecham, opera in English came into its own, and by the end of the third year of the war it had become firmly established. It has been noted that the public showed no eagerness to see serious plays. There was one curious exception to this attitude. In the early part of 1917 the ban which for many years had prevented the performance of Ibsen's "Ghosts"

raise the tax by substantial amounts, he bowed to criticism, modified the scale, and postponed the operation of the higher taxation.

Outdoor amusements were greatly curtailed, partly by voluntary action and partly at the dictation of the Government. While millions of the young men were in arms public opinion revolted against the thought that crowds of their fellows who for one reason or another had not gone should gather at the cricket ground or football ground to watch other able-bodied men, mostly of military age, engaged in the contests



THE FINISH OF THE "DERBY," 1915

and plays by Brieux, the French dramatist, which deal with sexual problems, was removed, and they were played to large audiences.

The big attendances at the theatres and music halls and the still larger crowds which flocked daily to the cinematograph palaces attracted the attention of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1916 as a source of revenue, and in the Budget of that year Mr. McKenna introduced an entertainments tax. Equitably graded, the tax was cheerfully paid; but when, twelve months afterwards, Mr. Bonar Law proposed to stiffen the levy he found little approval for his proposal. After announcing his intention to

of sport. The world of sportsmen, professional and amateur, sent its full quota of men into the Army, and the condemnation of spectacular cricket and football was no reflection either on the players or the game. Cricket, except public-school matches, was abandoned, and more than one of the first-class grounds was turned to another use. Football, which is organized on a somewhat different basis and in which the livelihood of the players was at stake, continued on a reduced scale, though by common consent most of the newspapers discarded the practice of reporting more than the bare result of the games. Racing was the



A PROMINENT POSTER IN PICCADILLY, 1916.

subject of direct action by the Government. Soon after the outbreak of war it was thought necessary, as a means of relieving the railways from the dislocation caused by race traffic and leaving them more free to handle the traffic of war, to restrict the number of race meetings held during the season. In 1916, as the result of negotiations between the Board of Trade and the Jockey Club, all provincial fixtures were cancelled except two meetings each at Lingfield, Gatwick and Windsor and three at Newbury, while four extra meetings were sanctioned for Newmarket. It was, however, stipulated that no special railway facilities should be provided for horses or visitors. In spite of this, the attendance at the meetings at each of the five courses was considerable. The motor-car took the place of the train—it was, in fact, insisted by the racing authorities that visitors should travel by road—and the sight of hundreds of cars on their way to a course or parked alongside the course called forth strong protests from many quarters against what was held to be a wanton waste of petrol. As will be presently explained, drastic restrictions were imposed towards the middle of that year on the purchase of motor-spirit. At the beginning of 1917 it was understood that the limited number of meetings permitted in the previous year would be repeated; but shortly after the season began it was intimated to the Jockey Club that the food situation was so serious as to forbid the unnecessary consumption of oats by horses in training and it was announced that all racing would be abandoned. An agitation at once arose from all the interests concerned in horse-breeding, and it was vigorously contended that the total stoppage of racing would strike a grave blow at an industry which was of national, and, moreover, of military, importance. Eventually, early in July, it was decided that approximately forty days' racing should be allowed at Newmarket and other specified places, and that not more than 15 lbs. of oats a day would be

released for horses in training to the maximum number of 1,200 horses. It was now, for the first time, made a condition that not only should special trains not be run for race-goers, but motor-cars and taxi-cabs should not be used. The effect of this condition was to deprive the race meeting of the last vestige of its social or recreative aspect, and to reduce it to its practical function of serving as a test of bloodstock. Hunting was almost entirely suspended, partly perhaps for sentimental reasons, but mainly because most of the young men were serving in the King's forces and the women were occupied in war work. Golf clubs were denuded not only of their members but of their professionals in many cases and their caddies. For a man who appeared to be of military age and fitness to be seen in public carrying a bag of clubs or a tennis racquet was rare, and only a bold man would face the ordeal.

Motoring, it has already been indicated, was subject to severe restrictions. Owing to the urgent demand for petrol for military and naval purposes, and the need for husbanding the shipping tonnage in view of the inroads made on the mercantile fleet by enemy submarines, it was necessary to establish a rigid control over the distribution of motor spirit, and pleasure motoring was the first to suffer. The way had been paved towards a curtailment of the use of private motor-cars, first by an Order of the Ministry of Munitions prohibiting the manufacture of private cars, secondly by a Board of Trade Order forbidding their importation, and thirdly by a sharp increase under the fourth War Budget in the licence duties on motor vehicles. In April, 1916, following a strong public protest which found expression in the correspondence columns of *The Times* against the scandalous waste of spirit on the part of race-goers, a Committee was set up by the Board of Trade to control its supply and distribution. The Committee lost no time in taking a census of supplies and requirements,

and in July a system of rationing by licence was instituted. A quarter of a million permits were issued for amounts varying according to the degree of national importance attached to the purpose for which each car was used. Though complaints of unequal treatment were plentiful, and often justified, the grip of the Committee was gradually tightened until motoring for pleasure almost died out. The hiring of "private" cars was also rigidly controlled, but the hackney cab was only slightly affected and the taxi-cab driver grew more autocratic and extortionate. Simultaneously in London the service of motor-omnibuses was reduced, and at the holiday resorts the motor charrs-à-bancs disappeared. The hindrance placed in the way of a healthy pastime mainly confined to the well-to-do had one noticeable result. Cycling, which before the war was rapidly losing its charm owing to the invasion of the roads and lanes by streams of noisy, dust-raising, fast-moving motor-cars, regained its popularity as a cheap and convenient means of combining travel with exercise and escaping from the turmoil of cities to the quiet and revitalising air of the open country.

The loss of the few was thus the gain of the many.

This was not the only change which the war made in the comfort of those that travel by land. In 1916 the demands made, or likely to be made, by the Army, not only on the staffs of the railways, but on their rolling stock, compelled the Government to take steps for the discouragement of unnecessary journeys by rail. No one, of course, had thought of railway travelling as something enjoyable for its own sake, but the facilities afforded by the railways for rapid transit were so abundant, and the cost was so moderate, that excursions from place to place to visit friends and relatives, or merely to seek change of air and scenery, took a prominent place among the amenities of life. In order to put a check to the waste of labour, money and fuel caused by what may be called luxury travel, and to release men, engines and rails for service in France, the railway companies, which were now working under unified State control, set to work to revise their time-tables. Competitive services on the main trunk lines were discontinued, cheap excursions were cancelled, long-distance expresses were made to serve intermediate stations, and



GEESE IN THEIR "COMPOUND" AT LORD'S CRICKET GROUND.

hundreds of trains disappeared from the railway guide. As a further deterrent to passengers, fares were increased by one-half on January 1, 1917, and a month or two later the public were told that they must handle their own baggage, and that not more than 100 lbs. of luggage would be permitted for any one traveller. On most of the railways, also, restaurant cars ceased to run. The cumulative effect of these changes was to turn a journey by rail from a tolerably comfortable and not expensive method of travel into something like a penance, at once costly and wearisome. Out of consideration for the multitude of people who live on the fringes of towns and journey by railway to and from their places of business, the prices of season tickets and of small metropolitan fares were not raised, and the services of suburban trains during the busy hours of the morning and evening were but slightly reduced. There was therefore no dislocation of legitimate and necessary travel, but there was a distinct curb on the "week-end" habit, and in the summer the exodus of holiday makers from the towns to the seaside and the inland health resorts was greatly lessened. The coast resorts, and especially those on the

East and South-East coast, which depend largely on the seasonal influx of visitors from the industrial centres, vied with one another in offering attractions to town-dwellers, and during the height of the holiday season many of them were crowded, chiefly with women and children. But the familiar scenes of bustle at the stations and overcrowding at the sea-fronts which were associated with the "holiday rush" of pre-war times were missing, and on some of the seaside towns the war pressed heavily. So serious was the shrinkage of their trade and so grave the loss of rate-revenue through the falling empty of shops, boarding houses, and private residences, that the Government came to their relief with grants in aid of the municipal authorities and the distressed inhabitants.

The limitation of travel for pleasure, whether by motor-car or by train, was one of the minor inconveniences of a state of war, and was accepted with general equanimity as a necessary nuisance. Far more important from the standpoint of the ordinary citizen was the restriction and regulation of the trade in alcohol. It is not necessary to recount here the history of the steps taken by the Govern-



PASSENGERS HANDLING THEIR OWN LUGGAGE AT A LONDON RAILWAY STATION.



A GLASGOW CROWD WAITING TO BUY WHISKY.

ment, by legislation and administratively through the mechanism of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic), to get a tight grip on the "drink" traffic. It is sufficient to record that by the spring of 1917 some 38,000,000 out of a total estimated population in Great Britain of 41,000,000 were living under orders which cut deeply into one of the oldest and most firmly rooted of the national habits. The hours during which the public could buy alcoholic liquor were stringently reduced, the potency of spirituous liquors was greatly weakened, the custom of "treating" was forbidden, the total quantity of drink for distribution was limited, and the price of every kind of intoxicant was unlimited. It is safe to say that, for the sake of the war, the nation submitted to an interference little short of revolutionary with one of the most established, and perhaps to some the most highly prized of its social liberties, and that changes were wrought by a few strokes of the pen which at any other time would have occupied many sessions of Parliament and have aroused a storm of agitation throughout the country. To suggest that the drastic control of the liquor traffic was borne by the whole of the non-tectotal public without a grumble would be misleading. In some cases it was openly resented, and harsh words were used of the somewhat novel and autocratic body which acted as the instrument of the Government in enforcing its policy. But there was little or no active opposition to any of the measures

of the Board. They were justified at first by their purpose, afterwards by their results; and in spite of the disturbance they caused to the methods by which brewers, distillers, and publicans conducted their business the Board enjoyed in all their actions the loyal co-operation of "the Trade." It is material to remember that in its initiation the control of the traffic was essentially a measure for the more effective prosecution of the war. Its object was to put an end to excessive indulgence on the part of a minority of workmen in the armament works, docks, shipyards, and other centres of war activity, in the interests of better time-keeping, and greater output. The powers of the Board when it was created about a year after the outbreak of war were expressly defined as applying to areas in which war material was being made, loaded, unloaded, or otherwise dealt with, and it was to districts coming obviously within that category that the earliest Orders of the Board were confined. But gradually the whole country was converted into one great war machine, and the control over its drinking habits was similarly extended. The result was a remarkable increase in the sobriety of the nation. After full allowance is made for the absence of millions of men who were on service, the increasing public sense of the national emergency, the break-up of home life involved by the departure of the men and the more general industrial employment of the women, the increased earnings of many of the

workers, the strain and excitement inseparable from war conditions, and all other possible factors on one side or the other, there is ample and conclusive evidence that the work of the Board brought about a marked decline in the excessive consumption of intoxicants.

The police courts provide a valuable, though by no means a perfect, test. In 1913 the total number of convictions for drunkenness in Greater London and the 36 boroughs with populations of more than 100,000 was 118,267, and in 1914 the number was about

excitement of the war upheaval and the receipt of separation allowances in lump payments. But between 1914 and 1915 the number of convictions of women for drunkenness dropped by 2,600, and between 1915 and 1916 it fell by nearly 14,000.

The drink problem, which was thus brought a long way towards solution by administrative Orders of the Central Board, was also attacked from other angles. In order to secure a supply of alcohol for munition purposes the Ministry of Munitions took control of the distilling of



WELDING AEROPLANE PARTS BY MEANS OF ACETYLENE BLOW-PIPES.

the same—117,489. By the end of 1915, when the Liquor Control Board had been in existence for six months, the total had fallen to 88,836; in 1916, after a full year of control, there was a further fall to 52,783 convictions: and by the middle of 1917 there was every hope that drunkenness as measured by this test would be reduced to one-third of the pre-war figure. Analysis of the figures shows that the decline in inebriety among women, except in the first year of the war, was almost as great as in the case of men. In the closing months of 1914 there was an actual increase in drinking by women who were confirmed drinkers, an evil which was probably inseparable from the

spirits. For revenue purposes the Chancellor of the Exchequer increased the taxation of alcoholic liquors. In order to release tonnage for essential cargoes the Board of Trade limited the importation of brewing materials. Finally, when it became imperative that no foodstuff should be used for purposes other than the feeding of the public, the newly created Ministry of Food placed a limit on the amount of beer which might be brewed. Each of these measures tended to drive up the price of intoxicants, and by the middle of 1917 their cumulative effect was seen in a pronounced disparity between the demand for beer and the supply available to meet it. In the year before

the war the total beer production in Great Britain and Ireland was 36,000,000 standard barrels. By stages this output was brought down to 26,000,000 barrels in the year ending March 31, 1917. In February of that year the Government fixed the maximum barrelage for 1917-18 at 10,000,000 barrels. The further increase in price which followed this restriction gave rise to open discontent among sections of the manual workers, and for a few days there was something like an organized boycott of the public-houses in various parts of the country.

also pointed out that most workers on the land, and notably labourers hired for harvesting, looked on beer as essential to the proper performance of their work. The advent of hot weather gave emphasis to these contentions, and on July 5 it was officially announced that the Government would sanction an increase of one-third in the quantity of beer authorized to be brewed for the summer quarter, on condition that roughly one-eighth of the additional beer should be of a light kind and should be reserved for munition areas and agricultural districts.



THE "GREYHOUND" STATE TAVERN.
Munition workers at dinner.

A month or two later it began to be apparent that brewing had been reduced to a point which meant positive dearth. Publicans found difficulty in getting stocks, and many of them were compelled to put up their shutters for a day or two because they had "sold out." Protests came from all directions, and especially from the munition areas and the agricultural districts. It was pointed out that to many men engaged in strenuous labour and often in a heated atmosphere—in coal mines, iron foundries and steel works, particularly—beer was a necessity for which no substitute satisfactory to them could be provided. It was

It is worthy of note that the King, who set the example of personal abstinence when the drink question first arose in an acute form, publicly recognized the reasonableness of the case for this concession. In a letter sent by him to Mr. Will Thorne, M.P., and published on the day on which the concession was announced, there appeared the following :

The question of the shortage of beer, especially during the summer months, is one that demands careful and prompt consideration. The King hopes the matter will be dealt with in a considerate and sympathetic manner.

There was an interesting constructive side to the work of the Central Control Board. At

Carlisle an experiment was made in the State ownership and management of licensed premises. A disused post office was converted into an attractive tavern-restaurant, in which the facilities for the purchase and consumption of liquor were accompanied by facilities for obtaining well-cooked food at a reasonable charge. The experiment was a complete success, a striking feature being the number of

chafed most under them would not seriously deny that, judged by their fruits, the Liquor Control Board was certainly the most successful of all the administrative bodies set up in the war. It is doubtful whether it made any converts to temperance in the sense of total abstinence, but it undoubtedly arrested the habit of "soaking," making the heavy drinker moderate and the moderate drinker more moderate, and in some directions its work gave promise of permanent fruitfulness.

In spite of the patent efficacy of the action of the Board, there was a strong current of opinion, especially among the temperance organizations, in favour of more drastic remedies for the secular evil of alcoholic indulgence, and from time to time vigorous demands were made for total prohibition. This agitation gave rise in many minds to a suspicion that advantage might be taken of the emergency of war to effect a "faddist" reformation, and large sections of the public watched the campaign with a keen and jealous eye. No doubt it contributed, with the opposition of "the Trade"—a curious alliance—to the sudden withdrawal of the Government from a far wiser policy which had practically been completed. On July 11, 1917, there was published a memorandum by the Central Control Board in favour of State purchase of the drink trade, which had been privately in the hands of the Government for the previous six months. The memorandum declared that the limits of effective action along the lines of Orders had been well-nigh reached, and "the successful prosecution of the war was still being hampered by excessive consumption of intoxicating liquor." For this reason the Board recommended the direct and complete control of the trade by the State. The results of the experiments in that policy at Carlisle and elsewhere led them to think that it "offered the most rapidly effective and the best permanent solution of the problem." On financial grounds they preferred a plan of purchase outright to any scheme for assuming control merely for the period of the war. For the time, however, this project remained a pious aspiration.

The hardships as distinct from the inconveniences occasioned by the war pressed in different ways and in varying degrees on the several classes of society. In the case of what might be called the income-tax paying classes, except those relatively few men who made a rich harvest out of war contracts, the pinch was



AN ECONOMY POSTER.

munition girls who habitually resorted to the tavern for meals. There was also a great extension of the works-canteen system. By May, 1917, there were in existence or under construction well over 600 canteens for munitions and transport workers, some established by the Board and others managed under their supervision. This part of the Board's activities was, by universal consent, a valuable contribution to the humanization of industry. Their restrictive operations, as already stated, provoked a certain amount of criticism, but were not seriously resisted. The prohibition of "treating" was perhaps the least easy to enforce, and, being an obstacle to the conventional method of demonstrating good fellowship, it was rather freely infringed. The rest of the dictates of the State were endured, more or less reluctantly; and even those who

mainly financial. While almost every item in the cost of living tended to rise, the demands of the tax-collector grew heavier. Income-tax reached an unprecedented level, patriotism required that every shilling that could be spared should be invested in War Loan, and it was only by the exercise of a rigid economy that many households could solve the problem of making ends meet. Among the middle classes the difficulty was frequently accentuated by the withdrawal of the breadwinner for military service and the total or partial loss of the chief source of income. Though some employers granted to the wives of their employees who enlisted or were called up either the full amount or some proportion of their salaries, there were others who made no such grant, and in such cases the separation allowance made by the Government, even when supplemented by special allowances in respect of insurance premiums and other "civil liabilities," was often not sufficient to prevent genuine hardship. Many a woman had a hard struggle to keep her home intact and provide her children with food and clothing out of the comparatively meagre sum to which her income dwindled; and some were driven to uproot their home life and go

out into the labour market to earn a living, perhaps in the occupations which they had given up on marriage. Sometimes, in the case of small shopkeepers and others who were their own employers, the call to the Army meant the break-up of businesses into which they had sunk all their savings and energies. The Tribunals set up to judge between the civil and military claims on the man-power of the nation did much to protect the "one man business" from destruction, either by giving exemptions from the Army in clear cases or by encouraging schemes whereby the businesses of those who were taken would be carried on for them by those who were left; but the many small shops and offices to be seen derelict in every town "owing," as a notice in an empty window commonly stated, "to the absence of the occupier on military service," afforded some measure of the sacrifice which even the Tribunals could not prevent.

These burdens, real as they were, did not bulk so largely in the mind of the public in general as the effects which the German submarine campaign, combined with a failure of the harvest of 1916, which was almost world-wide, had on the food supplies of the nation. In



MESSENGERS OBTAINING WAR-LOAN PROSPECTUSES AT THE BANK OF ENGL/ND.

broad terms the situation in this respect was accurately described by Mr. Lloyd George when he said, in a memorable speech made at Dundee on June 30, 1917, "I draw a distinction between privation and deprivation. There has been no privation in this country yet." It is unquestionable that in the third year of the war a scarcity of potatoes and cereals and to a less extent of margarine, followed by a serious inflation of prices all round, caused a considerable amount of hardship to the poorer people; but it is equally true that this hardship never became intolerable.

During the first two years of the war it may be said that scarcity of food was not felt at all. The working classes, with higher wages, actually enjoyed far better and more substantial meals than they had been able to obtain in normal times. There was a scarcity of sugar, due chiefly to the shutting off of imports from enemy sources, but with the merchant ship free to come and go on the high seas supplies of other things were fully maintained. The plenty which prevailed surprised many people who had been taught to fear that famine would follow fast on war in a country which relied on the production of others for the greater part of its food, and

some of whom in August, 1914, indulged in panic buying to stock their larders against the hungry days which they believed to be imminent. The hoarders were visited by a double punishment. Their selfishness drew upon them the odium of their fellows, and much of the food which they collected went bad as a result of the hot weather before it could be eaten.

It was not until the autumn of 1916 that uneasiness began to be felt concerning the food supply. About this time Ministers made speeches urging national economy, but their appeal was too vague in form to secure an effective response. It was difficult, too, to persuade people whose eating habits were not extravagant that they must eat less when in hotels and restaurants the most elaborate and expensive meals could be served to all who could pay for them. The Government of the day, largely as the result of a press campaign, eventually realized that action as well as words was needed. On November 17 wide powers were conferred on the Board of Trade for the control of the manufacture, sale and use of food, and in the exercise of these powers the President, Mr. Walter Runciman, issued a Milling Order on November 20 which made obligatory a



A CROWD WAITING TO PURCHASE POTATOES.



A LESSON ON FOOD ECONOMY BY THE MAYOR OF KEIGHLEY.
The town of Keighley set a fine example of loyalty to the Food Controller's edicts.

76 per cent. extraction of flour from wheat. This compulsory adoption of a modified form of "standard" bread helped many people to understand the danger of a food scarcity with which the country was threatened, and the measure received general approval. But it also served to emphasize the scandal of extravagant public meals, and, after repeated conferences with hotel and restaurant managers, Mr. Runciman produced on December 5 an Order limiting the number of courses which might be served at luncheon and dinner in "places of public eating." His plan to curb the appetite of the gourmand was to limit the number of dishes which might be consumed to a nominal two courses at the midday meal and a nominal three at any meal taken between 6 and 9.30 p.m. As a matter of fact, the regulation reduced luncheon to a meal which might consist of *hors d'œuvre*, soup, a meat course with vegetables, and cheese, and dinner to a similar bill of fare with the addition of fish or sweets. Vegetable *hors d'œuvre*, soup which contained no solid meat, and dessert were allowed to be counted each as half a course, and cheese was allowed to be eaten without prejudice to the earlier dishes of the meal. Cheese, in fact, was officially proclaimed to be "no course." In practice, Mr. Runciman's Order altered the character of public meals without producing any material saving. It led in some cases to an actual increase

in the consumption of bread and meat. As there was no restriction on the quantity of food which could be eaten, double portions and extra helpings were asked for, nobody seemed to want the light but cleverly contrived entrée, and cheese was eaten so freely that prices went soaring. Greedy people dined off a dozen oysters, a large sole, the best part of a fowl or pheasant, and dessert, and had as much bread as they required. The absurdity of the regulation quickly became apparent, but it was not until April 4, 1917, that it was replaced by a better-reasoned system of control.

The Public Meals Order was the last of the food regulations produced by Mr. Runciman. On the very day of its issue the Asquith Government fell, and Mr. Runciman followed his chief out of office. With the formation of the new Government by Mr. Lloyd George came the establishment of a Ministry of Food. The need for the appointment of a Food Controller had long been plain. Labour unrest due to extortionate prices, and the growing urgency of the conservation of supplies, had led Mr. Asquith to consider the creation of such a Minister, but he had failed to find any suitable man who was willing to accept the position. Reluctance to assume the responsibility of the office was possibly influenced by the limited nature of the powers which the Government at that time were ready to concede to a Food Controller.



A POTATO QUEUE IN NORTH LONDON.

Mr. Lloyd George made the establishment of a Food Minister one of his first actions, and, having selected Lord Devonport for the post, gave him a comparatively free hand to solve a big problem. A good deal was expected by the public from Lord Devonport—probably much more than it was in his power to accomplish. He undertook a difficult task, and, handicapped by ill-health, he found it too great for him. The chief criticisms levelled at his administration were that he showed a hesitation amounting almost to timidity in forming decisions, and that by handling his problem in a piecemeal way which involved the issue of a multiplicity of Orders he confused the public and left many opportunities of evasion to the unscrupulous. During the period of about five months in which he held office Lord Devonport signed more than fifty of these Orders, some of which were subsequently cancelled and some reviewed. Those which chiefly concerned the mass of the people related to public meals, the trade in cakes and pastries, the use of sugar, the waste and hoarding of food, the constitution of bread, and the maximum prices chargeable for potatoes and other articles.

Shortly after the appointment of the Food Controller the position in regard to the national reserves of cereals became acute. In February, 1917, the situation was so serious that the advisability of compulsory rationing had to be considered, and, although this step was not thought imperative at the moment, it was announced that the necessary machinery would be erected, and in the meantime drastic measures were introduced to check the consumption of wheat and other grain. It was made an offence to feed game birds on grain, restrictions were placed on the manufacture of malt, the extraction of flour from wheat was raised to a minimum of 81 per cent., and an admixture of 10 per cent. of flour milled from other cereals was made compulsory. Bakers were forbidden to sell bread which had not been made at least 12 hours; the shape and weight of loaves were definitely fixed; the sale of fancy bread was prohibited. Finally, the Food Controller took over on April 30 all the principal flour mills of the country, and following on this the proportion of other cereals mixed with wheat was again increased. In the early summer of 1917 complaints were made that the "war" bread, as it was now composed, was not only unpalatable but injurious to health, but experts advised the Food Controller that

the fault was in the baking, and the consumer had literally to swallow his grievance.

The steps taken by Lord Devonport to enforce food economy in hotels and restaurants secured much better results than Mr. Runciman's ill-advised plan. He resorted to a system of rationing by bulk, and required that the total quantities of meat, flour, bread and sugar used in any week should not exceed certain fixed weights based on a specified allowance for each person at each meal. The allowance of meat was based on an average of 5 ounces each for luncheon and dinner and 2 ounces for breakfast, the bread allowance on an average of 2 ounces for each meal of the day with 1 ounce of flour each, for luncheon and dinner, and the sugar allowance on an average of half a pound a week. A weekly meatless day was also introduced, and during the three months of spring when potatoes were abnormally scarce these vegetables were not to be served on more than two days in the week. Not only did these regulations reduce the consumption of staple articles, but by restoring liberty to the cook to exercise his skill in the preparation of light dishes they provided the public with more varied and enjoyable meals. The new rules were gladly accepted. Managers and cooks as a body set themselves to observe them, and no more was heard of extravagant eating in public. The only part of the Order which experience showed to be really unnecessary was that which enforced the meatless day, and this was ultimately abolished. It should be added that the Order did not apply to restaurants where the total charge for a meal, exclusive of the usual charges for beverages, did not exceed 1s. 3d. The saving clause was inserted to avoid interference with the legitimate requirements of workers in industrial districts. Another Order which materially affected hotels and restaurants was the Cake and Pastry Order of April 18, 1917. It put a ban on crumpets, muffins, and fancy pastries, and in combination with the regulation limiting the amount of bread to be eaten at a meal it checked extravagance at afternoon teas. The afternoon tea habit, before the enforcement of this restriction, had developed in quite a remarkable way, owing partly to the extensive replacement of men in offices by young women and partly to the cessation of military training at that hour. To drink tea, eat dainty pastries, and listen to an orchestra in the brightly furnished cafés of the West End of



THE CROWD AT THE READING OF THE KING'S PROCLAMATION AT THE ROYAL EXCHANGE

London or the corresponding centres of other cities became a favourite form of recreation among girl clerks, typists, and subalterns, and the interference of the Food Controller with their enjoyment, although it saved them money, was not popular. How firmly the habit had been established was shown by the continued prosperity of the tea-rooms even under altered conditions.

While Order was being added to Order by the Food Controller, the situation in regard to supplies of essential articles grew steadily worse, and in the spring of 1917 food queues were a common spectacle in all the large towns. The sugar scarcity was aggravated by shipping losses, and margarine stocks fell through interference with the imports from Holland and difficulties in obtaining raw materials for the manufacture of the substance in England. The most serious thing of all was that the partial failure of the crop and a want of foresight in distribution led to the premature exhaustion of the potato reserves. For about three months during which the dearth of potatoes and margarine was most pronounced, shopping for the poor and even for those well above the poverty line was a

tiring and time-devouring task. Women would wait for an hour in a queue outside a shop where it was known that potatoes were to be had, even if no one purchaser were allowed to buy more than a pound or two; and when they had been served at the greengrocer's they would have to go through the same ordeal at the grocer's in order to get a pound of margarine. The hunt for sugar was quite as trying to the patience, and it was doubly annoying before the Food Controller forbade tradesmen to make the sale of half a pound of sugar, probably unrefined and unattractive, conditional on the purchase of other and possibly unneeded commodities. Yet comparatively little serious grumbling was heard about the queue. The people knew that their plight was immeasurably better than that of the Germans, and they had also the assurance that the potato shortage, at any rate, was a temporary evil and that the scarcity of margarine was hardly likely to be permanent. Events justified this optimism, for in July a "bumper" new crop brought an abundance, which promised to become a glut, of potatoes, and the arrivals of margarine improved to an extent

which made queues unnecessary and led to a slight fall in prices.

When the food situation was causing the greatest anxiety, a national appeal was made for a reduced consumption of bread, meat and sugar. The appeal in its first official form came from Lord Devonport, who on February 2, 1917, asked that those who had charge of households should, in their weekly purchases, limit themselves to the following average quantities a head :

Bread	4 lb.
	(or equivalent in flour 3 lb.)				
Meat	2½ lb.
Sugar	¼ lb.

Those who bore the responsibility of safeguarding the food supplies of the people knew that if they failed to respond to this appeal for voluntary rationing compulsion might be inevitable, and in order to avert any need for the adoption of the ticket system great energy was thrown into a food economy campaign. The first results of the appeal were not encouraging, and opinion was hardening in favour of compulsion when a Proclamation by the King, issued on May 2, gave an impetus to the economy movement which served to carry it on to success. The proclamation, which fol-

lowed closely on the lines of an appeal made to the nation in the year 1800 by King George III., was in the following terms :

BY THE KING.

A PROCLAMATION.

GEORGE R.I.

We, being persuaded that the abstention from all unnecessary consumption of grain will furnish the surest and most effectual means of defeating the devices of Our enemies and thereby of bringing the war to a speedy and successful termination, and out of Our resolve to leave nothing undone which can contribute to these ends or to the welfare of Our people in these times of grave stress and anxiety, have thought fit, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclamation, most earnestly exhorting and charging all those of Our loving subjects the men and women of Our realm who have the means of procuring articles of food other than wheaten corn, as they tender their own immediate interests, and feel for the wants of others, especially to practise the greatest economy and frugality in the use of every species of grain : And We do for this purpose more particularly exhort and charge all heads of households to



THE COMMON CRIER OF THE CITY READING THE PROCLAMATION.

reduce the consumption of bread in their respective families by at least one-fourth of the quantity consumed in ordinary times; to abstain from the use of flour in pastry, and, moreover, carefully to restrict or wherever possible to abandon the use thereof in all other articles than bread: And We do also, in like manner, exhort and charge all persons who keep horses to abandon the practice of feeding the same on oats or other grain, unless they shall have received from Our Food Controller a licence to feed horses on oats or other grain to be given only in cases where it is necessary to do so with a view to maintain the breed of horses in the national interest: And We do hereby further charge and enjoin all Ministers of Religion in their respective churches and chapels within Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to read, or cause to be read this Our Proclamation on the Lord's Day, for four successive weeks after the issue thereof.

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Second day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, and in the Seventh year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE KING.

Before the issue of the Proclamation, Mr. Kennedy Jones, M.P., had been appointed Director-General of Food Economy, and a comprehensive canvass of the people, organized by Mr. R. M. Kindersley and his War Savings Committees in all parts of the country, had been initiated. The Proclamation was used as the basis of a pledge which people were asked to sign as a token that they would observe the King's behest, and, as it was known that the Royal Household was voluntarily observing the rules which the nation was invited to follow, the effect was satisfactory. By the end of June reports from all over the country showed that the consumption of bread had been reduced to an appreciable extent.

It has been said that the people showed little open discontent when diminished supplies of important articles of food created hardships for them. Willingness to economize in consumption and, in the case of those who could afford it, to eat such substitutes as beans instead of potatoes and oatcake instead of bread, also indicated the general desire to take in a good spirit the deprivation entailed by the war. The one thing which aroused bitter resentment was the widespread

conviction that the fluctuation of supplies and the inflation of prices were partly attributable to the taking of undue profits by some of those to whom the public had to look for their food. There seems little doubt that "profiteering," as the manipulation of markets and rates was popularly called, did exist in 1917 on a scale which appreciably heightened the effect of economic stringency, though the extent of it was probably exaggerated. Newspapers gave much space to the discussion of high prices, and "profiteering" was the text of half the speeches at Labour meetings. The Government expressed eagerness to grapple with the evil, and to save the people from exactions, but they found the task a very difficult one. Lord Devonport's first attempts to control prices did not give much relief to the consumer. When he fixed maximum wholesale and retail prices for potatoes the market was suddenly denuded of supplies, and from the time when the Order was made to the time when the new season's potatoes were lifted the limits he fixed were continually, if surreptitiously, evaded. Speculation in meat was admitted to be a notorious scandal, but no effective measures were devised to protect the public from extortion, though a distinct advance was made in that direction by the compulsory elimination of redundant "middlemen" from the organization of the trade. Gamblers and profit-mongers also found a particularly lucrative field for their activities in the substitutes for potatoes and other foods of which there was a scarcity. In one case, that of beans, the price was forced up to such an outrageous figure that intervention could not be avoided, but the maximum prices when fixed stood at double and treble the normal. When dissatisfaction at the apparent inability of the Government to arrest "profiteering" had reached a pitch at which it could no longer be ignored, Lord Devonport, owing to ill-health, resigned his post. The selection of a successor for the thankless task gave the Prime Minister some trouble, but eventually he persuaded Lord Rhondda, who was then at the head of the Local Government Board, to take the office. It was significant that in the first announcement of policy made by the new Food Controller he stated his intention of securing a reduction in the cost of bread and meat, and that one of his first acts was to set up an accountancy branch at his department in order to discover by the examination of traders'

books to what causes the dearness of food was due.

The careful husbanding of resources was only one side of the national food programme. With that combination of energy and forethought which was one of his distinguishing characteristics Mr. Lloyd George saw to it that no effort was spared to stimulate the pro-

duction of more food at home both by farmers on a large scale and by townspeople individually on a small scale. By an Order of the Board of Agriculture, carried out by the local authorities, disused and uncultivated land was placed at the disposal of householders in the towns for the growing of produce for their own use, and during the early months of 1917



WOMEN CARRIAGE CLEANERS ON A BRITISH RAILWAY.

many thousands of men whose ordinary occupations were industrial, commercial or professional spent most of their spare time in tilling the soil. Undeveloped building land, large tracts of the public common, oven stretches of the railway embankments, were parcelled up into small allotments and let at nominal rents to all who cared to apply. Clerks and other sedentary workers, as well as labourers accustomed to the use of the spade, devoted their leisure hours to breaking up and sowing the land. Often their women-folk would help with the fork or the rake. By the adoption of co-operative methods, fencing, seeds and manures were obtained cheaply, and by the early days of the summer the young crops of potatoes, cabbages and other vegetables not only hid the bare places of the suburbs but gave convincing and practical evidence of the adaptability and earnestness of the men who delved and planted. Much of the land they brought under cultivation was, to say the least, unpromising, and many of the gardeners began with the scantiest knowledge of kitchen gardening. As they watched the progress of their plants, and noted with a new anxiety the vagaries of the weather, hoping now for rain and now for sunshine, not

a few of them experienced for the first time a real sympathy with the proverbial discontent of the farmer. Beyond the immediate gain in fresh home-grown food, the war allotment brought to many a more permanent benefit in health strengthened by man's earliest form of exercise and in a widening of the interests of life.

During the third winter of the war the troubles of domestic life were aggravated by a breakdown of the distributive machinery of the coal trade. In common with every other item in the household budget, the cost of fuel was far above the normal level as the result of a variety of factors, among which many people included the supposed machinations of an unholy alliance of "exploiters"—colliery-owners, coal merchants, and shipowners. Even in the first winter of the war the price of house coal in London and other places outside the coalfields ranged from 30 to 32 shillings a ton, while the poorer section of the people who bought by the hundredweight paid at a rate varying from 35 to 40 shillings a ton; and in spite of legislation, conferences, and agreements these charges showed no sign of receding in the following winters. But during the winter of 1916-17 the dearth of coal was



UTILIZING THE LAND BORDERING A RAILWAY.



FAMILY WORK ON SUBURBAN ALLOTMENTS.

a minor matter in comparison with the extreme difficulty of getting it from the mine to the cellar. The cold weather was intense and prolonged, the stocks in the towns were consumed, and although there were ample supplies at the pit-head the means of distributing them were hopelessly inadequate. The railways were congested with the traffic in war material, and the coal merchants were handicapped by shortage of carmen and horses. It was impossible for the householder to obtain delivery of an order at any price except after a delay of weeks, and if in the interval his store ran out he was thrown back on the generosity of some more fortunate neighbour. In the homes of the poor the inability to buy even a sack or a scuttle-full was a severe affliction, and there was a natural outcry until the Government eased the situation by sending out soldiers and military motor-lorries to help in distribution. The experience was a sharp lesson to the authorities, and in the early summer of 1917 they were busy in devising plans for preventing its recurrence by reorganizing the whole system of coal distribution and enforcing, if necessary, a scheme of rationing.

The sacrifices and the compensations of war, it need hardly be said, recognized no territorial limits. In somewhat different forms they affected town and countryside alike. High



prices for home produce spelt better times for the farmer and all who lived by agriculture. Compared with agricultural wages, the allowance made by the State to the wife and family of the recruit from the village was handsome. The cost of living was always lower in the country district than in the urban area, and the pinch which was felt by the poor of the towns was not so severely felt by the poor of the villages. In short, from the economic standpoint, the average villager suffered even less than the average townsman or townswoman. On the other hand, the war was even more remote, in the sense defined earlier in this chapter, from the village than from the town, except where the village happened to be mistaken by a Zeppelin on a nocturnal bomb-dropping expedition for an arsenal or a dock-yard. No evening newspaper, it may be,

penetrated to it with the news of the war hour by hour. Its schoolrooms were not converted into hospital wards. It had not the woman tram-conductor to remind it of the transformations wrought by the war, though after a year or two it began to see the woman from the town driving the plough or tending horses. Yet no hamlet was so "sleepy" or so cut off from the main stream of the national life that



SCHOOL-CHILDREN TAKING HOME
COKE IN THEIR DINNER-HOUR.

it failed to play its part in the struggle of the nations. At the call—later at the bidding—of the recruiting officer the villages gave their young men to the Army and the Navy. So largely, indeed, was agriculture denuded of its labour that it was presently found necessary to release skilled ploughmen from the ranks and send them back to the land, and to adopt other expedients for preventing the land from falling out of cultivation, including the training of women for agriculture, the drafting of soldiers to the farms to help in harvest work, and the sanctioning of the employment, subject to certain safeguards, of children of school age. The villages gave also of their money towards the cost of the war, mainly by the purchase of War Savings Certificates through associations formed in connexion with the schools or the churches. They took their share in the food economy movement, and some of them could show a splendid record of bread saving. There were, of course, exceptions to the general rule—villages which thrived and feasted as though they positively enjoyed the war—but the fault was one of ignorance rather than wilful indifference, and as time passed they learned

something of the tremendous effort needed to achieve victory and mended their ways. Except for the absence of the young men, there was little change in the outward life of the village. Sometimes the body of a soldier from one of the cottages would be brought from the hospital where he died to be buried in the churchyard, and as the funeral procession passed along the street the whole village would seem as if in mourning. Sometimes, too, when a village lad came home with a medal ribbon on his tunic he would be given something like a public welcome. But these were the rare events in a dull, toilsome round, varied occasionally for the men by some movement in the price of cattle, crops or feeding-stuffs, and for the women by the arrival of letters from sons or husbands at the Front.

In bearing the long ordeal of the war the nation was probably supported more than it knew by the newspapers. There was a time when, because they were muzzled and unable to present to the public a true picture of events, the newspapers incurred the discredit of many of the people. But after a while the Press regained some of its freedom, and from that time onward it grew in power. It was largely through the urgings of the newspapers that the Government were moved to organize and the public to exert the full strength of the nation. In a brilliant novel dealing with newspaper life the mission ascribed to the war correspondent is "to sweeten the sacred home life of the readers with all the heroic pleasures of war, unalloyed by groin wounds or enteric." In practice, during this war at any rate, neither the correspondents nor the editorial writers spared their readers the horrors which attend the glories of the fighting. So far as they were permitted, they told the public the real dimensions of the contest, and whether it was in the provision of men, money or munitions, or in the saving of food, the newspapers never ceased to spur the nation on. Though they had their differences of method, they were united in their purpose of heartening and guiding the people. Sometimes, responding to the feeling of the public, they were impatient with Ministers and called for more vigour in the direction of war operations; but in the main their service lay in the preservation among the masses of the people of a steady mind and a strong will. In passing, it may be recorded that the shrinkage of the imports of paper, and the doubling and trebling

of its cost, compelled proprietors to choose between two policies. Some reduced the size of their newspapers almost out of recognition and clung to their circulation. Others risked their circulation, and deliberately reduced it for the time, by raising the price, while maintaining their old completeness. In November, 1916, the price of *The Times* was increased from 1d. to 1½d., and three months later it was raised to 2d. Over 200 other daily and weekly papers followed this example. Books also became dearer, the price of the new 6s. novel being raised from 4s. 6d. to 5s., and that of the cheap reprint from 7d. to 9d. In spite of this, a stream of varied literature continued to flow from the press. The output of books fell seriously under the first staggering shock of the war, but it quickly recovered, and thenceforth was well maintained. The people were not too intent on their war-work to find time for reading; indeed, some women probably found that they had more time for books than they had amid the whirl of social engagements before the war. A study of the types of books for which there was a demand, both from the booksellers and from the lending

libraries, showed that there was a distinct widening of the public horizon. One of the features of publishing in war-time was the great interest taken in books on Russian life and translations from Russian authors. Books on France were in demand; and historical works and travel books were widely read. There was naturally a voracious public for books of all kinds on the war—the number issued up to the end of 1916 was estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000—and there was a remarkable output of books of poems, including many written by soldiers in the field. The explanation of this harvest of lyrics from the seat of war was suggested by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education, when he said, at University College, London, in July, 1917, that the young soldier-poets looked to poetry as a deliverance from the grim necessities of the hour. Fiction fully held its place in the public favour, and it is an interesting fact that, according to a chance test made at Croydon Public Library one day, all but two out of 45 copies of works by Jane Austen, Dickens, George Eliot and Thackeray were in the hands of readers.

No survey of the life of the people in war-



TAXI-CAB AS COAL-CART.

Owing to shortage of labour in the winter of 1916-17 not a few well-to-do people had to fetch their own coal.

time would be complete which omitted to take note of certain discreditable but narrowly confined social phenomena which marred the national record. Early in 1917, in a leading article in *The Times*, the statement was made that "There are whole circles of society, both in London and elsewhere, in which the spirit of sacrifice is utterly unknown, and pre-war-time conditions still flourish without the smallest regard for the exhortations of the Prime Minister and the Food Controller." There was, undoubtedly, not in all people of some classes, but in some people of all classes, a spirit of selfish and wanton indulgence which showed itself in a reckless squandering of resources of food and money. Until Parliament passed legislation which brought them under control and, by destroying their chief attraction, virtually suppressed them, the "night clubs" of London were a real danger to young officers. So, for a brief period, was a new type of pseudo-private dance and supper held in a hall or gallery hired by a group of people with more money than conscience. About the same time the public mind was much disturbed by reports of the flagrant immorality which prevailed outside the London railway

termini and the disastrous effects of drunkenness and impurity on the health of the soldiers who were waylaid there. Drastic measures were suggested for cleansing the streets from open vice, but it was found that closer supervision by civil and military police produced an improvement and the public anxiety was short-lived. It is a moot question, though the police authorities were inclined to answer it with an emphatic negative, whether there was any actual increase in prostitution. The earlier closing of public-houses certainly had the effect of driving prostitutes into the open, and their traffic was more in evidence during the afternoon and evening than in the days before the war. The public conscience, too, was keenly aroused by the inroads of disease on the Army, and people gave more attention to what was going on in their midst. Finally, the police were reduced in numbers, oppressed by the limitations of their powers in this matter, and individually apt to look leniently on the women who ministered to the pleasures of the soldier. When these three factors are considered, it is quite intelligible that appearances, however discreditable, did exaggerate the facts, though they also gave a most



RANSACKING A GERMAN BAKER'S SHOP IN CALEDONIAN ROAD AFTER AN AIR-RAID ON LONDON.

desirable fillip to a great campaign of enlightenment.

Account must also be taken of a sporadic and local spirit of lawlessness which showed itself in organized attacks on shops believed to be occupied by Germans. The whole country grew more and more anti-German as the war went on, and each successive outrage committed by the enemy on land or sea stirred the nation to a deeper detestation of Germany and everything German. Towards

Germany and the Germans found vent on one or two occasions, and notably after the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May, 1915, in something like a pogrom against tradesmen with German names. Hundreds of so-called Hun shops—for the barbarities of the Germans had earned for them the opprobrious name of Huns—were sacked by undiscerning mobs, composed partly of honest people who could not restrain their anger and partly of hooligans who welcomed a pretext for looting. It should



A TOWER HILL MEETING TO DEMAND REPRISALS.
The crowd applauding the demand.

Germany's Allies the attitude of the people of Great Britain was one of contemptuous indifference. Germany was the enemy. Before the war there had been a tendency to over-value German things and to copy German social and economic policies. During the war Germans and everything that savoured of Germany were anathema to all save a negligible handful of sincere but sentimental idealists who believed that the best way to "love your enemies" was to impede and even vilify your own countrymen. Among certain classes of people who are in the habit of giving free and sometimes violent expression to their emotions, joyous or otherwise, the universal feeling of anger against

be added that both the police and the local military authorities resisted and repressed these riots, at the cost in some cases of personal injury to themselves, and that the magistrates had no mercy on the rioters who were brought before them after each outburst.

Another feature of the national life during the war which must be mentioned was the unrest which always simmered among the organized workmen, and at intervals gave rise to stoppages of work. It is not intended here to do more than suggest some reasons why labour was restless. The industrial workers, it cannot be too strongly stated, shouldered their share of the tasks and trials of the nation with a thorough

good will. Their recreations were curtailed and their hours of toil were lengthened. The strain upon them was intense and continuous. So long as they were satisfied that a sacrifice, whether of hard-won privileges, of cherished trade union principles, or of personal comfort, was really essential to the winning of the war they made that sacrifice without complaint. But when they had reason to believe that preventable causes were adding to the weight of their burdens they showed their resentment in the only way open to them. The serious rise in food prices, or rather the belief that the rise was due to "profiteering" by unscrupulous traders, was only one of the factors which made for labour discontent. The mishandling of the workmen and their grievances by the Government was at least as important a factor. For a long time it was the official policy to smother nascent troubles, such as were bound to accompany the adaptation of factory and workshop conditions to the needs of war, under a cloak of silence; and, in an unventilated atmosphere, the germs multiplied and the troubles grew until they could no longer be concealed. Government departments were so dilatory in dealing with disputes between

men and masters, the courts set up to adjudicate on their differences were so slow in their operation, and the want of co-ordination between various departments concerned with labour was so patent, that many of the workmen conceived a suspicion of the Government greater even than their habitual suspicion of capitalist employers. Agitators who cared nothing about the war and whose sole object was to foment trouble for some undefined purpose of their own fostered the fears and grievances of men exasperated by inability to obtain a prompt and sympathetic hearing of their claims and complaints, and thus matters were allowed to drift to the point of the strike. Even after a Ministry of Labour had been established, several Government departments retained overlapping and conflicting jurisdiction over some parts of the labour world. In May, 1917, the production and repair of guns was delayed for more than a fortnight by a strike of the engineers, led not by the executive of their union but by a self-constituted committee of shop stewards. By firm action, including the arrest of seven leaders of the strikers, the Government brought about a settlement. Then, for the first time



A WOMAN BARGEE.

apparently, it occurred to the Government that measures of prevention might be better than forcible remedies or negotiations after the event, and eight commissions were appointed, one for Scotland and seven for England and Wales, to make a thorough, impartial, not too formal, and, above all, speedy inquiry into the causes of labour unrest.

There was a school of thought, more theorist than practical, which never tired of declaiming against the infringements of the liberty of the individual which were contained in the mass of legislative and administrative measures adopted by the Government and sanctioned by Parliament for the prosecution of the war. An organization styled the National Council for Civil Liberties was created to resist these encroachments, and it became a habit among certain doctrinaires and others who "mean licence when they cry liberty" to speak of the Defence of the Realm Act and Regulations as if they were a network of coercive and tyrannical provisions for the subjugation of the people. The Act and the Regulations were referred to in some circles as "Dora and her satellites," and resolutions of protest against their oppressive embraces were frequently passed. The plain truth was that the actual interferences with the freedom of the people to come and go as they pleased were few and not excessively irksome. The Munitions of War Act, which to a large extent abrogated the right of the workman to dispose of his labour according to his own will, and the Military Service Acts, which imposed on men of military age the obligation to serve their country as soldiers or sailors, undoubtedly compelled many men to do what they would not have done of their own volition. But the cumulative effect of all the other checks put by the State on the liberty of the ordinary citizen was far from burdensome. There were districts in which he was forbidden to use a camera. If he wished to put up at an hotel or boarding-house he was required to sign a registration form giving particulars of his identity, nationality and business. If he desired to go abroad it was necessary to comply with stringent passport regulations. Incidentally it is worthy of record that owing to the large number of women who flocked to Egypt in the wake of the Army it was announced towards the end of 1915 that at the request of the General Officer Commanding there no more passports for that country would be issued to women. And this embargo on the

travelling of women abroad became almost universal later. There were districts at home also, to which no person of either sex above the age of sixteen was admitted without a permit signed by the military commandant, unless he or she was resident in the district. The reason for this precaution can be gathered from the list of names of these "Special Military Areas"—Newhaven, Dover, the Isle



SIGNING THE REGISTRATION FORM
AT A CITY HOTEL.

of Sheppey, Harwich, and the Scottish Highlands north and west of Inverness. In addition to these not very serious limitations on freedom of movement, there were naturally prohibitions on freedom of speech and action in so far as it might be subversive of the national interests and endanger the safety of the country. But the average, well-disposed citizen was scarcely conscious of the drastic powers with which the Government were armed against evil-doers, and the restraints of which he was conscious were too insignificant to chafe. If he thought of them at all, his thoughts were those expressed by Mr. G. J. Wardle, M.P., in his presidential

address to the Labour Conference at Manchester in January, 1917, when he said: "Liberty is restricted in order that we may win the greater freedom."

That was the spirit in which the people of Great Britain—for all that has been said about them applies to Scotland and Wales as well as to England—addressed themselves to the immense task which lay before them. They made war without unreasoning hate and without hysteria, but with an iron resolution to pursue the grim business to the end, whatever it might cost. Day by day and year by year the defeat of the enemy was the one absorbing and imperious purpose to which they devoted their minds and bodies. Though the sacrifice demanded of them in treasure and in still more precious life was immeasurably greater than any their forefathers had ever made, they offered it without flinching. When the hour was darkest their faith in the righteousness of their cause and the strength of their arm was undimmed. Reverse and success alike spurred them to greater effort. Cool, calm, and

collected, they strove on, determined not to spare themselves lest they should spare the enemy. "John Bull," said Mr. Lloyd George at Glasgow towards the end of the third year of the struggle, "is a good-tempered, forbearing, patient, tenacious old gentleman who has cultivated the habit of never giving in once he has made up his mind." Five hundred years earlier Froissart summed up the national characteristics of that time in less kindly terms. "The English," he wrote, "are the worst people in the world, the most obstinate, and the most presumptuous." Whether it be called tenacity or obstinacy, the predominant fibre displayed by Great Britain in the most terrible contest of all time was that of unrelenting determination to win, however hard and long the struggle might prove. It was as though the whole nation had ever before it the exhortation familiar to every schoolboy or schoolgirl who has read the greatest of all school books—"If you do fight, fight it out; and don't give in while you can stand and see."



CHAPTER CXCIH.

BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE : THE DEPORTATIONS.

ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF BELGIUM AND UNEMPLOYMENT—FORCED LABOUR IN 1915 AND 1916—THE DEPORTATION DECREE OF OCTOBER 3, 1916—PRESS PROPAGANDA—REAL CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT—THE RATHENAU PROGRAMME—BELGIUM DRAINED OF RAW MATERIALS—BRITISH OFFERS OF RELIEF REJECTED—HISTORY OF THE DEPORTATIONS—METHOD OF RAIDING AND CONSCRIPTION—NUMBER OF DEPORTEES—CONDITIONS OF SLAVERY IN GERMANY—EVIDENCE FROM CAMPS AND FACTORIES—BELGIAN AND NEUTRAL PROTESTS—GERMAN “CONCESSIONS”—PARTIAL REPATRIATIONS—A NEW PHASE OF THE DEPORTATIONS—TERRIBLE CONDITION OF “REPATRIATED” BELGIANS—DEATH OF GENERAL VON BISSING—TEXT OF BISSING’S POLITICAL WILL—GERMANY’S REAL AIMS—THE GERMAN OCCUPATION PREPARING FOR GERMAN ANNEXATION—BELGIUM AND “THE NEXT WAR.”

IN an earlier chapter* a full account was given of German administration in Belgium between September, 1914, and October, 1916, and some reference was made to the systematic economic exploitation of the country. It was seen that, in stripping Belgium of her resources, Germany gradually brought about the paralysis of her economic life. “Her factories had to shut down, her workmen were thrown out of employment, and unemployment gave the pretext for deportation.” It has also been observed that the Belgian deportations, themselves the climax of the long process of deliberate exploitation of Belgium, formed part of the “Hindenburg programme” to which Germany was driven in the autumn of 1916—a programme that included a new form of industrial conscription in Germany and an effort to impose conscription upon Russian Poland.† The present chapter describes the Belgian deportations in detail, and seeks to record in due perspective one of the

most remarkable of German achievements in the war, the imposition of slavery upon the inhabitants of a highly civilised Western European State. “I know of no case,” wrote Viscount Bryce, “in European history to surpass it. Not even in the Thirty Years’ War were there such things done by any recognized Government as the German Government has done, first and last, in Belgium. The act is like that of those Arab slave-raiders in Africa who carried off negroes to the coast to sell.” Another contemporary historian declared that there was no precedent for the systematic, wholesale deportation of a people since the Assyrian deportations of the eighth century B.C. The only parallel, indeed, in modern history was the Turkish deportation of the Armenians.

During the first two years of war the German Administration had on numerous occasions applied coercion to Belgian workers. In August, 1915, an Order issued by the Governor-General imposed forced labour on the unemployed, but declared that the labour was to be done on Belgian soil. A second Order, issued

* Vol. XI., Chapter CLXVII., *Belgium Under German Rule*: September, 1914, to October, 1916.

† See Vol. XI., page 474.

in May, 1916, reserved to the German authorities the right of giving work to the unemployed. A third Order (May 13, 1916) authorized governors, military commandants, and chiefs of districts to order the unemployed to be removed by force to the places where they were to work. "Thus forced labour," to quote Cardinal Mercier, "was already introduced,



M. PAUL HYMANS,
Belgian Minister in London.

but it was in Belgium." The new system of forced labour, definitely combined with deportation, with which we are here concerned, was instituted by a decree dated from German Headquarters on October 3, 1916, and signed by one Sauberzweig on behalf of the Quartermaster-General. It was called a decree "concerning the restriction of the burdens on public charity and the assistance to be given [i.e. by the inhabitants] in case of public calamity." It ran:—

"1. Persons able to work may be forced to work, even outside their place of domicile, if, by reason of gambling, drunkenness, idleness, or unemployment involuntary or voluntary, they are compelled to have recourse to the assistance of others for their maintenance or

for the maintenance of persons dependent upon them.

"2. Every inhabitant of the country is bound to render assistance in case of accident or public danger, and also for redress of public calamities, within the measure of his capacity, even outside his place of residence; in case of refusal he may be compelled.

"3. Whosoever, being called to work under clause 1, or clause 2, shall refuse the work, or to continue at the work, which is assigned to him, will be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three years and by a fine not exceeding 10,000 marks, or by one of these two punishments, unless the laws in force provide for the imposition of a more severe punishment.

"If the offence has been committed by collusion or agreement on the part of several persons, each accomplice will be punished by imprisonment for not less than one week.

"4. The military administrators and the German military courts are empowered to enforce this decree."

It will be seen at once that the Germans had determined to base their schemes upon the alleged existence of a serious "unemployment problem," which it was their duty to solve. The truth was that the "unemployment problem" was to be exploited in order to enable the Germans to drain the remaining man-power of the invaded country, and that the economic plight of Belgium, which was now to be turned to new German purposes, was the direct, inevitable and, indeed, intended result of the policy which Germany had adopted since the beginning of the war.

If it were necessary to demonstrate afresh the gross insincerity of the tyrants of Belgium, abundant evidence could be found in the German press alone. During the first two years of war Germany flooded the newspapers of her own country and of neutral countries with panegyrics of the beautiful benevolence of the German Administration, and represented Belgium as enjoying not only tolerable conditions but positive prosperity. This campaign was continued up to the very eve of the deportations. In July, 1916, for example, the German Government organised one of its periodical "tours of inspection" for neutrals—this time a select party of Scandinavian Socialists. The German press reported their expression of astonishment and delight at all that they saw. A message from Copenhagen,

published in the semi-official *North German Gazette* on August 7, contained the following:

In Belgium one was struck with astonishment at the appearance of the cultivated fields and at the fact that most of the industrial establishments were in full activity. This year's harvest in Belgium is extraordinarily brilliant. . . . Whereas at the beginning of the occupation there were in Belgium from 120,000 to 130,000 unemployed, there are at present not more than from 40,000 to 50,000. . . . The food conditions in Belgium are described as better than in Berlin. One does not obtain the impression that the Belgian population is suffering or underfed. Of course we must think constantly of the war, but, as honourable men, we cannot refrain from bearing witness to the fact that the Germans have shown a real talent of organization in eliminating as much as possible the consequences of the war.

Even as late as December, 1916, the whole German press was denouncing the "lies" of M. Maeterlinck, the famous Belgian poet, and accusing him of "ignoring the fact that, among all the European countries, Belgium is the one whose situation in the world-war is the best from the social, economic and hygienic points of view."

Meanwhile, however, the main course of German propaganda had, in October, 1916, suddenly been shifted. A great press campaign was initiated to demonstrate the extreme seriousness of Belgian "unemployment" and the beneficent desire of the German administration to meet a desperate situation. An


example may be quoted from the *Cologne Gazette* of October 13, which, in a "letter from Brussels," gave the German press its cue:

For a long time past reports have been multiplied in quite systematic fashion in the newspapers of our enemies, concerning alleged forced labour imposed by the German Government-General in Belgium. Brutal compulsion, violation of international law and the Hague Convention, is about the least accusation made against the terrible oppressor. What is the truth of these reports? For more than a year past the abuse has shown itself in the occupied territories of Belgium that many Belgian workmen become a burden upon public charity and live upon the poor relief instead of earning their bread by honest work. . . . There is no prospect of improvement of this state of affairs, because, in consequence of England's measures, raw materials which are needed by Belgian industry cannot be imported into Belgium, so that a great part of the industrial concerns are closed. In order to prevent the dangers arising out of this state of things, it seems appropriate to employ in Germany workmen who are a burden on public charity and for whom there is no work available in Belgium. Thousands of Belgian workmen have already accepted the offers of work made to them from Germany, which assure them higher pay than they have known in Belgium, and for a long time past have been working in Germany, where they are comfortable and contented. Those work-shy persons who would rather live on public charity than work for themselves and their dependents will shortly be deported compulsorily to appropriate places of work.

Those who remember the German press methods, which have been so often illustrated in other connections in these pages, can imagine the finer embroideries of the deportation campaign. The most extravagant efforts,



BELGIANS COMPELLED BY THE GERMANS TO DIG TRENCHES.



FACSIMILE OF ORDER, IN FLEMISH, WITH FRENCH TRANSLATION, CALLING UP BELGIAN WORKMEN AT GHENT, NOVEMBER, 1916.

perhaps, were the sermons on "honest work" and the delights of slavery in Germany which were put into the mouths of imaginary Belgian "employers." One German scribe was so moved by his own composition of a letter describing the advice given by a Belgian "industrialist" to his workmen on the eve of their departure for Germany that he concluded: "This industrialist spoke as a man with a heart and a truly Christian philosopher, for he was inspired by the divine evangelic precepts of Christ."* The occasional cautions with which the German propagandists tempered their praise of the promised land were entertaining. Thus the *Bruxellois*, one of the principal mouthpieces of the German Administration, was constrained to admit (October 18, 1916) that there had been disappointments. Some Belgians, it appeared, had gone to Germany "expecting to find there a sort of earthly paradise" where they would be overpaid but permitted to retain their Belgian habits of "unrestrained independence." Instead, they had had to learn that the greatness of Germany rests upon "a discipline of iron," and to adapt themselves to the requirements of "the industrial and economic grandeur of Germany."

It is impossible to determine the exact number of Belgian workmen who had been induced to accept work in Germany before October, 1916; the German Governor-General of Belgium, Baron von Bissing, in a statement made to the *New York Times* (German text in *North German Gazette* of November 14), put the total at 30,000. It is still more difficult to determine the number of "unemployed" at the time that the deportations were definitely organized. General von Bissing maintained that there were from 400,000 to 500,000 men idle in the parts of Belgium under civil administration; a statement from a probably trustworthy Belgian source put the total at something under 350,000.† That the extent of "unemployment" was large is beyond dispute. Let us consider the main causes.

It has already been seen that at a very early stage of the occupation of Belgium the German Administration assumed complete control of

the banking machinery, levied enormous war contributions on the country (at first £2,000,000 a month, but the sum was afterwards raised to £2,400,000 a month), requisitioned materials and commodities of every conceivable kind, and steadily drained Belgium of her material wealth.* In reality the whole process was one of deliberate robbery, intended to cripple Belgium as well as to serve immediate German needs. The German decrees prove the facts; it is also possible to prove the German intention.

The economic exploitation of the territories occupied by Germany during the great war will always deserve to be associated with the name of Herr Walter Rathenau, of the *Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft*. Realizing at the beginning of the war the vast importance of the raw materials problem, Rathenau, a typical representative of the Jewish industrialism of modern Germany,* forced himself upon the Prussian Ministry of War in August, 1914, as head of a new Raw Materials Department.‡ The Prussian authorities got rid of him in March, 1915, as they habitually got rid at the earliest moment of all Jewish invaders of the high places of Prussian bureaucracy. But it was Rathenau who had planned the spoliation of Belgium, France and Russian Poland. After his departure from office he was anxious to place his services on record. The *Chicago Daily News* was supplied with an eulogy of Herr Rathenau's work, which candidly explained that there were only three possibilities open to Germany at the beginning of the war—to open up new sources of production in Germany, to make the most of such channels of importation as still remained open, and to exhaust the supplies of the occupied territories. Herr Rathenau expanded these views in a lecture which he delivered in Berlin on December 20, 1915. When the lecture was published as a pamphlet the censorship had carefully removed the admissions concerning the spoliation of occupied territories. Happily, however, a full report of the lecture reached Vienna: that which was supplied to the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* by Professor Arnold Krasny contained the following passage:—

The occupation of Belgium, of the most important industrial part of France, and of parts of Russian territory, made new work for the German Raw Materials Department. The raw materials in the possession of these three areas had to be placed at the service of German war-economics: in particular, the stocks that were found in the centres of the wool trade of the Continent

* The German propaganda and most of the documentary evidence concerning the deportations are very fully treated in M. Fernand Passelecq's book, "Les Déportations Belges à la lumière des Documents Allemands," which has been of great value in the writing of this chapter.

† Passelecq, *op. cit.*, page 108.

* Vol. XI., pp. 27 to 36.

‡ See Vol. V., p. 183.

and the considerable stores of rubber and nitrates had to be turned to the use of German manufacture. The difficulties of requisitioning these supplies under the laws of war were overcome (*sic*), a network of collecting centres, warehouse centres and channels of distribution was established, the transport difficulties were removed, and new blood was poured into German industry, expanding and prolonging its vitality.

Moreover, Herr Rathenau boasted that his activities had "rendered quite ineffective the English blockade of raw materials"—an amusing commentary on the German efforts, to which further reference will be made, to attribute all the unemployment in Belgium to the British blockade!

The misfortunes of the German censorship did not end with Herr Rathenau's own confessions. In 1915 Herr Ludwig Ganghofer, a peculiarly inspired representative of Bavarian journalism and a special favourite of the German Emperor, published a little book called *Journey to the German Front*. It was a reproduction of contributions to the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*. Unfortunately for Herr Ganghofer, and for the German officials in Belgium, the appearance of the book only called attention to the censor's deletion from its pages of the following candid passage which appeared in one of Herr Ganghofer's articles as published in the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* of February 26, 1915:

For a fortnight I was on my legs every day, in order to obtain a rough idea of what is done in the area of a single corps and a single army by the carefully co-ordinated German machinery on the lines of communication, which works so quietly and surely. What I saw there on a limited scale is repeated all over the Western Front, to the great profit of Germany.

All the work is done on the principle that as little as possible of what the Army needs is to be brought from Germany, that as much as possible is to be got out of the conquered enemy country, and that everything indispensable to the Army or useful for Germany is to be transported to Germany. During three months about four-fifths of the requirements of the Army were covered out of the conquered country. Even now, when the profitable sources of the country conquered by us already yield a scantier flow, the conquered territory is still covering as much as two-thirds of the needs of the German Army in the West. It is estimated that, on an average, the German Empire has thus saved, during the past four months, from 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 marks a day. This profit from victory for the Germans is further increased very considerably by the economic war which, according to the provisions of international law, is carried on against the conquered country—that is to say, by the employment of the State-owned goods which are transported to Germany from Belgium and Northern France in enormous quantities, consisting of war booty, fortress supplies, corn, wool, metals, valuable wood, and other things; all this apart from all the unrequisitioned private property, which, indeed, is in necessary cases released to swell the German stocks, but is paid for by us to its full value. What Germany saves and gains by this economic war, conducted with commercial foresight, can be reckoned at a further 6,000,000 to 7,000,000 marks a day, so that the whole

profit which the German Empire has made behind its Western Front since the beginning of the war can be estimated at about 2,000,000,000 marks. For Germany this is a gigantic victory, because of the economy and increase of her economic strength; for the enemy it is a crushing defeat, because of the exhaustion of all the financial resources of his territories lost to us.

Of the ramifications and control of this economic war I shall have more to say. Then people will learn to banish to the lumber-room the catch phrase about "the impractical German." A German officer of high rank at St. Quentin expressed for me the happy change that, in this respect, has been accomplished in the thoughtful but amusing words: "It is extraordinary what a man can learn. Really, I am a Potsdam Guards officer, but now I am dealing in wood and wool—and even with success!"

In spite of all this, Baron von Bissing, trusting to the German censorship, declared in his statement to the *New York Times*: "Thanks to the pitiless economic strangulation of Belgium by England, more than a million impoverished Belgians, men, women and children, depend upon public relief. In consequence of the stoppage of importation of raw materials and the veto upon exportation of manufactured goods, England has condemned almost 500,000 Belgian workmen to a chronic state of demoralising inactivity. . . . I did everything possible to assist in the revival of Belgian industry. But, as the raw materials were lacking, it was impossible to make the Belgian factories produce to their full capacity."

Not only were the Germans thus trying to use the plight to which they had reduced Belgium as an argument which might provoke bitter criticism in Belgium and in neutral countries of the British blockade, but they were actually endeavouring to exploit British sympathy with unhappy Belgium in a desperate attempt to secure concessions which would enable them to squeeze still further manufactures out of the occupied territory. It was a manœuvre difficult to meet and difficult to expose. It was obvious that the British Government could permit importation of raw materials into Belgium only under the most rigid guarantees, and it was equally obvious that no promises which Germany might be pleased to make could be of the slightest value. Nevertheless it was decided to attempt an arrangement, and the British Government gave its approval to a scheme to provide relief for Belgian industries by importations of raw materials from abroad, "in spite of their belief that such importations, even under the safeguards proposed, would result in substantial benefit to the enemy."*

* Foreign Office Memorandum of February: *The Times*, Feb. 21, 1916.



PLATE No. 115

"AN OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT."

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

[Copyright of "Land and Water."]

The main feature of the proposals was that the importation of raw materials into Belgium should be effected through the agency and under the guarantee of the Belgian Relief Commission. The Germans "were to permit the free importation of raw materials, and the export of manufactured goods made from such materials, through the Relief Commission; they were to respect, and free from all embargo or requisition, any stocks of similar raw materials or manufactured goods still remaining

in the country; and they were, in general, to treat any factory thus supplied by the Commission as enjoying the same privileges and immunities as one of the Commission's warehouses." The German Government made no reply to these proposals, which were made early in the winter of 1915, and merely engaged in a fresh campaign of recrimination and misrepresentation, when the British Government brought the facts to light in February, 1916, in the Memorandum already

quoted, and said that it "must disclaim all responsibility towards the Belgian people for evils which the enemy has both caused and refused to remove." The discussion merely revealed the fixed German policy of impoverishing Belgium and driving the Belgian workmen into German employment.

While the Germans thus laboured to put the



GENERAL VON HUENE,
Military Governor of Antwerp in 1915-16.

odium of their own crimes upon England, they did not spare the good name of their victims; when they were not abusing the British blockade they were accusing the Belgians, notoriously one of the most industrious races in the world, of constitutional idleness and chronic "ill will."

It is hardly necessary to lay further stress upon the gross insincerity of the German Government and of the German authorities in Belgium; they had themselves created the "unemployment" which they proposed to turn to their own purposes. In a memorandum issued from Le Havre on February 1, 1917, the Belgian Government summarized as follows the terrible story that has now to be told:

On the part of the occupying Power, the deportations were coldly carried out in accordance with a carefully considered plan, in spite of the most formal promises and assurances of immunity but lately lavished on the population by the most distinguished representatives of the Imperial Government, notably by the Military Governor of Antwerp and the Governor-General, Field-Marshal von der Goltz. Belgian families have been broken up pitilessly. Men of all ages (from 17 to 55 and over), of all classes (those in receipt of relief and those in easy circumstances, the unemployed and the employed, many of the latter being actually taken from their work), were carried off in droves, transported, under most inhuman conditions, to places the names of which they were forbidden to reveal to their families, and subjected to compulsory labour in the military interests, direct or indirect, of the enemy. Before starting, they were

allowed the option of accepting a so-called "voluntary" engagement at an apparently high wage for work in Germany, or deportation, with a nominal wage (30 pfennigs a day). Whether they signed the agreement or not, they were condemned to forcible separation from their families. The vast majority of them refused to sign, and even to work. They were then subjected to the most horrible treatment, scientifically graded and applied with a refinement of calculated cruelty which hitherto was held to be the monopoly of barbarous peoples or those who had relapsed into barbarism. The tortures of hunger, thirst, cold, of standing motionless for hours, of beating; threats of death and imprisonment; clubbing with the butt-ends of rifles, etc., were all applied to break down the resistance of these obscure heroes of patriotic duty.

Reports calculated to make every civilized man quiver with indignation have come into the possession of the Belgian Government, describing the unspeakable sufferings inflicted on thousands of innocent men in the camps where they are herded by the German Government, camps where this pitiable human cattle is classified and broken in to serve the ends of German despotism.

Sufferings even greater perhaps are the portion of the hapless victims sent to the rear of the German lines in Flanders and in France.

Forced to undertake hard tasks and labour in the open air during the most rigorous season of the year, without having ever been trained and inured thereto; exposed to the fire of the artillery; miserably clad, insufficiently fed, large numbers of these poor creatures succumb to exhaustion and sickness. The mortality among them seems to be considerable. The sick and dying who can travel are sent home with less consideration than was shown in ancient times to slaves by owners who were concerned to preserve the human flocks which formed part of their wealth. From these pitiable bands of



GENERAL VON ZWEHL,
Military Governor of Antwerp, 1917.

repatriated sufferers we have now learnt what is the life led by their compatriots still at work; there is but one word to describe it—it is hell.

The German decree of October 3, 1916, was originally posted in the Etappen-Zone, or Zone of Depôts and Lines of Communication, which then consisted of the provinces of West Flanders and East Flanders and the Tournai district of the province of Hainaut.* But before the

* See Vol. XI., pp. 3, 4, and map (p. 16) showing the territory occupied by the Germans.

end of October deportations had begun in the parts of Belgium under the German civil administration: the decree was applied, in fact, to the whole of the occupied territory. It will have been observed that the decree made no distinctions of sex or age. It does not appear that any large number of Belgian women were deported to Germany, although many of them were made to work behind the



["Life" Publishing Co., N.Y.]

"GERMANY'S LATEST CRIME."

German lines in Belgium and Northern France. The lowest age of deportees was, generally, 17, the age fixed for Belgians to become liable to military control. The public notice issued by General von Huene, Governor of Antwerp, on November 2, confined the liability to deportation to men below the age of 30. But, whether or not this age limit was intended to apply universally, the Germans freely deported men up to, and over, the age of 50. In reality the whole procedure was arbitrary, and the fate of the population depended upon the pleasure of the German officers who happened to be employed as slave-drivers in particular districts.

The general method applied was as follows. The Belgian local authorities were compelled, under threats of imprisonment or deportation, to deliver lists of "unemployed" and persons in receipt of relief moneys. If there were no lists, the Belgian authorities were ordered to com-

pile lists immediately. In most cases the Belgian authorities refused, and the Germans then seized all sorts of registers—lists of population, electoral registers, and military registers—and called up at haphazard all the persons named. In some places the Germans issued a general summons to all males over the age of 17, or actually collected men from the streets. The men who reported underwent a sort of medical examination, and those who were obviously unable to work were weeded out. The men selected for deportation were then urged to sign "voluntary" contracts, which in many cases were drafted only in German. In some towns, for instance Bruges and Ghent, the Germans obtained all the signatures they could by imprisoning their victims and keeping them without food. In some cases the examination of recruits was followed by immediate deportation, in other cases the men were sent home for a time. A remarkable feature of the German arrangements was the requirement that the deportees, who according to the German theory were unable to support themselves, should provide themselves with a elaborate outfit for their pilgrimage. For instance, the following notice was issued at Alost:

Mobil. Etapp.-Kommatr. E.O. 13/14 October, 1916.
9. xviii. No. _____

COMMUNE OF ALOST.

On the 16th October, 1916, M— X— must present himself at 8.0 a.m. at Alost (at the Ecole de Pupilles), provided with:—

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1 scarf. | 1 overcoat. |
| 1 neckerchief. | 1 pair of cloth gloves. |
| 1 waistcoat. | 1 waterproof (capable of serving as a waterproof coat). |
| 1 pair of trousers. | 1 towel. |
| 1 pair of shoes or boots. | 1 food-bowl. |
| 2 shirts. | 1 spoon, knife and fork. |
| 2 pairs of socks. | 2 blankets. |
| 2 pairs of drawers. | |

He may also provide himself with money.

Failure to appear will be punished with imprisonment and deprivation of liberty up to a term of three years, and with a fine up to 10,000 marks, or with one or other of these penalties.

THE KOMMANDANTUR.

In some of the notices it was stated that the deportees should bring money, "if they had any," but no explanation was forthcoming of their assumed ability to pay fines of £500 apiece!

As for the actual work of deportation, abundant evidence soon found its way out of Belgium. Take, for instance, the proceedings in the district of Mons. On October 25 a notice was posted in half a dozen villages requiring the whole male population to present themselves at Quiévrain on the following

morning. The following is a trustworthy account of what followed :

The men assembled were brought into the courtyard of a school, where they remained for a long period in the rain. Most of them had come unprovided with warm clothing or food, unprepared for the length of the proceedings and ignorant of their meaning.

After a preliminary inspection, the authorities singled



[Copyright of "Land and Water."]

"ALL FOR THEIR GOOD."

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

out the priests, the professors and teachers, the town clerks, the customs officials and the members of the local food committees. Old men and cripples were at once rejected. The authorities then proceeded to select the men whom they proposed to take; the selection was made with great care, though the principle upon which it was based is not apparent; in some cases men out of work were sent back home, while others who had never been unemployed, as well as clerks, students and farmers, were taken; 1,200 persons were retained, about 20 to 25 per cent. of the able-bodied population of these villages.

These men were divided into various groups and sent to the railway station, where a train had been waiting since the morning; the train departed in the direction of Mons. Relatives who, in great distress, had followed the train as far as Mons, bringing clothes and food for the men, were not allowed access to them.

The following description was supplied by an American eye-witness to the London correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* :

Naturally the scenes attending this forcible removal of fathers and sons wring the hardest of hearts. I saw one long train of cattle trucks loaded with prospective deportees. Many had resisted, only to feel a German bayonet. Women and children had fought for their menfolk with desperate fierceness; clothes were tattered, eyes streaming, voices screaming and shouting until they were hoarse. Generally with as little brutality as possible, but always effectually, the Kaiser's soldiers crushed all opposition. Houses were searched by armed men from cellar to roofs. No discrimination was made between employed and unemployed. Only one object was

plainly in view—to obtain the largest possible number of strong hands. When the train was loaded women and children were standing about in a huge crowd. Suddenly they ran on the line in front of the locomotive, threw themselves on the rails, and clung there, shutting their eyes and uttering loud lamentations. Detachments of soldiers prised them loose with bayonets and forced them to clear the track, when the train moved off towards the German frontier.

In reality, as this American eye-witness said, there was no discrimination between employed and unemployed; the Germans simply carried away the people they wanted for their factories.

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Affiches Arrêtés et Avis Allemands

Gouvernement de Bruxelles
et du Brabant.

Bruxelles, le 12 novembre 1916.

AVIS

A tous les Bourgmestres du Grand-Bruxelles
et du Brabant.

Ce n'est pas la population belge qui profitera le moins de l'ordre donné par M. le Gouverneur général de transporter en Allemagne les sans-travail et les chômeurs volontaires qui sont à la charge de l'assistance publique. Les classes laborieuses réduites à l'inaction depuis des années, trouvaient en Allemagne des salaires rémunérateurs qu'elles ne peuvent trouver en Belgique, à raison principalement du manque de matières premières.

Il est du devoir de toutes les administrations communales belges de prêter leur aide à l'exécution des mesures. Tous les bourgmestres doivent immédiatement remettre au commandant — pour le Grand-Bruxelles à la Commandantur — les listes exigées des ouvriers n'ayant pas d'occupation saisonnière. Les communes doivent s'abstenir de jour au jour, à partir de cette date, à préparer leurs chômeurs au départ.

Dans les communes où les listes ne seront pas fournies en temps voulu, l'administration allemande choisira elle-même les hommes à transporter en Allemagne. Mais elle n'a ni le temps, ni les moyens, de faire une enquête sur la situation de chaque personne. Si donc, au cours de ce choix, il se produit des cas pénibles ou des erreurs, la responsabilité en retombera sur les bourgmestres qui auront refusé d'aider l'Administration allemande. L'insistance sur le fait que les ouvriers, une fois transportés en Allemagne, ne pourront revenir en Belgique que dans des cas exceptionnels d'extrême urgence ou justifiés par des raisons irrécusables.


Je sévira avec la plus extrême rigueur contre les bourgmestres qui ne dresseront pas les listes ou qui les dresseront avec négligence, et cela non pas seulement pour desobéissance aux ordres allemands, mais aussi pour avoir méconnu leur devoir vis-à-vis de la population confiée à leurs soins.

Le Gouverneur,
HURT,
Lieutenant-Général.

Echos et Nouvelles

GERMAN PROCLAMATION AT BRUSSELS,

Putting upon the Belgian Burgomasters the blame for the "impossibility" of proper examination of deportees to Germany.



[Copyright of "Land and Water."]

"PROSPERITY REIGNS IN FLANDERS."

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

Before many months had passed a mass of evidence on this point was obtained from Belgians who escaped. It demonstrated that the number of employed who were deported enormously exceeded the number of unemployed. For example, out of 304 deportees from Quaregnon only 77 were unemployed;

out of 140 from Hornu only 53 were unemployed; out of 183 from Templeuve only 30 were unemployed; out of 170 from Eeckeren only 50 were unemployed. And so on. It appears that there was not a single unemployed man among 400 deported from Arlon, some of whom were actually carried away from a

MOED, BELGEN!

... harte houding en uw krachtdadig verze-
... den u druk maakt op de neutrale volkeren
Waarom is het, dat de vreemde dagbladen niet meer
door laten? Omdat zij alle den snooden aanslag op
uw vrijheid en uw veroordeelen.

... en verhoeding!
... zij zat een de nabij. Maar toont aan de wereld,
... dat geroep al de volkeren, h'e grootste zij door de
... de onbrugbare mond overkinderen
... het ongenade jale van e u
... en beetje minder of een beetje mee-
... dat-geacht voor uw rechts teden veld
... zij geweld. Geheel de wereld bewoond nu
... des medemens zal uwen lof verkonden
... zal, noch rechtstreeks noch onrecht
... van den vijand helpen ver-
... reiken

Ons waantwoord blijft, voor iedereen, altijd en overal:

Wij gaan ons niet aanmelden!

Wij laten ons niet wegvoeren!

LEVE ONS VADERLAND!

A "lawless" appeal to workmen to resist the deportations.

Contrat de Travail

Le soussigné, Monsieur
rue
déclare contracter par la présente un engagement de travail avec la Maison

- 1^{er} - Il s'engage en qualité de
sous même titre et conditions que les ouvriers allemands, de même catégorie selon
le travail fourni, à Frs
en moyenne par jour
- 2^o - Il reconnaît expressément les lois de travail de l'Empire Allemand et le règlement en
vigueur dans l'usine, tout en reconnaissant l'article 3 du présent contrat
- 3^o - L'ouvrier sera assuré contre la maladie et les accidents du travail exactement comme
les ouvriers allemands

4^o - Il se soumet à l'obligation d'habiter un logement qui lui sera désigné, et il lui sera
porté en compte pour le logement et nourriture par jour environ Frs

5^o - Ce contrat a une validité de quatre mois, à partir du premier jour de travail, et il
ne peut être résilié par aucune des parties pendant cette période

6^o - L'ouvrier déclare être libre de toute infirmité

Fait en double à Châteaufort Boulevard Audent, le

Le
1916
L'Ouvrier.

En franchissant la frontière il est strictement défendu d'emporter des lettres, livres, journaux,
notes, etc., sans les documents d'identité
Bij het overtreeden der grens is het streng verboden brieven, boeken, dagbladen, aantekening-
ingen, enz. mede te nemen behalve bijzondere documenten van identiteit.

The "Contract" to which the Germans endeavoured to obtain the signatures of Belgian deportees.

factory. The Germans took gardeners and diamond-workers from Antwerp, iron-workers from Ghent, railway servants from Nivelles, men from the arsenal at Malines, men from a guano factory at Burcht, and a batch of civilians who arrived at Alten-Grabow in November, 1915, included miners, engineers and office clerks. At Virton all the skilled workmen were taken. Special care was taken to pursue men who had refused to work for the Germans in Belgium.

As has been said, the methods of raiding were arbitrary. The German officers who directed operations usually selected their victims at random, inspecting whole batches at a time and simply ordering men for deportation to the left and men for exemption to the right. At some places the Belgian burgomasters and priests were able to intercede successfully for their people, but in most cases all their efforts were defeated. At Virton a priest was wounded in the disturbances, and afterwards condemned to three months' imprisonment for interference in the recruiting operations.

After some experience of the system of summoning men by general notice, the German authorities began, at any rate in large towns, to call up their victims by individual letters. At Brussels, for instance, every man received a card, stating his name, address, age and profession, and ordering him to appear at the railway station at 8 a.m. The card also bore the following notice :

As you may be sent to a place of work, and it may therefore be no longer possible to keep in touch with your family, it is suggested that you provide yourself with a spoon, a fork, winter garments, linen and strong boots.

At Malines the men belonging to professions had their cards specially stamped with an exemption mark; the main object of the Germans was to discover skilled workmen. There were cases—at Ciply, for example—in which the German officers, angered because the recruiting operations proceeded too slowly, simply liberated some of the men at random and deported the rest. At places where men who were to be deported escaped during or after the raids the local authorities and the population were held responsible, and fines and various punishments were inflicted. The resistance of the population was necessarily of a passive kind; in many towns leaflets were secretly printed and distributed, urging the men not to answer the summons of the German authorities. It must be understood that all

exemptions were merely temporary, and that the raids might be repeated at any time. Both at Ghent and Antwerp there were at least two large raids.

The Germans never showed any pity, and never exempted men because they had large families or widowed mothers to support. Their own rules as to the exemption of particular classes were made to be broken. The theoretical exemption of students was seldom observed; farmers were often deported; former members of the Belgian Garde Civique were exempted in some places and deported from others. There were many proved cases of the deportation of boys of 14 and 15 years of age. Everywhere failure to report in answer to the German summons was regarded as proof of "unemployment," and every effort was made to arrest absentees at their homes.

It is impossible to state with certainty the total number of deportations, but it appears that in their main campaign, which continued during the winter of 1916-17, the Germans carried away some 60,000 men to work in their factories and workshops. The number of Belgians deported to the German front in France may be estimated at 75,000. Including the men who were removed for work of a military character on the Dutch frontier and behind the German front in Belgium, the total number of persons affected by the deportations may, perhaps, be put at 150,000.

Let us now see how Germany carried out what General von Bissing called her "economic and social duty" of employing Belgian labour in Germany, and how she proceeded, in another of his unctuous phrases, "to put the great interests of the whole above the freedom of the individual falsely understood."

Some of the deportees were taken to the Yser front, a large number were taken to the occupied territory in France, a great many of the latter working on a new strategic line running from Lille to Civet. Those who were deported to Germany were either transferred at once to factories—many were employed at Gelsenkirchen—or they were herded in camps, where they constituted reserves of labour for the authorities or for private employers. These camps were the modern German equivalent of slave-markets, and local employers were informed of their opportunities by official advertisements in the newspapers. "Those may reckon them-



MÜNSTER PRISONERS' CAMP: ARRIVAL OF BELGIANS.

selves happy who were not the victims of a cruel system of starvation and torture. Those who refused work were often compelled to stand upright for several days, almost without food. They had the choice between complete inactivity, the preface to irreparable enfeeblement, or crushing toil for the benefit of the enemy. The German authorities tried to deceive their families by publishing imaginary letters alleged to be written by deportees. The heavy and ridiculous style of these letters betrayed their Germanic origin and increased anxiety in Belgium."* Here is an example of these epistles, published on December 18, 1916, in the German organ, *Le Bruxellois* :

From Gustave G., at Rothausen, to his wife : "Our

* From "De la Déportation des Belges en Allemagne," an excellent review of the whole subject contributed to the *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* by M. van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister to the Vatican.

food is good. In the morning coffee and bread and butter ; at midday fricassée and potatoes, carrots, and a little meat, and I assure you that not one of us can eat it all without loosening his belt ; in the evening lentil soup and a little pork or a herring. I believe we shall weigh a hundred kilos when we return."

A mass of evidence as to the treatment of the Belgian deportees in Germany was provided in the course of time by the victims themselves. Individual reports are difficult to check, and not too much reliance would be placed upon reports few in number and unsupported. But the evidence here is overwhelming in its cumulative effect, and it is well to record a number of reports which can be regarded as trustworthy. The most important camp was at Münster, in Westphalia, and the men interned there formed a labour reserve for the works at Essen and Dortmund and for the Westphalian coal mines. Here are some reports on the prevailing conditions :



MÜNSTER PRISONERS' CAMP: FRENCH AND BELGIAN PRISONERS EMPLOYED TO DRAW WAGGONS.

Food bad. Just enough to keep body and soul together. Many prisoners are ill. Under the least pretext the guards knock them about. (Report of a man deported from Liège, who escaped.)

Bad food. Some dry bread to eat, and swede soup (Deportee from Belgian Luxemburg.)

Bad and insufficient food. Many deaths of deportees from the Hainaut Province. (Protest of Mons Deputies to Baron von Bissing, January, 1917.)

Insufficient food. Deportees from Mons were sent to "punishment camp" because they refused to work. They had been obliged to work in the marshes without food in the bitter cold. They had been threatened several times, a quick-firing gun being brought to bear on them and firing blank cartridges in order to terrorise them into submission. After 42 days of this régime many had died, and the survivors had been sent to Münster. Eleven of these died in the camp within

work either in the fields from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. or in the marshes, their feet in the water, under the stick of the "Feldwebels," or in the salt and coal mines under German supervision, and in the factories. Those who refuse to work are deprived of food or forced to remain a whole day at attention without moving. (Report of an escaped prisoner of war, February, 1917, on the fate of the deportees.)

Eleven thousand Belgian deportees at Soltau who refuse to work. We received only at 6 a.m. a decoction of acorns, at noon a pint of soup with some turnips, carrots, or swedes, at 3 p.m. $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of black bread, very often mouldy, in the evening half a pint of the same soup as at noon. Even the strongest decline in health. Some die every day. Two went mad in the first week of their captivity. In the evening they creep into the kitchen to collect the parings of potatoes, turnips and carrots, which they eat raw.



GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMP AT SOLTAU.

1, Camp I.—2, Camp II.—3, Kitchens.—4, Catholic Church.—5, 5, Guns.

eight days. (Report of deportees from Florenville, January, 1917.)

Those who refuse to sign are obliged to drill three times a day, and are deprived of their midday meal.

The following reports are from another very large internment centre, Soltau :

There were nearly 2,500 civilians left in the camp housed in nine huts ; 7,000 had been sent to work in the detachments (Kommandos), some at Metz and Sedan, others as far as Allenstein (East Prussia). The huts were not heated, or badly heated, the food quite insufficient. There were 380 sick people in February, 1917, 100 of whom were left in the huts. Their priest was not allowed to visit them. From November, 1916, to February, 1917, 200 men had died, mostly from tuberculosis and pneumonia ; 5,000 to 6,000 had been sent back to Belgium, most of them in an exhausted condition. The régime is especially hard in the Kommandos. Those who come back to camp are half dead and worn out. The deportees were not allowed to receive parcels from abroad.

From 2,500 to 3,000 men too weak to be sent to the Kommandos are staying in the camp. The others

Various methods are adopted in order to compel the men to work. One day 40 of them were taken away. A week later they returned. They had been taken to the Grand-Duchy of Baden, where they had been given abundant food for a couple of days. Then they were informed that they would receive the same amount every day if they would consent to work. On their refusal they were sent back to Soltau in a cattle truck, remaining 35 hours without food. Another day a German sergeant disguised as a Belgian soldier harangued the deportees, telling them that they were very foolish to endure such sufferings, that no one would be grateful to them, etc. (Reports of deportees sent back to Belgium, December, 1916.)

A deportee taken to Baden Etelser Moor near Soltau, reported :

They left the men 36 hours without food or drink, because they refused to work. We were left without fire. When we complained the soldiers answered, "No work, no bread." Then the men were put on half rations and forced to walk with hands uplifted. I have seen 50 of these martyrs fall exhausted within one hour.

As has already been stated, deportations of women were rare, although the Germans had taken care not to exempt women under the deportation decree of October 3, 1916. Here is the report (December, 1916) of a woman who was deported to Oberbrück, near Heinsberg, and sent back to Belgium :

The first women deported were taken from Alost on December 8. Women were taken afterwards from Brussels, Ghent, etc. They were sent to Germany with the men, wearing the name of the employer to whom they were sent. These met the deportees at Aachen, and took away their human cattle without any consideration of family ties. The 20 women of Alost were the first Belgian women at Oberbrück, but they found there 400 women from Alsace-Lorraine.

There were three huts at Oberbrück, one for the men and two for the women. There were not enough beds for all the women, and the food was bad and scarce.

Those who refused to work, the women as well as the men, were deprived of food. Those who "behaved well" could go out for two hours every week. On Sundays they were led to church under escort, but they were not allowed to confess and to communicate.

They were employed in an artificial silk factory. The women were paid 2 marks a day, but 1 mark was taken for their food, and fines were numerous. When the prisoners heard that the silk was for Zeppelins they refused to work and were punished.

A particularly illuminating report is that of a competent witness of events between March and December, 1916, at Holzminden, a large civilian camp, where there were 44 huts for men and 10 for women ; boys were allowed to remain with their mothers until they reached the age of 12 or 13, when they were taken away and put with the men. In June, 1916, there

were already in the camp 734 men, 59 women and 13 children of Belgian nationality ; one of the prisoners was the distinguished Belgian historian, Professor Henri Pirenne, whose crime was his refusal to co-operate in Baron von Bissing's "Flemish movement." In December, 1916, there were 700 or 800 women and about 40 children, most of them Russians or Poles. The women's camp was in charge of a German prostitute and a Russian. The report explains clearly the German system :

Food is bad and insufficient—200 grammes of potato-bread and swede soups. There are many sick prisoners ; dysentery and tuberculosis are spreading. The prisoners are obliged to work from 6 to 12 and from 1 to 6 p.m. The women are not obliged to work. According to needs the authorities take from the camp detachments who are obliged to work in the salt-mines or in the rubber factories of Harburg and Hanover (Jacobi), where motor-cars are made for the Army.

The employers can apply at the "Arbeitsnachweisbüro" in the camp. They have to pay 40 marks (£2) for every worker engaged. These must sign an engagement to work for the duration of the war. Those who refuse to sign are incorporated in an "Arbeits-Kommando." The "Büro" is called the "slave-market" by the prisoners.

The "Arbeits-Kommandos" have been organized in the camp since November, 1916. The men are housed in three separate huts—one Russian, one French and one Belgian—and are compelled to work in a neighbouring quarry. Their treatment is so bad that they cannot hold out long.

There are three categories of punishment : *Mittel arrest* : 3 to 15 days in a small cell (3 yards square) ; *Strengarrest* : 4 weeks in a completely dark cell ; and *Pilori*, for those who try to escape. The condemned man is tied to a post in a hut. His hands are tied behind his back and his body suspended by ropes



A GERMAN PICTURE OF THE CAMP HOSPITAL AT SOLTAU.



HOLZMINDEN: CHILD PRISONERS.

ried round the breast and above the feet. The torture lasts three to four hours. It is frequently applied. Sometimes eight men are tortured at the same time.

There are no riots. A machine-gun is placed at each corner of the camp.

Some of the prisoners have been able to purchase their liberty for sums varying between 5,000 and 10,000 marks (£250 and £500).

A large number of deportees were sent to Cassel, and when they refused to work were transferred for a period of punishment at Ohrdruf. "The 25 days at Ohrdruf," wrote one of them, "are 25 days of martyrdom." Here is an account (December, 1916) of the Ohrdruf régime :

The men who refuse to work must remain in a field in the snow, without moving, hands out of their pockets. If one of them faints with cold and exhaustion the others may not help him. If they still resist they are deprived of bread and given only half their already small ration of soup. Then the fires are put out in the huts. And if they still persevere after three days of exposure and privation they are left to perish from cold without mattresses and blankets.

Let us add to the horrible record of the camps two reports about Meschede, originally a camp for Belgian soldiers, to which many deportees were sent in the autumn of 1916. The first report is by a native of Aerschot :

We were about 800 deportees from Aerschot and surrounding villages. On the way to Meschede we were joined by many Walloons, and when we arrived we found people from Antwerp and Tirlemont ; then came people from Malines and Arlon. We were finally about 600. Those who accepted work were not too miserable, but the others were mercilessly beaten. Some of them received bayonet wounds. The punishments were the cell, blows and privation of food. There was not enough

food and it was very bad. To make some soup the people dug among a heap of rotten turnips. During three months they received about 20 potatoes per head. From November 23 to December 27 62 men died of exhaustion. The deportees were sent to work in a briquette factory. They refused to work and during three days they were deprived of food. Then, under new threats, they surrendered.

The following is the declaration of a deportee from Mons :

Three men from Mons, all working, were sent to Meschede on November 17 and thence to Eschweiler. They were obliged there to make fire-proof bricks. Food was very bad and insufficient.

On one day, in camp, they buried four of their comrades, all strong men before they were taken away. One man was condemned to 14 days' cell for refusal to work. He was obliged to stand all day long and could only lie down at night. He received 200 gr. of bread and some water every day. Others who refused to work were sent to the punishment camp of Westenberg, near Frankfurt.

The workers received 0.45 mark per hour, but 3 m. 5 were taken every day for board and clothes, and they had to pay 1 m. 80 every fortnight for their insurance and also their laundry.

Such were the conditions in the German camps. What was the treatment of the unfortunate Belgians who were compelled to work in the German factories ? Some were employed in quarries, some in coal mines. Five hundred deportees from Brussels were employed as coal miners near Osterfeld. "They were treated like slaves. Work was very hard and food insufficient. Those who did not go down into the pits because they were ill were beaten and locked up in cellars." A Belgian who escaped from Herne, in West-



HOLZMINDEN: CHILDREN COMING FROM THE WOMEN'S CAMP.

phalia, reported on life at Baum's Maschinen-Fabrik :

We worked 11 hours a day from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. and received from three. to fourpence an hour. But we had to pay 1 m. 65 per day for our board and 8 m. per week for the war tax, also for our clothes.

Food was bad and insufficient, and the workers were very badly treated. A Belgian prisoner, who had broken the cable of a machine by accident, had not only to pay for it but was relentlessly beaten by civilians and soldiers. He was struck with a hatchet and badly wounded.

A foreman having boxed the ears of an Italian prisoner because he worked too slowly, the man sprang at the throat of his gaoler, but some German soldiers and civilians came to the rescue. They beat the prisoner with iron bars. He was carried away unconscious, the blood pouring from his face. He never came back, and must have died in hospital.

A man from Ghent, who refused to work on account

of his weakness, was stripped of his clothes and left standing in a meadow white with frost. The German women, who worked on a railway line in front of the factory, gathered round and applauded each time a German soldier struck him.

At Mannheim many Belgians were compelled to work in munition factories. At Ruhrort many Belgian and French deportees worked in the coal-fields. At Bochum Belgian deportees were forced to make trollies in the Breitstein und Koppel factories. At Düsseldorf Belgians were forced to work in the Rheinische Metal-waren-Fabrik—Government munition factories. One of them made the following report :


Everything which comes out of the kitchen camps is filthy. A man found one day a dead mouse in his platter, another day the dressing of a wounded cook. If you protested you were knocked about. During the coldest days of winter a prisoner was obliged to run two hours with only his shirt on, behind the hut. Each month the Commandant had to send some of the men to be examined at Münster. According to the result of this examination it was decided whether or not the German doctors must come down to choose the sick men to be sent to Switzerland. Fearing this inspection, the Commandant always sent to Münster the strongest men.

Deportees in the Münster camp were forced to work in the Mannesmann works at Gelsenkirchen, and deportees in the Holzminden camp were employed in cement works and in the Phoenix iron works. Other Belgian deportees, especially those who refused to work, were taken to Russian Poland. The following report describes conditions near Warsaw in the winter of 1916-17 :

The men had refused to sign an engagement to work. In Poland they had been housed in huts without fire or bedding. The men were famished, and in order to tempt them their guards passed from time to time through the huts carrying buckets of steaming soup. If they signed they should have some. Then, as they persevered, they were compelled to walk in the snow with only their socks on. Nearly all came back with frozen feet. Forty of them were carried to hospital after the first day.



HOLZMINDEN CAMP: CHILDREN AND MEN AT THE KITCHEN.



[Copyright of "Lana and Water."]

"PERHAPS THIS ONE WILL KILL MY SON ON THE YSER."

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

They were sent back in a closed waggon, and during five days got only one meal. Every day their gaoler shovelled a certain quantity of bread into the waggon. When they arrived they were so dazed that they did not even take the money which was offered them.

From all parts of industrial Germany—conditions in Saxony, for example, were no better than in Prussia—came similar reports of starvation, filthy accommodation, brutality and deliberate torture.

As was to be expected, a flood of protests poured upon the Germans from all Belgian

communities and authorities which were able to make their voices heard. It is impossible to reproduce here the eloquent appeals of the Deputies and Senators of Antwerp, Brussels, Mons, Luxemburg, of scientific bodies, universities, and representatives of the law. It will suffice to quote the brief correspondence which passed between the Municipal Council of Tournai and the local German command :

RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TOURNAI,
DATED OCTOBER 20, 1916.

In the matter of the requisition made by the German

authorities on October 20, 1916 (requisition of a list of workmen to be drawn up by the Municipality) . . .

The Municipal Council resolves to maintain its attitude of refusal.

It further feels it its duty to place on record the following :

The City of Tournai is prepared to submit unreservedly to all the exigencies authorised by the laws and customs of war. Its sincerity cannot be questioned. For more



CARDINAL MERCIER.

than two years it has submitted to the German Occupation, during which time it has lodged and lived at close quarters with the German troops, yet it has displayed perfect composure and has refrained itself from any act of hostility, proving thereby that it is animated by no idle spirit of bravado.

But the City could not bring itself to provide arms for use against its own children, knowing well that natural law and the law of nations (which is the expression of natural law) both forbid such action.

In his declaration dated September 2, 1914, the German Governor-General of Belgium declared : " I ask none to renounce his patriotic sentiments."

The City of Tournai reposes confidence in this declara-

tion, which it is bound to consider as the sentiment of the German Emperor, in whose name the Governor-General was speaking. In accepting the inspiration of honour and patriotism, the City is loyal to a fundamental duty, the loftiness of which must be apparent to any German officer.

The City is confident that the straightforwardness and clearness of this attitude will prevent any misunderstanding arising between itself and the German Army.

GERMAN REPLY TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF TOURNAI.

Tournai, October 23, 1916.

In permitting itself, through the medium of Municipal Resolutions, to oppose the orders of the German Military Authorities in the occupied territory, the City is guilty of an unexampled arrogance and of a complete misunderstanding of the situation created by the state of war.

The " clear and simple situation " is in reality the following :

The Military Authorities order the City to obey. Otherwise the City must bear the heavy consequences, as I have pointed out in my previous explanations.

The General Commanding the Army has inflicted on the City—on account of its refusal, up to date, to furnish the lists demanded—a punitive contribution of 200,000 marks, which must be paid within the next six days, beginning with to-day. The General also adds that until such time as all the lists demanded are in his hands, for every day in arrear, beginning with December 31, 1916, a sum of 20,000 marks will be paid by the City.

(Signed) HOPFER, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Etappen-Kommandant.

There was a remarkable exchange of letters between Cardinal Mercier and Baron von Bissing. Cardinal Mercier, as on so many other occasions, tore the German pretences to shreds, and his enemy was no match in controversy for one of the bravest characters and most penetrating intellects of all these terrible times. Here was Cardinal Mercier's last word (November 10, 1916) :

Slavery and the severest penalty in the penal code after the death penalty, the penalty of deportation ! Had Belgium, which never did you an injury, deserved at your hands this treatment, which cries for vengeance to Heaven ?

Monsieur le Gouverneur-Général, at the beginning of my letter I recalled your Excellency's noble words : " I have come to Belgium with the mission of staunching your country's wounds." If your Excellency could enter working homes as we clergy can, and could hear the lamentations of wives and mothers, whom your orders have thrown into mourning and consternation, your Excellency would better understand that the wound of the Belgian people is a gaping one !

Two years ago, we heard them saying, it was death, pillage, incendiarism, but that was war ! To-day it is no longer war, but cold calculation, deliberate annihilation, the empire of might over right, the degradation of human personality, a challenge to humanity.

It is in your Excellency's power to silence these cries of outraged conscience. May God, on whom we call with all the ardour of our heart on behalf of our oppressed people, inspire in you the pity of the Good Samaritan !

On November 13, 1916, the Belgian Government addressed a Note of protest to the Powers, and on December 17 the Belgian Chambers appealed to the Parliaments of all allied and

neutral countries. Needless to say, the Governments of the Allies associated themselves with Belgium. But almost the only hope was in the horror aroused throughout the neutral world. During the month of November Spain, the Vatican, Holland, Switzerland and the United States all entered their protests.


Switzerland decided not to go beyond "drawing attention to the unfavourable impression which the transportation of Belgian workmen *en masse* to Germany has produced upon Swiss public opinion." Spain and the United States, owing to their responsibility for Belgian Relief, were in a stronger position. In America the deportations made a very deep impression. The American protest contained the following passage :

With great pain and lively regret the Government of the United States has learnt of the policy adopted by the German Government in regard to the deportation from Belgium of part of the civil population and their compulsion to work in Germany. The Government of the United States is forced to protest, in a friendly but solemn manner, against this measure, which is contrary to all precedents and also to the humanitarian

not, little or nothing came of it during the period before diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany were broken off (February 3, 1917). But the American and Spanish Ministers at Brussels established an office for registering and forwarding appeals to Germany, and their efforts appear to have caused the repatriation of about 5,000 deportees.*

The Dutch protest naturally laid special stress upon the guarantees given by Germany early in the war to Belgians who had escaped to Holland but were induced to return. The German reply quibbled and prevaricated about those solemn pledges, but Germany had to consent to investigation of the cases of those who were doubly victims of German crime and German breach of faith. The Dutch Minister at Brussels forwarded about 30,000 appeals to Berlin.†

The Pope called first for an investigation of the facts, and on November 10 informed Germany that the Vatican associated itself with the representations of Spain. But Germany



POSTCARD FOR THE USE OF DEPORTED BELGIANS.

It shows that the workmen were treated like prisoners of war.

principles of international practice which have long been adopted and followed by civilised nations for the treatment of non-combatants in occupied territories.

Germany declared that the American Government had been ill-informed, and formally defended the deportations, but offered (December 11) that representatives of the American Embassy in Berlin should investigate the conditions under which the Belgians were working in Germany. Whether this offer was serious or

made no sign of submission. On December 4 the Pope held a Consistory, and made an unmistakable reference to the German crimes :

In this great conflict of peoples we see the unworthy treatment of the holy things and the ministers of God, even those of high rank, in spite of the sacred character which they possess in virtue of Divine law and the law of nations; peaceful citizens are torn in large numbers from their homes and carried far away amid the mourning of their mothers, wives and children . . .

* Van den Heuvel, *op. cit.* p. 36.

† Van den Heuvel, *op. cit.* p. 37.



BELGIAN REFUGEES RETURNING FROM HOLLAND TO ANTWERP UNDER THE GERMAN GUARANTEES OF IMMUNITY,
WHICH PROVED WORTHLESS.

We deplore this accumulation of evils and we reprove afresh all the wrongs committed in this war, in whatever theatre and by whatever author.

Perhaps it will never be known whether the Germans, when they began the deportations on an organized system, expected to be able to defy civilized opinion altogether. Their calculation may rather have been that no protests or interferences could keep pace with the crime, that in any case they would secure a valuable supply of labour for a considerable period, that in no circumstances need all the men deported be repatriated, and that it would not be difficult to invent new excuses and new delays. At any rate, it is only such complex considerations that explain their actions. On January 20, 1917, the Vatican informed Cardinal Mercier that the German Government had promised to stop deportation and to take certain measures for the gradual repatriation of the deported Belgians. Characteristically, the German Government attempted to "acquire merit" elsewhere than at Rome. During February, in spite of the fact that Germany had already pledged her word to the Pope, the German administration in Belgium called for a formal appeal to the Kaiser from Belgian notables, including Cardinal Mercier. The object was to enable the Kaiser to make a display of benevolence, and after further delays the following notice (March 15) was issued from Berlin :

The German Emperor has ordered compulsory deportations from Belgium to be discontinued for the present. In addition the Emperor has ordered the Governor-General of Belgium, as the result of a thorough investigation, to repatriate immediately all Belgians wrongly sent to Germany as unemployed. This action was taken after a petition had been received by the Emperor from a number of prominent Belgians representing all parties.

Some effort was also made to pretend that German clemency had been inspired by the representations of Flemish "activists," who sent a deputation to Berlin on March 3. This was a legend invented by the Germans in order to increase the influence of the small band of Flemish "activists" in Belgium; according to German reports published before the legend had been conceived, the deputation to Berlin had nothing whatever to do with the deportations question.

Still later the German Socialist majority, who were about to be employed as Government emissaries to Stockholm, claimed all the merit for themselves. No German workman had lifted a finger on behalf of the Belgian slaves. But Herr Südekum on April 11 calmly published in the *Vorwärts* an open letter to the Swedish

Socialist leader, M. Branting, in which he maintained that it was the German Socialists who had influenced the Kaiser! And he added: "After our protest no more Belgians were brought to Germany and most of those already there were sent back."

On April 12 the Dutch Government announced that Germany had bowed to Dutch protests also. As a matter of fact the German Government, while professing to satisfy the Pope, the Belgian notables, the Flemish "activists," the German Socialists, and the Dutch Government, was simultaneously assuring German employers that the repatriation of Belgians would be by no means universal.

The following notice was published in the German Press early in May :

Erroneous ideas have lately arisen about the extent of the repatriation of deported Belgians. In order to remove the uneasiness and uncertainty which has been caused in the circles interested, it must be pointed out that in accordance with the Kaiser's expression of his will only those Belgians have any prospect of repatriation who were wrongly deported to Germany as unemployed. Consequently only those persons can return in whose cases it has been satisfactorily proved that the terms of the Order of the Governor-General of Belgium of May 15, 1916, concerning refusal to work, did not apply to them. There is no intention to repatriate all the Belgians in Germany; on the contrary, those persons who were rightly imported as unemployed, and who are capable of doing work, will still remain in Germany.

The actual repatriations in reality only represented some by no means large percentage of the deportations. Moreover, evidence was soon forthcoming that, although the first phase of the deportations was finished, the Germans were following their policy of slavery along new lines. On June 13 *The Times* explained the revised policy of the Germans as follows :

Under pressure, they gave various promises to the world in general, and to the Pope in particular, that they would stop the deportations. But all that they have done is to abandon the pretext of "unemployment" as a ground for deportation, and they have now fallen back on what is practically the application to Belgium, in an aggravated form, of the system of "auxiliary service" which was instituted in Germany by the Auxiliary Service Law of December, 1916. They are also falling back upon a provision in the original deportation decree of October 3, 1916, that "every inhabitant" of Belgium is bound to assist the authorities in case of emergency. Thus, while the "unemployment" pretence which justified the Belgian slave raids between October, 1916, and February, 1917, has had to be abandoned, new foundations for new slave raids have been invented.

Since January, at any rate, boys, old men, and women have been compelled to work for the German Army in the name of "auxiliary service"—in the Army zone of Flanders, and a notice signed by the Inspector-General, by name von Schikfus, denounced the inhabitants of a commune in West Flanders for not having presented themselves before January 3, although "called up for auxiliary service." There is similar information from the Belgian-Dutch frontier. In the Army zone of Mons



BELGIAN CIVILIAN PRISONERS AT GÜTERSLOH CAMP.

General von Below posted a notice on March 14 recalling the terms of the deportation decree of October 3 and proclaiming the whole area of the First Army to be in the state of emergency which, as already explained, empowers the German authorities to call upon "every inhabitant." In accordance with this proclamation, the town of Mons was required to provide, on April 16, 600 labourers—the first call being on students, small shopkeepers and innkeepers, waiters and clerks. About the same time calling-up notices for both men and women were issued in the Army zone of Belgian Luxemburg. The following typical notice was issued at Jamoigne on May 1 to the men marked for deportation :

"You are ordered to go to-morrow morning at 5.30 to the Kommandantur, with food for three days, clothing, and boots, in order to be deported. If you do not come you will be heavily punished."

It is also certain that the new deportation policy affects not only the Army zone, but also the parts of Belgium which are under the German Governor-General. During the first fortnight in May a train containing 400 young men from Etterbeek, a suburb of Brussels. At Liège and Mons Belgians belonging to the Red Cross have been called up for the service of the German wounded in the field. It should be added that "auxiliary service" is by no means always in Belgium. The deportations to the German front in France continue, and during the second fortnight of May 300 men were carried off for military road-building in the neighbourhood of Montmédy and for the construction of railways in the region of Metz.

The written accounts of the German torture-camps and slave-factories were bad enough. What was the state of the unhappy victims who were "repatriated." Repatriation meant for the Germans the getting rid of the sick and useless. While the men retained in Belgium were, as far as possible, divided up in small batches and scattered about the country, in

order to make the public believe that all or almost all, had been sent home, the sick and exhausted filled the hospitals of Belgium. "A great number," said a trustworthy confidential report in April, 1917, "came back with tuberculosis or in a grave condition. Some of them have died a few days after their return. In every case the verdict of the doctors on their state was deplorable, and this verdict was based, not on any definite illness or any former weakness, but on the general decay of their constitution which a few weeks in the concentration camps had produced in them, and which was probably irremediable."

Healthy deportees who were sent home were usually only given a fortnight's holiday, on condition that they signed a contract to return to work in Germany for four or five months. Others learned on arrival in Belgium that they could only stay for two or three weeks. The following is the report of a trustworthy Belgian who escaped in June, 1917 :

The victims who are brought back are unrecognizable. A robust man who went away in good health had on his return lost 88 lbs. in weight. The deportees on their return journey to Belgium pass through Liège, where the worst cases of illness are detained. Amongst these an average of two deaths a day has been registered. Many have their feet and legs badly frost-bitten, as they had been exposed, naked, to the cold, and gangrene had set in. Among the dying taken off the train, some were unconscious, but in their delirious agony they still repeated, with a movement of pushing something away : "I will not sign. I will not sign."

Much other evidence of a similar kind might be quoted. Particularly terrible was the spread of tuberculosis among the deportees.

On April 18, 1917, General von Bissing died, and he was succeeded as Governor-General of Belgium by General von Falkenhausen. Bissing had been in office ever since November, 1914, and it is of considerable importance for the proper understanding of the German occupation to determine the motives of his policy. There is no doubt that Bissing had not entirely approved of all the measures which he carried out; it is practically certain that he did not himself approve of the deportations. The reason was not that he suffered from any moral scruples, but that, knowing full well that he enjoyed the complete approval of the Kaiser, whatever the German Imperial Chancellor and the General Staff might say or think, Bissing considered his Governor-Generalship as a period in which to reduce and mould Belgium with a view to the permanent German domination of the whole country. The imposition of slavery was not

calculated to serve his ends. Three months before his death Bissing wrote to the Pan-German deputy, Herr Stresemann:

There lies in my house a memorandum composed by me for myself alone, which deals more precisely and exhaustively with the future of Belgium, and arrives at the definite result that, if we do not get Belgium into our sphere of power, and if we do not govern it in German fashion and use it in German fashion, the war is lost. Do not let people deceive themselves who think superficially about the Belgian question, and who are willing to put up with guarantees of a paper kind, and who consider sufficient a frontier which is called "the Meuse line" but can never be a frontier such as we need. . . .

Great difficulties have often been made for my policy, and the policy of the fist alone has been set up as the only right policy. I, however, have quietly sought to establish connexions, and although these connexions have often been broken, and what remains of them may only exist in secret, they will bear fruit as soon as Germany is able to speak the power-word of conquest. . . . This is how my Flemish policy has been guided and carried out. In the same way I have conducted my Church policy with wise moderation. Perhaps it would have been easier for me if I had adopted a *Kulturkampf* policy, but we shall need the Church when some day we want to develop German ways and German activity in Belgium.

Fortunately Bissing's Pan-German friends did not neglect to publish for their own purposes the "memorandum" which Bissing had written in 1915 and thus endorsed in 1917. The docu-



FUNERAL OF GENERAL VON BISSING IN BERLIN.

ment is so important and illuminating that it is well to record here all the principal passages. Bissing began with references to the political situation in Germany, the speeches of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, and the fear that Germany might ultimately be influenced by the belief



GENERAL VON FALKENHAUSEN.
Governor-General of Belgium, 1917.

that England would never make peace if the Germans did not restore Belgium. He proceeded:—

I will not enter into the disputed question whether England is invincible, and whether she possesses so much strength that, notwithstanding the threatening of the English world-Empire, and notwithstanding the ever multiplying signs that England's vital nerve has been struck in the West and in the East, she can still stake everything in order to tear Belgium from us, in order to force us to restore Belgium to Anglo-French influence, and in order also to achieve the recovery by Belgium of her original frontiers, which in future will not be on the Channel but be pushed forward to the Eastern frontier of Belgium. I intend only to expand the views which I have already expressed, and to speak of the *dura necessitas*, or rather the sacred duty, that we should retain Belgium for our influence and sphere of power, and in the interests of Germany's security that we should not give Belgium up. My confident hope needs, indeed, still to be realised—that the final military decision shall constitute victory for us. But we must already be quite clear about the fact that a restored Belgium, whether declared a neutral country or not, will not only be forced over naturally into the camp of our enemies, but will be drawn over by them. Even if one liked to cling to illusions about reconciliation, and even if one were able to create guarantees by treaties ever so good, Belgium will in every respect be constructed and employed as concentration area and outpost position for our enemies.

I shall now indicate the strategic importance of Belgium for a future war. In order to be able to conduct the

present war offensively at all, the German Supreme Command was forced to march through Belgium, and in this process the right wing of the German army had to push itself laboriously along the edge of the Dutch province of Limburg. Strategically, the objective of the present war, as regards the Western theatre, should consist in our obtaining room, in order that in any new war whatever we should be able to operate with our army against France and England. If the result of the present war were the continued existence of an independent Belgian State, the operations would have to be conducted differently, and under greater difficulties, than at the beginning of the present war; for the aim of France and England will be, in conjunction with an allied or strongly influenced Belgium, to anticipate the German Army. It will, therefore, rightly be asked whether in such circumstances it can be possible to guarantee the freedom of operations of the German right wing, and whether the advance of these groups of armies to conduct a new war offensively is possible.

But the present war has also shown that the possession of the German industrial areas is a vital question for our ability to hold out and for a energetic conduct of the war; they cannot possibly be protected unless we hold and defend an area in advance of the Rhine. In this respect the present German frontier is not enough. A Belgium fortified by the military strength of England and France is a definite menace to our industrial districts, whose factories are so important for the provision of our army. If England continues to dominate Belgium in times of peace, she will not shrink from the attempt to force Holland—just as she has now done in Greece—to abandon her neutrality, or to make herself serviceable for the military operations of England. It is, therefore, requisite to secure for all time, by far advanced defensive lines, the auxiliary resources indispensable for our conduct of war, and so to guarantee the freedom of operation of our right wing, and to widen in desirable fashion the area of our concentration and advance.

Before leaving the military strategic sphere, I must also refer to the fact that the Belgian industrial districts are of great value, not only in peace, but also in war. A neutral Belgium, or a Belgium made subject to Anglo-French influence, with her munition factories, her metal industry and her coal, strengthens the fighting force and power of resistance of the country in the same way as our industrial districts do for us. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to prevent Belgian industry from serving the armament policy of our enemies. The advantages which we have been able during the present war to obtain from Belgian industry, by the removal of machinery and so on, are as important as the disadvantages which our enemies have suffered through lack of this addition to their fighting strength.

When one considers the importance of Belgium as the theatre of our armies' advance, and as territory which favours our further operations, both offensively and defensively, there can be no further doubt that a frontier which is quite falsely described as the line of the Meuse, and is to be protected by the fortresses of Liège and Namur, is inadequate. No, our frontier—in the interest also of our sea power—must be pushed forward to the sea.

The immediate importance of the Belgian industrial districts for our conduct of war by no means exhausts the subject. The war of weapons will in future be accompanied by a harder economic war than is the case to-day. Without coal what would have become of our policy of industrial exchange, not only with Holland, but also with far distant northern countries? The annual Belgian production of 23,000,000 tons of coal has given us a monopoly on the Continent, which has helped to maintain our vitality. In addition to these factors, which are of importance in a new war, the protection of our economic interests in Belgium even in time of peace, is of inestimable importance. A Belgium whose independence is restored will never be

neutral, but will submit to the protection of France and England. If we do not hold Belgium, administer Belgium in future for our interests, and protect Belgium by force of arms, our trade and industry will lose the position that they have won in Belgium, and perhaps will never recover them. The threat to German interests at Antwerp is obvious, and the result will be inevitable the moment Germany gives up Belgium. There can be no doubt that this country will enter into close economic union with England and France as soon as it feels itself independent once more. The Belgian Government and the politicians who have fled to London are working quite openly for this object. We shall of course never desire to kill Belgian industry, but by the

imposition of special laws we must bring it under the same conditions of production as German industry. We can incorporate Belgian industry in our own industrial organisations, and so, in our own interest, make it a lever for the fixing of prices in the world-market. If we lost Antwerp we should lose not only the port and our influence over railway rates, etc., but above all we should lose the powerful influence which Antwerp possesses as a trade and money centre, especially in South America. All these forces would naturally turn against us as soon as they were released.

History has already shown how little trust could be placed in a neutral Belgium before the war and at the beginning of the war, and if, as one must, one appreciates



[Copyright of "Land and Water."

ENTRAINMENT OF DEPORTEES.
From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.



FLEMISH FISHERMAN OF OSTEND.

the value of such historic truths, we can never allow ourselves to be induced to let Belgium, at the conclusion of peace, revive as a neutral country. Just as was the case before the war, a neutral Belgium, or an independent Belgium based upon treaties of a different kind, will succumb to the disastrous influence of England and France, and to the effort of America to exploit Belgian resources. Against all this our only weapon is the policy of power, and this policy must see to it that the Belgian

population, now still hostile to us, shall adapt itself and subordinate itself, if only gradually, to the German domination. It is also necessary that, by a peace which will secure the linking up of Belgium with Germany, we shall be able to give the necessary protection to the Germans who have settled in the country. This protection will be of quite special importance to us for the future battle of the world-markets. In the same way, it is only by complete domination of Belgium that we can utilise for German interests the capital created by Belgian savings and the Belgian companies which already exist in large numbers in the countries of our enemies. We must keep under our control the considerable Belgian accumulations of capital in Turkey, the Balkans, and China.

Among the German interests in Belgium is also the Flemish movement, which has already made good progress; it would be struck an incalculable blow if we do not extend our policy of power over Belgium. We have among the Flemings many open and very many still undeclared friends, who are ready to join the great circle of German world-interests. That will also be very important for the future policy of Holland. But as soon as we remove our protecting hand the Flemish movement will be branded by the Walloons and Frenchlings as pro-German, and will be completely suppressed. We must do everything without delay to repress boundless hopes on the part of the Flemings. Some of them dream of an independent State of Flanders, with a King to govern it, and of complete separation. It is true that we must protect the Flemish movement, but never must we lend a hand to make the Flemings completely independent. The Flemings, with their antagonistic attitude to the Walloons, will as a Germanic tribe constitute a strengthening of Germanism.

Belgium must be seized and held, as it now is, and as it must be in future. It is only by the most simple possible solution of the Belgian problem that we shall satisfy an important condition of our future position in the world. If we abandon part of Belgium, or if we make a part of it, such as the territory of Flanders, into an independent Flemish State, we shall not only be creating considerable difficulties for ourselves, but we shall be depriving ourselves of the considerable advantages and aids which can be afforded us only by Belgium as a whole under



FLEMISH LACE-MAKERS.



WALLOON MILK-GIRLS.

German administration. If only on account of the necessary bases for our fleet, and in order not to cut off Antwerp from the Belgian trade area, it is necessary to have the adjacent hinterland.

Thus, at the conclusion of peace, we shall find opportunity, after a century, to repair the mistakes of the Vienna Congress. In 1871, by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which Prussia even at the time of the Vienna Congress wanted to claim for herself, we repaired the first of those mistakes. It is our business now to put aside reluctance and ideas of reconciliation and not to fall into new mistakes. Gneisenau said:

"We must demand the cession of all territories and fortresses whose rivers flow into the Rhine, the Moselle, the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the Lys. The line Calais-Bâle is the only frontier against France which guarantees us security against a disturbed, warlike, and capable people."

Blücher complained after the conclusion of peace in 1815:

"This peace is a miserable patchwork, thanks to which Prussia and Germany stand betrayed before the whole world."

The poet Ernst Moritz Arndt demanded the natural frontiers from Dunkirk to Bâle. Among German claims he counted Flanders, Calais, Bruges, Ghent, Brabant, Brussels, Louvain, Antwerp, and the Meuse districts. The lessons of a century and the events of the present war have proved how right was the judgment of Gneisenau and Blücher.

Now we have a unique opportunity at the coming conclusion of peace to make good our losses, and we must do it because, in consequence of our own great development, Belgium has become still more important for us than ever. If we do not show ruthlessness and firmness, in order to wring the necessary respect for us from England, if we give way, if we withdraw to the Meuse line or make any agreement about Antwerp, we shall be exposed to the world as weaklings, diminish our great successes in the Balkans, and injure our prestige in Turkey and throughout Islam, in spite of our admirable successes in arms.

It is only by remaining in Belgium that we shall force the English to recognize our equality with them. England

must not remain master of the Belgian coast. She must be prevented from controlling an area which can be used as the starting point of a new and overwhelming Anglo-French offensive. Here lies the guarantee for the only proper relationship with England, and so for a lasting peace. The same thing applies to France, whose policy of expansion, pursued since the times of Louis XIV., we have now definitely defeated. As soon as we go out of Belgium, I am convinced that not only will English and French influence be preponderant, but the military union of English and French troops will take place. That means in a coming war that more than 1,000,000 soldiers will stand ready on our present frontier or on the Meuse line for defence or for attacks.

We must keep Belgium, as France formerly tried to keep it against England. The importance of Belgium for Germany as regards *Machtpolitik* has been proved for 800 years. As long as Germany was powerful she had Belgium mainly under her influence. For a stronger Germany Belgium is again a vital question, because Belgium as a free country constitutes, together with Holland, the English gate of invasion on the Continent. We must not in a new war again have to reckon with the English holding their troops in readiness for Ostend and Antwerp, to support the Belgian Army.

I will only allude briefly to the grave crises in domestic politics which surrender of Belgium must produce in Germany. The majority of the people would not understand our abandonment of fruits that had long been in our hand—the result of our tremendous, bloody victory. The war will deprive us of at least 1,000,000 men in the prime of life, and rob our industry of a great part of our best workmen. The people has a right to see its hopes realised, and so there would be deep dissension if they were disappointed. Moreover, our diplomatic failures in the last twenty years have already had a very bad effect among the people, and the fear finds ever louder expression that diplomacy will spoil what the sword has won. This time, after such enormous sacrifices, we cannot take the risk of such charges again being spread abroad. We must achieve the war-aim which seems to every plain man to be absolutely necessary. In Belgium we really have to do not merely with the smallest claims that can be justified militarily, but with questions that



THE GENTLE GERMAN.

As he was depicted by himself in Belgium.

are vital for the future of the German people and the German Empire.

Anybody who, as I do, advocates with complete conviction and energy the retention of Belgium is also obliged to be quite clear about the difficulties and objections which may have to be overcome in order thoroughly to justify this energetic demand. I shall not discuss the views of those who dream that the German Government is bound by the declaration made at the beginning of the war that Germany will conduct the war not for conquests, but only for the protection of the Fatherland. The conquest of Belgium has simply been forced upon us, and consideration of future possibilities has led to the logical conclusion that we absolutely must demand the protection of Germany by the extension of the German frontiers in the West. The objection that we must keep Germany an unaltered National State, and that it would constitute a weakening of the national unity of Germany if we were to take into Germany so and so many millions of inhabitants of a country with a different language—such objections seem to me mere phrases. Germany can remain German and retain its German feeling, if we draw into our sphere of power a country which has been penetrated through and through by Germanic tribes—for even the Walloons have been made French only by time—and if, with clear and sure appreciation of the facts, we see to it that German intellect and German energy become domiciled where French influence has hitherto provided for the gallicization of the country. Germany's tasks are, of course, great and difficult, if Belgium submits and is incorporated. But Germany is strong enough, and it is to be hoped that, especially after this war, she will have plenty of efficient men to do in Belgium, in a German sense, what unfortunately was not done in Alsace and Lorraine. Surely we shall have learnt from the mistakes that were made, and we shall never again have recourse to the oscillating policy of conciliation which was so disadvantageous not only in Alsace-Lorraine, but also

in Poland. Of course, no people which has been appointed to play a creative part in the history of the world will find pigeons dropping already roasted into its mouth. A people which, during the war, has achieved such brilliant things in the trenches, in the Army Command, and in all branches of economic life, will have forces enough at its disposal to solve the difficult, but assuredly not insuperable, problems of peace.

Church questions in Belgium have often been described as extremely serious. I admit that precisely the Germanic provinces of Belgium, which once defended their Protestantism so heroically, are to-day far more convinced adherents of the Catholic Church than are the easily-moved Walloons; any German statesman who is appointed to control the German administration in Belgium must realize that Catholicism is, and will remain, a strong and living force in Belgium, and that among the most important requirements for successful German work is an intelligent regard for the Catholic Church and its disciples.

The problem of our influence upon the schools can be solved in agreement with the clergy, if obligatory religious teaching is introduced in the same way as the general obligation to attend school; there are a number of points of contact and agreement between the future German administration and the Catholic clergy, which must learn more and more to understand that the Catholic Church enjoys, and can enjoy, under the power of Germany, protection quite different from that which it will have if Belgium, under French influence, turns towards a completely Radical philosophy. One knows that Belgian Socialism is strongly influenced by French Socialism, and Vandervelde has often proclaimed the revolution as the completion of the religion of freedom and equality. It is known that Social Democracy has become a strong factor for the gallicization of Belgium. The clergy, however, will have to associate themselves with the social reforms which must be taken in hand immediately after the conclusion of peace, and in

this the clergy will have to go hand in hand with the German administration.

The question of the form in which the linking up of Belgium with Germany must be accomplished causes much racking of brains in diplomatic circles, and in the studies of the constitutional lawyers, and the question "With whom shall we conclude peace in order to make the right of conquest into a constitutional right?" has often been asked, and is certainly not easy to answer. Hitherto, it is true, the Royal Government of Belgium and the King himself have not adhered to the undertakings of the Quadruple Entente not to enter into peace negotiations and not to conclude peace except jointly. But this reserve, which may soon be abandoned, does not open up any prospect that we shall ever be able to conclude with the King of the Belgians and his Government a peace by which Belgium will remain in the German sphere of power, and it is impossible that the Quadruple Entente, over the heads of its Allies, shall ever accept our peace demands with regard to Belgium. It only remains for us, therefore, to avoid during the peace negotiations all discussion about the form of the annexation, and to apply nothing but the right of conquest. It is true that dynastic considerations have an importance which is not to be underestimated. For, in view of our just and ruthless procedure, the King of the Belgians will be deposed, and will remain abroad as an aggrieved enemy. We must put up with that, and it is to be regarded almost as a happy circumstance that necessity compels us to leave dynastic considerations entirely out of account. A King will never voluntarily hand over his country to the conqueror, and Belgium's King can never consent to abandon his sovereignty or to allow it to be restricted. If he did so his prestige would be so undermined that he would have to be regarded not as a support, but as an obstacle, to German interests. On the most various occasions the English have described the right of conquest as the

healthiest and simplest kind of right, and we can read in Machiavelli that he who desires to take possession of a country will be compelled to remove the King or Regent, even by killing him.

These are grave decisions, but they must be taken, for we are concerned with the welfare and the future of Germany, and concerned also with reparation for the war of destruction that has been directed against us.

For years to come we must maintain the existing state of dictatorship. It is the only form of administration, based as it is upon military resources, which can be chosen, in order to gain time for the gradual and methodical building up of the most appropriate possible administration.

One must beware of wanting to determine—perhaps in a peace concluded in 1916—what can only be ripe for decision after decades have past. If we bind ourselves too soon, it will be difficult to take measures to counteract those binding decisions. We must preserve patience and method in our procedure. Thence will proceed, in addition to the factors of tranquillization and ever-increasing order in the machinery of administration, the linguistic, ecclesiastic, economic, judicial and military regulations, which, indeed, will make necessary the amendment of a number of Belgian laws.

The completion of the annexation will be regarded by many Flemings, and by a great part of the Walloons, as a release from uncertainty and from vain hopes. Both races will be able to return to the life that will be rendered possible by renewed opportunity for trade and pleasure. During such a period of transition the Flemings will allow themselves to be led back from French tyranny to their free, although not easily controlled, Low German way of living. The Walloons can, and must, decide during this period whether they will adapt themselves to the definitely altered state of affairs, or whether they prefer to leave Belgium. He who remains in the country must declare his allegiance to Germany, and after



ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN BELGIUM.

a certain time must declare his allegiance to Germanism. In connection with this it cannot be tolerated that wealthy Belgians shall leave the country, and nevertheless draw profit from their possessions in Belgium. Expropriation is absolutely necessary, in order to prevent such a state of things as exists in Alsace-Lorraine to the present day. I hope that we shall be strong, not only with the sword, but also with statesmanlike illumination and preparation and all the things necessary to fruitful administration. Half measures and a middle course must be condemned most of all. Lack of determination in the decisive days of German fate will be a grave wrong to the blood that has been shed.

Among such half-measures I include the intention of treating Belgium merely as a pawn, which might be used to recover or extend our colonial possessions. As regards the extension of our colonial possessions, the Belgian Congo comes especially into question. The possession of the Belgian Congo is certainly to be aimed at, and I desire to insist that a German Colonial Empire, whatever its shape, is indispensable for Germany's world policy and expansion of power. But, on the other hand, I am of the opinion that only such frontiers as will contribute to the acquisition of greater freedom on the sea are calculated to make colonial possessions valuable. Consequently, the supporters of the colonial movement

must also demand the Belgian coast, together with the Belgian hinterland. If we give up the Belgian coast our Fleet will lack important bases for its share in the protection of our Colonial Empire.

I am conscious that the demand that we shall retain all Belgium, and link it up in one form or another with the German sphere of power, is a great aim, which can be achieved only by determined and self-sacrificing courage and by the utmost energy and skill in negotiation. Let us apply a saying of Bismarck that "in policy, if in any sphere, faith moves mountains, and courage and victory are not cause and effect but identical."

Such were the real views of the man who for two and a half years governed a country which Germany had invaded in defiance of all right and of all her solemn promises, and such were the ambitions which the chief German representative in Belgium not only cherished but expressed, in spite of the German pledge at the outbreak of war that Germany would repair the "wrong" which she had committed.

END OF VOLUME TWELVE.

INDEX TO VOLUME XII.

A

Abruzzi, Adm. the Duke of the, resignation, 314
 Adriatic Sea: coast line and harbours, 305-307; declared a "military area," 330; French blockade in, 44-46; Italian operations in the (1915), 315-317; naval raids in the, 44, 45
 Aegean Sea, work of Allied Navies in the, 20
 Ailette, French occupy line of, 374
 Aircraft: British, help to Kut garrison, 413, 414; on the Western Front, 350; French, aviators drop bombs on Monastir, Ghevgeji, and Sofia, 20; German, bombs dropped on Salonika, 13, 20, 21; Italian, achievements of, 321-323
 Albania: Italian expedition to, 331, 332; Italians in, 21, 22, 35; Italy declares blockade of coast, 330; political intrigues in, 22
 Alsace, fighting in February, 1917, 358
Amalfi, Italian cruiser, sunk in Upper Adriatic, 316
Amiral Charner, French cruiser, torpedoed, 65
Amiral Ganteaume, French refugee ship, torpedoed, 70
Ancona, Italian steamer, sunk by submarine, 340, 341
 Ancre Valley: fighting in, 357; German accounts of British advance, 359; German retreat commenced, 359, 361
 Armoured cars, British, in East Africa, 92; in Rumanian campaign, 129
 Arras-Le Transloy Salient, strategic position of, 369
 Arz von Straussenberg, General, on the Moldavian border, 117
 Aschenbach, Dr., in charge of Wittenberg Camp, 231
 Augagneur, M., French Minister of Marine, 41; on Allied plans in Gallipoli, 49
 Australia: Coalition Cabinet formed, 295; Conscription referendum campaign, 294; General Election, 296; politics in, 292, 293
 Australian Government, suggested Naval Conference, 1913, 276
 Austria, Archduke Joseph of, in nominal command in Rumania, 117
 Avcresecu, General, in command of Rumanian Armies, 118, 122; reorganization of Rumanian Army, 140
 Avlona, Italian occupation of, 21
 Aylmer, General F. J.: first failure to relieve Kut, 390; reorganizes forces in Mesopotamia, 398; second failure to relieve Kut, 400, 401; succeeded by Maj.-General Sir G. F. Goringe, 403

B

Babtic, Surg.-General, censured *re* medical breakdown in Mesopotamia, 416
 Baillecourt Farm, British take, 355
 Bairas, General, in command of 6th Greek Division at Seres, 28
 Bapaume, British take, 370
 Barrow, Sir E., censured for share in Mesopotamia failure, 416
 Basra, General Aylmer's concentration at, 383
Bayern, German steamer, seized by Italians, 343
 Bcatty, Sir David, on work of engineers in Dogger Bank and Jutland actions, 228
 Beaurains, British capture, 370
 Belgium: deportation decree (October 3, 1916), 454; forced labour for unemployed, 453; German economic exploitation in, 457; raw materials, British offer of import under guarantee rejected, 458-460; unemployment, 455; causts, 457
 Belgium under German Rule: The Deportations, 453-484
 Benekendorff, Countess, Chairman of Russian Prisoners of War Committee, 261
 Berrangé, Brig.-General C. A. L., in command of Third S. A. Infantry Brigade, 94, 108
 Beves, Brig.-General P. S., in command of Second S. A. Infantry Brigade, 94, 104
 Bissing, Baron von: blames British Blockade for economic strangulation of Belgium, 458; death, 476; text of political will, 477-484; on total of unemployed in Belgium, 457
Bisson, French destroyer, sinks Austrian submarine *U3*, 47
 Bistrica River, fighting on, 37
 Bojovich, General, in command of Serbians on Salonika Front, 26; operations on the Tchernia Front, 33
 Borden, Sir Robert: on Canadian Defence Committee, 277; on Sir Joseph Pope's proposals, 278, 279; on foreign policy and defence, 272, 275; on Imperial problems, 297, 298; on War Conference, 303
 Botha, General: agreement with Unionists, 289-291; visit to East Africa, 107
 Botha, Brig.-General Mamie, in command of 1st S. A. Mounted Brigade, 94, 108
Bouvet, French battleship, mined and sunk, 55
 Braila, Russians retire on, 123, 130; evacuate, 131
 Bratianu, M., on Rumania's difficulties, 146

Bratianu, M. Vintila, appointed Rumanian Minister of War, 145
Breslau, German cruiser, in the Mediterranean, 42
 Briggs, Lieut.-General C. J., operations on the Struma, 31
 British Empire, Dominions and Imperial policy, 269-304
 British Navy: co-operation in Carso offensive, 339; during Mesopotamia operations, 413, 414; drifters (14) sunk by Austrians in Otranto Straits, 336; engineering, evolution of, 193-223; engines, internal combustion, 223-225; introduction of screw propeller, 194-198; Parsons' steam turbines, invention of, 203-208; water-tube boilers, 196, 202, 203; engineers, training of, 225-227; engine-room departments in action, 228; oil fuel, use of, 217-225
 British People at War, The, 417-452
 Brits, Maj.-General Coen, in command of East African Third Division, 94
 Brunner, Colonel, Commandant at Gardelegen Camp, 233
 Bryce, Viscount, on the Belgian Deportations, 453
 Bulgaria: Greek Provisional Government declares war on, 30
 Buzeu, Germans capture, 123

C

Calvados, French transport, sunk, 65
 Canada, politics in, 286, 287
 Canadian Defence Committee, 277; Memorandum quoted, 278, 279
 Carp, M. Peter, policy of, 144, 148, 149
 Carpathians, enemy offensive in, 136
 Carter, Major R. M., on medical breakdown in Mesopotamia, 394
Carthage, French auxiliary, sunk, 61
Casabianca, French mine-layer, sunk, 63
 Castellorizo, Island of, French occupy, 63
 Castelnaud, Gen., visit to Salonika, 12
 Cattaro: Austrians at, 309; bombardment of, 44
 Chamberlain, Mr. Austen, censured for share in Mesopotamia failure, 415, 416
 Champagne District, fighting in, 355, 362, 367-370
 Charlton, Rear-Admiral E. F., in command of Naval Squadron in East African Campaign, 105
 Chaulnes, British take, 370
 Chocheprat, Vice-Admiral, in the Mediterranean, 43

Churchill, Mr. Winston: on engineers in naval actions, 228; on oil fuel, 222, 223
 Cochiu, M. Denys, Special Envoy to Greece, 8
 Collyer, Brig.-General J. J., Chief of General Staff under General Smuts, 94
 Cordonnier, General, in command of French contingent in Salonika, 26
 Corfu, French occupy, 63
 Corsi, Vice-Admiral, appointed Italian Minister of Marine, 314; on submarine menace, 341, 342
 Crewe, Lord, on Imperial General Staff Memorandum (1909), 273
 Crewe, Brig.-General Sir Charles, in German East Africa, 116
 Croiselles, British take, 378
 Ctesiphon, bringing in wounded from, 394

D

Dague, French destroyer, mined off Antwari, 45
 Danglis, General, supports M. Venizelos, 30
 Danton, French Dreadnought, sunk in the Mediterranean, 66
 Danube, Delta of, description of, 125, 126; Bulgarian battalion annihilated by Russians, 137, 138
 Dar-es-Salaam, British occupy, 114
 Dartmouth, British cruiser, torpedoed in Otranto Straits, 336
 Daylight Saving Bill, introduction in England, 425
 Dedeagatch; Allied ships bombard, 20, 344
 Defence of the Realm Restrictions, 451
 Demirhissar, Allies blow up railway bridge at, 13
 Deportations, Belgian, 453-484; Cardinal Mercier, letter to Baron von Bissing *re*, 472; Decree (October 3, 1916), 454; deportees, partial repatriation, 475; history of, 460; methods of conscription, 461-464; numbers, 465; protests, Belgian, 471, 472, Neutral, 472, 473; slavery in Germany, 465, 466
 Devonport, Lord, appointed Food Controller, 439; appeal for voluntary rationing, 441; resigns appointment, 442
 Dobrudja; Allies retire in, 124; Russian withdrawal from, 129-133
 Doignies, British take, 378
 Doiran, Lake, British take over line of, 25
 Doiran - Vardar River, operations on, 31, 32
 Dominions, and Imperial policy, 269 - 304; constitutional system in the, 272, 296, 297; Military and Naval organizations of the, 273,

275; suggested representation on Committee of Imperial Defence, 275-277
 Dousmanis, General, replaced by General Moskhopoulos as Chief of Greek General Staff, 29
 Duff, Sir Beauchamp, censured for share in Mesopotamia failure, 415, 416
 Dujaila Redoubt, British attack on, 400, 401
 Durazzo: Allied withdrawal from, 335; Italians open communications with Valona, 332

E

East Africa, railway communications in, 94, 96
 East African Expeditionary Force: Divisional and Brigade Commanders, 94; reorganization of, by General Smuts, 94
 Edwards, Brig.-General W. F. S., Inspector-General of Communications in East Africa, 94
 Elbasan, Bulgarians occupy, 21
 England during War-time, 417-452
 Enslin, Brig.-General B., in command of Second S.A. Mounted Brigade, 94, 111
 Epirus, Northern: Greek occupation of, 21; Italian advance in, 35
 Essad Pasha, Albanian leader, visits Allied capitals, 22
 Es Sinn position, British attack, 400, 401
 Ewart, Brig.-General R. H., Chief of Administrative Staff under General Smuts, 94

F

Falahiyah position, British take (April 5, 1916), 405
 Falkenhayn, General von, in command of Ninth German Army in Rumania, 117, 122
 Falkenhayn, General von, succeeds Baron von Bissing as Governor-General of Belgium, 477
 Falkenstein, Count, in command of Nyasa force in German East Africa, 83
 Favereau, Vice-Admiral C. E., Commander-in-Chief of French forces in the Channel, 69
 Filipeshiti, Allies evacuate, 128
 Fisher, Lord, work in engineering department of the Navy, 193
 Fisher, Mr. Andrew, appointed Prime Minister of Australia, 292; on need of meeting of Imperial Conference (1915), 282, 283
 Fishermen, British, work in the Adriatic, 337
 Florina, Bulgarians occupy, Allies retake, 32
 Foeshani: Austro-Hungarians attack, 136, enter, 137; strategic value of, 133

Food: allotment schemes, 444; appeals for national economy, 436, 437; appeals for voluntary rationing, 439, 441; King's proclamation issued, 441, 442; Lord Devonport appointed Controller, 439; Lord Rhondda appointed Controller, 442; "profiteering," 442; submarine menace to supplies, 435
 Foster, Sir George, at Paris Economic Conference, 293
 Fournet, Vice-Admiral Dartige du, succeeds Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrière as Commander-in-Chief of French Navy, 47; demands surrender of Greek Fleet, 64
 France, Ministry of Marine, changes, 41
 Franconia, British transport, sunk, 65
 French Marines in Battle of Yser, 71-76
 French Naval Brigade, Colours presented to, 74
 French Navy, the Work of the, 41-76; help in Belgian operations, 69-76, in Channel and North Sea, 69, in Dardanelles, 47-61, in Mediterranean, 61, 62, in Salonika Expedition, 63-65
 Fresnel, French submarine, sunk, 47

G

Gallia, French transport, sunk, 65
 Ganghofer, Herr, on German exploitation of Belgium, 458
 Gardelgen Camp: conditions in, 232-235; typhus outbreak in, 234, 235
 Gauchet, Vice-Admiral, succeeds Vice-Admiral Dartige du Fournet, 63
Gaulois, French battleship, damaged at the Dardanelles, 55
 Geary, Captain, prisoner of war, case of, 253
 George V., King, food economy proclamation quoted, 441, 442; on the drink question, 433
 Gerard, Mr., endeavour to improve conditions at Wittenberg, 232; visits to prisoner camps, 236; on German prison camps, 237, 238; on prisoner of war labour, 244
 German East Africa, Campaign (II.), 77-116; Belgian operations in, 114, 116; German use of native forces, cruelty to natives, 80, 81; naval help in, 105, 107
 Gerok, General von, on the Moldavian border, 117, 123, 136
Giacinto Pullino, Italian submarine, loss of, 321
 Giessen prisoners camp, 241
Giuseppe Garibaldi, Italian cruiser, sunk by Austrian submarine U4, 316, 317
Goeben, German cruiser, in the Mediterranean, 42

Goltz, Marshal von der, supervision of Turkish defences in Mesopotamia, 387
 Gommecourt, British occupy, 363
 Gorringe, Maj.-General Sir G. F., takes over command of Relief Expedition in Mesopotamia, 403
 Gough, General Sir Hubert, mentioned in dispatches, 380
 Grandcourt, British enter, 355
 Great Britain: Agriculture, labour problems, 446; amusements during War-time, 425, 426, tax introduced, 427; Censorship, 421; coal, dearth of, 444, 445; drink, restrictions, 430, 434; food, see "Food"; Income Tax, rise in, 435; labour unrest, 449, 451; motoring restrictions, 428, 429; prosperity of working classes, 419; racing, curtailment of, 427, 428; War Government of the Peoples, 269-304
 Greece: Austro-Bulgarian invasion of, 27-29; blockade of ports proclaimed, 65; Ministry of M. Kalogeropoulos, 30, of Professor Lambros, 30, of M. Skouloudis, 8, 21, 23, resignation, 25; of M. Venizelos, resignation, 3, of M. Zaïmis, 3, 25; objections to transport of Serbian Army, 23; partial blockade by Allies, 8; Provisional Government formed, War on Bulgaria declared, 30; revolution, 28, 29
 Greece, King of: dismissal of M. Venizelos, 3; pro-German policy of, 28, 29
 Greek Army, surrender of IV Army Corps to the enemy, 28
 Greek Navy, under control of French Navy, 64
 Gréville, British occupy, 368
 Guépratte, Rear-Admiral, in command of French Fleet in the Dardanelles, 48, 54; in the Mediterranean, 43
 Gurko, General, in command of Allied forces on the Rumanian Front, 118
 Gyimes Pass, fighting in the, 137

H

Haig, General Sir Douglas, dispatches quoted, 379, 380
 Ham, French take, 373
 Handeni, British take, 104; German retreat to, 103
 Hannyngton, Brig.-General J. A., in command of 2nd E.A. Brigade, 94, 103
 Harcourt, Mr., refusal to hold Imperial Conference (1915), 284, 285; reply to suggestion of Naval Conference (1913), 276, 277; on Dominions and Imperial policy, 275

Hardinge, Lord, censured for share in Mesopotamia failure, 415, 416
 Hathaway, Surg.-General, censured *re* medical breakdown in Mesopotamia, 416
 Hertzog, General, opposition to General Botha, 289
 Hindenburg Line: German retirement to, 369
 Hindenburg Retreat, 345-380
 Holman, Mr., Premier of New South Wales, on lack of information in the Dominions, 281, 282
 Hoskins, Maj.-General, A. R., Commander of 1st Division East African Army, 94
 Huenc, General von, Governor of Antwerp (1915-16), 461
 Hughes, Mr. W. M., Prime Minister of Australia, 292; attends Economic Conference at Paris, 293; conscription policy, 293-295; visit to England, 292, 293
 Huguet, Rear-Admiral, in charge of French Naval Division in the Far East, 66

I

Imperial Conference: 1911, resolution quoted, 275; 1915, postponement, *The Times* comment on, 282, 283; 1917, meeting of, 303
 Imperial General Staff, Memorandum on formation of (1909), 272, quoted, 273
 Imperial War Cabinet: idea of, 269, invitation to Dominions, quoted, 298; meeting of, 302
Impetuoso, Italian warship, torpedoed, 318
Intrepido, Italian warship, mined, 318
 Ionescu, M. Take, joins Rumanian Government, 145, 146
 Irls, British take, 367
 Isonzo offensive, naval support to, 337-339
 Italian Army, in Salonika, 26
 Italian Navy, The work of the, 305-344; assistance to Army, 309; bombardment of Monfalcone and Porto Rosega, 338; cooperation with French Navy in Adriatic, 47; strength and composition of, 310-312; transport of Serbian Army, 309, 334; transport operations, 331-335
 Italy: declares war on Turkey, 330; shipping and submarine warfare, 339-342; seizure of German, 342, 343

J

Jalea, Italian submarine, mined, 321
 Jassy, Rumanian Government transferred to, 146
Jauréguiberry, French battleship, in Dardanelles, 57, 59

Jellicoe, Admiral, on work of engineers in Jutland action, 228
 Joffre, General, gratitude to French Naval Brigade, 75
 Jones, Mr. Kennedy, appointed Director-General of Food Economy, 442
Julnar, British steamer: Firman and Cowley attempt to reach Kut, 181, 182; captured by the Turks, 414
 Jutland, Battle of: awards for gallantry during, 182-184; work of engineers during, 228

K

Kahe: action at, 91-93
 Kaledin, General, on Rumanian Front, 117
 Kalogeropoulos, M., appointed Greek Premier, 30
 Kastellorizon, Island of, French Marines occupy, 20
 Kavala, surrendered by Greeks to the enemy, 28
 Kaymakchalan, Mount, Serbian victory at, 34
 Keary, Maj.-General, in command of 3rd Division of "Tigris Corps," 383; attack on Sinn Aftar, 410; night march to the Dujaila Redoubt, 400, 401
 Kcball, Maj.-General: at Battle of Sheikh Saad, 387; night march to the Dujaila Redoubt, 400, 401
 Khatzapoulos, Colonel, surrender to the enemy at Kavala, 28
 Kilimanjaro operations, 85-93; description of area of, 86, 87; General Smuts on the, 88
 Kitchener, Lord, Special Envoy to Greece, 8
 Knobelsdorf, General Schmidt von, in command of Prussian 42nd Division, 131
 Kondoa Irangi: British occupy, 99; German offensive fails at, 100, 101
Königsberg, German cruiser, destroyed in the Rufiji, 83
 Korogwe, British reach, 103
 Koseh, General von, in command of Danube Army, 118, 121, 128, 131
 Koundouriotis, Admiral, supports M. Venizelos, 30
 Kövess von Kövesshaza, General, on the Moldavian border, 117
 Kraft von Delmensingen, General, in Rumania, 118, 127, 131
 Kraut, Major, in command of Northern German forces in German East Africa, 83
 Kristodhoulos, Colonel: defence of Seres, 28
 Krivolak, French occupy, 5
 Kühne, General von, in Rumania, 118, 131, 137
 Kut, The Siege and Fall of, January-April, 1916, 381-417; failure of first attempt to relieve, 390; failure of

second attempt, 401, 403, causes, 402; Naval and Air services to garrison at, 413; surrender of, 414; third attempt to relieve, 404-412, failure of, 413

L

Lacaze, Admiral, succeeds M. Augagneur as French Minister of Marine, 41; gratitude to French Navy, 75
 Lake, Lieut.-General Sir Percy, succeeds Sir John Nixon in Mesopotamia, 384; Kut dispatches quoted, 401, 404-408, 411, 412
 Lambros, Professor, appointed Greek Premier, 30
Latouche-Tréville, French cruiser, work during Dardanelles operations, 58-61
 Le Barque, British capture, 362
 Le Bon, Rear-Admiral, in Dardanelles operations, 61
 Le Bris, Vice-Admiral, in the Mediterranean, 43
 Lechitsky, General, on Rumanian Front, 117
Lemnos, Austrian steamer, destroyed during raid on Aeneon, 330
Leonardo da Vinci, Italian dreadnought, blown up, 310, 337
Léon Gambetta, French armoured cruiser, sunk by Austrian submarine, 44, 45
 Le Transloy-Loupard line, Germans fall back on, 362
 Lettow-Vorbeck, Colonel von, in command in East Africa, 77-83; in Kondoa Irangi, 100
 Ligny, British occupy, 362
 Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David: issues summons for Imperial War Cabinet, 298; legislation to increase food production, 443; on Imperial War Cabinet, 301, 302; on prospects on the Western Front, 346; on scarcity of food, 436; on spirit of the British people, 452; on success of Imperial War Cabinet, 302, 303
 Loupart, British occupy, 368

M

Macin: fall of, 130; strategic importance of, 129
 Maekensen, Field-Marshal von, in command of operations in Rumania, 117, 129
 MacNeece, Surg.-General, censured *re* medical breakdown in Mesopotamia, 416
Magnet, Austrian gunboat, attacked by Italian submarine, 320, 321
 Mahon, General Sir Bryan, in command of 10th Division in Salonika, 3
 Malleson, Brig.-General, in command of 2nd East African

Division, 78; resigns command, 88
 Marghiloman, M. Alexander: refusal to participate in Rumanian Government, 149
 Massey, Mr., Prime Minister of New Zealand in Coalition Cabinet, 291
 Massiges Ridge, German attack on, 356
 Maude, General, in command of 13th Division in Mesopotamia, 404
 Mbuyuni, British base at, 83, 94, 96
 Mediterranean: French Navy in the, 42-44, 61, 62; submarine menace in the, 65
Médusa, Italian submarine, sunk by Austrian submarine, 319, 320
 Mercier, Cardinal: protest against Belgian deportations, 472; on forced labour in Belgium, 454
 Mesopotamia: medical breakdown in, 391, 395; Vineent-Bingley Commission quoted, 392-394, 396, 397; Royal Commission appointed, 414. Report issued, 416
 Mesopotamia Operations: 1914-16: General Aylmer's reorganization of forces during the, 398; scandal of defective equipment, 390; transport difficulties, 384, 385
 Meuse, fighting on, 365-368, 370, 372
 Meyer, Sir Wm., responsibility for economies in Indian Army, 416
 Millo, Captain Enrico, Italian Minister of Marine (1913-14), 312, 313
 Milne, Lieut.-General G. F., succeeds Sir B. Mahon in Salonika, 25; operations on Vardar Front, 30; dispatches quoted, 31
 Miraumont, Germans abandon, 359
 Mishich, General, in command of 2nd Serbian Army in advance on Monastir, 36
 Mombasa, British base at, 94
 Monastir: Allied advance on, 33-38, fall of, 38
 Monfalcone, fall of, Naval and Military cooperation, 338
Monge, French submarine, sunk off Durazzo, 47
 Monro, General Sir Chas., in Salonika, 6; on the 10th Division, 7
 Mont St. Quentin, British take, 370
 Morgen, General von, in Rumania, 117, 131
 Moshi, British occupy, 89, 93
 Moskhopoulos, General, appointed Chief of General Staff, 29; in command of 111 Greek (Salonika) Army Corps, 3, 13
Mousquet, French destroyer, sunk by the *Emden*, 67
 Mrogoro: General Smuts's advance on, 113; Germans

fall back on, 108, 109, 111, evacuate, 113

Murray, General Sir A., succeeds General Monro as Commander of British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 14

N

Naval Engineering: see *British Navy*
Nembo, Italian warship, sunk by Austrian submarine, 318
Nereide, Italian submarine, torpedoed, 316
 Nerizoff, General, in command of 3rd Bulgarian Army, 118
 Nesle, British and French take, 370
 New Zealand: Coalition Cabinet formed, 291; Compulsion Bill passed, 291, 292
 Nguru Mountains, operations on the, 109, 111
 Nicol, Vice-Admiral, in the Dardanelles, 61
 Nixon, General Sir John: censured for share in Mesopotamia failure, 415, 416; resigns Mesopotamian Command, 384
 Northey, Brig.-General, in command of Rhodesia-Nyasaland Force, 77
Novara, Austrian light cruiser, sinks two British drifters in Adriatic, 335
 Noyon, French occupy, 372
 Nussey, Brig.-General A. H. M., Chief of Staff under General Van Deventer, 98

O

Oettingen, General von, in Rumania, 131
 Oil fuel: see *British Navy*
 Oitoz Valley, battles in the, 136
 Otranto, Straits of, Austrians sink 14 British drifters in the, 336

P

Pangani River: General Smuts's advance along, 102; port occupied by British Navy, 107
 Pare Mountains: description of region, 102; operations in, 91
 Parsons, Sir Charles: invention of steam turbine, 203-208
 Pelagosa, Island of, occupied by Italians, 307, 316
 Péronne, British take, 370
 Petitti di Roreto, Count Alfonso, in command of Italian Army in Salonika, 26
 Piacentini, General, succeeds General Bertotti in command of Italian Expeditionary Force, 22
Piemonte, Italian cruiser, bombards Dedeagatch, 344
 Ploeshti, Allies' retreat from, 122
 Pola: Austrian Navy at, 307, 308; Italian destroyer raid on (November, 1916), 319

Pongwe, General Beves fights action at, 104
 Pope, The, protest against Belgian deportations, 473
 Popoff, Dr., at Schneidemühl Camp, 236
 Porto Rosega, Italian occupation of, 338
 Presan, General: Chief-of-Staff under General Averescu, 140; in command of Rumanian 4th Army, 117
Principe Umberto, Italian transport, sunk by Austrian submarine, 334
 Prisoners of War (II.), 229-268; Australians, treatment of, 249, 250; behind the firing line, 246-250; Blankenburg Camp, 238, 239; Camps, improvements, Mr. Gerard's work, 236-239; dispatch of wounded and invalids to Switzerland, 256-258; escapes, 263-265, 267; exchange of disabled men, 256; food, 241, 243; Gardlegen Camp, 232-235; Giessen Camp, 241; Irish refuse to join Roger Casement, 240, 241; Kronach Camp, 239; labour exploitation, 244, 245; Mesopotamia, treatment by Turks in, 253, 254; Minden Camp, 236; Prisoners of War Societies formed, 254; Russian Prisoners of War Committee, formation of, 261; Schneidemühl Camp, 236; Serbians, conditions in various Camps, 262, 263; S.W. Africa, treatment of British in, 252, 253; statistics, 229; Stendal Camp, 235; Süd-Edewechter-Moor Camp, 239; treatment of Russians on Eastern Front, 258-262; Tully, Private, ease of, 240; Wittenberg Camp, 230-232
Provence II., French auxiliary cruiser, sunk by U35, 65
 Puisieux-au-Mont, British capture, 363
 Pys, Germans abandon, 359

R

Rathenau, Herr Walter, exploitation of Belgium and other occupied territories, 457, 458
 Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, mentioned in dispatches, 380
Renaudin, French destroyer, sunk by Austrian submarine, 47
 Reprisals, German treatment of prisoners, 251
Re Umberto, Italian vessel, sunk, 331
 Revel, Vice-Admiral Count Thaon di, succeeds Duke of Abruzzi as Commander-in-Chief of Italian Navy, 314
 Rhondda, Lord, succeeds Lord Devonport as Food Controller, 442

Rimnic Sarat: Battle of, 126-128
 Rocquigny-Bapaume-Ablainzeville line, Germans fall back on, 368
 Ronarc'h, Admiral, at the Yser, 72, 73
 Rouyer, Rear-Admiral, in command of French Fleet in the Channel, 42
 Roye: British position extended to, 363; French enter, 370
 Rufiji River, Germans driven into district of, 114
 Rumania: corn supplies imported into Germany and Austria, 141; formation of National Government, 147, 148; Government transferred to Jassy, 146; harvest bought by British Government, 142; oil and corn destroyed, 142; political events in, 143-152
 Rumania, King of, on Rumania's policy, 146
 Rumanian Army, reorganization of the, 140, 141
 Rumanian Campaign of 1916: III., The Last Phase, 117-152; lull in operations during winter, 138-140; Russians annihilate Bulgarian battalion in Danube Delta, 137, 138; Russo-Rumanian retreat to the Sereth, 119-133
 Rupel, Fort, Greek surrender of, 24
Russell, British battleship, sunk in the Mediterranean, 65
 Russian Army, lands in Salonika, 26
 Russian Prisoners of War Committee, formation of, 261

S

Sailly-Saillisel Ridge, British take Hill 153, 355
 St. Pierre-Vaast Wood, Germans abandon, 369
 St. Quentin, Allied advance on, 376; Canal, French cross, 374
 Sakharoff, General, in command of Allied Forces in the Dobrudja, 118, 130
 Salaita Hill, British bombard, 87
 Salonika: air raids on, 13, 20, 21; Anglo-French contingents land, 3; conditions and life in, 17-19; history of, 10-12
 Salonika Expedition: October, 1915, to November, 1916, 1-40; Allies' defensive lines, 12-15; French Navy in, 63-66; landing of Italians and Russians, 26; opening of Allied offensive, 26; withdrawal of Allied troops into Greek territory, 7-9; work of 10th Division, 7
 Sanna-i-yat position, British failure at, 406-408; last British assault on, 406-413
 Sarrail, General: in command of Allied Armies in Macedonia, 14; in Salonika, 3, 26;

arrests enemy Consuls in Salonika, 13
 Schmettow, General Count, in Rumania, 118, 131
 Schnee, Dr., carries on civil administration in German East Africa, 78, 81
 Selous, Captain F. C., D.S.O., in East Africa, 104
 Sénès, Rear-Admiral, in command of the *Léon Gambetta* when sunk, 45, 46
 Sensée, British line extended on the, 379
 Serbia: Bulgarization of occupied parts of, 23; over-running of, 3; Serbian entry into Serbian villages, 34
 Serbia, Prince Regent Alexander, arrives in Salonika, 26
 Serbian Army: objections to transport across Greece, 23; reorganization at Corfu, 23; transport of, 309, 334
 Sereth line: description and strategical value of, 119, 133; German advance on Lower Sereth, 131, 133; Russo-Rumanian retreat to River, 119-133
 Serre, Germans abandon, 359
Shark, British torpedo boat destroyer, crew awarded the D.S.O., 184
 Sheikh Saad: British advance on, 385; Battle of, 387
 Sheppard, Brig.-General S. H., in command of 1st East African Brigade, 91-94, 112
 Sinn Afar, British failure to take, 410, 411
 Skoplje (Uskub), Allied efforts to reach, 3
 Skouloudis, M., resignation of, 25
 Smuts, Lieut.-General J. C., in command in East Africa, 77; adopts General Tighe's plans, 84-86; dispatches quoted, 88, 89, 92; moves headquarters to Moshi, 94; plans to take Pare and Usambara regions, 102; reorganizes East African Army, 94; on future Constitution of the Empire, 304; visit to England, 304
 Soissons, French advance north of, 375
 Somme: Battle of the, German explanations of, 346; bridging at Brie by British, 370, 371; German retreat from Arras to Soissons, 369
 Somme Canal, French cross, 375
 South Africa: Election (1915), 289-291; politics in, 289-291
 Soveia, enemy defeat in the region of, 136
 Starkov Grob line, Bulgars evacuate, 34
 Stewart, Maj.-General J. M., in command of 1st East African Division, 78, 84, 91; resigns command, 91
 Struma, River: British take over line of, 25; fighting on the, 27, 30

Sturdee, Sir Doveton, on work of Naval engineers in Falkland Islands action, 228

Submarines: Australian, *AE2* sunk, 53; Austrian, destroyed by Italians, 343; *U3* sunk by the *Bisson*, 47; *U3* and *U4* sunk in the Adriatic, 317; *U5* sinks *Léon Gambetta*, 45; *U12* sunk by Italian submarine, 320; *UC12* sunk whilst mine-laying in Adriatic, 325, 327; French, *Bernouilli* sinks Austrian destroyer, 47; *Coulomb*, exploit of the, 51-53; *Curie* captured at Pola, 45; *Foucault* sunk in the Adriatic, 47; *Joule* sunk, 51, 53; *Mariotte* sunk, 53; *Papin*, exploits of, 47; *Saphir* sunk, 54; *Turquoise* sunk, 53, 54

Suffren, French flagship, damaged at the Dardanelles, 55; sunk, 66

Surprise, French gunboat, shells coast positions at Compo and Kribili, 68

T

Tabora, Belgian progress in and occupation of, 108, 116

Tanga, British occupy, 107

Taveta: British advance on and take, 86, 88; Germans evacuate, 87

Taylor, Dr., on insufficient food in German camps, 243

Teherna River, fighting on, 35-39

Thiepval-Morval Ridge, German boasts of strength of, 359

Tighe, Maj.-General Sir Michael, in command in British East Africa, 78, 83, 87-89; General Smuts's sanction to plans, 84-86

Tilloy, British take, 363

Todoroff, General, in command of Bulgarian troops on the Vardar, 25

Tombeur, General, in command of Belgian Forces in German East Africa, 77, 114

Townshend, General: at Kut, 381, 382; reports discovery of food in Kut, 389; taken prisoner, 414; appeal to troops in Kut quoted, 390

Transylvania, attitude of Rumanian population, 150, 151

Trieste, Gulf of, Italian and British Naval cooperation in, 339

Triglar, Austrian destroyer, sunk off Durazzo, 333

Trotus line, attack against the, 136

Trotus Valley, description and position of, 135

Tulcea, Bulgar-German forces enter, 125

Tully, Pte., prisoner of war in Germany, ease of, 240

Turline, Italian destroyer, lost, 328

Turbines: general adoption in the British Navy, 208-210;

problems of gearing, etc., 211-216

Turbinia, British torpedo boat, fitted with Parsons turbine, 203

Typbus in German prison camps, 234-236

U

Uluguru Mountains, Germans driven from the, 114

Umm el Hanna: British carry positions, 404; Turkish success at, 388, 389

Usambara Region, description of, 102

Uskub (Skoplje), Allied efforts to reach, 3

V

Vacareni, Battle of, 130

Valona, occupied by Italians as naval base, 307, 331

Van Deventer, Maj.-Gen. J. L., Commander of Second Division of East African Army, 94; advance on Dodoma, 108, on Kahe, 91; in Kilimanjaro operations, 84; occupies Moshi, 89, Mpapua, 112; takes Kondoia Irangi, 99, 101, Taveta, 88

Vardar Sector, French defence of, 25

Veles, Anglo-French advance on, 5

Venizelos, M.: proclaims General Mobilization in Greece, 2, and Provisional Government, 30; resignation of, 3; speech adjuring the King to defend Greece quoted, 28

Viale, Adm., appointed Italian Minister of Marine, 313, resignation, 314

Victoria Crosses of the War, II., 153-192; list, 190, 192; Addison, Rev. W. R. F., 165; Adlam, Temp. 2nd Lieut. T. E., 175; Allen, Capt. W. B., 170; Barber, Pte. E., 155; Batten-Pooll, Lieut. A. H., 157; Baxter, 2nd Lieut. E. F., 166; Bell, 2nd Lieut. D. S., 163; Bell, Capt. E. N. F., 166; Bennett, Temp. 2nd Lieut. E. P., 179; Bingham, Comm. the Hon. E. B. S., 184; Blackburn, 2nd Lieut. A. S., 159; Bloomfield, Capt. W. A., 179, 180; Boulter, Sgt. W. E., 172, 173; Bradford, Lieut.-Col. R. B., 174, 175; Bromley, Capt., 184; Buchanan, Capt. A. B., 165, 166; Campbell, Comm. G., 186; Campbell, Lieut.-Col. J. V., 168; Carter, Sgt.-Maj. N. V., 164; Carton de Wiart, Capt. A., 159; Castleton, Sgt. C. C., 165; Cates, 2nd Lieut. G. E., 186; Cather, Temp. Lieut. G. St. G. S., 164; Chafer, Pte. G. W., 156; Chavasse, Capt. N. G., 168, 170;

Clarke, Pte. Leo, 171, 172; Congreve, Maj. W. La T., 168, 169; Cooke, Pte. T., 164; Cornwell, Boy Jack, 155, 189; Coury, 2nd Lieut. G. G., 171; Cowley, Lieut.-Comm. C. H., 181, 182; Cunningham, Pte. J., 180; Davies, Cpl. J. R., 192; Downie, Sgt. R., 175, 177; Drake, Cpl. A., 155; Edwards, Pte. F. J., 176; Erskine, Act.-Sgt. John, 156, 190; Faulds, Pte. W. F., 161, 163; Firman, Lieut. H. O. B., 181, 182; Freyberg, Capt. B. C., 177, 178; Fynn, Pte. J. H., 165, 190; Gallipoli landing awards, 184-186; Gill, Sgt. A., 170, 171; Green, Capt. J., 155; Grimshaw, Sgt. J., 185; Hackett, Sapper W., 155; Harvey, Maj. F. J. W., 184; Hill, Pte. A., 167, 168; Holland, Lieut. J. V., 174; Hughes, Pte. T., 172; Hutchinson, Pte. J., 159, 160; Jackson, Pte. W., 161-163; Jones, Sgt. David, 171; Jones, Comm. Loftus W., 153, 182-184; Jones, Lieut. R. B. B., 157, 158; Jones, Pte. T. A. ("Todger"), 168, 173, 174; Jutland Bank Battle awards, 182-184; Kelly, Temp. 2nd Lieut. H., 175; Keneally, Pte. W., 184; Kerr, Pte. J. C., 174; Khan, Naik Shabamad, 168; Lauder, Pte. D. R., 180; Leak, Pte. J., 159, 160; Lewis, Pte. H. W., 178, 179; Liddell, Capt. J. A., 155; Loudoun-Shand, Maj. S. W., 163; McFadzean, Pte. W. F., 164, 165; Mc Ness, Lee.-Sgt., 172; Miller, Pte. J., 164; Mott, Sgt. E. J., 187; Mottershead, Sgt. T., 182; Murray, Capt. H. W., 187; Myles, 2nd Lieut. E. K., 165; O'Meara, Pte. Martin, 161, 163; Palmer, 2nd Lieut. F. W., 181; Proctor, Pte. A. H., 156; Quigg, Pte. R., 161, 162; Rees, Capt. L. W. B., 157, 158; Richards, Sgt. A., 184; Ritchie, Drummer W., 159; Robinson, Lieut. W. L., 189; Ryder, Pte. R., 176, 177; Sanders, Cpl. G., 159, 160; Short, Pte. W., 163, 164; Stringer, Pte. G., 157; Stubbs, Sgt. F. E., 184, 185; Turnbull, Sgt. J. Y., 176, 177; Turner, 2nd Lieut. A. B., 155; Turrall, Pte. T. G., 161, 162; Vallentin, Capt. J. F., 155; Veale, Pte. T. W. H., 161, 162; Walford, Capt. G. N., 155; Ware, Cpl. S. W., 165; Warner, Pte. E., 175; White, Capt. A. C. T., 171; Wilkinson, Lieut. T. O. L., 166; Williams, W. C., A.B., 155; Willis, Capt. R. R., 184; Wright, Capt. T., 155

Vincent - Bingley Commission, Report on Mesopotamia quoted, 392, 394, 396, 397

W

"Wadi" position, Battle at (January 13, 1916), 387, 388
 Wable, Maj.-Gen. von, in command of German troops at Tabora, 83
 Wami River, Germans fall back on the, 111, 112
 Ward, Sir Joseph, resolution at Imperial Conference (1911), 275
 War Government of the British Peoples, The, 269-304
 Wedgwood, minority report on Mesopotamia quoted, 416
 Wenzil, Dr., Staff Doctor at Gardelegen Camp, 233; death, 234
 Western Front: British position at beginning of 1917, 346,

347; British raids during January and February, 1917, 349-358, 361-364; French raids (February, 1917), 356, 357, 365-368; Hindenburg line, German retirement to the, 369; "Hindenburg" retreat (January-April, 1917), 345, 380; British captures during February, 1917, 363, destruction and looting during the, 360, 372, 373, German strategy, 361

Whitehead, Surg.-Gen. H. R., in command of R.A.M.C. in Salonika expedition, 31

Wilhelmstal, British occupy, 103

Winckler, Gen. von, in command of Austro-German troops on the Vardar, 25

Wittenberg Camp, treatment of prisoners in, 230-232

Women, War services of, 422, 423

Y

Younghusband, Maj.-Gen., in command of 7th Division of the "Tigris Corps," 383; at Battle of Sheikh Saad, 387

Yser, Battle of, French Marines in, 71

Z

Zainis, M., appointed Greek Premier, 325; resignation of, 30

Zanzibar, Government place steamers at disposal of General Smuts, 105

Zeffiro, Italian warship, raids by, 317, 318

Zenta, Austrian cruiser, destroyed off Antivari, 44

Zeppelin, LZ85 brought down at Salonika, 21

Zimvrakakis, Col., leader of the Greek revolution, 29

ILLUSTRATIONS IN VOLUME XII.

PLACES.

	PAGE		PAGE		PAGE
Amara	402, 403	Holzminden	469, 470	Ottawa	273
<i>Amiral Charner</i>	44	<i>Indomito</i>	312	Pclagosa	308
Aucona	330	<i>Julnar</i>	396, 414	Péronne	374
Bapaume	375	<i>Jupiter</i>	214	Ploeshti	143
<i>Benedetto Brin</i>	313	Kahe Bridge, Pangani River	92	Pola	44, 309
Blankenburg War Prison	238	Kaymakchalan, Mount	34	Pretoria	290
<i>Bouvet</i>	55, 57	Keighley	437	<i>Provence</i>	74
Braila	131	Kilimanjaro	87	Pys... ..	357
Brindisi	327	Kilossa	82	Rimnic Sarat	130
Bukarest	121	Kissaki, Uluguru Mountains	114	Roye	371
Buzeu	122	Kovil, Mount	25	Sailly-Saillisel	354
Buzeu River Valley	123	Kut	386, 395	Salonika ... 6, 10, 14, 16, 21, 27	
Capetown	290	Langansalza Camp	234, 235, 237, 263	Sanna-i-yat	406
Cattaro	45	Lassigny	369	Santa Quaranta	332
Chaulnes	370	<i>Latouche-Tréville</i>	59	Sebenico	344
<i>Condé</i>	68	<i>Lemnos</i>	335	Serre	359
Corfu	64	<i>Léon Gambetta</i>	46	Sheikh Saad	385, 391, 405
Coucy Château	360	Le Sars	378	Soltau Camp	467, 468
Dakawa, Wami River	113	Lissa	316	<i>Suffren</i>	48
<i>Danton</i>	66	London, Caledonian Road	448	Suliman Pâk	382
Dartmouth, Britannia Royal Naval College	228	London, Royal Exchange	440	Sydney	283
Demirhissar, Viaduct over Struma	13	London, Tower Hill	449	Tanga Harbour	108
<i>Devastation</i>	194	Lord's Cricket Ground	429	Taranto	338
Döberitz	248, 254, 266	Macin	128	Tehrana River	7
Duntroon Military College, Canberra	295	Mar Piccolo	332	Teltow, Berlin	243
Durazzo	337	<i>Marseillaise</i>	42	Tilloy	365
Epsom	421, 427	Melbourne	277, 284	Toulon	67
Es Sinn	400	Mikotsheni Bridge, Pangani River	105	Trieste	307
Faurei Railway Station	133	Minden Camp	236	Tuleea	125
Fjume	322	Miramont-le-Grand	362	<i>Turbinia</i>	207
<i>Foca</i>	320	Monastir	39	Umm el Hanna	388
Frankfort	250	Monfaleone	339	Valona	342
<i>Gaulois</i>	54, 56	Münster Camp	466	Vardar Valley	5
Glasgow	431	Nesle	373	Venice	324
<i>Gloire</i>	43	New Mosli	80	<i>Viper</i>	209
Gommeourt	363			<i>Waldeck-Rousseau</i>	49, 53
Gütersloh Camp	476			Wellington, New Zealand	293
				Wytshaete	349

PORTRAITS.

	PAGE		PAGE		PAGE
Agha Khan, The ...	278	George V., H.M. King ...	183	Newton, Lord ...	249
Aylmer, Lieut.-Gen. Sir		Grauard, Lord ...	30		
F. J. ...	383	Griffiths, Col. Norton ...	142	Oram, Vice-Adm. Sir H. J.	195
		Guépratte, Adm. ...	50		
Balfourier, Gen. ...	76			Parsons, The Hon. Sir C. A.	211
Benekendorff, The Countess	262	Hamilton, Lord George ...	415	Pearce, Mr. G. F....	297
Berrangé, Brig.-Gen. C.		Hannington, Brig.-Gen.		Pope, Sir J. ...	278
A. L. ...	96	J. A. ...	103	Pretorius, Capt. ...	100
Beves, Brig.-Gen. P. S. ...	107	Hareourt, Lord ...	274	Princee, Capt. ...	100
Biard, Capt. ...	54	Hazen, Mr. J. D. ...	286		
Bikanir, The Maharajah of	278,	Holman, Mr. W. A. ...	282	Revel, Vice-Adm. Count	
279, 292, 299, 303		Huene, Gen. von ...	460	Thaon di ...	314
Borden, Sir R. ...	272, 287, 288,	Hughes, Mr. W. M. ...	294	Ronare'h. Adm. ...	75
	289, 292	Hymans, M. Paul ...	454	Roreto, Gen. Petitti di ...	26
Botha, Gen. ...	109, 278, 291			Rumania, King Ferdinand	
Bulkeley, Mrs. Rivers ...	259	Imperial Conference of 1907	270	of ...	147
		Imperial War Cabinet and			
		Conference, 1917 ...	280	Sarrail, Gen. ...	2
Carp, M. Peter ...	146			Selous, Capt. ...	106
Carter, Maj. R. M. ...	394	Jameson, Sir Starr ...	257	Sheppard, Brig.-Gen. S. H.	93
Collyer, Brig.-Gen. J. J. ...	81, 96			Sinha, Sir Satyendra Pras-	
Conference in London of		Keary, Maj.-Gen. H. d'U. ...	383	anna ...	299
Dominion M.P.'s, July		Kemball, Maj.-Gen. G. V. ...	401	Skouloudis, M. ...	9
1916 ...	300	Khristodhoulou, Col. ...	29	Smethurst, Alderman ...	302
Cook, Mr. J. ...	276	Kövess, Gen. von... ...	118	Smuts, Lieut.-Gen. J. C. ...	79, 81,
Cordonnier, Gen. ...	26			95, 109, 292, 299, 302, 303	
Cornwell, John Travers,		Lacaze, Adm. ...	43	Straussenberg, Gen. Arz	
V.C. ...	191	Lake, Lieut.-Gen. Sir Percy	390	von ...	118
Corsi, Vice-Adm. ...	315	Laurier, Sir W. ...	275		
Crewe, Earl of ...	278	Long, Mr. W. ...	301, 302	Tufnell, Mrs. Hugh ...	259
Cutinelli, Adm. ...	316	Lyautey, Gen. ...	73, 76		
				Van Deventer, Maj.-Gen. ...	89, 100
Darley Livingstone, Mrs.	258	Mary, H.M. Queen ...	183	Viale, Adm. ...	315
de la Panouse, The Vis-		McCabe, Sir D. ...	302	V.C.'s ...	154-156, 158-166, 168-
countess ...	258	Mahon, Gen. ...	2	182, 184-188	
Devonshire, Duke of ...	278	Marghiloman, M. Alexander	146	Villarey, Capt. di... ...	342
Donoughmore, Lord ...	415	Marzolo, Adm. ...	316		
du Fournet, Adm. Dartige	47	Massey, Mr. ...	296	Wakefield, Lord Mayor ...	296
Durston, Vice-Adm. Sir		Mereier, Cardinal ...	472	Ward, Sir Joseph... ...	275, 278
A. J. ...	194	Meston, Sir J. ...	299	White, Sir W. T. ...	301
		Millo, Rear-Adm. Enrico... ...	313		
Falkenhauseu, Gen. von... ...	478	Milne, Lieut.-Gen. G. F. ...	25	Younger, Mr. Justice ...	230
Fisher, Mr. A. ...	285	Minto, Earl of ...	278		
Foster, Sir G. E. ...	294	Monro, Gen. Sir C. C. ...	11	Zäimis, M.... ...	3
Fournier, Adm. ...	50	Morris, Sir E. ...	278, 297, 299	Zimvrakakis, Gen. ...	30
Fynn, Pte., V.C. ...	167			Zwehl, Gen. von ...	460

MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.

	PAGE		PAGE		PAGE
Adriatic Shores ...	306	Engineering, Various ...	195-204,	Moldavia, Campaign in ...	120
Albania, Italian Operations		206, 208, 210, 212, 213,		Monastir, Operations near	32
in ...	20	215-217, 220-224			
				Pola ...	306
Balkan War Area ...	4	"Hindenburg" Retreat,		Taranto ...	306
		Jan.-April, 1917 ...	348	Trieste, Gulf of ...	340
Central Railway, German				Venice, Gulf of ...	324
East Africa ...	98	Kifimanjaro Campaign ...	86		
		Kut and River Tigris ...	398	Wittenberg Camp ...	231
Danube Delta ...	124	Mesopotamia ...	384		

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